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ANNUAL ENVIRONMENTAL CASE LAW UPDATE
BY: Lesly A.R. Davis!
Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP
Taylor Scott Building
311 West Main Street
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
(502) 223-2104
A. CERCLA
1. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 125 S.Ct. 577 (2004).
On December 13,2004, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision
which alters the conventional understanding of how CERCLA applies to private
cost recovery actions. Cooper Industries, Inc. owned four Texas properties until
1981 when it sold them to Aviall Services, Inc. After operating the sites for
several years, Aviall discovered that both it and Cooper had contaminated the sites
and that hazardous substances had leaked into the soil and groundwater. Aviall
notified the state of the contamination, but neither the state nor the U.S.
government took judicial or administrative measures to compel cleanup. Aviall
cleaned up the properties under the state's supervision and sold them to a third
party. Aviall remained contractually responsible for $5 million or more in
cleanup costs. Aviall filed an action against Cooper to recover costs. The original
complaint asserted, among others, a claim for cost recovery under CERCLA
§107(a) and a separate claim for contribution under §113(£)(1). Aviall later
amended the complaint to combine its two CERCLA claims into a single joint
claim that, pursuant to §113(£)(1), sought contribution from Cooper as a
potentially responsible party ("PRP") under §107(a). The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of Cooper holding that Aviall had abandoned its §107
claim and that contribution under §113(£)(1) was unavailable because Aviall had
not been sued under §106 or §107. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme
Court held that a private party is not permitted to bring a cost recovery action
under §113(£)(1) ofCERCLA unless U.S. EPA or a state has taken action against
it under §§106 or 107 of CERCLA or has entered into an administrative
settlement with the United States. The Supreme Court left two very significant
questions unanswered: (1) whether a private party who voluntarily complies with
a §106 order can seek contribution under §113(£)(1); and (2) whether a private
party who voluntarily incurs costs can recover under §107(a)(1). This decision
will have a profound impact on how future environmental cost recovery actions
are handled.
1 The author expresses her appreciation to Jeff Baird of Wyatt, Tarrant, & Combs for his
assistance in the preparation of this outline.
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2. United States v. Gurley, 384 F.3d 316 (6th Cir. 2004).
The Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court's imposition of a $1.9 million
penalty upon an individual for failure to respond adequately to an U.S. EPA
CERCLA §104(e) information request. The information request was issued in
connection with an investigation of a former landfill. Gurley was the president
and majority stockholder of the company that had disposed of oil waste at the
landfill. In affirming the district court's decision, the Sixth Circuit noted the
authority of U.S. EPA to issue information requests pursuant to §104(e) of
CERCLA and to impose liability for unreasonably failing to satisfy a properly
issued request for information. The Court rejected Gurley's claim that imposition
of civil penalties violated the excessive fines and due process clauses of the
United States Constitution and that §104(e) violates the Fifth Amendment. In
doing so, the Court distinguished Tennessee Valley Authority v. Whitman, 336
F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003), an Eleventh Circuit decision, on the grounds that
Defendant had a full and fair hearing before a federal judge. The Court also
rejected Defendant's argument that the information sought had already been
provided in a deposition and that the information request was no longer useful.
3. GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 390 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2004).
During the 1960s, GenCorp manufactured urethane foam at a plant in
Ashtabula, Ohio. A component of the production process is toluene di-isocyanate
("TDI"). Olin Corp. developed a process for producing TDI involving highly
toxic chemicals. In 1962, Olin and GenCorp reached an agreement under which
Olin would build and operate a plant for manufacturing the chemical. The plant
was built on land owned by GenCorp. Under the agreement, GenCorp would
purchase 50% of the TDI's plant output. Olin initially held title to the plant but at
a later date it was contemplated that Olin would "sell, convey and transfer" title to
GenCorp. Engineering specifications for the plant were subject to approval of
both GenCorp and Olin. Olin agreed not to make any capital expenditures
without GenCorp's approval. Ultimately, GenCorp did not buy the plant. Olin
instead bought out GenCorp's interests in the early 1970's. Once the plant
became operational, Olin's plant manager hired a waste hauler to dispose of waste
at the Big D Disposal site. During the plant's operation, a joint committee
addressed the issue of waste disposal, including approving waste hauling costs,
and a GenCorp committee member visited the Big D site more than once. In
1983, U.S. EPA listed the Big D site on the Superfund NPL and in 1990 an
unilateral administrative order was issued requiring Olin to clean up the site.
GenCorp filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that it was not liable
for Superfund cleanup costs. Olin's counterclaim sought a declaration that
GenCorp was jointly and severally liable for response costs or for contribution
under CERCLA §113. The trial court found GenCorp liable as an "arranger".
GenCorp appealed arguing it did not actively participate in arranging for the waste
disposal at Big D, nor did it "own or possess" the hazardous waste. The Sixth
Circuit found that a party need not actively participate in the disposal of hazardous
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waste to be held liable as an "arranger" for disposal. According to the Court,
constructive ownership or possession of a hazardous waste is sufficient to hold a
party liable as an "arranger" for disposal. GenCorp was liable as an "arranger"
even though it never held title to the facility. GenCorp put up half of the
construction costs and maintained an option to buy the plant. The Court stressed
that the two companies had equal representation on the committee that oversaw
construction, operation, and management of the plant, including waste disposal.
4. Ford Motor Company v. United States, 378 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
The Court found that the United States must indemnify a World War II
contractor for contamination at a bomber plant under a contractual agreement
requiring the government to pay for damages to property from all claims,
including those "which are not now known." In this case, Plaintiff manufacturer
Ford Motor Company brought suit against the United States for breach of contract
and sought compensation for the costs of environmental cleanup. During World
War II, Plaintiff and the United States Army Air Force entered into a contract to
manufacture bomber planes. Decades later, the Michigan regulatory authority and
U.S. EPA notified Plaintiff and others of certain environmental damage
obligations under CERCLA, including cleanup of chemical waste from the war
contract operations. All of the charged entities entered into a consent judgment of
liability. Plaintiff was assigned approximately 9% of the total cleanup costs. The
government denied Plaintiffs request for reimbursement. The Court held in favor
of Plaintiff finding that the claim for reimbursement of CERCLA costs is defeated
neither by the Anti-Deficiency Act nor the fact that CERCLA was not foreseen at
the time of the indemnification agreement.
5. E.I. DuPont De Nemours v. United States, 365 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., Inc. ("DuPont") brought a Contracts
Disputes Act action to recover costs incurred pursuant to CERCLA for an
ordinance plant it built and operated for the government during World War II. On
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the United States Court of
Federal Claims entered judgment for the government. The reviewing Court held
that the trial court correctly found that the government had agreed to indemnify
DuPont for the costs at issue. The trial court erred, however, in concluding that a
predecessor to the Anti-Deficiency Act ("ADA"), current version at 31 U.S.C.
§1341 (2000), bars DuPont's recovery. DuPont's contract with the military, which
contained an indemnification provision, was authorized by the Contract
Settlement Act, 41 U.S.C. §101, and thus comes under an exception to the ADA.
As a result, the Court reversed the judgment in favor of the government and
remanded for a determination of damages and entry of judgment in favor of
DuPont.
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6. United States v. JO-24, Inc., et aI., 309 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.P.R. 2004).
Defendants filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff United States asserting
that while involved in a removal action on their property, U.S. EPA caused more
than $20 million in damages. Defendants asserted that they suffered money
damages for property losses that resulted from the alleged negligent actions of
U.S. EPA while it was purportedly in possession of the JO site during the removal
action. These included losses to real estate property, marketable goods and
equipment losses. In finding that U.S. EPA may not be sued for damages to
property during a CERCLA response action to clean up property containing drums
of chemicals, the Court found that CERCLA does not provide a cause of action
for liability against U.S. EPA for alleged tortious behavior while undertaking a
removal action, that Fed. R. Civ. P. B(d) does not extend the right of a party to
sue the U.S. beyond the limits established by statute, and that U.S. EPA's clean up
actions fall within the discretionary function exemption to the Federal Torts Claim
Act.
7. United States v. E. 1. DuPont De Nemours, et aI., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16366 (Del. 2004); 59 ERC (BNA) 1472.
Plaintiff United States filed an action pursuant to §107(a) of CERCLA to
recover costs from Defendants DuPont and its successor. The United States
alleged to have incurred the costs when responding to the release or threatened
release of hazardous substances at a factory site run by the companies. The parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Court citing Third Circuit
precedent, denied the government's claim for remedial design oversight costs (See
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d. Cir. 1993). Relying upon
Rohm & Haas, the Court also concluded that the government may not recover
costs incurred in the oversight of a private parties' remedial activities, and that the
government's litigation costs in pursuing non-recoverable costs are not
recoverable costs. There is a fundamental unfairness if a prevailing party is forced
to pay for the government's efforts to reverse existing precedent. Finally, the
Court held that the government may recover interest only for those expenditures
that a demand letter asserts with specificity.
B. TOXIC TORTS
1. Olden, et al. v. LaFarge Corp.} 383 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 2004).
A class of 3,600 persons who owned single-family residences in Alpena,
Michigan alleged, among others, personal and property damages caused by toxic
pollutants originating from a cement manufacturing plant owned by Defendant
LaFarge Corporation. The district court granted in part and denied in part
Defendant's motion to dismiss and granted Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class
action. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit was called upon to decide whether Plaintiffs'
class action against the nation's largest cement plant was valid and decide for the
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first time in the Sixth Circuit whether Zahn v. International Paper Company, 414
U.S. 291 (1973), was overruled by 28 U.S.C. §1367. The Sixth Circuit held that
Plaintiffs may aggregate their claims for purposes of meeting the jurisdictional
amount. The Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
certifying the class and that the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Zahn was
overruled by Congress in the 1990 Judicial Improvements Act. Thus, each
Plaintiff need not show that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00.
2. Kennedy Building Associates v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 2004).
Viacom, Inc., the corporate successor to Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, appealed a judgment entered against it for damages and injunctive
relief and awards of attorneys' fees and prejudgment interest in this suit arising
out of Westinghouse's environmental contamination of a site it once owned in
Minneapolis. Kennedy Building Associates ("Kennedy"), the present owner of
the contaminated property, obtained a jury verdict for compensatory damages and
$5 million dollars in punitive damages on its common law claim for strict
liability. The district court awarded Kennedy, among other relief, response costs
which it had incurred under CERCLA and the Minnesota counterpart thereto. The
district court also declared Viacom liable for any response costs Kennedy should
incur in the future. The court also issued an injunction under the Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act ("MERA") requiring Viacom to clean up the
contamination at the site. Viacom appealed everything except the CERCLA and
MERA relief, arguing that the strict liability award was not permissible under
Minnesota common law; and that the strict liability claim could not support an
award of punitive damages. Upon review, the Court, among other action,
reversed as to the common law strict liability claim and the punitive damages
award. In overturning the jury verdict for $5 million dollars in punitive damages
against the prior owner for causing PCB contamination, the Court found that the
strict liability principles of Rylands v. Fletcher, L R 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (an English
case) apply to activities that escape the property but do not apply to harm on
Defendant's own property caused by a predecessor in title. The owner may be
entitled to compensatory damages under other state laws.
3. AJ&K Operating Company, Inc., et aI. v. Smith, et aI., 355 Ark. 510 (2004).
Landowners filed a complaint alleging that certain oil companies, which
leased the landowners' land for production of oil, caused property damages and
contamination. The landowners obtained a temporary restraining order from the
circuit court preventing AJ&K Operating Co., Inc., (the "Oil Companies") from
entering upon and remediating the land. The Oil Companies appealed asserting,
among other things, that there was no irreparable harm to support the injunctive
relief. The Court stated that in order for there to be irreparable harm sufficient to
support a temporary restraining order, the harm must be to a degree that it cannot
adequately be remedied by monetary damages or in a court of law. The primary
objective of the Landowners in seeking the restraining order was to prevent the
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Oil Companies from "covering up" evidence of property contamination while
remediation activities were being conducted. The Court could find no case law
prohibiting remediation by contaminators where an injunction was issued. In fact,
the Court believed that if the restraining order stood, it could possibly lead to
continuing contamination and worsening conditions. The contention that
remediation would destroy evidence did not constitute irreparable harm. The
circuit court was ordered to modify the temporary restraining order to permit the
Oil Companies to clean up and remediate the land.
C. ENERGY
1. The Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, et ai. v. Nielson, et aI.. 376
F.3d 1223 (lOth Cir. 2004)
Defendants, Utah's Governor, Attorney General and environmental and
transportation officials, appealed a U.S. District Court for the District of Utah
ruling in favor of Plaintiffs, a consortium of utility companies and an Indian tribe.
The district court found that Utah's statutes regulating the storage and
transportation of spent nuclear fuel were preempted by federal law. The
consortium entered into a lease with the Indian tribe for the purpose of building a
spent nuclear fuel facility. Plaintiffs submitted a license application to the federal
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), and the Utah officials intervened
arguing that the NRC lacked authority to license the facility. The NRC rejected
that argument stating that "Congress, in enacting the Atomic Energy Act, gave the
NRC authority to license privately owned, away-from-reactor facilities ... ". The
Tenth Circuit found that Utah statutes regulating the storage and transportation of
spent nuclear fuel are pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act.
2. Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 373
F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
Petitioners, the State of Nevada, local committees, the nuclear energy
industry and other groups, filed a challenge to the statutory and regulatory scheme
devised by U.S. EPA, the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to establish and govern a Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated the regulations
insofar as they included a ten thousand year compliance period. According to the
Court, the 10,000 year radiation protection standard violated the Energy Policy
Act because it was not consistent with the findings and recommendations of the
National Academy of Sciences. The Court, however, held that the congressional
resolution selecting Yucca Mountain was an appropriate exercise of Congress'
authority over federal property and that Department of Energy's and the
President's actions leading to the selection of the site were unreviewable.
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D. AIR QUALITY
1. Engine Manufacturers Association, et aI. v. South Coast Air Quality
Management District, et aI., 541 U.S. 246 (2004).
In this United States Supreme Court case, Petitioner associations sued
Respondents California South Coast Air Quality Management District and its
officials, claiming that §209 (42 U.S.C.S. §7543) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA")
(42 U.S.C.S. §7401 et seq.), pre-empted six local vehicle fleet rules. The district
court granted summary judgment upholding the rules in their entirety. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and vacated and remanded the case. The rules
at issue required the use of either alternative-fuel vehicles or those that met
stringent emissions standards promulgated by the state. Section 209(a) of the
CAA preempts state and local standards "relating to the control of emissions" of
covered vehicles as well as any state and local requirements "relating to the
control of emissions" as a prerequisite to "the initial sale, titling (if any), or
registration" of such vehicles. The lower courts agreed that this provision covered
only requirements applicable to vehicle manufacturers but not those directed to
purchasers or lessees. The Supreme Court concluded that this reading of §209(a)
ignored the distinction between the definition of a standard and the method for
enforcing a standard. Standards apply to vehicles, but enforcement could target
either manufacturers or buyers. The Court concluded that the lower courts
misconstrued §209(a), and remanded the case to determine whether all or only
some of the local rules were preempted.
2. Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461
(2004).
This case concerns the authority of U.S. EPA to enforce the provisions of
the Clean Air Act's ("CAA") Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD")
program (42 U.S.C.S. §§7401 et seq., 42 U.S.C.S. §7475(a)(4)). Under that
program, no major air pollutant emitting facility may be constructed unless the
facility is equipped with "the best available control technology" ("BACT"). A
controversy arose when Cominco, with funding from the state, sought to expand
zinc production by 40%. The expansion required a permit under Alaska's state
implementation plan because the larger operation would increase nitrogen oxide
emissions. Alaska's environmental agency initially identified selective catalytic
reduction as the BACT under the CAA. The company amended its proposal and
suggested an alternative BACT known as low NOx which the state ultimately
endorsed because of selective catalytic reduction's disportionate costs. U.S. EPA
invoked its authority under the CAA and ordered Alaska not to issue a PSD
permit because the company had not adequately justified its claim of economic
infeasibility. The state and company challenged U.S. EPA's action and argued
that the federal government could not overturn the state's decision through
administrative proceedings but must seek judicial review in Alaska's courts. U.S.
A- 7
EPA argued that the CAA's definition of BACT gave it authority to review state
decisions under the PSD program. The Supreme Court held that U.S. EPA had
supervisory authority over the reasonableness of the agency's BACT
determination and that U.S. EPA properly determined that the agency's BACT
determination lacked evidentiary support. The Court also found that it would be
anomalous to require a federal agency that administers a federal statute to go to
state court to challenge a state issued permit under that statute in the absence of
explicit congressional direction. The judgment up holding U.S . EPA's stop orders
was affirmed.
3. Blue Water Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
U.S. EPA issued a final rule in 2002 establishing emissions standards for
snowmobiles and certain other "non-road" vehicles. (67 Fed. Reg. 68242 (Nov. 8,
2002)). The emissions standards at issue were promulgated under §213 of the
Clean Air Act ("CAA") (42 U.S.C. §7547 (2000)). The D.C. Circuit set aside
important elements of the snowmobile emissions standards. The Court held that
the agency had authority under the CAA to promulgate standards relating to
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons but not for nitrogen oxides. The carbon
monoxide and hydrocarbons standards, however, were remanded for U.S. EPA to
clarify the analysis and evidence upon which the standards were based.
4. Weiler, et at v. Chatham Forest Products. Inc., 370 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2004).
Appellant citizens sought review of a judgment which dismissed their
complaint for failure to state a claim under § 304(a)(3) of the Clean Air Act
("CAA") (42 U.S.C.S. §§7401-767Iq). Appellee proposed to build a strand board
manufacturing facility and the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation ("NYDEC") approved the application under the synthetic minor
source permit scheme after determining that effective and enforceable pollution
control mechanisms were in place. The citizens alleged in their complaint that the
facility was in fact a major emitting facility and that a synthetic minor source
permit was not sufficient. The Court held that a state determination that a
prospective source is not a major emitting facility does not preclude citizens from
bringing suit seeking to enjoin construction of the facility under the CAA. In
further support of its position, the Court noted that citizens playa vital role in the
enforcement of the CAA in that the citizens suit provisions of the CAA were
designed to not only "motivate government agencies", but also to make citizens
partners in the enforcement of the CAA. The Court vacated the judgment
dismissing the complaint and remanded the case.
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E. WATER QUALITY
1. South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe ofIndians,
et aI., 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
Respondents, an Indian tribe and an environmental group, sued Petitioner
South Florida Water Management District ("District") under the Clean Water Act
("CWA") (33 U.S.C.S. §§1251, et seq.) contending that a pumping facility was
required to obtain a discharge permit. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Respondents and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. The facts demonstrated that the pump station
emptied water from a canal into a water conservation area ("WCA"). Respondents
argued that the District could not operate the pump station without a point source
discharge permit under the NPDES because the pump station moved phosphorus
laden water from the canal into the WCA. The district court agreed and granted
summary judgment to Respondents and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Resolving
the issue as to whether the operation of the pump station which did not add
pollutants to the water, could constitute the "discharge of a pollutant" within the
meaning of the CWA, the Supreme Court determined that the definition of
"discharge of a pollutant" contained in 33 U.S.C.S. §1362(12) included within its
reach point sources that did not themselves generate pollutants. The Court,
however, determined that summary judgment was inappropriate because further
development of the record was necessary to resolve the dispute over whether the
canal and the WCA were distinct water bodies.
2. Ohio Valley EnvtI. Coalition, et aI. v. Bulen, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12690; 34 ELR 20048 (S.D.W.V. 2004).
Environmental groups sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"),
challenging the issuance of a general permit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
(33 U.S.C.S. §1344(e», which would allow coal mines to discharge excess spoil
material generated by mountaintop removal operations into the waters of the
United States. Under this general permit, the Corps would determine the need for
environmental mitigation on a case-by-case basis, however, no public notice or
comment period was involved after the general permit was issued. The Court held
that the general permit failed to comply with the CWA in that it defined a
procedure rather than permitting a category of activities which were determined in
advance to have minimal environmental impact as contemplated by §1344(e). A
case-by-case analysis under the general permit lacked objective requirements and
allowed only individual projects without public notice or comment. As authority
for this decision, the Court cited §1344(a), which authorizes the Corps to issue
permits only after notice and opportunity for public hearings. Petitioner's motion
for summary judgment was granted and the Corps was enjoined from approving
projects under the general permit. In subsequent proceedings, the Corps of
Engineers motion for reconsideration was denied.
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3. United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 366 F. 3d 164 (3rd Cir. 2004).
The United States filed an action against Allegheny Ludlum Corp. ("ALC"),
a steel manufacturer, alleging violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
including allegations of discharges in excess of ALC's permits and failure to
report violations. ALC filed a motion for summary judgment contending, among
others, that "laboratory error" was the cause of its reporting violations which
overstated certain pollutant levels. The district court rejected this defense as it
had not been recognized in the Third Circuit. On appeal, the Third Circuit held
that the "laboratory error" defense, where the error results in over-reporting, is a
valid defense. According to the Third Circuit, deprivation of the defense would
not advance the purpose of the CWA in that it would be grossly unfair, especially
in view of the presence of companion provisions of the CWA imposing liability
for monitoring and reporting violations. The Court also concluded that the district
court's determination of economic benefit, holding that 12.73% weighted average
cost of capital, so vastly overstated the economic benefit to ALC of its improper
discharges, that it does not "level the playing field" and that constitutes abuse of
discretion.
F. OTHER CASES
1. Ethics
Pinal Creek Group, et at v. Newmont Mining Corp., et aI., 312 F. Supp.
2d 1212 (D. Ariz. 2004).
This matter arose out of a motion of Plaintiff BHP Copper, Inc. ("BHP")
to disqualify James Norris and the firm Hydro Geo Chern as litigation
consultations in a CERCLA dispute. To resolve a motion to disqualify an expert
in cases other than where an expert has clearly switched sides the Court undertook
a two step inquiry, whether: (l) it was objectively reasonable for the moving party
to believe that it had a confidential relationship with the expert; and (2) whether
the moving party disclosed confidential information to the expert that is relevant
to the current litigation. The Court also balances competing policy objectives and
considers concerns of fundamental fairness. The Court found that both prongs of
the test were satisfied and that the expert had received confidential information
from other parties in his capacity as a consultant to a defendant's group. The
Court further' concluded that there was no waiver of confidentiality as a result of
the disclosure of the information to the defendant's group and disqualification was
required even though he was a testifying expert.
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2. NAFTA
Department of Transportation, et al. v. Public Citizen, et. aI., 541 U.S. 752
(2004).
One of the most important Supreme Court decisions in the environmental
field in 2004 involved the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration ("FMCSA") had no obligation to evaluate the environmental
effects of the operation of Mexican trucks in the United States under NAFTA. It
was held that under the circumstances presented with respect to FMCSA's
promulgation of regulations which would allow the cross-border operations by
Mexican domiciled motor carriers to occur, neither NEPA or the Clean Air Act
required FMCSA to evaluate the environmental effects of such cross-border
operations.
3. Constitutional
a. Biodiversity Associates, et al. v. Cables, 357 F. 3d 1152 (10th Cir.
2004).
Appellants, an environmental group and its chairman, sought review of a
judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The
judgment denied the Appellants' Motion for an order requiring continued
enforcement of a settlement agreement with Appellee U.S. Forest Service which
prohibited the harvesting of trees in certain areas of the Black Hills National
Forest in South Dakota. In an effort to address the dangers of insect infestation
and fire, Congress passed legislation permitting logging and other clearance
measures in the Black Hills National Forest. A rider was attached to a major
unrelated appropriations bill that required the Forest Service to take a variety of
action, including allowing logging in the Black Hills National Forest, that was
inconsistent with the settlement. The Appellants contended that the rider
unconstitutionally infringed on both the executive and judicial branches. The
Tenth Circuit found that the rider did not unconstitutionally intrude on either
executive or judicial power. The Court found that the U.S. Constitution gave
Congress the authority to regulate property belonging to the United States and that
the rider comported with the current view of executive branch officials regarding
management of the national forest.
b. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Wayne. 303 F.Supp. 2d 835
(E.D. Mich. 2004).
Plaintiffs, a solid waste management association and member company,
filed a motion for declaratory judgment alleging that a Wayne County solid waste
ordinance was unconstitutional. The ordinance prohibited county landfill
operators from accepting solid waste from jurisdictions that were not regulated by
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a beverage container deposit law similar to Michigan's beverage container law.
Plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const.
art. I, §8, cl. 3, because the ordinance discriminated against interstate and foreign
commerce by impeding the flow of non-Michigan waste into the county. The
Court agreed, holding that while the ordinance was not facially discriminatory, it
was effectively discriminatory because it specifically targeted out-of-state waste.
Citing Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich Dept. of Natural Res., 504 U.S.
353, the Court reiterated that "[W]hen a state unconstitutionally regulates the
movement of interstate commerce, it is said to violate the dormant "domestic' or
"interstate" Commerce Clause. This aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits
states from advancing their own commercial interests by curtailing the movement
of articles of commerce, either into or out of the state." In addition, the Court
cited Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly. 822 F.2d 388, stating that "[w]hen a state
unconstitutionally regulates the movement of foreign commerce, it is said to
violate the dormant "foreign" Commerce Clause. State or local laws that burden
foreign commerce are subjected to a more rigorous and searching scrutiny. This
rule serves the need of ensuring uniformity among the states in the area of foreign
trade."
4. False Claims Act
United States, ex reI. Bain v. Georgia Gulf Corp.. 386 F.3d 648 (5th Cir.
2004).
In this qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act ("FCA") (31
U.S.C.S. §7729, et seq.), Appellee Bain filed a "reverse false claims" action
against Georgia Gulf Corp., a manufacturer of polyvinyl chloride. Appellee
alleged that Georgia Gulf Corp. did not measure toxic emissions and submitted
false records to the government pertaining to those emissions thereby depriving
the government of fines and penalties. Georgia Gulf Corp. filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim which was denied. Georgia Gulf Corp.
appealed the denial. Bain argued that Georgia Gulf Corp. 's conduct supported a
reverse false claim under 31 U.S.c. § 3729(a)(7) since the emissions, if properly
measured and reported, warranted monetary assessments, and since the reports to
the government were allegedly false, the government was being deprived of such
assessments. The Court held that while there may be potential for fines and
penalties, without an actual assessment or initiating penalty proceeding there is no
obligation to pay money to the government which is required to support a claim
under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7). The Court went on to say that the emissions permit
created a regulatory relationship between Georgia Gulf Corp. and the government.
It did not create a contractual or other economic relationship where payment of
money to the government was contemplated. The order denying Georgia Gulf
Corp. 's motion to dismiss was reversed and the case was remanded for further
proceedings. An opposite result might have sparked a dramatic increase in FCA
cases.
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5. Resources
Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, et aI., 383 F.3d
1241 (lOth Cir. 2004).
Wyoming Sawmills, Inc., a logging company, claimed that a Historic
Preservation Plan ("HPP") issued by the U.S. Forest Service ("USFS") for the
management of a historic Native American landmark violated the Establishment
Clause and the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA") (l6 U.S.C.S. §1600,
et seq.). The U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming dismissed the claims
and Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. appealed. The USFS agreed to close a portion of a
forest development road which provided access to a Native American landmark.
The USFS did make an exception for access to the landmark for religious
purposes. The HPP issued by the USFS was crafted to ensure that the area was
protected as an important cultural site. Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. had been the key
purchaser of timber resources from the forest for over 30 years. In addition to
challenging the HPP, Wyoming Sawmills, Inc.'s complaint also addressed the
USFS's decision not to hold a proposed timber sale alleging economic injury.
The Court affirmed the decision of the district court and rejected the company's
claim of constitutional injury under the Establishment Clause. The Court held
that the loss of an opportunity to bid on timber contracts is not a sufficient basis to
confer standing and the company failed to allege a non-economic injury
6. Takings
a. The Stearns Co., LTD. v. United States, 53 Fed. CI. 446 (2002);
rev'd The Stearns Co., LTD. v. United States, 396 F.3d 1354 (U.S.
Fed. Cir. 2005).
The Stearns Co., LTD. ("Stearns") filed suit against the United States
seeking compensation for an unconstitutional taking pursuant to the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Stearns had retained the mineral rights to
55 square miles of what is now the Daniel Boone National Forest pursuant to a
1937 deed granting surface rights to the United States Forest Service. The Office
of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement ("OSM") was charged with
enforcing the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ("SMCRA")
(30 U.S.C.S. §1201 et~. In 1980, a lessee of Stearns sought a permit to
conduct mining operations. OSM rejected the permit application claiming that
Stearns did not have valid existing rights ("VER") to conduct mining operations
on the property. Under SMCRA, however, Steams could seek a determination as
to whether or not the proposed surface operations would be compatible with
"significant recreational, timber, economic or other values." Steams declined to
seek the compatibility determination and filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims.
The Court of Federal Claims held that the government's denial ofVER effected a
taking of the Stearns property and that just compensation was warranted under the
Fifth Amendment. The government appealed the decision to the United States
A- 13
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which reversed the Court of Federal
Claims judgment citing that: (1) at no time was Steams required to suffer the
physical occupation of either the government or third party on either the mineral
estate or the implied appurtenant easement; and (2) the issue was not ripe for
review because Steams never sought the compatibility determination from OSM
which could have allowed it to use the easement for mineral extraction. Without
such a determination by OSM, the Court of Appeals did not know whether or to
what extent OSM would have restricted the use of the property in question.
b. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 230 (2004).
Plaintiff John R. Sand & Gravel Co. leased property which included a
landfill for the purpose of stone and sand mining. Subsequently, the landfill was
listed by U.S. EPA as a superfund site and U.S. EPA began remediation. Pursuant
to a consent decree entered into between U.S. EPA and the PRPs, the U.S. EPA
issued an order prohibiting Plaintiff from using the landfill cap area. Plaintiff was
not identified by U.S. EPA as a PRP. Plaintiff filed suit alleging a takings and
that U.S. EPA physically took part of its leased property. On cross motions for
summary judgment, the Court found that the government may rely on the nuisance
exemption as a defense to the company's takings claim. The government may
show that the owner's activity violates nuisance law and therefore is not a valid
property interest.
7. RCRA
Hoosier Environmental Council, Inc., et al. v. Northern Indiana Public
Service Company, 2004 US Dist. LEXIS 10805 (2004).
Northern Indiana Public Service Company ("NIPSCO") filed a motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint filed pursuant to the citizens suit provisions of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), (§7002(a)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§6972(a)(l)(B). The complaint alleged that NIPSCO was not protecting citizens
from pollutants being introduced to well water. The motion to dismiss alleged
lack of subject matter jurisdiction (under RCRA) and failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted (under CERCLA). The Court held that the group of
residents may proceed with their citizens suit under RCRA §7002 seeking safe
well water despite a prior CERCLA §106 order requiring that other residents be
connected to a municipal water supply. CERCLA §113(h) is no bar to the suit
because the complaint does not challenge the CERCLA order and would not
necessarily delay a continuing removal action. For similar reasons, the "diligent
prosecution" provision of RCRA is not applicable.
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8. Financial Guaranty
James E. Bickford, et al. v. Lodestar Energy, Inc., et aI., 310 B.R. 70, 204
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5097 (E.D. Ky. 2004).
Appellees, including a debtor, filed an adversary proceeding to enJOIn
Appellant Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet
(the "Cabinet") from enforcing state statutory bonding requirements. The United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky determined that the
Cabinet's threatened actions would violate the automatic stay and granted
Appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Appellant's filed an appeal.
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision and remanded the
matter. In doing so, the Court recognized that while the Cabinet's bonding
requirements would provide the funds to reclaim the disturbed land if a permittee
cannot or will not do work, the sole purpose of bonding is not to cover such costs.
According to the Court, bonding serves the purpose of protecting the citizens of
the Commonwealth against dangers posed by land that is not reclaimed and
proceedings to enforce the bonding requirements are not subject to the automatic
stay.
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2004 Statutory Changes:
1. Senate Bill 222 (effective July 13, 2004) amended KRS 244.46-580 to extend the
Hazardous Waste Assessment Fee collection to June 30, 2006. The assessment on
generators remains the same at one and two-tenths cents ($0.012) per pound for liquid
waste, and two-tenths of a cent ($0.002) per pound for solid waste.
2. Senate Bill 224 (effective July 13,2004) amended KRS 224.60-142 to require registration
of tanks installed after July 15,2004, rather than July 15,2002, to be eligible to participate
in the fund and require registration of tanks currently existing to be registered by July 15,
2006, rather than July 15, 2004, prior to applying to the fund. The bill also amended KRS
224.60-145 to extend the Small Operator Assistance Program until July 15, 2008, rather
than July 15,2004.
Division of Waste Management Regulatory Changes:
1. 401 KAR 47:030. Environmental Performance Standards.
Effective: March 18, 2004
This regulation was amended to reflect Maximum Contaminant Levels consistent with 401
KAR Chapter 8 and 401 KAR 30:031.
2. 401 KAR 100:030. Remediation requirements.
Effective: March 18, 2004
This regulation was promulgated to create a framework that implements the requirements
followed in conducting environmental remediation. The standards for remediation were
promulgated along with protocols for cleanups conducted under KRS 224.01-400 and KRS
224.01-405 and the Kentucky Voluntary Environmental Remediation Act. The
administrative regulations also established Region 9 PRGs as screening values for the
program, detailed determination and use of ambient background for voluntary cleanups,
and established methods for risk based screening.
3. 401 KAR 49:011. General provisions relating to area solid waste management plans.
Effective: January 21,2005
This regulation was amended to update two forms incorporated by reference which are the
"Solid Waste Management Area Annual Report Form" and the "Guidance For Preparing an
Area Solid Waste Management Plan Five-Year Update."
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4. 401 KAR 49:080. Solid waste grant funds and solid waste collector and recycler
registration.
Effective January 21,2005.
This new regulation creates a framework for counties to follow in order to receive funding
related to HB 174 cleanups.
Division of Water Regulatory Changes:
1. 401 KAR 5:005. Permits to construct, modify, or operate a facility.
Effective: April 12, 2004
This regulation was amended to exempt the following sewer systems from the requirements
of this administrative regulation: gravity sewers that have a diameter of less than eight
inches and discharge directly to the sewer main; serve a single family residence building
with four dwelling units or less; serve a single office building or a single mercantile
building with an occupant load of less than thirty persons; force main sewers, regardless of
the location of the pump station which have a length of less than 500 feet and discharge
directly to the gravity sewer main; serve a single family residence building with four
dwelling units or less, or serve a single office building or a single mercantile building with
an occupant load of less than thirty persons. This amendment also updates some cross-
references that are no longer valid.
2. 401 KAR 5:002. Definitions for 401 KAR Chapter 5.
Effective: September 8, 2004
An amendment revises the chapter defmition section to include two new definitions and
deletes one definition that is no longer necessary. The two new definitions are for the term,
"E. coli" or "Escherichia coli" and the category, "high quality water." The previously
included category, "use protected water," has been deleted in this amendment because the
category name, "impaired water," is now being used. The term "impairment" already exists
in the definitions regulation; therefore, there was no need to include a definition for
"impaired" in this amendment.
3. 401 KAR 5:026. Designation of uses of surface waters.
Effective: September 8, 2004
An amendment revises designated use information for three previously listed surface
waters, replaces two previously listed surface waters, and adds fourteen previously unlisted
surface waters. Two of the revisions were to correct errors in the previous triennial review
in which cold water aquatic habitat use was mistakenly changed to warm water aquatic
habitat use in the Nolin and Rough rivers below their respective reservoirs. This
amendment is necessary to update surface water information and assign use designations
for previously unlisted surface waters. This administrative regulation was amended as part
of the triennial review.
4. 401 KAR 5:029. General provisions.
Effective: September 8, 2004
An amendment restricts location of a mixing zone which would jeopardize endangered or
threatened aquatic species listed in the Federal Endangered Species Act. This amendment
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also prohibits mixing zones for new discharges of Bioaccumulative Chemicals of Concern
(BCCs) and phases out mixing zones for existing discharges of these substances. This
amendment is necessary to establish revised measures to protect human health and aquatic
life.
5. 401 KAR 5:030. Antidegradation policy implementation methodology.
Effective: contingent on US EPA approval.
An amendment revises surface water categories to include the new category of high quality
water as a default category and the newly named impaired water. It also sets forth
antidegradation review requirements for several types of discharges. The amendment
reorganizes much of the Section 1 text and includes 146 surface waters newly classified as
exceptional water that are reorganized into a new table. Outstanding state resource water
that is not otherwise categorized as outstanding national resource water or exceptional
water is defaulted into the high quality water category. Two new documents are
incorporated by reference and two documents previously incorporated by reference have
been removed from this administrative regulation. This amendment is necessary to address
outstanding U.S. EPA disapproval. The U.S. EPA has disapproved this regulation after
promulgation twice on August 7, 1997 and August 20, 2000. At Volume 67 Federal
Register No. 220 p. 68971 on November 14,2002, U.S. EPA proposed a substitute rule that
is substantially the same as 401 KAR 5:029(1).
6. 401 KAR 5:031. Surface water standards.
Effective: September 8, 2004
An amendment updates water quality criteria to reflect scientific developments. Three
tables previously divided in this administrative regulation have been consolidated into one
table and placed in Section 6 of this administrative regulation. Dilution flows for non-
carcinogenic substances in fish tissue and radionuclides were modified from 7QlO to
harmonic mean flow in order to more accurately reflect the duration of exposure under
which these human health criteria were developed. This amendment is necessary to revise
criteria to protect human health and to meet federal recommendations.
7. 401 KAR 8:010. Defintions for 401 KAR Chapter 8.
Effective: January 4, 2005
An amendment updates definitions included in this administrative regulation and complies
with federal mandates required to maintain primacy.
8. 401 KAR 8:020. Public and semipublic water supplies - general provisions.
Effective: January 4, 2005
DOW changed provisions regarding boil water notices, boil water advisories, and
consumer advisories.
9. 401 KAR 8:070. Public Notification.
Effective: January 4, 2005
Extensive federal revisions to this rule necessitated the adoption of corresponding state
revisions. The federal deadline for state adoption was May 2004.
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10. 401 KAR 8:075. Consumer confidence reports.
Effective: January 4, 2005
This regulation required amendment to conform to federal requirements regarding
consumer confidence reporting. The federal regulation became effective in 1998. The
corresponding state regulation was adopted in 2001. A consumer confidence report is an
annual report prepared by a community water system that informs consumers of the quality
of the water distributed by the system and characterizes the risks of exposure to
contaminants found in drinking water. Other changes clarify the Cabinet's intent regarding
the content of a consumer confidence report, the certification, and distribution of the report
11. 401 KAR 8:150. Disinfection, filtration, and recycling.
Effective: January 4, 2005
The filter backwash rule became effective June 2003. The federal language covers
requirements for recycling backwash water from the treatment processes. These changes
were necessary for primacy.
12. 401 KAR 8:300. Lead and copper.
Effective: January 4, 2005
The lead and copper minor revisions were effective January 2002 and the federal deadline
for state adoption was January 2004. These minor revisions were incorporated into state
regulations to maintain primacy and to allow systems to reduce monitoring where allowed.
The regulation bans lead in drinking water facilities and provides standards for lead and
copper in drinking water. While there are extensive revisions throughout this
administrative regulation, many reduce the monitoring required for systems that qualify for
reduced monitoring and waivers.
13. 401 KAR 8:441. (Repeals 401 KAR 8:440)
Effective: January 4, 2005
This regulation repeals 401 KAR 8:440, Special testing for unregulated inorganic and
synthetic organic contaminants. U.S. EPA administers the unregulated contaminants
monitoring rule; therefore, the state regulation was repealed. The inclusion of the
regulation in 401 KAR Chapter 8 had caused confusion with water operators.
14. 401 KAR 8:700. Bottled water.
Effective: January 4, 2005
Other administrative regulations promulgated in 2001 affected this regulation. State
administrative regulations assure the purity of water bottled in Kentucky to be resold as a
food for human consumption or other consumer use. These regulations for disinfection by-
products and surface water treatment forced changes to the bottled water regulation to
clarify what bottled water systems are and are not required to do. Many of the
requirements apply to individual filters and the distribution system. These provisions do
not apply to a bottled water system; therefore, this administrative regulation was amended
to clarify the Cabinet's intent.
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Division for AirQuality Regulatory Changes:
1. 401 KAR 51:001, Definitions for 401 KAR Chapter 51.
401 KAR 51:017, Prevention of significant deterioration of air quality (PSD).
401 KAR 51:052, Review of new sources in or impacting upon non-attainment areas
(NSR).
Effective: July 14, 2004.
The amendments to 401 KAR 51:001,401 KAR 51:017, and 401 KAR 51:052 include the
revisions that were published in the December 31, 2002, Federal Register. The
amendments address five specific areas of the New Source Review program. The reforms
include a change to the calculation of baseline actual emissions, actual-to-projected actual
applicability test, clean unit test, plantwide applicability limitations (PALs), and pollution
control projects (PCPs).
2. 401 KAR 59:185, New solvent metal cleaning equipment.
Effective Date: January 4,2005
The Cabinet was mandated by the 2004 General Assembly to terminate the vehicle
emissions testing (VET) program in Northern Kentucky, if possible. For EPA approval to
terminate the VET program, the Cabinet must demonstrate that compensating emission
reductions of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and NOx equal or exceed the emissions
reductions obtained from the VET program. To help compensate for the removal of the
VET program, the Division amended 401 KAR 59:185, New solvent metal cleaning
equipment. This amendment will reduce the VOC emissions from cold cleaning
degreasing operations in Boone, Campbell, and Kenton counties. The sale and use of
cleaning solvents is restricted to a solvent with a lowered vapor pressure (1.0 mm Hg).
3. 401 KAR 59:760 and 401 KAR 59:760E, Commercial motor vehicle and mobile
equipment refinishing operations.
Effective Dates: November 14,2004 (Emergency Regulation); Ordinary Regulation March
8,2005.
The 2004 General Assembly mandated the Cabinet to terminate the vehicle emissions
testing (VET) program in Northern Kentucky, if possible. The Cabinet must propose
substitute emissions reductions of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and NOx to equal or
exceed the reductions obtained from the VET program. This new administrative regulation
will reduce the VOC emissions from auto body repair shops in Boone, Campbell, and
Kenton counties by requiring the use of high transfer efficiency application techniques at
these operations. The Cabinet has calculated that this proposed regulation, in combination
with the amendment to 401 KAR 59:185, will provide the necessary VOC reductions
necessary to compensate for the emission reductions obtained by the VET program.
4. 401 KAR 57:002, Part 61 national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants.
401 KAR 60:005, Part 60 standards of performance for new stationary sources.
401 KAR 63:002, Part 63 national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants.
401 KAR 58:025, Asbestos standards.
401 KAR 60:670, Standards of performance of nonmetallic mineral processing plants.
401 KAR 63:106, Repeal of 401 KAR 63:105.
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Effective Date: January 4, 2005.
The amendments to 401 KAR 57:002, 401 KAR 60:005, and 401 KAR 60:670 revise the
existing incorporations by reference to the July 1, 2003, CFR publication.
The amendment to 401 KAR 58:025 includes incorporating the July 1, 2003, CFR by
reference and the September 18, 2003, Federal Register which corrects OSHA
requirements citations cross referenced in the federal Asbestos NESHAP.
The amendment to 401 KAR 63:002 also includes incorporating the July 1,2003, CFR by
reference, and, in addition, adds final MACT standards and amendments through the June
15,2004, Federal Register publications.
401 KAR 63:106 proposes to repeal 401 KAR 63:105 in order to incorporate the provisions
of 40 CFR 63, Subpart B into 401 KAR 63:002
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AN ACT relating to revenue and taxation and making an appropriation therefor and
declaring an emergency.
* * * * * * [Amendments to Defenses and Limitations on Liability]
Section 141. KRS 224.01-400 is amended to read as follows:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Hazardous substance" means any substance or combination of substances including
wastes of a solid, liquid, gaseous, or semi-solid form which, because of its quantity,
concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause or
significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness, or pose a substantial present or
potential hazard to human health or the environment. The substances may include but
are not limited to those which are, according to criteria established by the cabinet,
toxic, corrosive, ignitable, irritants, strong sensitizers, or explosive, except that the
term "hazardous substance" shall not include petroleum, including crude oil or any
fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous
substance under this section, and shall not include natural gas, natural gas liquids,
liquified natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel, or mixtures of natural gas and
synthetic gas;
(b) "Release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing hazardous
substances, pollutants, or contaminants into the environment, including the
abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles
containing any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, but excludes
emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel,
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or pipeline pumping station engine; the release of source, by-product, or special
nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, if the release is subject to requirements with respect to financial
protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under Section 170 of
the Act, or any release of source by-product, or special nuclear material from any
processing site designated under Sections 102(a)(l) or 302(a) of the Uranium Mill
Tailing Radiation Control Act of 1978; and the normal application of fertilizer;
(c) "Site" means any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe, or pipeline,
including any pipe into a sewer or publicly-owned treatment works, well, pit, pond,
lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage containers, motor vehicles, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or any other place or area where a release or threatened release has
occurred. The term shall not include any consumer product in consumer use;
(d) "Environmental emergency" means any release or threatened release of materials into
the environment in such quantities or concentrations as cause or threaten to cause an
imminent and substantial danger to human health or the environment; the term
includes, but is not limited to, discharges of oil and hazardous substances prohibited
by Section 311(b)(3) of the Federal Clean Water Act - (Public Law 92-500), as
amended;
(e) "Threatened release" means a circumstance which presents a substantial threat of a
release;
(f) "Pollutant or contaminant" shall include, but not be limited to, any element,
substance, compound, or mixture, including disease-causing agents, which after
release into the environment and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or assimilation
into any organism, either directly from the environment or indirectly by ingestion
through food chains, will or may reasonably be anticipated to cause death, disease,
behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutation, physiological malfunctions
(including malfunctions in reproduction) or physical deformations, in such organisms
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or their offspring; except that the term "pollutant or contaminant" shall not include
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under this section and shall
not include natural gas, liquified natural gas, or synthetic gas of pipeline quality (or
mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas);
(g) "Environment" means the waters of the Commonwealth, land surface, surface, and
subsurface soils and strata, or ambient air within the Commonwealth or under the
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth;
(h) "Financial institution" means, for purposes of subsections (26) and (27) of this
section, the following:
I. A bank or trust company defined by KRS Chapter 287;
2. A savings and loan association defined by KRS Chapter 289;
3. A credit union defined by KRS Chapter 290;
4. A mortgage loan company or loan broker defined by KRS Chapter 294;
5. An insurer defined by KRS Chapter 304; and
6. Any other financial institution engaged in the business of lending money, the
lending operations ofwhich are subject to state or federal regulation; and
(i) "Fiduciary" means, for purposes of subsections (26) and (27) of this section, a
fiduciary as defined by KRS Chapter 386.
(2) The cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with the provisions
of KRS Chapter 13A designating individual hazardous substances, pollutants, or
contaminants; establishing their respective reportable quantities; and establishing their
respective release notification requirements, which differ from those designated or
established in subsections (3) to (9) of this section, if necessary to:
(a) Protect human health and the environment;
(b) Maintain consistency with valid scientific development; or
(c) Maintain consistency with newly adopted federal regulations.
(3) The hazardous substances for which release notification is required shall be those
hazardous substances designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 302 under the Federal Comprehensive
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Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended; those
extremely hazardous substances designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 355 under Title III of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986; nerve and blister agents
designated under KRS 224.50-130(2); and any hazardous substances designated by the
cabinet in administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (2) of this section.
(4) The reportable quantity for a release of a hazardous substance designated in 40 C.F.R. Part
302 under the Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, as amended, shall be the quantity designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 302.
The reportable quantity for a release of an extremely hazardous substance designated in 40
C.F.R. Part 355 under Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 shall be the quantity designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 355. The reportable quantity for a
release of a nerve or blister agent designated under KRS 224.50-130(2) shall be any
quantity. The cabinet may establish reportable quantities for hazardous substances in
administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (2) of this section which
differ from those established in this subsection. The reportable quantity for any hazardous
substance designated by the cabinet in administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to
subsection (2) of this section shall be the reportable quantity established by the cabinet.
(5) The release notification requirements for a release of a hazardous substance designated in
40 C.F.R. Part 302 under the Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response
. Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended, shall be the notification
requirements established in 40 C.F.R. Part 302. The release notification requirements for a
release of an extremely hazardous substance designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 355 under Title
III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 shall be the notification
requirements established in 40 C.F.R. Part 355. Whenever notification of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance is required pursuant to this section, any person
possessing or controlling the hazardous substance shall immediately notify the cabinet's
twenty-four (24) hour environmental response line. The cabinet may establish release
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notification requirements by administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to subsection
(2) of this section which differ from those established in this subsection. The release
notification requirements for any hazardous substance designated by the cabinet in
administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (2) of this section shall be
the release notification requirements established in the cabinet's administrative regulations.
(6) Any person possessing or controlling a pollutant or contaminant for which a reportable
quantity has been established by administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to
subsection (2) of this section shall immediately notify the cabinet's twenty-four (24) hour
environmental response line, as soon as that person has knowledge of any release or
threatened release, other than a permitted release or application of a pesticide in accordance
with the manufacturer's instructions, of a pollutant or contaminant to the environment in a
quantity equal to or exceeding the reportable quantity. In the notice to be made to the
cabinet, the person shall state, at a minimum, the location of the release or threatened
release, the material released or threatened to be released, and the approximate quantity and
concentration of the release or threatened release.
(7) Any person possessing or controlling a pollutant or contaminant shall, as soon as that
person has knowledge of any release or threatened release of a pollutant or contaminant
from a site to the environment in a quantity which may present an imminent or substantial
danger to the public health or welfare, immediately notify the cabinet's twenty-four (24)
hour environmental response line. In the notice to be made to the cabinet, the person shall
state, at a minimum, the location of the release or threatened release, the material released
or threatened to be released, and the approximate quantity and concentration of the release
or threatened release. If a person possessing or controlling a pollutant or contaminant for
which a reportable quantity has not been established in administrative regulations
promulgated pursuant to subsection (2) of the section fails to report a release or threatened
release because of a good-faith belief that the release did not present an imminent or
substantial danger to the public health or welfare, that person shall not be liable for a
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violation of the release notification requirements of this section. In determining whether a
person has acted in good faith, the cabinet shall consider the circumstances surrounding the
release, including whether the release was a permitted release or the application of a
pesticide in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
(8) The cabinet may require the person subject to the release notification requirements of
subsections (5) to (9) of this section to provide a written report on the release or threatened
release. This report shall be submitted to the environmental response section of the cabinet
within seven (7) days of the cabinet's demand for the report. The report shall identify the
following:
(a) The ,Precise location of the release or threatened release;
(b) The name, address, and phone number of the person possessing or controlling the
material at the time of the release or threatened release;
(c) The name, address, and phone number of persons having actual knowledge of the
facts surrounding the release or threatened release;
(d) The specific pollutant or contaminant or hazardous substance released or threatened
to be released;
(e) The concentration and quantity of the pollutant or contaminant or hazardous
substance in the release or threatened release;
(f) The circumstances and cause of the release or threatened release;
(g) Efforts taken by the person to control or mitigate the release or threatened release;
(h) To the extent known, the harmful effects ofthe release or threatened release;
(i) The transportation characteristics of the medium or matrix into which the material
was released or threatened to be released;
G) Any present or proposed remedial action by the person at the site of the release or
threatened release;
(k) The name, address, and phone number of the person who can be contacted for
additional information concerning the release or threatened release; and
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(1) Any other information that may facilitate remediation of the site.
(9) A person possessing or controlling a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant shall
immediately notify the cabinet pursuant to subsection (5) of this section when release
notification, including notification of a continuous release reported under the Federal
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as
amended, is provided to the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Within seven
(7) days of providing any written notification to the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, the person shall submit to the cabinet a copy of the release notification
submitted to the United States Environmental Protection Agency. The cabinet shall not
require additional information pursuant to subsection (5) of this section if the release
notification is in compliance with this subsection, unless a written report is required under
subsection (8) of this section or the release or threatened release constitutes an
environmental emergency.
(10) Any person in charge of a vessel or site from which oil is discharged in a harmful quantity
as defined by 40 C.F.R. Part 110 in contravention of Section 311 of the Federal Clean
Water Act shall immediately notify the cabinet's twenty-four (24) hour environmental
response line. In the notice to be made to the cabinet, the person shall state, at a minimum,
the location of the discharge, the material discharged, and the approximate quantity and
concentration of the discharge.
(11) Any person possessing or controlling petroleum or a petroleum product as defined by KRS
224.60-115(15) shall, as soon as that person has knowledge of any release or threatened
release, other than a permitted release or application of a pesticide in accordance with the
manufacturer's instructions, in an amount of twenty-five (25) gallons or more in a twenty-
four (24) hour period, except for diesel fuel for which the reportable quantity is seventy-
five (75) gallons or more in a twenty-four (24) hour period, or in contravention of Section
311 of the Federal Clean Water Act, immediately notify the cabinet's twenty-four (24) hour
environmental response line. In the notice to be made to the cabinet, the person shall state,
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at a minimum, the location of the release or threatened release, the material released or
threatened to be released, and the approximate quantity and concentration of the release or
threatened release.
(12) The cabinet may require the person subject to subsections (10) and (11) of this section to
provide a written report on the discharge or release. This report shall be submitted to the
environmental response section of the cabinet within seven (7) days of the cabinet's
demand for the report. The report shall identify the following:
(a) The precise location of the discharge or release;
(b) The name, address, and phone number of the person possessing or controlling the
material at the time ofthe discharge or release;
(c) The name, address, and phone number of persons having actual knowledge of the
facts surrounding the discharge or release;
(d) The concentration and quantity of the discharge or release;
(e) The circumstances and cause of the discharge or release;
(t) Efforts taken by the person to control or mitigate the discharge or release;
(g) To the extent known, the harmful effects of the discharge or release;
(h) The transportation characteristics of the medium or matrix into which the material
was discharged or released;
(i) Any present or proposed remedial action by the person at the site of the discharge or
release;
G) The name, address, and phone number of the person who can be contacted for
additional information concerning the discharge or release; and
(k) Any other information that may facilitate an emergency spill response, or remediation
of the site.
(13) Timely notification received under the release notification requirements of this section or
information obtained in a notification received under the release notification requirements
of this section may not be used against the person making the notification in any criminal
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proceeding, except in a prosecution for submitting a false or untimely notification to the
cabinet. Notification received by the cabinet of a threatened release or discharge shall not
be deemed a separate incident.
(14) The cabinet shall be the lead agency for hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant
emergency spill response and, after consultation with other affected federal, state, and local
agencies and private organizations, shall establish a contingency plan for undertaking
emergency actions in response to the release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant. The contingency plan shall:
(a) Provide for efficient, coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage to the air,
land, and waters of the Commonwealth caused by the release or threatened release of
hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants;
(b) Include containment, cleanup, and disposal procedures;
(c) Provide for remediation or restoration of the lands or waters affected consistent with
this section;
(d) Assign duties and responsibilities among state cabinets and agencies in coordination
with federal and local agencies;
(e) Provide for the identification, procurement, maintenance, and storage of necessary
equipment and supplies;
(f) Provide for designation of persons trained, prepared, and available to provide the
necessary services to carry out the plan; and
(g) Establish procedures and techniques for identifying, containing, removing, and
disposing of hazardous substances released or being released.
(15) The cabinet shall have the authority, power, and duty to:
(a) Recover from persons liable therefor for the benefit of the hazardous waste
management fund, the cabinet's actual and necessary costs expended in response to a
threatened release, an environmental emergency, or a release of a hazardous
substance that is reportable under this section. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of
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this subsection, this section is intended solely to recognize the existence of a cause of
action on behalf of the cabinet and is not intended to expand or contract the bases of
liability, the elements of proof, or the amount of liability of any person;
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection, recover its costs incurred in the
removal of oil or hazardous substances discharged in violation of Section 311 (b)(3)
of the Federal Clean Water Act from any person liable therefor under Section 311 of
the Federal Clean Water Act subject to limitations of liability and defenses provided
in the section. The limitations of liability shall apply to the total of state and federal
expenses; and
(c) In every case where action required under this section is not being adequately taken
or the identity of the person responsible for the release or threatened release is
unknown, the cabinet or its agent may contain, remove, or dispose of the hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant or take any other action consistent with this
section, including, but not limited to, issuance of an emergency order as provided in
KRS 224.1 0-410 to the person possessing, controlling, or responsible for the release
or threatened release as necessary for the protection of the environment and public
health, safety, or welfare.
(16) Any duly authorized officer, employee, or agent of the cabinet may upon notice to the
owner or occupant enter any property, premises, or place at any time for the purposes of
this section, if the entry is necessary to prevent damage to the air, land, or waters of the
Commonwealth. Notice to the owner or occupant shall not be required if the delay
attendant upon providing it will result in imminent risk to public health or safety.
(17) The cabinet shall prepare and annually update an inventory of all sites in the
Commonwealth at which there is or has been an environmental emergency or a release of a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant. In preparing the inventory, the cabinet
shall determine, based on information available to the cabinet, the impact of each site on
public health and the environment and identify the relative priority for restoration or
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remedial action. Upon determining that no further restoration or remedial action is
necessary, the cabinet shall so designate the site on the inventory. A separate designation of
sites where a remedial action involving on-site containment or treatment has been
performed and other sites where restoration of the environment has not been achieved shall
be maintained. A review of environmental conditions at sites remediated by on-site
containment or treatment and other sites where restoration or remediation of the
environment is not achieved shall be conducted by the cabinet every five (5) years to
determine whether additional action is necessary to protect human health or the
environment.
(18) Any person possessing or controlling a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant
which is released to the environment, or any person who caused a release to the
environment of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, shall characterize the
extent of the release as necessary to determine the effect of the release on the environment,
and shall take actions necessary to correct the effect of the release on the environment. Any
person required to take action under this subsection shall have the following options:
(a) Demonstrating that no action is necessary to protect human health, safety, and the
environment;
(b) Managing the release in a manner that controls and minimizes the harmful effects of
the release and protects human health, safety, and the environment, provided that the
management may include any existing or proposed engineering or institutional
controls and the maintenance of those controls;
(c) Restoring the environment through the removal of the hazardous substance, pollutant,
or contaminant; or
(d) Any combination of paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection.
(19) Unless otherwise required by the cabinet, a person required to characterize the extent of a
release and correct the effect of the release on the environment under subsection (18) of
this section may take those actions without making the demonstrations to the cabinet
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required by subsections (18) to (21) of this section, if:
(a) The release is less than the reportable quantity of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant;
(b) The release is of a pollutant or contaminant for which a reportable quantity has not
been established by administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to subsection (2)
of this section, if the release does not present an imminent or substantial danger to the
public health or welfare; or
(c) The release is authorized by a state or federal permit.
(20) If a person required to take action under subsection (18) of this section demonstrates to the
cabinet that, pursuant to subsection (18)(a) of this section, no action is necessary to protect
human health, safety, and the environment or, pursuant to subsection (18)(b) of this
section, the release will be managed in a manner that controls and minimizes the harmful
effects of the release and protects human health, safety, and the environment, the cabinet
shall not require restoration of the environment through the removal of the hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant pursuant to subsection (18)(c) of this section.
(21) A person required to take action under subsection (18) of this section who does not restore
the environment through removal of the hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant in
accordance with subsection (18)(c) of this section shall demonstrate to the cabinet that the
remedy is protective of human health, safety, and the environment, by considering the
following factors:
(a) The characteristics of the substance, pollutant, or contaminant, including its toxicity,
persistence, environmental fate and transport dynamics, bioaccumulation,
biomagnification, and potential for synergistic interaction and with specific reference
to the environment into which the substance, pollutant, or contaminant has been
released;
(b) The hydrogeologic characteristics of the facility and the surrounding area;
(c) The proximity, quality, and current and future uses of surface water and groundwater;
B - 18
House Bill 272
(d) The potential effects of residual contamination of potentially impacted surface water
and groundwater;
(e) The chronic and acute health effects and environmental consequences to terrestrial
and aquatic life of exposure to the hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant
through direct and indirect pathways;
(f) An exposure assessment; and
(g) All other available information.
(22) A person who submits a proposal to the cabinet pursuant to subsection (18) of this section
may request in writing a final determination on the proposal no sooner than thirty (30) days
after its submission. When a final determination on the proposal is requested, the cabinet
shall make its final determination within sixty (60) working days from the date the request
is received by the cabinet. After a final determination has been made, the person requesting
the final determination may request a hearing pursuant to the provisions of KRS 224.10-
420. Nothing in this subsection shall relieve any person of any obligations imposed by law
during an environmental emergency, nor shall it require the cabinet to approve a proposal
which would violate this chapter or the administrative regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto.
(23) (a) The cabinet shall have a lien against the real and personal property of a person liable
for the actual and necessary costs expended in response to a release or threatened
release or an environmental emergency. The lien shall be filed with the county clerk
of the county in which the property of the person is located.
(b) If a financial institution exempted from liability by subsection (26) of this section
conveys the site it has acquired, then the cabinet shall have a lien against the site for
the actual and necessary costs expended in response to a release or threatened release
or an environmental emergency. The lien shall be filed with the county clerk of the
county in which the site is located.
(24) Nothing in this section shall replace the financial and technical assistance available to the
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Commonwealth pursuant to Section 311 of the Federal Clean Water Act (Public Law 92-
500) as amended, but shall be used to provide the Commonwealth with a mechanism for
additional response to releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants,
or contaminants.
(25) Defenses to liability, limitations to liability, and rights to contribution shall be determined
in accordance with Sections 101(35),101(40), 107(a) to (d), 107(q) and 107&), and 113(t)
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, as
amended, and the Federal Clean Water Act, as amended.
(26) In addition to the defenses and limitations provided in subsection (25) of this section, a
financial institution that acquired a site by foreclosure, by receiving an assignment, by deed
in lieu of foreclosure, or by otherwise becoming the owner as a result of the enforcement of
a mortgage, lien, or other security interest held by the financial institution, shall not be
liable under this section with respect to the site, if:
(a) The financial institution served only in an administrative, custodial, financial, or
similar capacity with respect to the site before its acquisition;
(b) The financial institution did not control or direct the handling of the material causing
the environmental emergency, or control or direct the handling of the hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminants, at the site before its acquisition;
(c) The financial institution did not participate in the day-to-day management of the site
before its acquisition;
(d) The financial institution, at the time it acquired the site, did not know and had no
reason to know that a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant was disposed at
the site. For purposes of this paragraph, the financial institution shall have
undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiries into the previous
ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary
practice in an effort to minimize liability. What actions constitute all appropriate
inquiries shall be determined by taking into account any specialized knowledge or
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experience on the part of the financial institution, the relationship of the market value
of the site to the value of the site if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably
ascertainable information about the site, the obviousness of the presence or likely
presence of contamination at the site, the ability to detect the contamination by
appropriate inspection, and any other relevant factor;
(e) The financial institution, when it undertakes actions to protect or preserve the value
of the site, undertakes those actions in accordance with this chapter and the
administrative regulations adopted pursuant thereto;
(f) The financial institution, its employees, agents, and contractors did not cause or
contribute to an environmental emergency, or to a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant; and
(g) The financial institution complies with the release notification requirements of
subsection (9) of this section.
(27) In addition to the defenses and limitations provided in subsection (25) of this section, a
financial institution serving as a fiduciary with respect to an estate or trust, the assets of
which contain a site, shall not be liable under this section with respect to the site if:
(a) The financial institution served only in an administrative, custodial, financial, or
similar capacity with respect to the site before it became a fiduciary;
(b) The financial institution did not control or direct the handling of the material causing
the environmental emergency, or control or direct the handling of the hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminants, at the site before it became a fiduciary;
(c) The financial institution did not participate in the day-to-day management of the site
before it became a fiduciary;
(d) The financial institution, at the time it became a fiduciary, did not know and had no
reason to know that a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant was disposed at
the site. For purposes of this paragraph, the financial institution shall have
undertaken, at the time it became a fiduciary, all appropriate inquiries into the
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previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or
customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. What actions constitute all
appropriate inquiries shall be determined by taking into account any specialized
knowledge or experience on the part of the financial institution, the relationship of the
market value of the site to the value of the site if uncontaminated, commonly known
or reasonably ascertainable information about the site, the obviousness of the
presence or likely presence of contamination at the site, the ability to detect the
contamination by appropriate inspection, and any other relevant factor;
(e) The financial institution, when it undertakes actions to protect or preserve the value
of the site, undertakes those actions in accordance with this chapter and the
administrative regulations adopted pursuant thereto;
(f) The financial institution, its employees, agents, and contractors did not cause or
contribute to an environmental emergency, or to a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant; and
(g) The fmancial institution complies with the release notification requirements of
subsection (9) of this section.
* * * * * * * * [Voluntary Environmental Remediation Income Tax Credit]
SECTION 140. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 141 IS CREATED TO READ
AS FOLLOWS:
(1) As used in this section:
ra) "Quali(ving voluntary environmental remediation propertv" means real propertv
subject to the provisions o(KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405 for which the
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet has made a
determination that:
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1. The responsible parties are financially unable to carry out the obligations in
KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405; and
2. The property was acquired after the effective date ofthis Act by a bona fide
prospective purchaser as defined in 42 U.S.CO sec. 9601(40);
(b) "Expenditures" means payment for work to characterize the extent of
contamination and to remediate the contamination at a qualifying voluntary
environmental remediation property; and
(d "Taxpayer" means an individual subject to tax under KRS 141.020 or a
corporation subject to tax under KRS 141.040.
(2) There shall be allowed a nonrefundable credit against the tax imposed under KRS
141.020 or 141.040 for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2004, for taxpayer
expenditures made at a qualifying voluntary environmental remediation property in
order to meet the requirements ofan agreed order entered into by the taxpayer under the
provisions ofKRS 224.01-518, provided that the taxpayer has obtained a covenant not to
sue (rom the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet under KRS
224.01-526.
(3) The maximum total credit for each taxpayer shall not exceed one hundred fifty thousand
dollars ($150,000). For purposes ofthis section, an affiliated group oftaxpayers required
to file a consolidated return under KRS 141.200 shall be treated as one taxpayer
(4) A taxpayer claiming a credit under this section shall submit receipts to the Finance and
Administration Cabinet in proof of the expenditures claimed. The Finance and
Administration Cabinet shall forward the receipts to the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet for verification. After the receipts are verified, the
Finance and Administration Cabinet shall notifv the taxpayer ofeligibility for the credit.
(5) The credit may be first claimed on the income tax return of the taxpayer filed in the
taxable year during which the credit was certified. The amount of the allowable credit
for any taxable year shall be twenty-five percent (25%) ofthe maximum credit approved.
The credit may be carried forward for ten (10) successive taxable years.
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(6) If the taxpayer is a general partnership. the credit shall pass through in the same
proportion as the distributive share ofincome or loss is passed through.
* * * * * * * * * [Voluntary Environmental Remediation Real Property Tax Incentive]
Section 54. KRS 132.010 is amended to read as follows:
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Cabinet" means the Revenue Cabinet.
(2) "Taxpayer" means any person made liable by law to file a return or pay a tax.
(3) "Real property" includes all lands within this state and improvements thereon.
(4) "Personal property" includes every species and character of property, tangible and
intangible, other than real property.
(5) "Resident" means any person who has taken up a place of abode within this state with the
intention of continuing to abide in this state; any person who has had his actual or habitual
place of abode in this state for the larger portion of the twelve (12) months next preceding
the date as of which an assessment is due to be made shall be deemed to have intended to
become a resident of this state.
(6) "Compensating tax rate" means that rate which, rounded to the next higher one-tenth of one
cent ($0.001) per one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed value and applied to the current
year's assessment of the property subject to taxation by a taxing district, excluding new
property and personal property, produces an amount of revenue approximately equal to that
produced in the preceding year from real property. However, in no event shall the
compensating tax rate be a rate which, when applied to the total current year assessment of
all classes of taxable property, produces an amount of revenue less than was produced in
the preceding year from all classes of taxable property. For purposes of this subsection,
"property subject to taxation" means the total fair cash value of all property subject to full
local rates, less the total valuation exempted from taxation by the homestead exemption
provision of the Constitution and the difference between the fair cash value and agricultural
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or horticultural value of agricultural or horticultural land.
(7) "Net assessment growth" means the difference between:
(a) The total valuation of property subject to taxation by the county, city, school district,
or special district in the preceding year, less the total valuation exempted from
taxation by the homestead exemption provision of the Constitution in the current year
over that exempted in the preceding year, and
(b) The total valuation of property subject to taxation by the county, city, school district,
or special district for the current year.
(8) "New property" means the net difference in taxable value between real property additions
and deletions to the property tax roll for the current year. "Real property additions" shall
mean:
(a) Property annexed or incorporated by a municipal corporation, or any other taxing
jurisdiction; however, this definition shall not apply to property acquired through the
merger or consolidation of school districts, or the transfer of property from one (1)
school district to another;
(b) Property, the ownership of which has been transferred from a tax-exempt entity to a
nontax-exempt entity;
(c) The value of improvements to existing nomesidential property;
(d) The value ofnew residential improvements to property;
(e) The value of improvements to existing residential property when the improvement
increases the assessed value of the property by fifty percent (50%) or more;
(f) Property created by the subdivision of unimproved property, provided, that when
such property is reclassified from farm to subdivision by the property valuation
administrator, the value of such property as a farm shall be a deletion from that
category;
(g) Property exempt from taxation, as an inducement for industrial or business use, at the
expiration of its tax exempt status;
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(h) Property, the tax rate of which will change, according to the provisions of KRS
82.085, to reflect additional urban services to be provided by the taxing jurisdiction,
provided, however, that such property shall be considered "real property additions"
only in proportion to the additional urban services to be provided to the property over
the urban services previously provided; and
(i) The value of improvements to real property previously under assessment moratorium.
"Real property deletions" shall be limited to the value of real property removed from, or
reduced over the preceding year on, the property tax roll for the current year.
(9) "Agricultural land" means:
(a) Any tract ofland, including all income-producing improvements, of at least ten (10)
contiguous acres in area used for the production of livestock, livestock products,
poultry, poultry products and/or the growing of tobacco and/or other crops including
timber;
(b) Any tract ofland, including all income-producing improvements, of at least five (5)
contiguous acres in area commercially used for aquaculture; or
(c) Any tract of land devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifications for
payments pursuant to agriculture programs under an agreement with the state or
federal government.
(10) "Horticultural land" means any tract of land, including all income-producing
improvements, of at least five (5) contiguous acres in area commercially used for the
cultivation of a garden, orchard, or the raising of fruits or nuts, vegetables, flowers, or
ornamental plants.
(11) "Agricultural or horticultural value" means the use value of "agricultural or horticultural
land" based upon income-producing capability and comparable sales of farmland
purchased for farm purposes where the price is indicative of farm use value, excluding
sales representing purchases for farm expansion, better accessibility, and other factors
which inflate the purchase price beyond farm use value, if any, considering the following
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factors as they affect a taxable unit:
(a) Relative percentages of tillable land, pasture land, and woodland;
(b) Degree ofproductivity of the soil;
(c) Risk of flooding;
(d) Improvements to and on the land that relate to the production of income;
(e) Row crop capability including allotted crops other than tobacco;
(t) Accessibility to all-weather roads and markets; and
(g) Factors which affect the general agricultural or horticultural economy, such as:
interest, price of farm products, cost of farm materials and supplies, labor, or any
economic factor which would affect net farm income.
(12) "Deferred tax" means the difference in the tax based on agricultural or horticultural value
and the tax based on fair cash value.
(13) "Homestead" means real property maintained as the permanent residence of the owner with
all land and improvements adjoining and contiguous thereto including, but not limited to,
lawns, drives, flower or vegetable gardens, outbuildings, and all other land connected
thereto.
(14) "Residential unit" means all or that part of real property occupied as the permanent
residence of the owner.
(15) "Special benefits" are those which are provided by public works not financed through the
general tax levy but through special assessments against the benefited property.
(16) "Mobile home" means a structure, transportable in one (1) or more sections, which when
erected on site measures eight (8) body feet or more in width and thirty-two (32) body feet
or more in length, and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a
dwelling, with or without a permanent foundation, when connected to the required utilities,
and includes the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems contained
therein. It may be used as a place of residence, business, profession, or trade by the owner,
lessee, or their assigns and may consist of one (1) or more units that can be attached or
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joined together to comprise an integral unit or condominium structure.
(17) "Recreational vehicle" means a vehicular type unit primarily designed as temporary living
quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, which either has its own motive power or
is mounted on or drawn by another vehicle. The basic entities are: travel trailer, camping
trailer, truck camper, and motor home.
(a) Travel trailer: A vehicular unit, mounted on wheels, designed to provide temporary
living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, and of such size or weight as
not to require special highway movement permits when drawn by a motorized
vehicle, and with a living area of less than two hundred twenty (220) square feet,
excluding built-in equipment (such as wardrobes, closets, cabinets, kitchen units or
fixtures) and bath and toilet rooms.
(b) Camping trailer: A vehicular portable unit mounted on wheels and constructed with
collapsible partial side walls which fold for towing by another vehicle and unfold at
the camp site to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel
use.
(c) Truck camper: A portable unit constructed to provide temporary living quarters for
recreational, travel, or camping use, consisting of a roof, floor, and sides, designed to
be loaded onto and unloaded from the bed of a pick-up truck.
(d) Motor home: A vehicular unit designed to provide temporary living quarters for
recreational, camping, or travel use built on or permanently attached to a self-
propelled motor vehicle chassis or on a chassis cab or van which is an integral part of
the completed vehicle.
(18) "Intangible personal propertv" means stocks. mutual funds. money market funds.
bonds. loans. notes. mortgages. accounts receivable. land contracts. cash. credits.
patents. trademarks. copyrights. tobacco base. allotments. annuities. deferred
compensation. retirement plans. and any other We of personal property that is not
tangible personal propertv.
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(19) "Qualifying voluntary environmental remediation property" means real property subject
to the provisions of KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405 for which the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet has made a determination that:
(a) The responsible parties are financially unable to carry out the obligations in KRS
224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405; and
(b) The property was acquired after the effective date of this Act by a bona fide
prospective purchaser as defined in 42 U.S.e. sec. 9601(40).
Section 55. KRS 132.020 is amended to read as follows:
(1) The owner or person assessed shall pay an annual ad valorem tax for state purposes at the
rate of:
f!!l Thirty-one and one-half cents ($0.315) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of-
value of all real property directed to be assessed for taxation,d, and]
f!!1. One and one-half cents ($0.015) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all
privately-owned leasehold interests in industrial buildings, as defined under KRS
103.200, owned and financed by a tax-exempt governmental unit, or tax-exempt
statutory authority under the provisions of KRS Chapter 103, upon the prior approval
of the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority, except that the rate shall
,
not apply to the proportion of value of the leasehold interest created through any
-
private financingi[, and]
(d One and one-halfcents ($0.015) upon each one hundred dollars ($1001 ofvalue of
all qualifying voluntary environmental remediation property, provided the bona
fide prospective purchaser has obtained a covenant not to sue from the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet under KRS 224.01-526 for all
known releases located on the property. This rate shall apply for a period of three
(3) years following the issuance of the covenant not to sue, after which the regular
tax rate shall apply;
f!!1. One and one-half cents ($0.015) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all
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tobacco directed to be assessed for taxationi[, and t\\'eBt)' fi¥e eeBts ($0.25) upoa
eaeh oae hUfldred dollars ($100) of 'ralue of all moaey ia haRd, ootes, boIlds,
aeeo1:mts, and other eredits, whether seeured by mortgage, pledge, or otherwise, or
unseeured, eKeept as otherwise proyided ia subseetioa (2) of this seetioa, and]
(gl One and one-half cents ($0.015) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of
unmanufactured agricultural productsifd
U1. One-tenth of one cent ($0.001) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all
farm implements and farm machinery owned by or leased to a person actually
engaged in farming and used in his farm operationsifd
{gl One-tenth of one cent ($0.001) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all
livestock and domestic fowlifd
{f!l One-tenth of one cent ($0.001) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all
tangible personal property located in a foreign trade zone established pursuant to 19
U.S.C. sec. 81, provided that the zone is activated in accordance with the regulations
of the United States Customs Service and the Foreign Trade Zones Boardifd
li1. Fifteen cents ($0.15) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all
machinery actually engaged in manufacturingifd
til Fifteen cents ($0.15) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all
commercial radio, television, and telephonic equipment directly used or associated
with electronic equipment which broadcasts electronic signals to an antennaifd
t!1. Fifteen cents ($0.15) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value ofall property
which has been certified as a pollution control facility as defined in KRS 224.01-
300ifd
tl1. One-tenth of one cent ($0.001) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value ofall
property which has been certified as an alcohol production facility as defined in KRS
247.910, or as a fluidized bed energy production facility as defined in KRS
211.390ifd
B - 30
House Bill 272
(m) Twenty-five cents ($0.25) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of motor
vehicles qualifying for permanent registration as historic motor vehicles under the
provisions ofKRS 186.043ib1
(n) Five cents ($0.05) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) ofvalue ofgoods held for
sale in the regular course of business, which includes machinery and equipment
held in a retailer's inventory for sale or lease originating under a floor plan
financing arrangement; and raw materials, which includes distilled spirits and
distilled spirits inventory, and in-process materials, which includes distilled spirits
and distilled spirits inventory, held for incorporation in finished goods held for sale
in the regular course ofbusiness;
(0) Ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed value on the
operating propertv ofrailroads or railway companies that operate solely within the
Commonwealth;
(0) One and one-half cents ($0.015) per one hundred dollars ($100) ofassessed value
on aircraft not used in the business of transporting persons or propertv for
compensation or hire;
(q) One and one-half cents ($0.015) per one hundred dollars ($100) ofassessed value
on federally documented vessels not used in the business oftransporting persons or
propertv for compensation or hire, or for other commercial purposes; and
f!i Forty-five cents ($0.45) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of value of all other
property directed to be assessed for taxation shall be paid by the owner or person
assessed, except as provided in[ subseetion (2) of this seetion and] KRS 132.030,{
132.050,] 132.200, 136.300, and 136.320,[ and other seetions] providing a different
tax rate for particular property.
(2) [(a) An atlBual ad 'faIorem tax for state purposes of one and one haIf eents ($0.015) upon
eaeh one hundred dollars ($100) of 'faIue shall be paid upon the follo't\'ing elasses of
intangible personal properties, 'llhen the intangible personal properties have not
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acquired a taJea13le situs without this state:
1. Accounts receiYaBle, notes, 13onds, credits, and any other intangi13le property
rights arising out of or created in the course of regular and continuing 13usiness
transactions suastantially performed outside this state;
2. Patents, trademarks, copyrights, and licensing or royalty agreements relating
to these;
3. Notes, 13onds, accounts receivaBle, and all other intercompany intangi13le
personal property due from any affiliated company; and
4. To13acco 13ase allotments.
(a) An arJRlal ad 'falorem tax fur state purposes of one thousandth of one percent
(0.001%) shall 13e paid upon money in hand, notes, 13onds, accounts, credits, and other
intangi13le assets, whether By mortgage, pledge, or otherwise, or oosecured, of
financial institutions, as defined in US 136.500.
(3) "Affiliated company" shall mean a parent corporation or suasidiary corporation, and any
corporation principally engaged in 13usiness outside the United States in which the OVffler or
the person assessed directly or indirectly OVfflS or controls not less than ten percent (10%)
of the outstanding yoting stock.
(4) With respect to the intangi13le properties taxed pursuant to su13section (2) of this section, no
other ad valorem tax shall 13e levied 13Y the state or any county, city, school, or other taxing
district on the intangi13le properties, or directly or indirectly against the OVffler.
(5) Thirty cents ($0.30) of the thirty one and one half cents ($0.315) state tax rate on real
propert)'and thirty cents ($0.30) of the furty five cents ($0.45) state tale on tangible
personalty suBject to local taxation shall 13e considered as local school district we levies for
purposes of computing any direct payments of state or federal fimds to said districts as
replacement for ad 'falorem taxes lost on property acquired 13Y a gO'fernmental agency.
Should the equPfalency ever 13e less than thirty cents ($0.30), as certified 13Y the
Departlnent of Education, the direct payments shall 13e reduced proportionately.
(6) The pro'fisions of suasection (1) of this section ]Notwithstanding subsection (l)(a) of this
section, the state tax rate on real property shall be reduced to compensate for any increase
in the aggregate assessed value of real property to the extent that the increase exceeds the
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preceding year's assessment by more than four percent (4%), excluding.::
(!!J. The assessment ofnew property as defined in KRS 132.010(8);
(b) The assessment from property which is subject to tax increment financing pursuant to
KRS Chapter 65;, and
f£1. The assessment from leasehold property which is owned and financed by a tax-
exempt governmental unit, or tax-exempt statutory authority under the provisions of
KRS Chapter 103 and entitled to the reduced rate of one and one-half cents ($0.015)
pursuant to subsection (1)l!!1. of this section. In any year in which the aggregate
assessed value of real property is less than the preceding year, the state rate shall be
increased to the extent necessary to produce the approximate amount of revenue that
was produced in the preceding year from real property.
fJlff7t.tBy July 1 each year, the cabinet shall compute the state tax rate applicable to real
property for the current year in accordance with the provisions of subsectionm~ of this
section and certify the rate to the county clerks for their use in preparing the tax bills. If the
assessments for all counties have not been certified by July 1, the cabinet shall, when either
real property assessments of at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the total number of
counties of the Commonwealth have been determined to be acceptable by the cabinet, or
when the number of counties having at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the total real
property assessment for the previous year have been determined to be acceptable by the
cabinet, make an estimate of the real property assessments of the uncertified counties and
compute the state tax rate.
ffi«&HIf the tax rate set by the cabinet as provided in subsection al.«eH of this section produces
more than a four percent (4%) increase in real property tax revenues, excluding.::
(a) The revenue resulting (rom new property as defined in KRS 132.010(8),·
l!!1. The revenue from property which is subject to tax increment financing pursuant to
KRS Chapter 65;, and
f£1. The revenue from leasehold property which is owned and financed by a tax-exempt
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governmental unit, or tax-exempt statutory authority under the provisions of KRS
Chapter 103 and entitled to the reduced rate of one and one-half cents ($0.015)
pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the rate shall be adjusted in the succeeding
year so that the cumulative total of each year's property tax revenue increase shall not
exceed four percent (4%) per year.
illff9j}The provisions of subsection @ft6* of this section notwithstanding, the assessed value
of unmined coal certified by the cabinet after July 1, J994, shall not be included with the
assessed value of other real property in determining the state real property tax rate. All
omitted unmined coal assessments made after July 1, 1994, shall also be excluded from the
provisions of subsection @ft6* of this section. The calculated rate shall, however, be
applied to unmined coal property, and the state revenue shall be devoted to the program
described in KRS 146.550 to 146.570, except that four hundred thousand dollars
($400,000) of the state revenue shall be paid annually to the State Treasury and credited to
the Kentucky Coal Council for the purpose of public education ofcoal-related issues.
[(10) Effective on or after January 1, 1990, an ad valorem tffi( for state purposes of five cents
($0.05) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of 'falue shall be paid upon goods held for
sale in the regular course of business, which, on or after January 1, 1999, includes
machinery and equipment held in a retailer's ifl-Ventory for sale or lease originating ooder a
floor plan financing arrangement; and raw materials, which includes distilled spirits and
distilled spirits itwentory, and in pfOcess materials, which includes distilled spirits and
distilled spirits iWfentory, held for incorporation in finished goods held for sale in the
regular course of business.
(11) An ad Ifalorem tax for state purposes of ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars ($100) of
assessed yalue shall be paid on the operating property of railfOads or railway companies
that operate solely vlithin the Common'liealth.
(12) l\1l ad yalorem tax for state purposes of one and one half cents ($0.015) per one hoodred
dollars ($100) of assessed yalue shall be paid on aircraft not used in the business of
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transflortiB:g flersoB:s or flroflerty for eOmJ>eB:satioB: or hire.
(13) l\n ad valorem tax for state flurposes of OB:e and OB:e half eeB:ts ($0.015) f>er OB:e
hundred dollars ($100) of assessed ¥alae shall be flaid OB: federally doeameB:ted v:essels
B:ot ased iB: the basiB:ess of tranSflortiB:g flerSOB:S or flFOflerty for eOillfleB:satioB: or hire, or
for other eommereial flW'poses.]
* * * * * * * [Voluntary Environmental Remediation Real Property Tax Incentive]
Section 57. KRS 132.200 is amended to read as follows:
All property subject to taxation for state purposes shall also be subject to taxation in the county,
city, school, or other taxing district in which it has a taxable situs, except the class[elasses] of
property described in KRS 132.030[ and 132.050,] and the following classes of property, which
shall be subject to taxation for state purposes only:
(1) Farm implements and farm machinery owned by or leased to a person actually engaged in
farming and used in his farm operation;
(2) Livestock, ratite birds, and domestic fowl;
(3) Capital stock of savings and loan associations;
(4) Machinery actually engaged in manufacturing, products in the course of manufacture, and
raw material actually on hand at the plant for the purpose of manufacture. The printing,
publication, and distribution of a newspaper or operating a job printing plant shall be
deemed to be manufacturing;
(5) Commercial radio, television, and telephonic equipment directly used or associated with
electronic equipment which broadcasts electronic signals to an antenna; however, radio or
television towers not essential to the production of the wave or signal broadcast shall not be
included;
(6) Unmanufactured agricultural products. They shall be exempt from taxation for state
purposes to the extent of the value, or amount, of any unpaid nonrecourse loans thereon
granted by the United States government or any agency thereof, and except that cities and
counties may each impose an ad valorem tax of not exceeding one and one-half cents
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($0.015) on each one hundred dollars ($100) of the fair cash value of all unmanufactured
tobacco and not exceeding four and one-half cents ($0.045) on each one hundred dollars
($100) of the fair cash value of all other unmanufactured agricultural products, subject to
taxation within their limits that are not actually on hand at the plants of manufacturing
concerns for the purpose of manufacture, nor in the hands of the producer or any agent of
the producer to whom the products have been conveyed or assigned for the purpose of sale;
(7)[ Money in hand, notes, bonds, aeeol:lflts, and other eredits, v.'hether seem'ed by mortgage,
pledge, or otherwise, or lHlseem'ed. Nothing in this seetion shall forbid loea! taxation of
fraaehises of eorporations or of finaneia! institutions, as provided for in KRS 136.575, or
domestie life inSm'anee eompames;
f8tI- All privately-owned leasehold interest III industrial buildings, as defined under KRS
103.200, owned and financed by a tax-exempt governmental unit, or tax-exempt statutory
authority under the provisions of KRS Chapter 103, except that the rate shall not apply to
the proportion ofvalue of the leasehold interest created through any private financing;
lHlft91tProperty which has been certified as a pollution control facility as defined in KRS
224.01-300;
!2J.ffWjJ Property which has been certified as an alcohol production facility as defined in
KRS 247.910;
(lO)ffl-B} On and after January 1, 1977, the assessed value of unmined coal shall be
included in the formula contained in KRS 132.590(9) in determining the amount of county
appropriation to the office of the property valuation administrator;
(l1)~ Tangible personal property located in a foreign trade zone established pursuant to
19 U.S.C. sec. 81, provided that the zone is activated in accordance with the regulations of
the United States Customs Service and the Foreign Trade Zones Board;
(l2)~ Motor vehicles qualifying for permanent registration as historic motor vehicles
under the provisions of KRS 186.043. However, nothing herein shall be construed to
exempt historical motor vehicles from the usage tax imposed by KRS 138.460;
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o3)~ Property which has been certified as a fluidized bed energy production facility as
defined in KRS 211.390;
(l4)~ All motor vehicles held for sale in the inventory of a licensed motor vehicle
dealer, which are not currently titled and registered in Kentucky and are held on an
assignment pursuant to the provisions of KRS 186A.230, and all motor vehicles with a
salvage title held by an insurance company;
(l5):Efl-6H Machinery or equipment owned by a business, industry, or organization in order
to collect, source separate, compress, bale, shred, or otherwise handle waste materials if the
machinery or equipment is primarily used for recycling purposes as defined in KRS
139.095;
06):Ef!-+:)} New farm machinery and other equipment held in the retailer's inventory for sale
under a floor plan financing arrangement by a retailer, as defined under KRS 365.800;
(l7)f8-81} New boats and new marine equipment held for retail sale under a floor plan
financing arrangement by a dealer registered under KRS 235.220;
(l8)ffl-9j} Aircraft not used in the business of transporting persons or property for
compensation or hire if an exemption is approved by the county, city, school, or other
taxing district in which the aircraft has its taxable situs;
(l9)~ Federally documented vessels not used in the business of transporting persons or
property for compensation or hire or for other commercial purposes, if an exemption is
approved by the county, city, school, or other taxing district in which the federally
documented vessel has its taxable situs;f-tm4}
(20)~ Any nonferrous metal that conforms to the quality, shape, and weight
specifications set by the New York Mercantile Exchange's special contract rules for metals,
and which is located or stored in a commodity warehouse and held on warrant, or for which
a written request has been made to a commodity warehouse to place it on warrant,
according to the rules and regulations of a trading facility. In this subsection:
(a) "Commodity warehouse" means a warehouse, shipping plant, depository, or other
B·37
House Bill 272
facility that has been designated or approved by a trading facility as a regular delivery
point for a commodity on contracts of sale for future delivery; and
(b) "Trading facility" means a facility that is designated by or registered with the federal
Commodity Futures Trading Commission under 7 U.S.C. sees. 1 et seq. "Trading
facility" includes the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, and the New York Mercantile Exchange; and
(21) Qualifying voluntary environmental remediation property for a period of three (3) years
following the issuance of a covenant not to sue by the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet for all known releases located on the property.
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House Bill 472 Uniform Environmental Covenant
AN ACT relating to uniform environmental covenants.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
SECTION 2. SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS ESTABLISHED AND A
NEW SECTION THEREOF IS CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
As used in this subchapter:
(l) "Activity and use limitations" means restrictions or obligations created under Sections 1
to 12 oUhis Act.
(2) "Applicant" means a person applving to the cabinet for approval of an environmental
covenant.
(3) "Cabinet" means the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet.
(4) "Common interest community" means a condominium. cooperative. or other real
property owed by a person as part of a parcel of real property for which there is an
obligation to pay property taxes. insurance premiums. or maintenance. or to make
improvements to the real property as described and established in a recorded
environmental covenant.
(5) "Environmental covenant" means a servitude arising under an environmental response
project that imposes activity and use limitations.
(6) "Environmental response project" means a plan or work performed for the
environmental remediation ofreal property conducted:
(0) Under a federal or state program governing environmental remediation of real
property including programs established pursuant to KRS 224.01-400. 224.01-405.
224.46-530. and 224.01-450 to 224.01-465;
(b) Incident to closure ofa solid or hazardous waste management unit. ifthe closure is
conducted with approval ofthe cabinet; or
(d Under a Commonwealth voluntary cleanup program authorized under KRS
224.01-510 to 224.01-532.
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(7) "Holder" means the grantee ofan environmental covenant.
(8) "Indexing" means the practice or method kept by a county clerk's office to record legal
property transactions.
(9) "Interest" means all or part ofa legal equitable claim to a right in real property which
shall include both possessory and nonpossessory interests.
(0) "Owner" means a person that owns a fee simple interest or any other interest in real
property that is subject to an environmental covenant.
OJ) "Person" shall have the meaning specified in KRS 224.01-010(7).
(2) "Public Notice" means the publication of required information in a daily or weekly
newspaper of major circulation located in the county or counties where the property
subject to the proposed environmental covenant is located. If there is no daily or weekly
newpaper of major circulation in the county or counties where the property is located.
public notice shall mean publication of required informantion in a daily or weekly
newpaper ofmajor circulation in a county adjacent to the county or counties where the
property is located.
OJ) "Subordination agreement" means an agreement affecting priority ofinterests in a real
property that is subject to an environmental covenant.
(4) "Servitude" means a right. burden. or restriction on the use ofreal property that passes
(rom the current owner or tenant to any owners or tenants in succession.
SECTION 3. A NEW SECTION OF SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHApTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
(J) Any person that owns an interest in a real property subject to an environmental response
project as defined in subsection (6) ofSection 1 ofthis Act as ofJuly 1.2005. may utilize
an environmental covenant as part of a corrective action plan submitted to the cabinet
for review and approval.
(2) The cabinet shall review and shall approve or deny the environmental covenant. or
request additional information as part of its review ofa corrective action plan submitted
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pursuant to KRS 224.01-400.224.01-405.224.46-530 and 224.01-450 to 224.01-465. The
cabinet shall review the environmental covenant and determine whether:
(a) The real property is eligible for an environmental covenant under Sections 1 to 12
ofthisAct;
(b) The environmental covenant is complete;
(d The environmental covenant is protective of human health. safetv. and the
environment under KRS 224.01-400. 224.01-405. 224.01-510 to 224.01-532.
224.46-530. and 224.01-450 to 224.01-465.
(d) The person proposing the environmental covenant has published. through public
notice. a notification identifying by legal description and address the property that
is being considered for an environmental covenant. the intent to place an
environmental covenant on the property, and a list ofinterest holders ofrecord.
(3) In addition to other conditions for the approval of an environmental covenant. the
cabinet may require those persons specified by the cabinet who have an interest in the
real property to sign the covenant.
(4) The cabinet may deny an environmental covenant for reasonable grounds. including a
determination that the covenant does not protect human health or the environment. The
cabinet shall specify in writing. the grounds for denying the environmental covenant.
(5) Any person. including the cabinet. that signs an environmental covenant or an
amendment thereto shall be required to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities
prescribed to him or her in the environmental covenant or amendment. The cabinet's act
ofsigning the environmental covenant shall be deemed an approval ofan environmental
covenant. Nothing contained in this subsection shall modify or deny any existing duties.
rights. or protections granted under law. except as explicitly and legally provided for in
the environmental covenant.
(6) If the environmental covenant is approved and signed in accordance with this
subchapter. those parties meeting the requirements in subsection (7) ofthis section shall
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be deemed holders. The environmental covenant shall be deemed created.
(7) A holder may be:
(a) Any person. including a person that owns an interest in the real property; or
(b) A governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real property under the laws
oOhis state or ofthe United States.
SECTION 4. A NEW SECTION OF SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
(J) An environmental covenant may identify more than one (J) holder. and the interest ofa
holder is an interest in real property.
(2) A right ofthe cabinet pursuant to Sections 1 to 12 ofthis Act or under an environmental
covenant shall not be deemed an interest in real property. The obligations imposed on a
property and holders of a property subject to an environmental covenant shall be
considered as ongoing obligations in furtherance ofprotection o(public health and the
environment and are not intended to be obligations that are reducible to a money claim
or dischargeable under bankruptcy law.
(3) The following rules apply to persons with interests in real property in existence at the
time an environmental covenant is created or modified:
(a) A person with an interest that has priority under other law shall not be affected by
an environmental covenant. except when the owner of the interest is a party to the
covenant or subordinates his or her interest to the environmental covenant in a
subordination agreement.
(b) Nothing contained in Sections 1 to 12 ofthis Act shall require a person that owns a
prior interest to subordinate that interest to an environmental covenant or to agree
to be bound by an environmental covenant.
(e) The cabinet shall have the authority to disapprove an environmental covenant ifall
prior interests to the real property are not subordinated to the environmental
covenant.
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(d) A subordination agreement may be contained in the environmental covenant
covering real property or in a separate record. If the environmental covenant
covers commonly owned property in a common interest community. the record may
be signed by any person authorized by the governing board of the owners'
association.
(e) A person's act of subordinating his or her prior interest in a real property to an
environmental covenant shall affect the prioritv ofthat person's interest. The act of
subordinating a prior interest in a real propertv subject to an environmental
covenant shall not be presumed to impose any affirmative obligation on the person
with respect to the environmental covenant.
SECTION 5. A NEW SECTION OF SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
0) An environmental covenant shall:
(a) State that the instrument is an environmental covenant executed pursuant to
Sections 1 to 12 ofthis Act;
(b) Contain a legal description ofthe real propertv and a metes and bounds description
ofthe portion ofthe real propertv;
(d Describe the activitv and use limitations imposed on the real property;
(d) Identify every holder;
(e) Be signed by the cabinet. by every holder. and. unless waived by the cabinet. by
every owner of an interest in the real property subject to the environmental
covenant; and
CO Identify the name and location ofany administrative record for the environmental
response project.
(2) In addition to the information required under subsection 0) of this section. an
environmental covenant may contain other information. restrictions. and requirements
agreed to by the persons who signed it. including:
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(a) Requirements for notice following transfer ofa specified interest in, or concerning
proposed changes in use of. application for building permits for, or proposals for
any site work affecting the contamination on, the property subject to the covenant;
(b) Requirements for periodic reporting describing compliance with the covenant;
(c) Rights of access to the property granted in connection with implementation or
enforcement ofthe covenant;
(d) A brief narrative description of the contamination and remedy, including the
contaminants of concern, the pathways of exposure, limits on exposure, and the
location and extent ofthe contamination;
(e) Limitation on amendment or termination of the covenant in addition to those
contained in Sections 9 and 10 ofthis Act; and
(0 Rights of the holder in addition to the holder's right to enforce the covenant
pursuant to Section 11 oUhis Act.
SECTION 6. A NEW SECTION OF 'SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) An environmental covenant in compliance with the provisions ofSections 1 to 12 ofthis
Act shall run with the land.
(2) An environmental covenant that is otherwise effective shall be deemed valid and shall be
enforceable even if:
(a) The environmental covenant is not appurtenant to an interest in real property,'
(b) The environmental covenant can be or has been assigned to a person other than
the original holder;
(d The environmental covenant is not of a character that has been recognized
traditionally in common law,'
(d) The environmental covenant imposes a negative burden;
(e) The environmental covenant imposes an affirmative obligation on a person having
an interest in the real property or on the holder;
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(0 The benefit or burden does not touch or concern real property;
(g) There is no privity ofestate or contract;
(h) The holder dies. ceases to exist. resigns. or is replaced; or
m The owner ofan interest subject to the environmental covenant and the holder are
the same person.
(3) An instrument that creates restrictions or obligations with respect to real property that
would qualify as activitv and use limitations except for the fact that the instrument was
recorded before the effective date of this Act shall not be invalidated or deemed
unenforceable due to:
(a) Any ofthe limitations on enforcement ofintflrests described in paragraphs (a) to m
ofsubsection (2) ofthis section; or
(b) The identification of the instrument as an easement. servitude. deed restriction. or
other interest.
(4) Sections 1 to 12 of this Act shall not invalidate or render unenforceable any interest.
whether designated as an environmental covenant or other interest. that is otherwise
enforceable under the law.
SECTION 7. A NEW SECTION OF SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
Sections 1 to 12 of this Act shall not be construed to authorize a use of real propertv that is
otherwise prohibited by zoning, by law other than is prescribed for the regulating of real
propertv in Sections 1 to 12 ofthis Act. or by a recorded instrument that has prioritv over the
environmental covenant. An environmental covenant may prohibit or restrict uses of real
property authorized by zoning or by law that are not prescribed in Sections 1 to 12 oUhis Act.
SECTION 8. A NEW SECTION OF SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) A copy of the environmental covenant shall be provided to the following persons in a
manner prescribed by the cabinet:
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(a) Each person signing the environmental covenant;
(b) Each person holding a recorded interest in the real property subject to the
environmental covenant;
(c) Each person in possession of the real property subject to the environmental
covenant;
(d) Each municipality or other unit oflocal government in which real property subject
to the environmental covenant is located; and
(e) Any other person that the cabinet requires.
(2) An environmental covenant shall not be deemed invalid due to a failure to provide a copy
ofthe environmental covenant to a person as required in subsection 0) ofthis section.
SECTION 9. A NEW SECTION OF SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
0) An environmental covenant and any amendment to or termination ofthat environmental
covenant shall be recorded in the county clerk~ office in each county that contains any
portion of the real property subject to the environmental covenant. For the purposes of
indexing. a holder shall be treated as a grantee.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) ofSection 9 ofthis Act. an environmental
covenant shall be subject to the laws ofthe Commonwealth governing the recording and
priority ofinterests in real property.
SECTION 10. A NEW SECTION OF SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
0) An environmental covenant shall be perpetual except under the following
circumstances:
(a) By its terms. the environmental covenant is limited to a specific duration or is
terminated by the occurrence ofa specific event;
(b) The environmental covenant is terminated pursuant to Section 10 ofthis Act;
(c) The environmental covenant is terminated by foreclosure of an interest that has
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priority over the environmental covenant; or
(d) The environmental covenant is terminated or modified in an eminent domain
proceeding and the following conditions exist:
1. The cabinet is a party to the eminent domain proceeding;
2. All persons identified in subsections (1) and (2) ofSection 10 ofthis Act are
given notice ofthe pendency ofthe eminent domain proceeding.· and
3. A court ofcompetent jurisdiction determines. after hearing. that the
termination or modification ofthe environmental covenant will not adversely
affect human health or the environment.
(2) If the cabinet or ifany holder determines that the intended benefits ofan environmental
covenant can no longer be realized. Franklin Circuit Court, under the doctrine of
changed circumstances, in an action in which all persons identified in subsections (1)
and (2) of Section 10 of this Act have been given notice. may terminate the
environmental covenant or reduce its burden on the real property subject to the
environmental covenant.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (1) and (2) ofthis section, an environmental
covenant may not be extinguished, limited, or impaired through the issuance of a tax
deed, foreclosure of a tax lien. or application of the doctrine of adverse possession,
prescription, abandonment, waiver. lack of enforcement, acquiescence, or a similar
doctrine.
SECTION 11. A NEW SECTION OF SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) An environmental covenant may be amended or terminated by consent only if the
amendment or termination is requested as a modification to the corrective action plan
approved by the cabinet, and only ifthe amendmend or termination is signed by:
(a) The cabinet;
(b) The current owner ofthe fee simple ofthe real property subject to the covenant;
(c) Each person that originally signed the environmental covenant or the person's
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heirs. assigns. or transferees unless:
1. The person or the person's heirs. assigns. or transferees waived in a signed
document the right to consent; or
2. A court finds that the person no longer exists or cannot be located or identified
with the exercise ofreasonable diligence; and
(d) The holder. except as otherwise provided in subsection (4)(b) oOhis section.
(2) If an interest in real propertv is subject to an environmental covenant. the interest shall
not be affected by an amendment oOhe environmental covenant unless:
(a) The current owner oOhe interest consents to the amendment; or
(b) The current owner ofthe interest has waived in a signed record the right to consent
to the amendments.
(3) Except for an assignment undertaken pursuant to a governmental reorganization.
assignment of an environmental covenant to a new holder shall be deemed an
amendment ofthe environmental covenant.
(4) Except as otherwise provided in an environmental covenant:
(a) A holder may not assign its interest without consent of the other parties to the
environmental covenant specified in subsection (1) oOhis section; and
(b) A holder may be removed and replaced by agreement of the other parties specified
in subsection (1) ofthis section.
(5) A court ofcompetent jurisdiction may fill a vacancy in the position oOhe holder.
SECTION 12. A NEW SECTION OF SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) A civil action for injunctive or other equitable relief for violation of an environmental
covenant may be brought by:
(a) A partv to the environmental covenant;
(b) The cabinet;
(c) Any person to whom the environmental covenant expressly grants power to
enforce;
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(d) A person whose interest in the real property or whose collateral or liability may be
affected by the alleged violation oUhe environmental covenant; or
(e) A municipality or other unit oflocal government in which the real property subject
to the environmental covenant is located.
(2) Sections 1 to 12 of this Act shall not limit the cabinet's exercise of regulatory authority
under law with respect to an environmental response project unless the environmental
covenant expressly prohibits the cabinet (rom undertaking specified actions.
(3) A person shall not be responsible for or subject to liability for environmental remediation
solely because the person has the right to enforce an environmental covenant.
SECTION 13. A NEW SECTION OF SUBCHAPTER 80 OF KRS CHAPTER 224 IS
CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
The cabinet shall establish and maintain a registry that contains all environmental covenants
and any amendments to or terminations of those environmental covenants. The registry also
may contain any other information concerning environmental covenants and the real property
subject to those environmental covenants that the cabinet deems appropriate. The registry
shall be deemed a public record under KRS 61.872 to 61.884.
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Senate Bill 175 Authorization to Issue Permits Pursuant to Clean Water Act Section 404
AN ACT relating to the issuance of federal permits by the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly 0/the Commonwealth 0/Kentucky:
Section 14. KRS 224.16-050 is amended to read as follows:
(1) The cabinet may issue federal permits pursuant to 33 U.S.C. sec. 1342(b) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. sees. 1251 et seq.) subject to the conditions
imposed in 33 U.S.C. sees. 1342(b) and 1342(d). The cabinet may issue federal permits
pursuant to 33 U.S.C sec. 1344(e) and (g) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 33
U.S.C secs. 1251 et seq.• subject to the conditions imposed in 33 U.S.C sec. 1344(h). (i). and
fil:. Any exemptions granted in the issuance of NPDES permits shall be pursuant to 33 U.S.C.
sees. 1311, 1312, and 1326(a). The cabinet shall report to the standing committees of
jurisdiction over environmental protection. and appropriations and revenue. no later than
January 1. 2006. on the costs. personnel requirements. and any statutory or regulatory
changes needed to support state assumption of the permitting program under 33 U.S.C
1344(e) and (g). and the anticipated benefits in permit streamlining and environmental quality
from state administration ofthe program".
(2) The cabinet may certify pursuant to 33 U.S.C. sec. 1341 that applicants for a federal permit
for the construction or operation of facilities which may result in a discharge into the
waters of the Commonwealth will comply with the applicable provisions of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. sees. 1251 et seq.).
(3) The cabinet shall not undertake either of the actions authorized in subsections (1) or (2) of
this section unless the Governor of the Commonwealth has determined that such activity
will be in the best interests of the environment and the people of the Commonwealth.
(4) The cabinet shall not impose under any permit issued pursuant to this section any effluent
limitation, monitoring requirement, or other condition which is more stringent than the
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effluent limitation, monitoring requirement, or other condition which would have been
applicable under federal regulation if the permit were issued by the federal government.
(5) Nonprofit organizations which have been qualified under Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code and which operate their own treatment facilities and which are designated
for capacities less than ten thousand (10,000) gallons per day shall be charged a fee no
greater than fifty dollars ($50) by the cabinet to process a construction permit, nor a fee
greater than twenty dollars ($20) per year for an operating permit for one (1) facility. These
fees shall in no case be higher than the fees charged by the cabinet to process permit
applications for comparable privately owned facilities. This subsection shall not apply to
any school or waterworks owned by a water district, water association, or municipality and
established pursuant to KRS Chapters 74 or 106.
(6) The following activities do not require a permit issued under 33 U.S.e. sec. 1344. The
discharge ofdredged or fill material:
(a) From normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities such as plowing,
seeding, cultivating, minor draining, harvesting for the production of food, fiber,
and forest products, or upland soil and water conservation practices;
(b) For the purpose of maintenance, including emergency reconstruction of recently
damaged parts of currently serviceable structures such as dikes, dams, levees,
groins, riprap, breakwaters. causeways, bridge abutments or approaches, and
transportation structures;
(d For the purpose ofconstruction or maintenance offarm or stock ponds, irrigation
ditches. or the maintenance ofdrainage ditches,·
(d) For the purpose of construction of temporary sedimentation basins on a
construction site which does not include placement of fill material into the
navigable waters,· or
(e) For the purpose of construction or maintenance of farm roads, forest roads, or
temporary roads for moving mining equipment, where the roads are constructed
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and maintained. in accordance with best management practices. to ensure that flow
and circulation patterns and chemical and biological characteristics of the
navigable waters are not impaired. that the reach of the navigable waters is not
reduced. and that any adverse effect on the aquatic environment will be minimized.
(7) Prior to assuming delegated authoritv from the United States Environmental Protection
Agency to administer 33 U.S.e. sec. 1344(e) and (V. the cabinet shall enter into a
memorandum of agreement with the United States Department ofAgriculture (USDA)
regarding wetlands delineation on agricultural lands or lands owned or operated by a
USDA program participant. The cabinet shall give the same deference to wetlands
delineations made by USDA as would have been given by a federal agency administering
33 U.S.e. sec. 1344(e) and (g).
(8) The cabinet may establish by regulation a fee for processing permit applications under
33 U.S.e. sec. 1344.
B - 52

PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL STANDARDS
FOR DUE DILIGENCE ON
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
ALL APPROPRIATE INQUIRY
Dennis J. Conniff
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Louisville, Kentucky
Copyright 2005. All Rights Reserved.
SECTIONC

Host, , w IBrovlIl IOdd : ~
PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL STANDARDS
FOR DUE DILIGENCE ON
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
ALL APPROPRIATE INQUIRY
Dennis J. Conniff
Frost Brown Todd LLC
Pr....talIon lor:
Envlronmental Law Institute
Unlvemly of Kentucky
College of Law
Man:h 18, 2005
BH'OSr.-C'..Ad IlU\VnRKJ &
Proposed Rule
40 CFR Part 312
69 FR 52,542 (August 26,2004)
Comment Period was extended from October 25, 2004
until November 30, 2004
69 FR 56, 016 (September 17, 2004)
Current Status
No further action on the proposed rule as of this date
What is "All Appropriate Inquiry?"
CERCLA 5ection 101(35)(A)Q)(42 usc 9601)
provides adefense to liability jf:
"At the time the defendant acquired the facility the
defendant did not know and had no reason to know
that any hazardous substance was disposed of, on,
in, or at the facility."
Commonly referred to as the "Innocent Landowner
Defense"
C' 1
it I~I' ,'rOSif , ' ,Brov-m k)(:ld ' '
What is "All Appropriate Inquiry?" (continued)
Also applies to
"Bonafide Prospective Purchasers Defense,"
CERCLA Section 101 (40}(42 USC 6901 (40)),
and the
"Contiguous Property Owners Defense," CERCLA Section 107
(q) (42 USC 9607 (q))
Small Business Uability and Brownfialds Revitalization At! of 2002
What is "All Appropriate Inquiry?" (continued)
CERCLA Section 101(B)(i)(42 USC 9601) defines
"reason to know" to mean that:
"on or befora tha data tha dalendant acquired tha facility,
dafendant conductad all approprtlla Inqulrt....."
CERCLA Section 101 (B}(ii)(42 USC 9601)
"requires EPA 19Qulation [to] astab6sh standards and pl1lclicas for
the purpose of satisfying the requirement to carry out all
appropriate inquiries"
BFiDSifl"-Aj IrOWl1uul ' , . £
CERCLA § 101(B)(iii)(42 USC 9601) requires the
standards and practices of all appropriate inquiry to
include:
The results of an inquiry by an environmental
professional
Interviews with the I!H! and present owner, operator
and occupant of the facility to gather information about
potential contamination of the facility
Review of historical sources to determine previous users
of the real property since it was first developed
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CERCLA § 101 (B)(iii)(42 USC 9601) (continued)
Review of government records
Visual inspection of the facility and adjoining
properties
The degree of obviousness of the presence or likely
presence of contamination at the property and the ability
to detect the contamination by appropriate investigation
Specialized knowledge on the part of the prospective
purchaser
- Th. reI.n""lp of tll. pUrch_ price to tll. valu. of tll.
property Wtll. property was not contamln_
- Commonly known or r81sooably ascertainable information
about the property
- Aseerch for recorded environmental iens
Interim Standards which apply to purchases
of property after May 31, 1997
until adoption of the new rule
Use of ASTM Standard E1527-97 'Standard Practice for
Environmental Site Assessment: Phase I Environmental
Site Assessment Process' satisfies the all appropriate
inquiry requirement for purchases of property after
May 31,1997 until the proposed regulation becomes
final.
NOTE: The ASTM Standard was modified in 2000, but
CERCLA incorporates the 1997 Standard
How Does The Proposed Regulation Differ
From ASTM Standard E1527-97?
More Interviews - must include past owners and
operators of the facility
More thorough visual inspection of adjoining properties
Broader review of government records for facility and
adjoining properties
Report must acknowledge areas of uncertainty
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Interviews
Most include one or more of
Current and past managers with knowledge of the
uses of the property
Past owners, operators and occupants
Employees of current and past occupants
REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT RECORDS
ASTM Standard provides specific categories of
records
Proposed regulation sets forth broad categories:
Reccrds 01 reported "'leases
Reccrds 01 activities that may have ceused a",leese, i.e. waste
units or storage lanks
Perm~ records and records of inspaclions
CERCUS records
Public health records
Emergency response notification records
Lists 01 engineering and institutional controls inclUding those
applicable to adjoining properties)
VISUAL INSPECTIONS
Must conduct visual inspections of adjoining
Properties
Must make good faith effort to gain access
If access denied, must attempt inspection from best
available public access point to view the adjoining
properties
C-4
CONTENT OF REPORT
Identify data gaps
Vague and subject to interpretation of Environmental
Professional
Will probably result in recommendation for sampling to
fill the gap
Discussion of the significance of the data gaps
Sampling and analysis not required to address data gaps
but, failure to address data gaps calls "appropriateness" of
the inquiry into question
IHust, , ' ~Brown lodd , ~
CONTENT OF REPORT
(continued)
Report should comment on fair market value
Environmental Professional may not be qualified to
evaluate fair market value
, IFrost, , "Brown 16dd :Ii: "
CONTENT OF REPORT
(continued)
Report good for one year from date of site inspection
but lien search and database review must be within 180
days of closing
Beware the delayed closing
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ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROFESSIONAL
Some Environmental Professionals currenUy
performing ASTM Environmental Site Assessments
will not meet the new qualifications
ASTM has no specific standard for an Environmental
Professional
*, I~!+c)Srt ' ' :Btuwn lodd <* "
ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROFESSIONAL (continued)
An Environmental Professional shall:
• Be a P.E. or P.G. with at least 3 years of relevant full-
time experience
or
• Have a license or certificaUon to perform environmental
inquiries and 3years relevant full-Ume experience
or
Have aBaccalaureate or higher degree in engineering,
environmental science or earth science, and 5years of
relevant full-time experience
I;rosti , ,IBrown IOdd ' ' . .
ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROFESSIONAL (continued)
Or
Have aBaccalaureate or higher degree and 10 years of
relevant full-time experience as of the effective date of
the regUlation
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ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROFESSIONAL (continued)
Prospective purchasers have duly to review the Environmental
Professional's qualifications.
Preference for aprofessional engineer or professional geologist
is consistent with typical practices under Kentucky regulatory
reqUirements that key documents be certified by P.E. or P.G.
BFin'llfI' I J '. I~rovm 0(0 .
ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROFESSIONAL cont.
All inquiries are to be undertaken by or under the
supervision of the Environmental Professional
Proposed regulation does not require Environmental
Professional to conduct the site investigation, but
preamble indicates this is required
BFrost,l)",·J j ..fmvn uul tW .i.
CONCLUSION
More Cost
Less Certainty
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These materials include the following:
1. My introduction to CSOs and the current issues surrounding them
2. Executive Summary of the EPA's 2004 Report to Congress on CSOs and SSOs
3. EPA Fact Sheet on CSO Management and Pollution Prevention
4. EPA Fact Sheet on CSO Management and Sewer Separation
5. EPA Fact Sheet on Operation and Maintenance to Reduce CSOs
6. EPA Fact Sheet on Coordinating CSO Long-Term Planning with Water Quality
Standards Reviews
7. Dept. of Justice Press Release on EPA's partial settlement with Cincinnati re SSOs
8. Cincinnati's Consent Decree
What is a Combined Sewer Overflow?
The United States Environmental Protection Agency defines a combined sewer overflow
("CSO") as a discharge from a combined sewer system at some point prior to a wastewater treatment
plant. A combined sewer system is a wastewater collection system which conveys sanitary
wastewaters and stormwater through a single pipe system to a treatment plant.
Many ofthe cities in the eastern part ofthe United States were built with a combined sewer
system. That is, the cities built pipes to convey wastewater and also built inlets into those pipes for
stormwater. In a combined sewer system, when you see stormwater enter a culvert off a street, that
stormwater goes into the same pipe as the wastewater from a house. That pipe conveys the
combined waters to a wastewater treatment plant.
Rain can overwhelm the handling capacityofa combined sewer system and cause a discharge
of the water before it gets to the treatment plant. For the most part, the discharged water is
stormwater. However, because the stormwater and the wastewaters are combined in the single pipe,
the discharged water also includes the wastewater in the pipe. Also, a diversion ofstormwater may
be necessary to prevent flooding of the treatment plant.
In theory, the best way to stop CSOs from occurring is to build two completely separate
D - 1
sewer systems. One system would carry wastewater, and the other would carry stormwater. The
wastewater system would go to the treatment plant, regardless ofwhethef there was heavy rain in
the stormwater system. Building two separate systems, however, would be an enormous undertaking
in an existing city and would cost billions of dollars. Instead of a complete sewer separation,
communities have developed different methods for ending CSOs. For example, Atlanta is building
a deep, underground tunnel which would hold water in the pipes during a storm for treatment later
as allowed by the capacity ofthe treatment plant.
Because CSOs consist ofmixtures ofsewage and stormwater, they often contain high levels
of suspended solids, pathogenic microorganisms, toxic pollutants, floatables, nutrients, oxygen-
demanding organic compounds, oil and grease, and other pollutants. CSOs can cause exceedences
ofwater quality standards which maypose risks to human health, threaten aquatic life and its habitat,
and impair the usage limit of water waste.
How Are CSOs Regulated?
CSOs are generally regulated through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit program. EPA has delegated the NPDES permit programs to the states. Therefore,
the state permitting authority is the regulator ofCSOs. EPA, however, has set forth a national policy
regarding CSOs which are implemented through the states and their permits.
EPA retains the authority to inspect systems, evaluate CSO programs, and step in with
enforcement proceedings whenever it determines that the state regulators are not aggressive enough.
In practice, the authority retained by EPA means that EPA has brought suit against numerous CSO
communities in the past few years generally resulting in judicially enforceable consent decrees.
EPA enforcement actions regarding CSOs are typically filed with the EPA and the state as
plaintiffs jointly. According to the EPA in its Guidelines for Joint State and Federal Civil
Environmental Enforcement Litigation, "the federal government and the states share common goals
of, an overlapping authorities for, protecting the environment. This fact is reflected in many ofthe
federal environmental statutes, which are premised on cooperative federalism. It is therefore
important that federal and state agencies collaborate to promote, within the regulated communityand
among the public, the notion of fair and even-handed enforcement. Further, cooperation in
environmental enforcement helps ensure that an action taken by one sovereign does not impair the
overall goals of the other sovereign."
For example, the US EPA partnered with the State of Ohio to bring a lawsuit against the
Board ofCounty Commissioners ofHamilton County, Ohio and the City ofCincinnati regarding its
CSOs and its sanitary sewer overflows ("SSOs"). The lawsuit ended with a Consent Decree that
requires the Metropolitan Sewer District ofGreater Cincinnati to spend more than $1 billion to bring
its sewer system into compliance with the Clean Water Act. The Consent Decree is based on the
premise that CSOs were caused by inadequate capacity within the combined sewer system, causing
an estimated discharge ofsix billion gallons ofuntreated wastewater each year. In addition to money
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spent on decreasing CSOs, the Consent Decree requires that the Defendants pay $1.2 million in civil
penalties and undertake supplemental environmental programs valued at $5.3 million.
What is the EPA's National Policy on CSOs?
EPA has issued a Guidance for Nine Minimum Controls which describes the EPA's expectations
for management of CSOs. They are:
1. Proper operation and regular maintenance programs for the sewer system and the
CSOs.
2. Maximum use ofthe collection system for storage.
3. Review and modification ofpre-treatment requirements to assure CSO impacts are
minimized.
4. Maximization of flow to the publicly-owned treatment works for treatment.
5. Prohibition of CSOs during dry weather.
6. Control of solid and floatable material in CSOs.
7. Pollution prevention.
8. Public notification to ensure that the public receives adequate notification of CSO
occurrences and CSO impacts.
9. Monitoring to effectively characterize CSO impacts in the efficacy ofCSO controls.
These nine minimum controls are considered by the EPA to be the minimum amount of
compliance required of each CSO community and should have been implemented years ago
according to the EPA CSO Policy. The EPA's policy behind adoption of the Nine Minimum
Controls was to force communities to do all of the inexpensive and quick-fixes that they could to
prevent or treat CSOs. For example, if the sewer system is properly operated and regularly
maintained, more wastewater would reach the treatment plant for treatment than in a poorly
operating or poorly maintained system. Ifcapacity is down because collection pipes have silted up,
under the Nine Minimum Controls, a community would have to clean out the silt as part ofa regular
maintenance program in order to maximize use ofthe collection system for storage.
Control of solids and floatables can take several forms. A solid or floatable includes trash
or leaves that gets washed into a stream with stormwater flow. Controls can include street cleaning
regularly to remove trash and leaves from the streets so that they aren't washed into the collection
system. Controls may also include screens to prevent solids and floatables from entering streams
D - 3
when stormwater causes a CSO to discharge.
The EPA's policy stresses its prohibition ofCSOs during dry weather because a dry weather
CSO is almost always sewage, not stormwater. The dry weather CSO may occur, for example, ifa
combined sewer is blocked and the discharge backs up behind that blockage until it exits through
a CSO pipe. Unlike discharge brought about through stormwater, dry weather discharge is not
diluted by the rain and runoff. Dry weather discharges occur only when something is wrong with
the system. Wet weather CSOs, on the other hand, actually occur because the system was designed
to accept stormwater up to a maximum amount and to discharge the remainder.
The EPA stresses public notification to ensure the public receives notice ofCSO occurrences
and CSO impacts because many CSOs are discharged into bodies of water where the public may
come in contact with the water. For example, in Jefferson County, Kentucky, Beargrass Creek which
runs through Cherokee Park contains CSOs which discharge during certain storm events. During
storms heavy enough to cause a discharge and immediately thereafter, the level ofpollutants in the
creek rises. Public notification along this creek tells people to stay out of the creek during such
times.
While Nine Minimum Controls was designed to take care of the easy fix, EPA has adopted
a national policy regarding CSOs which requires CSO communities to create a Long-Term Control
Plan ("LTCP"). This Long-Term Control Plan will be the communities' plan for ridding itselfof
CSOs. Essential elements of a Long-Term Control Plan are as follows:
1. Characterization, monitoring, and modeling of the combined sewer system.
2. Public participation.
3. Consideration of sensitive areas.
4. Evaluation of alternatives to meet Clean Water Act requirements using either the
"presumptive approach" or the "demonstrative approach".
5. Cost/performance considerations.
6. Operational plan.
7. Maximizing treatment at the existing treatment plant.
8. Implementation schedule.
9. Post-construction compliance monitoring the program.
By this time, every CSO community should have drafted a Long-Term Control Plan and sent
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it to their state permitting authority for approval. Long-Term Control Plan begins with studying the
system to determine methods of treating CSOs. This is where communities must be creative. For
example, building two separate sewer systems is one incredibly expensive method oftreating CSOs.
Another less expensive method may be rehabilitating certain pump stations or force mains to
maximize flow to the treatment plants. Further, communities may decide to create stormwater
storage basins which will hold stormwater while the system is full and release it at a controlled rate
after the storm is over to allow for treatment. Some communities have created underground tunnels
for storage of stormwater, while others have created detention and retention basins above ground.
In Louisville, the Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District has created a Real
Time Control System which utilizes large combined sewers that already exist under the city to hold
stormwater behind inflatable dams for later treatment. Whatever the method used, once a Long
Term Control Plan is complete, communities are required to implement the plans as soon as
practicable. Plan completion is generally made a part of discharge permit requirements.
The Intersection Between Water Quality Standards and CSOs
State water quality standard authority should be involved in the Long Term Control Planning
efforts to ensure that development of the plans are coordinated with the review, and possibly
revision, of water quality standards on CSO impacted waters. In short, CSO controls should be
designed to meet water quality standards. A Long Term Control Plan should give the highest priority
to controlling overflows to sensitive areas. Those sensitive areas would include waters with
threatened or endangered species and their habitat, waters with primary contact recreation, public
drinking water intakes or their designated protection areas, and shellfish beds.
Any Long Term Control Plan begins with characterization, monitoring and modeling ofthe
system so that a community can determine the effect ofits planned projects on the system. In order
to characterize the sewer system, a community needs to have complete rainfall records for the
geographic area of the system in order to evaluate flow variations in the receiving water body
correlate between CSOs and receiving water conditions. A community needs the comprehensive
representative monitoring program to measure their frequency, duration, flow rate, volume and
pollutant concentration of CSO discharge and to assess the impact of the CSOs on the receiving
waters. With this data, a community then creates a model of its sewer system to use as a tool in
predicting sewer system responses to various wet weather events and assessing water quality impacts
when evaluating different control strategies and alternatives. For example, with proper data a
modeling, a community could determine what effect increasing the size of a pump station would
have on a particular CSO.
The CSO program is presumed to provide an adequate level ofcontrol under the presumptive
approach if it meets the following criteria:
1. No more than an average of four overflow events per year;
2. The elimination or capture for treatment of no less than 85% by volume of the
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combined sewage collected in the system during precipitation events on a system-
wide annual average basis; or
3. The elimination or removal of no less than the mass of the pollutants identified as
causing water quality impairment through the sewer system characterization
monitoring and modeling efforts for the volumes that would be eliminated or
captured for treatment under 2.
Under the demonstrative approach, a community may demonstrate that a selective control
program is adequate to meet the water quality base requirements of the Clean Water Act. Such a
demonstration requires the following:
1. The demonstration that the Plan Control Program is adequate to meet water quality
standards and protect designated uses, unless water quality standards or uses cannot
be met as a result ofnatural background conditions or pollution sources other than
CSOs;
2. The CSO discharges remaining after implementation ofthe control program will not
preclude the attainment ofwater quality standards or the receiving waters designated
uses or contribute to their impairment;
3. The program will provide the maximum pollution reduction benefits reasonably
attainable; and
4. The program is designed to allow cost-effective expansion or cost-effective changes
if additional controls are subsequently determined to be necessary to meet water
quality standards or designated uses.
Water quality standards are adopted by each state and serve as the goals for the water body
and the legal basis for the water quality-based permit requirements under the Clean Water Act.
Water quality standards consist ofuses which the states designate for their water bodies, criteria to
protect the uses, and anti-degregation policy to protect the water quality improvements gained and
other policies affecting the implementation ofthe standards.
A primary objective of the EPA's long-term control plan is to meet water quality standards
including the designated uses through reducing risk to human health and the environment by
eliminating, relocating or controlling CSOs to the affected waters. The Clean Water Act requires
states to periodically, but at least once every three years, to hold public hearings for the purpose of
reviewing applicable water quality standards and, as appropriate, modifying and adopting standards.
The states must provide the public an opportunity to comment on any proposed revisions to water
quality standards and all revisions must be submitted to EPA for review and approval.
The EPA Is On Its Way
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EPA's CSO policies have been well-defined for a decade, but recently their enforcement of
these policies has increased. Although EPA has delegated permitting authority to the states and the
CSO policies should be implemented under permits, EPA has kept a tight reign on these programs.
In theory, EPA should allow the states to enforce this EPA policy under the permits that they issue.
EPA should only step in and enforce their policy ifthe state has failed to do so. In practice, however,
EPA doesn't wait for a state to enforce or not enforce the CSO policy. EPA's general practice is to
come in to a community and begin an enforcement project, bringing the state in as co-plaintiff.
Communities must be pro-active with their CSO policy and must go on the offense in
explaining their CSO programs and CSO successes. Further, communities would be wise to work
closely with their state permitting authorities so that the state is on their side in supporting their CSO
programs if and when the EPA comes in to assert a deficiency.
The EPA's CSO policy is intentionally open-ended to allow communities to tailor a CSO
program that fits. This can work against a community, however, if EPA levels criticism that their
CSO policy is not doing enough fast enough. To counter or head off any such criticism,
communities must communicate early and often with their permitting authorities and must continue
steady progress toward meeting their CSO plans and be able to justify those plans as adequate for
their community. If communities don't do this, the EPA will dictate a CSO policy that very well
may not fit the community at all.
While EPA's policy side can be quite creative in developing and recognizing successful CSO
policies, the enforcement side is not nearly as flexible. EPA enforcement favors sewer separations
and deep tunnels which are both expensive, capital-intensive programs that mayor may not answer
an individual community's CSO problems
The EPA's Draft Policy On Blending
Currently, the EPA has a draft policy proposed on the practice ofblending which will give
communities another tool when constructing their EPA policy. Blending occurs when large volumes
of stormwater exceed the capacity of the secondary treatment units at a sewage treatment facility.
In dry weather, incoming wastewater is treated by primary units and then secondary units. With
blending, a wastewater treatment facility would still treat as much incoming wastewater as it can
through both the primary and secondary treatment units, but amounts in excess ofthe capacity ofthe
secondary units are diverted after they leave the primary unit. These excess amounts are not given
secondary treatment, but are later recombined or blended with the wastewater that has gone through
the secondary units. These blended flows are disinfected and discharged. Blending would help
manage high-flow events at wastewater treatment plants while maintaining compliance with permit
limits. A proposed policy would clarify the requirements of the Clean Water Act and applicable
regulations on the practice ofblending and would require that municipal sewage treatment facilities
implement safeguards, including enhanced monitoring.
Blending has been practiced by quite a few communities, yet the EPA's policy regarding
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blending has been ambiguous. With the new policy, the EPA would clarify its blending regulations.
Blending should be address in the permitting process which would specify conditions under which
blended discharges are allowed and set forth monitoring requirements ofthe discharge. The ultimate
discharge would still have to meet the terms of the permit, regardless of any blending. Blending
would reduce the frequency and volume of CSOs by allowing more water to flow through the
treatment plant. It would also ensure that the increased flow to the plant would meet discharge limits
and would be given primary treatment and disinfectant. The use of blending as an option for
managing wet weather flows coming into a sewage treatment facility can help reduce overflows of
sewage from elsewhere in the system through CSOs. Blending allows a much higher volume of
incoming wastewater to receive treatment and disinfection, therebyreducing or possibly eliminating
much more harmful overflows of untreated sewage. Blending is currently being used in many
communities. In fact, many existing plants were designed to blend and manypermits for these plants
recognize blending. The EPA originally released the draft policy for public comment in late 2003,
setting a deadline for comment on January 9,2004. As oftoday, the policy has not been acted on.
Extent And Status OfCSOs In The United States In 2004
In 2004, the EPA issued a report to Congress on both CSOs and sanitary sewer overflows.
At that time, there were 828 NPDS permits with authorized discharges from CSO outfalls in 32
states. The total number of authorized outfalls listed in those permits was 9,348. Most combined
sewer systems are located in the Northeast and Great Lakes region. The estimated volume ofCSO
discharge nationwide is 850 billion gallons per year. Only 59% of communities have submitted a
long-term control plan to their permitting authorities. This is up from 34% in 2001.
Thirty-six federal judicial enforcement actions have been concluded against municipalities
in Regions 1 through 5 as a result ofCSO violations. In most cases, the relevant state served as Co-
Plaintiffwith the EPA. Sixty federal administrative orders have been issued for CSO violations in
Regions 1, 3, and 5 since 1987. Two CSO administrative penalty orders were issued to
municipalities in Massachusetts. During the same time, state-initiated CSO enforcement cases
numbered 16, and 53 state-initiated administrative actions for CSO violations were initiated.
Additionally, states issued 18 CSO administrative penalty orders.
In 2004, the EPA estimated that current combined capital investment in wastewater
infrastructure from federal, state and local governments is just over $13 billion annually. According
to industry organizations, individual utilities can pay as much as 90% of capital expenses. While
capital expenditures by state and local governments have remained relatively constant since 1988,
annual operating and maintenance expenditures have more than doubled. Many municipalities have
made significant investments in CSO controls within their jurisdictions. In the 2004 report, EPA
was able to document expenditures on CSO controls in 48 communities, totaling more than $6
billion. In reviewing data from 71 CSO communities, EPA projected that these communities needed
more than $22 billion for projected CSO capital needs.
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The u.s. EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA or"the Agency") is transmitting
this Report to Congress on the extent
of human health and environmental
impacts caused by municipal
combined sewer overflows (CSOs)
and sanitary sewer overflows (SSOs),
including the location of discharges
causing such impacts, the volume of
pollutants discharged, the constituents
discharged, the resources spent
by municipalities to address these
impacts, and the technologies used
by municipalities to address these
impacts.
Overview and Background
Why is EPA Preparing this Report?
I n the Consolidated AppropriationsAct for Fiscal Year 2001, P.L. 106-554 (or "2000 amendments to the
Clean Water Act"), Congress requested
two reports and the development of
a technology clearinghouse. The first
report was transmitted to Congress in
December 2001 as Report to Congress-
Implementation and Enforcement
of the Combined Sewer Overflow
Control Policy (EPA 2001a). This
second Report to Congress fulfIlls the
requirement that:
Not later than 3 years after
the date ofenactment of this
Act, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency
shall transmit to Congress a report
summarizing-
(A) the extent ofhuman health
and environmental impacts
caused by municipal combined
sewer overflows and sanitary
sewer overflows, including the
location ofdischarges causing such
impacts, the volume ofpollutants
discharged, and the constituents
discharged;
(B) the resources spent by
municipalities to address these
impacts; and
(C) an evaluation of the
technologies used by municipalities
to address these impacts.
Further, the technology information
compiled for this Report to
Congress will serve as a key element
in developing the technology
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SSOs include untreated discharges from SSSs
that reach waters of the United States, as
well as overflows out of manholes and onto
city streets, sidewalks, and other terrestrial
locations.
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clearinghouse requested by P.L. 106-
554.
What are CSOs and Why are They a
Problem?
Two types of public sewer systems
predominate in the United States:
combined sewer systems (CSSs) and
sanitary sewer systems (SSSs). CSSs
were among the earliest sewer systems
constructed in the United States and
were built until the first part of the
20th century. As defined in the 1994
CSO Control Policy (EPA 1994a), a
CSS is:
A wastewater collection system
owned by a state of municipality
(as defined by Section 502(4)
of the Clean Water Act) that
conveys domestic, commercial, and
industrial wastewaters and storm
water runoff through a single
pipe system to a publicly-owned
treatment works (POTW).
During wet weather events (e.g.,
rainfall or snowmelt), the combined
volume of wastewater and storm water
runoff entering CSSs often exceeds
conveyance capacity. Most CSSs are
designed to discharge flows that
exceed conveyance capacity directly to
surface waters, such as rivers, streams,
estuaries, and coastal waters. Such
events are called CSOs.
A CSO is defined as:
The discharge from a CSS at
a point prior to the POTW
treatment plant.
Some CSO outfalls discharge
infrequently, while others discharge
every time it rains. Overflow
frequency and duration varies from
system to system and from outfall to
ES-2
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outfall within a single CSS. Because
CSOs contain untreated wastewater
and storm water, they contribute
microbial pathogens and other
pollutants to surface waters. CSOs
can impact the environment and
human health. Specifically, CSOs
can cause or contribute to water
quality impairments, beach closures,
shellfish bed closures, contamination
of drinking water supplies, and other
environmental and human health
problems.
What are SSOs and Why are They a
Problem?
Since the first part of the 20th century,
municipalities in the United States
have generally constructed SSSs.
For the purposes of this Report to
Congress, an SSS is:
A municipal wastewater collection
system that conveys domestic,
commercial, and industrial
wastewater, and limited amounts
ofinfiltrated groundwater and
storm water, to aPOT~
SSSs are not designed to collect large
amounts of storm water runoff from
precipitation events. Areas served by
SSSs often have a municipal separate
storm sewer system (MS4) to collect
and convey runoff from rainfall and
snowmelt.
Untreated or partially treated
discharges from SSSs are commonly
referred to as SSOs. SSOs have a
variety of causes including blockages,
line breaks, sewer defects that allow
excess storm water and groundwater
to overload the system, lapses in sewer
system operation and maintenance,
inadequate sewer design and
construction, power failures, and
vandalism. An SSO is defined as:
An untreated or partially treated
sewage release from a SSS.
The discussion of SSOs in this
report, including national estimates
of SSO volume and frequency, does
not account for discharges from
points after the headworks of the
treatment plant, regardless of the
level of treatment, or backups into
buildings caused by problems in the
publicly-owned portion of the SSS.
EPA found that backups into buildings
are not widely tracked by permitting
authorities.
Generally speaking, SSOs can occur
at any point in an SSS, during dry
weather or wet weather. SSOs include
overflows that reach waters of the
United States. SSOs also include
overflows out of manholes and onto
city streets, sidewalks, and other
terrestrial locations. A limited number
of municipalities have SSOs that
discharge from fixed points within
their sewer system. SSSs can back
up into buildings, including private
residences. When sewage backups are
caused by problems in the publicly-
owned portion of an SSS, they are
considered SSOs.
SSOs can range in volume from
one gallon to millions of gallons.
The microbial pathogens and other
pollutants present in SSOs can
cause or contribute to water quality
impairments, beach closures, shellfish
bed closures, contamination of
drinking water supplies, and other
environmental and human health
problems.
What Statutory and Regulatory
Framework Applies to CSOs and
SSOs?
With extensive and documented
stakeholder support, EPA issued
its final CSO Control Policy on
April 19, 1994 (59 FR 18688). The
CSO Control Policy "represents a
comprehensive national strategy to
ensure that municipalities, permitting
authorities, water quality standards
authorities, and the public engage in a
comprehensive and coordinated effort
to achieve cost-effective CSO controls
that ultimately meet appropriate
health and environmental objectives."
When the CSO Control Policy was
released, many stakeholders, key
members of Congress, and EPA
advocated for it to be endorsed in
the Clean Water Act to ensure its full
implementation. In the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2001, P.L. 106-554, Congress stated
that:
...each permit, order, or decree
issued pursuant to this Act after
the date ofenactment ofthis
subsection for a discharge from a
municipal combined storm and
sanitary sewer shall conform to the
csa Control Policy signed by the
Administrator on April 11, 1994.
SSOs that reach waters of the United
States are point source discharges,
and, like other point source discharges
from municipal SSSs, are prohibited
unless authorized by an National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit. Moreover,
SSOs, including those that do not
reach waters of the United States, may
be indicative of improper operation
and maintenance of the sewer system,
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variety of shapes and sizes. including the
large box culvert shown here. In general. eso
outfalls discharge directly to receiving waters.
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and thus may violate NPDES permit
conditions.
What Methodology Did EPA Use
for this Report to Congress?
The basic study approach for this
report was to divide the congressional
request into a series of discrete study
questions, then to identify and collect
existing data appropriate to each study
question. This effort entailed:
• Reviewing existing data collected
by EPA and other federal agencies,
state and local governments, and
non-governmental organizations;
• Searching the existing literature
for environmental and human
health impacts attributable to
CSOs and SSOs, as well as the cost
and technologies used to control
CSOs and SSOs;
• Organizing forums to work
with EPA and external experts
and stakeholders on the specific
questions addressed in this report;
• Updating, verifying, and
establishing latitude and longitude
coordinates for the inventory of
CSO outfalls developed as part
of EPA's 2001 Report to Congress-
Implementation and Enforcement
of the Combined Sewer Overflow
Control Policy;
• Collecting SSO event information
from those states that compile
data on the volume, frequency,
and cause of SSO events in
electronic data management
systems;
• Developing national estimates
of the volume and frequency of
CSOs and SSOs; and
ES-4
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• Developing simple models to
estimate environmental and
human health impacts where there
was an absence of direct cause-
and-effect data.
EPA emphasized the collection,
compilation, and analysis of existing
data for this report. This effort allowed
the Agency to expand its knowledge
about CSOs and SSOs, and to identify
gaps in the existing data and in
current systems that provide such data.
This Report to Congress recognizes
that EPA should and will continue
to investigate the environmental and
human health challenges posed by wet
weather.
Response to Congress
EPA's response to thecongressional request set forthin P.L. 106-554 is presented
below, organized into five themes
addressing both CSOs and SSOs:
• Characterization
• Environmental impacts
• Human health impacts
• Control technologies
• Resources spent
What are the Location, Volume of
Pollutants, and Constituents of
C50s and 550s?
Currently, 828 NPDES permits
authorize discharges from 9,348 CSO
outfalls in 32 states (including the
District of Columbia). As shown in
Figure ES.l, most CSSs are located in
the Northeast and Great Lakes regions.
The estimated volume of CSO
discharged nationwide is 850 billion
gallons per year. The number of
CSSs and CSO permits has decreased
slightly since publication of EPA's 2001
Report to Congress-Implementation
and Enforcement of the Combined
Sewer Overflow Control Policy. Further,
the percentage of CSO long-term
control plans (LTCPs) that have been
submitted to permitting authorities
has increased from 34 to 59 percent.
This represents progress in controlling
CSOs in the United States.
As shown in Figure ES.2, SSSs are
located across the country. EPA's
2000 Clean Watersheds Needs Survey
(CWNS) Report to Congress reported
15,582 municipal SSSs with wastewater
treatment facilities; an additional
4,846 satellite SSSs collect and
transport wastewater flows to regional
wastewater treatment facilities. SSOs
have the potential to occur in any of
these SSSs.
EPA estimates that between 23,000
and 75,000 SSO events occur per year
in the United States, discharging a
total volume of three to 10 billion
gallons per year. This estimate does
not account for discharges occurring
after the headworks of the treatment
plant or backups into buildings caused
by problems in the publicly-owned
portion of an SSS. The majority
of SSO events are caused by sewer
blockages that can occur at any time.
The majority of SSO volume appears
to be related to events caused by wet
weather and excessive inflow and
infiltration.
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.. _-----------" A comparison of the estimated annual
CSO and SSO discharge volume with
treated wastewater is presented in
Table ES.1.
CSOs and SSOs contain untreated
wastewater, and therefore the pollutant
concentration depends on the service
population, the characteristics of the
sewer system, weather conditions, any
treatment provided, and other factors.
The principal pollutants present in
CSOs and SSOs are:
• Microbial pathogens
• Oxygen depleting substances
ES-6
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• Total suspended solids (TSS)
• Toxies
• Nutrients
• Floatables and trash
Pollutant concentrations in CSOs
and SSOs vary substantially, not only
from community to community and
event to event, but also within a given
event. CSOs and SSOs contribute
pollutant loadings to waterbodies
where discharges occur. It is important
to note that waterbodies also receive
pollutants of the types found in CSOs
and SSOs from other sources such as
storm water runoff.
Source Annual Discharge Volume
(billion gallons)
Treated wastewatera
SSoc
a EPA 2000a
b GPRACSO model, Section 4.5.1 of this report
c Section 4.7.4 of this report
What is the Extent of
Environmental Impacts Caused by
CSOs and SSOs?
Pollutant concentrations in CSOs
and SSOs may be sufficient to cause a
violation of water quality standards,
precluding the attainment of one or
more of the designated uses (e.g.,
swimming, boating, fishing) for the
waterbody.
CSOs and wet weather SSOs discharge
simultaneously with storm water
runoff and other nonpoint sources of
pollution. EPA recognizes that this can
make it difficult to identify and assign
specific cause-and-effect relationships
between CSOs, SSOs, and observed
water quality problems. In addition,
EPA found that the identification
and quantification of environmental
impacts caused by CSOs and SSOs
at the national level is difficult
because there is no comprehensive
national data system for tracking the
occurrence and impacts of CSOs and
SSOs.
Nevertheless, CSOs and SSOs can
by themselves affect the attainment
of designated uses and cause water
quality standards violations. Average
bacteria concentrations in CSOs and
SSOs may be several thousand times
greater than water quality standard
criteria, and waterbodies that receive
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CSO and SSO discharges may lack
sufficient dilution or assimilative
capacity. Based on modeling analysis
conducted by EPA and summarized in
Table 5.6 of this report, water quality
standards are projected to be violated
frequently, even in the absence
of other sources of fecal coliform
pollution, where discharges from SSO
events include more concentrated
wastewater (e.g., SSOs with limited
III) or when SSOs discharge to smaller
receiving waters such as a stream or
small tributary.
As shown in Figure ES.3, CSOs were
responsible for 1 percent of reported
advisories and closings, and 2 percent
of advisories and closings that had
a known cause during the 2002
swimming season. SSOs were reported
to be responsible for 6 percent of
reported advisories and closings, and
12 percent of advisories and closings
having a known cause. Studies also
identify CSOs and SSOs as a cause
of shellfish harvesting prohibitions
and restrictions in classified shellfish
growing areas.
The environmental impacts of CSOs
and SSOs are most apparent at the
local level, and as the result of large
or recurrent discharges. Examples of
localized impacts due to CSOs and
SSOs include:
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• The City of Indianapolis assessed
receiving waters in the city and
ranked CSOs high in importance
relative to other sources of
pollution.
• The State of North Carolina has
documented fish kills attributed to
SSOs since 1997.
• The State of New Jersey closed
over 30,000 acres of classified
shellfish growing areas in the
Raritan Bay area due to a large
SSO in 2003.
What is the Extent of Human
Health Impacts Caused by C50s
and 5S0s?
Microbial pathogens and toxics can
be present in CSOs and SSOs at levels
that pose risks to human health.
Human health impacts occur when
people become ill due to contact with
water or ingestion of water or shellfish
that have been contaminated by CSO
or SSO discharges. In addition, CSSs
and SSSs can back up into buildings,
including private residences. These
discharges provide a direct pathway
for human contact with untreated
wastewater. Exposure to land-based
SSOs typically occurs through the
skin via direct contact. The resulting
diseases are often similar to those
associated with exposure through
drinking water and swimming (e.g.,
gastroenteritis), but may also include
illness caused by inhaling microbial
pathogens.
Although it is clear that CSOs
and SSOs contain disease-causing
pathogens and other pollutants, EPA
has limited information on actual
human health impacts occurring as a
result of CSO and SSO events. Further,
CSOs and wet weather SSOs also tend
to occur at times (e.g., storm events)
when exposure potential may be lower.
Identification and quantification
of human health impacts caused
by CSOs and SSOs at the national
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level is difficult due to a number of
factors, including under-reporting and
incomplete tracking of waterborne
illness, contributions of pollutants
from other sources, and the lack of a
comprehensive national data system
for tracking the occurrence and
impacts of CSOs and SSOs. As an
alternative to direct data on human
health impacts, EPA modeled the
annual number of gastroenteritis
cases potentially occurring as a result
of exposure to water contaminated
by CSOs and SSOs at BEACH survey
beaches. As shown in Table 6.6,
EPA found that CSOs and SSOs are
estimated to cause between 3,448 and
5,576 illnesses annually at the subset
of recreational areas included in the
analysis.
What Technologies Have
Municipalities Used to Reduce the
Impacts of CSOs and SSOs?
Municipalities have many options in
selecting technologies to reduce the
impacts of CSOs and SSOs. These
technologies range from large-scale
structural projects (e.g., wet weather
storage facilities) to operation and
maintenance practices (e.g., sewer
cleaning). Technology selection is
determined by characteristics of the
sewer system, problems identified in
the sewer system, performance goals
established for the sewer system,
resources available, and other site-
specific considerations.
Municipalities employ a wide variety
of technologies and operating
practices to maintain existing
infrastructure, minimize the
introduction of unnecessary waste
and flow into the sewer system,
increase capture and treatment of
wet weather flow reaching the sewer
system, and minimize the impact of
any subsequent discharges on the
environment and human health. For
this Report to Congress, technologies
used to address CSOs and SSOs
have been grouped into five broad
categories:
• Operation and maintenance
practices
• Collection system controls
• Storage facilities
• Treatment technologies
• Low-impact development
techniques
EPA, states, and municipalities have
made progress in developing tools and
strategies for reducing the frequency
and volume of CSOs and SSOs.
Much remains to be done, however,
to fully realize the objectives of the
Clean Water Act and the CSO Control
Policy. Municipalities have suggested
that limited resources prevent them
from acquiring and implementing
technologies as quickly as they and
regulatory agencies would prefer.
What Resources Have
Municipalities Spent to Address
the Impacts of CSOs and SSOs?
Municipal resources used to address
CSOs and SSOs are documented in
different ways. EPA's estimates of
municipal CSO expenditures rely
on requests for Clean Water State
Revolving Loan Fund (CWSRF)
loans and on documents submitted
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to EPA's CWNS, which include CSO
LTCPs and other facility planning
documents. In addition, EPA uses a
cost curve methodology to estimate
costs for communities with CSSs
that do not submit documentation.
In communities served by SSSs, SSO
control expenditures are generally
a combination of general operation
and maintenance (O&M) and
capital expenditures. In total, EPA
documented expenditures of more
than $6 billion on CSO control
(through 2002) and at least $4 billion
on SSO control (1998-2002). EPA's
2000 CWNS estimated that at least an
additional $50.6 billion is required to
capture no less than 85 percent of the
CSO by volume, and an additional
$88.8 billion is required to control
SSOs over the next 20 years (EPA
2003b).
What Actions Should be Taken to
Reduce the Impacts of CSOs and
SSOs?
In its preparation of this report, EPA
found that:
Maintaining and improving the
integrity of the nation's wastewater
infrastructure will protect the high
level of environmental quality and
public health enjoyed in the United
States. Proper O&M of the nation's
sewers is integral to ensuring that
wastewater is collected, transported,
and treated at POTWs; and to
reducing the volume and frequency
of CSO and SSO discharges. Many
existing structural and non-structural
technologies are well suited for
CSO and SSO control. Emerging
technologies and innovative practices
hold promise for even greater
ES-l0
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reductions in pollution. Municipal
owners and operators of sewer systems
and wastewater treatment facilities
need to manage their assets effectively
and implement new controls, where
necessary, as this infrastructure
continues to age.
The impacts of CSOs and SSOs are a
concern at the local watershed level.
CSOs and SSOs are two among many
sources of pollutants that contribute
to urban water quality problems.
The watershed approach is central
to water quality assessments and the
identification of control strategies
must include all sources of pollution
affecting water quality. The presence
of sewer systems in most developed
watersheds nationwide underscores
the importance of considering
potential SSOs impacts on water
quality. Similarly, the presence of
CSOs in 32 states places them in
many watersheds across the country.
EPA, states, and municipalities should
strive toward better integration of
wet weather programs with other
NPDES, compliance assistance,
and enforcement activities. Better
integration of programs and activities
at the watershed level will provide
economies of scale with respect to
monitoring and reporting, protecting
water quality, and reducing the
impacts of CSOs and SSOs.
Improved monitoring and reporting
programs would provide better
data for decision-makers on CSO
and SSO control. Better tracking
of environmental impacts and the
incidence of waterborne disease would
increase national understanding of
the environmental and human health
impacts associated with CSOs, SSOs,
and other sources of pollution. Use
of standardized reporting formats
for information on the occurrence
and control of CSOs and SSOs would
enable EPA, states, and others to track
pollutant loads and the performance
of controls. Recent EPA efforts such
as WATERS (Watershed Assessment,
Tracking, and Environmental
ResultS) work to unite national
water quality information that was
previously available only from several
independent and unconnected
databases. EPA will continue to work
to improve the information available.
The success that the nation has
achieved in improving water quality
since passage of the Clean Water Act is
due to the collective efforts of federal
and state agencies, municipalities,
industry, non-governmental
organizations, and citizens. Continued
cooperation among these groups
is essential to meet the challenges
to clean water that lie ahead. As
described in this Report to Congress,
numerous pollutant sources threaten
the environment and human health,
but establishing direct cause-and-
effect relationships is often difficult.
The information necessary to manage
water quality problems comes from
many sources. EPA recognizes the
value of working with stakeholders
and has pursued a strategy of extensive
stakeholder participation in its policy-
making on CSO and SSO issues.
Likewise, as communities continue
to implement CSO and SSO controls,
further cooperation with municipal,
industry, and environmental
organizations is essential to ensure
successful development and
implementation of environmental
programs.
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DESCRIPTION • Waste reduction and recycling
This fact sheet describes the use of pollution
prevention best management practices (BMPs).
These practices are intended to both reduce the
volume of pollutants entering a combined sewer
system (CSS), and to help reduce the number of
combined sewer overflows (CSOs) that occur
during storm water runoff producing events.
Combined sewer systems (CSSs) are wastewater
collection systems designed to carry both sanitary
sewage and storm water runoff in a single pipe to a
wastewater treatment plant. Combined sewer
overflows occur during wet weather periods when
the hydraulic capacity of the CSS becomes
overloaded. This causes overflows at discharge
points within the CSS. Substantial water quality
and habitat benefits can be achieved by keeping
pollutants out of the CSS, and thus out of CSO
discharges. This can often be accomplished through
the implementation of a pollution prevention
program. Pollution prevention involves the use of
materials, processes, and practices that reduce or
eliminate the creation ofpollutants and waste at the
source.
Pollution prevention is broadly applicable, and is
one of the Nine Minimum Controls (NMCs) every
CSS community is expected to implement.
Pollution prevention generally relies on low
technology practices that are applied by many
individuals and commercial and industrial
establishments. Successful programs should include
public education, municipal participation, and
proper regulation. Examples include:
• Solid waste management
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• Commercial/Industrial pollution prevention
• Street cleaning
• Catch basin maintenance
• Water conservation
• Fertilizer and pesticide control
• Erosion and sediment control at construction
sites
Many of these practices overlap those addressed in
other components of the NMCs, including:
operating and maintaining the CSS; maximizing
collection system storage and flow to wastewater
treatment plants; reviewing and modifying
pretreatment programs; and controlling solids and
floatables in CSO discharges. A comparison the
efforts and relative cost of implementing pollution
prevention technologies is presented in Table 1.
These practices are further described in the sections
below:
Solid Waste Management
Solid waste management (SWM) can play an
important role in reducing the amount of litter and
pollutants that enter the CSS. Successful SWM
programs must address issues ofbulk waste disposal
(e.g. household appliances, batteries, and tires),
illegal dumping by both businesses and residential
property owners, hazardous waste collection and
disposal, street debris and animal waste removal.
Programs may also include banning or substituting
TABLE 1 A COMPARISON OF POLLUTION PREVENTION TECHNIQUES
TECHNOLOGY Implementation Relative Cost Role of Public Required
Effort Education Maintenance
Solid Waste Management M L H M
Waste Recycling and M L H M
Reduction
Commercial/Industrial M L L L
Pollution Prevention
Street Cleaning M M L H
Catch Basin Maintenance M M L H
Water Conservation L L H L
Fertilizer and Pesticide L L H L
Control
Sediment and Erosion M L L M
Control
HIGH: H MODERATE: M LOW: L
products and packaging materials that do not readily
degrade in the environment.
raw materials.
Commercial and Industrial Pollution Prevention
Waste Reduction and Recycling
Waste reduction is the design, purchase,
manufacture, oruse ofproducts and materials which
limit the amount of solid waste generated.
Recycling is the recovery and reuse of waste
materials. Waste reduction and recycling reduce the
total amount of solid waste generated by a
community. This helps limit the amount of trash
that finds its way into the CSS.
In the home, reusing and recycling common
materials such as plastic and paper reduces pollution
and eliminates the need for disposal. A
well-organized recycling program for homeowners
with clearly marked containers, established transfer
locations, and regular collection schedules can be
very effective in reducing the total amount of solid
waste produced. For industry, waste reduction and
recycling can improve environmental compliance,
lower accident rates, and reduce regulatory
liabilities, reporting requirements and insurance
rate. Waste reduction and recycling can also
increase profits by reducing the costs of waste
disposal, handling, treatment, and the purchase of
Commercial and industrial establishments contribute
large amounts of pollutants to CSSs. These
pollutants originate as either industrial waste or
storm water runoff discharged directly to the CSS.
Adherence to pretreatment requirements, the
development of spill control plans, and the
prevention or minimization of industrial discharges
during wet weather periods can reduce the amount
of industrial waste in CSOs. Employing best
management practices (BMPs) such as providing
temporary covers for outside storage areas, using
rain-proof dumpsters, performing vehicle
maintenance in covered bays, and maintaining good
housekeeping for all areas exposed to storm water
runoff, is important. Other examples of BMPs to
prevent commercial and industrial pollution include
the installation ofoil and grease traps in catch basins
(inlet chambers which provide access for runoff to
enter the CSS) that service commercial and
industrial areas, and the use ofcovered areas and/or
reverse berms to redirect runoff away from truck
and railcar load/offload areas. When coordinated in
an overall pollution prevention plan, these practices
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can reduce both storm water volume and pollutants
discharged to a CSS during wet weather periods.
Street Cleaning
Street cleaning can be an effective means of
reducing the accumulation of street debris. Street
debris is typically composed of food and beverage
wrappers and containers, paper and plastic bags,
leaves, and sand/soil. Frequent cleaning limits the
quantities of dirt, debris, and pollutants including
floatables, entering the CSS during wet weather
events. Sweeping also contributes to improved
water quality by reducing nutrient, BOD, bacterial
and metal loads delivered to the CSS.
Catch Basin Maintenance
Regularly scheduled catch basin cleaning can
prevent debris, sediment, and floatables from
accumulating in the CSS. Cleaning prevents
potential clogging ofthe basins, which helps both to
avoid localized flooding and to maintain basin
sediment trapping ability. The available options for
catch basin cleaning are manual cleaning, vacuum
cleaning, and cleaning with eductor equipment.
Catch basin cleaning is also beneficial to collection
system performance because it reduces the
likelihood of fouling or damaging downstream
pumping equipment, and it prevents sediment
buildup that can reduce capacity and accelerate
CSO events.
Water Conservation
Water conservation can be defined as practices,
techniques, and technologies that improve the
efficiency of water use. An effective water
conservation program helps to reduce CSOs by
reducing sanitary flow. This reduction provides a
net increase in CSS collection and treatment
capacity for storm water during storm events.
Fertilizer and Pesticide Control
Fertilizers and pesticides washed from the ground
surface and transported with runoff into CSSs
during wet weather events can be contained in CSO
discharges. Fertilizers, which contain high levels of
nitrogen and phosphorous, contribute to
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eutrophication of receiving waters. In addition,
pesticides are potentially toxic to aquatic life. While
the individual contribution of pollutants from a
homeowner's lawn, the grounds of a business
establishment, or a municipal park may be small, the
cumulative impact on water quality may be
significant. The control of urban fertilizer and
pesticide levels involves convincing residents,
institutions, and municipal departments to adhere to
handling and application techniques that limit
pollutant runoff. Integrated pest management
(IPM) programs that provide information on
alternatives to traditional fertilizer, pesticide, and
herbicide practices are currently being developed
within local and state governments.
Sediment and Erosion Control
Sediment and erosion control practices can play an
important role in reducing the volume of storm
water and the amount of sediment delivered to the
CSS during wet weather periods. Well-managed
soil retains rainwater, and tends to keep sediment on
site. In contrast, poorly-managed soil, particularly
at construction sites, produces unnecessary runoff
and increased sediment loads. Activities that
accelerate erosion include: removing vegetative
cover; compacting or disturbing the soil; changing
natural drainage patterns; and increasing the amount
of impermeable surfaces.
The impact ofincreased sediment and erosion on the
CSS can be substantial. System capacity is reduced
by the excess storm water, leading to larger and
more frequent overflows. In addition, sediment
often clogs catch basins and contributes to
inefficient operation of the CSS. Receiving waters
are also impacted as sediment increases turbidity,
upsets natural habitat and aquatic life, and adds
undesirable nutrients, metals, and other toxic
substances.
APPLICABILITY
Pollutionprevention prevention programs should be
applicable in all CSO communities. By relying on a
combination of public awareness programs and
community initiatives, these programs can play a
significant role in reducing CSOs. and other toxic
substances.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Solid Waste Management
The illegal disposal of household trash and
chemicals is a major problem in most CSO
communities. Public education is essential to
solving this problem. In addition to raising
awareness of waste disposal issues, programs must
provide direction to the general public. People need
accurate information on recyclable waste materials.
Clear and concise instructions for preparing all types
of household wastes, including bulk wastes, for
curbside pickup or drop-off must be disseminated.
Maintaining convenienthours ofoperation for waste
drop-off facilities will make it easier for residents to
properly dispose of waste items. Frequently
emptying municipal trash receptacles, so that they
remain empty and clean, will prevent spillover and
encourage their use. The stenciling of storm drain
catch basins serves to educate the public about the
connection between storm runoff and receiving
waters, and the dangers of dumping waste, such as
paintbrush residues and concrete truck washout,
into CSS inlets. To prevent animal waste from
entering the CSS, municipalities can institute a so
called pooper-scooper regulation and place signs
near popular walking trails or common areas
reminding people to clean up after their pets.
Waste Reduction and Recycling
Like solid waste management, recycling relies on
voluntary cooperation. Public education will be an
essential part of any successful recycling effort.
Recycling involves encouraging the reuse of
materials in both household and industrial settings.
Many reusable substances, such as motor oil and
cleaningproducts, require special storage containers
and recycling techniques.
Setting a recycling goal for the community is
important. However, it takes time for recycling
programs to become established and to have a
measurable impact. To encourage participation
recycling must be made convenient. Providing
reliable curbside collection may be the best way to
encourage household participation. Pick-ups should
occur on a regular schedule, as often as once a
week. Drop-off centers where residents may leave
recyclable materials at scheduled times can also be
established. Offices can contract with paper
recyclers for onsite pickup ofwaste paper and other
recyclables.
Commercial and Industrial Pollution Prevention
Pretreatment requirements can be reviewed and
modified to control the amount and characteristics
of industrial waste entering the CSS. Sewer use
ordinances, rules, and regulations can be
implemented to control pollutant concentrations,
and, in some instances, the timing of discharges to
the CSS. CSO communities can provide technical
assistance and incentives for pollution prevention to
commercial and industrial establishments.
Additionally, CSO communities can implement
broad programs that encourage commercial and
industrial establishments to participate in pollution
prevention programs, and they can recognize
successes. These programs include strategies for
reducing the volumes ofindustrial wastes generated
through: material substitution; process modification;
chemical and water use reductions; sensible
chemical storage; spill prevention, and good
housekeeping.
Street Cleaning
Street sweeping services are provided by either
municipal or contracted personnel. The overall
effectiveness of a street cleaning program is
primarily a function ofthe frequency and regularity
of the cleanings. The frequency of street sweeping
is determined by need, the number of miles to be
served, and local budget constraints. Other factors
for consideration include climatic conditions (e.g.,
rainfall frequency and season), the size of particles
captured by the cleaning, and street-parking
regulations. Because parked cars prohibit the street
cleaner from removing curbside litter, enforcement
of parking regulations is essential.
Sweeping programs tend to be implemented
city-wide, not just in areas serviced by CSOs.
Budget constraints may require that sweeping
efforts be timed to be most effective. Early spring
cleanings are essential in areas subject to winter salt,
sand, and cinder applications. Late fall sweepings
are essential in areas with sustained winter rains. In
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general, street sweeping provides appreciable
aesthetic benefits that go well beyond CSO control.
Catch Basin Maintenance
Implementing a successful catch basin cleaning
program requires a commitment to regularly-
scheduled cleaning and maintenance. Catch basins
should be cleaned whenever material deposited in
the bottom ofthe basin reaches a height greater than
one-third of the depth from the basin bottom to the
lowest opening into or out ofthe basin. Catch basin
cleaning is thought to mitigate the "first flush"
effect, which occurs when the initial major storm
water flow into a catch basin re-suspends deposited
material and flushes it out through the outflow pipe.
A study comparing the effect of different cleaning
schedules found that quarterly cleanings appear to
be the most effective in reducing pollutant loads.
Water Conservation
Water conservation programs should be combined
with a strong public education component that
emphasizes the fmancial and environmental benefits
associated with water conservation and water use
efficiency. Water conservation tips can be sent to
customers in newsletters that accompanywaterbills.
Local ordinances can be developed to ensure that
water conservation practices are standardized.
Utilities can also offer technical advice and
incentives to customers to encourage water
conservation.
Fertilizer and Pesticide Control
Users must receive instruction on how to safely
handle and properly apply fertilizer and pesticide
products. Public education programs should
emphasize that "more is not better," and that the
lowest effective dose listed on the label for anyone
application should always be used. Care should also
be taken to identify pests correctly so that the
proper pesticide is selected, and inappropriate
materials are not wastefully applied. Education
about alternative pest control measures can also be
valuable. Information about beneficial insects,
proper planting dates, and companion cropping
systems should be disseminated for consideration.
The caretakers of large parcels of urban land,
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including local parks departments and other
institutions, should be encouraged to lead the way
and demonstrate the responsible use of fertilizers
and pesticides. Finally, the use ofClass A biosolids
to replace or supplement synthetic fertilizer in
turfgrass establishment can greatly reduce the
quantity of runoff and its pollutant content.
Erosion and Sediment Control
Soil erosion within the CSS is most prevalent in
open space areas, at construction sites, and within
streambanks. Open space is largely comprised of
lawns in residential areas, open areas at educational,
corporate and medical institutions, and
government-owned land, including parks. The
practices most suitable for lawns and parks are
maintaining a vegetative cover and, where
applicable, using grassed drainageways and terraces
that hold the soil in place and allow water to
infiltrate on-site.
For construction sites, planning prior to disturbance
is essential. The planning should address controlling
erosion by preserving existing vegetation,
controlling sediment on site, and post construction
activities. The strategy is to spread and slow storm
water runoff when possible, and to ensure that
concentrated flows do not erode drainageways. Silt
fences, filter fabrics, and straw wattles can
effectively retain sediment on disturbed slopes.
Fabrics must be selected with an appropriate pore
size to ensure maximum sediment control for the
type of soil encountered. Rock check dams,
woodchip-filled bags, and hay bales can be effective
sediment traps in drainageways. Small onsite stilling
ponds, designed to slow runoff and allow settling,
can also be effective. Construction entrance
protection is needed to prevent tracking of
sediments onto public streets via truck tires.
Protection includes laying a woven geotextile fabric
across the entranceway and at least 50 feet into the
site. Three-inch minus rock is then placed over the
fabric. On very large construction sites, wheel
washes are often used as an additional sediment
control strategy. Additionally, environmentally-
oriented landscaping, mulching, and seeding will
contribute to erosion and sediment control. CSO
communities should consider the development of
standards and recommended practices for sediment
and erosion control to guide new development and
redevelopment projects.
IMPLEMENTATION
Solid Waste Management
Jefferson County, KY, has opened a permanent
center for the disposal ofhousehold chemicals, such
as paint thinners and solvents, cleaning solutions,
lawn chemicals, and waste oils. The center is called
AHaz Bin and operates two days per week on a year
round basis. AHaz Bin has an annual operating
budget of $250,000. During 1996, AHaz Bin
collected approximately 68,040 kilograms (150,000
pounds) of household chemicals from 2,080
households. More than 85 percent ofthe waste was
either recycled or used in fuel blending.
Waste Reduction and Recycling
Louisville, KY, provides garbage collection once a
week and conducts a simultaneous recycling
program that collects newsprint, glass, plastics, and
tin and aluminum cans. The program collects
approximately 15.2 million kilograms (15,000 tons)
of material each year, of which 75-80 percent is
fiber. The City has found a private contractor who
will purchase fibers for 2 cents per kilogram
($25/per ton). This money is used to offset costs
associated with all aspects of solid waste
management.
The Industrial Materials Exchange (IMEX) is an
element of the King County, WA, hazardous waste
management program, and has been active since
1989. IMEX's goals are to conserve energy and
resources, and to protect the environment by
helping businesses and organizations find
alternatives to the disposal of valuable materials or
wastes. 1MEX has an annual operating budget of
$250,000, which is used to help businesses find
markets for industrial by-products, surplus
materials, and wastes. Potential wastes are reused
to the mutual benefit of the supplier of the surplus
material, the user, and the environment.
Commercial and Industrial Pollution Prevention
As part of its outreach effort, The Rouge River
National Wet Weather Demonstration Project in
Michigan initiated the Rouge Friendly Business
Program. The Program works with small business
owners to help them complete a facility management
self-assessment form. The program then suggests
the implementation of source controls, such as:
storage and disposal of non-hazardous materials,
grease handling, and managing outdoor work areas.
The Program recognizes and promotes businesses
which make the suggested changes and demonstrate
river-friendly pollution prevention practices. As of
June 1997, 17 businesses have been officially
recognized.
Street Cleaning
New York City's street sweeping program cleans
just over 50 percent of the city's 18,800 curb
kilometers (11,700 curb miles). Streets are cleaned
on a regular schedule that ranges between one and
three sweepings per week.
Alternate-side-of-the-street parking regulations
support the sweeping program. There are also
ordinances in place which prohibit littering and
require property owners to clean sidewalks and
gutters daily. Enforcement agents patrol commercial
areas and fme owners who fail to maintain sidewalks
and gutters.
South Portland, ME, utilizes contracted sweeping
services to sweep the entire 160 kilometers (100
miles) of city roadways each spring. This process
yields more than 1,500 cubic meters (2,000 cubic
yards) of material annually. City streets are then
continually maintained by city personnel and
equipment throughout the summer and fall months.
On average, an additional 750 cubic meters (1,000
cubic yards) of debris is picked up during this
period.
Catch Basin Maintenance
An in-depth study of floatable discharges to New
York Harbor was recently completed. The fmal
report recommended that the City adopt a two year
cycle for cleaning catch basins, which number well
over 100,000 city-wide. In trying to meet this goal,
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the City cleaned 63,500 catch basins in 1996.
Approximately 32,000 were scheduled cleanings,
and the remaining were the result of complaints
phoned into the City's Department of
Environmental Protection.
Water Conservation
As part of its Water Smart Technology Program,
Seattle Water in Washington offered technical
assistance and fmancial incentives to commercial
customers to encourage installation of water
conservation technologies. The financial incentives
included refunds of as much as 50 percent of the
installed cost for an approved conservation project.
Through June 1997, the incentive program spent
$1.2 million, and has seen a savings of
approximately 0.9 MGD. Seattle Water also
created a toilet rebate program. The program offers
rebates of $100-$150 for each fixture replaced.
Through June 1997, the toilet program has spent
$1.4 million, and installed more than 8,000 fixtures
with an estimated water savings of 0.8 MGD. In
total, the programs have conserved approximately
1.7 MGD for the $2.6 million spent.
Fertilizer and Pesticide Control
The local hazardous waste program in King County,
WA, sponsors an annual Green Gardening Program.
The program focuses on integrated pest
management (IPM). Major program components
include working with schools, hosting tours of
gardens grown with little or no pesticides, and
holding workshops for nursery store staff, master
gardeners, and professional grounds managers.
Nearly 2,000 people participated in the various
activities in 1996, and 41 percent of participants
said they were very likely to adopt green gardening
methods. Additionally, the Washington State
University Cooperative Extension promotes the
Green Gardening Program in its weekly newspaper
column for ten weeks each spring.
Sediment and Erosion Control
The Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan
Sewer District (MSD) in Kentucky developed
erosion control standards for the county. The
standards require erosion controls (silt fence
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placement) to be in place before the soil is
disturbed, and will stipulate that any site left 14 days
without activity be stabilized. Additionally, no more
than 500 linear meters (1,500 linear feet) of earth
can be disturbed at one time.
In addition, the local governments of Louisville
and Jefferson County are working together to
reduce the generation of household and industrial
wastes. The MSD modified wastewater rates to
encourage industrial water conservation and
pretreatment. Additionally, an erosion control plan
is now a required component for construction
activities. MSD developed a set of minimum
requirements which can be easily inserted into most
construction plans. Recently, MSD offered
instruction in sediment and erosion control to
private design engineering firms and contractors
who frequently work on municipal projects and to
governmentemployees involved inplanning, design,
construction, and inspection. Complementing that
work, the Department of Solid Waste Management
and Services (SWMS) has reduced the amount of
household waste entering local landfills by providing
separate weekly collections for recyclable and
compostable waste. To further encourage waste
reduction, SWMS has reduced residential garbage
collection from twice to once per week. Also, the
Jefferson County Department of Environmental
Protection and Management has opened a
permanent center for the disposal of household
hazardous waste. The combined efforts have
yielded the collection of 170 million kilograms
(168,000 tons) of recyclable materials in 1996, the
recycling or reuse of more than 85 percent of the
household hazardous waste brought to the center,
and decreased water demands from a growing
population.
COSTS
Cost comparisons for the wide range of strategies
used for pollution prevention are difficult to make
without consideration of site-specific factors. The
following section summarizes the range of costs
representative of each pollution prevention
technique:
Solid Waste Management
Costs vary greatly depending on the type of
program implemented and the size of the
community.
Waste Reduction and Recycling
The costs associated with municipal recycling
programs are typically between one and two dollars
per household per month. This estimate includes
expenses of 7.4 to 7.8 cents per kilogram ($75-80
per ton) to collect the recyclables. However,
recyclables often generate $0.02-0.025 perkilogram
($20-25 per ton) in revenue.
Street Cleaning
Cost will depend on the frequency of cleaning, the
number of cars on the street, the degree of
enforcement of parking regulations, the volume of
litter, and the types of labor and machinery
employed. Cost will also depend on the landfill
tipping fees associated with the removed debris. The
reported costs ofsweeping vary widely, but average
$62 per curb kilometer ($100 per curb mile).
Catch Basin Maintenance
The cost to clean catch basins can range from $65
to $110 per basin, depending on the type of
equipment used. This figure includes machine
rental, fuel, and labor costs. The purchase cost for
vacuum trucks ranges from $150,000 to $200,000
for trucks having a capacity of 7.6 to 12.2 cubic
meters (10 to 16 cubic yards) of material. Recent
technological advances have produced high
performance vacuum sweeping trucks that can also
clean out catch basins. Maintenance costs are
estimated by a manufacturer to range from $12,500
to $15,000 per truck per year. The cost estimate
does not include fuel, but reflects costs for routine
maintenance materials and mechanic-time.
Water Conservation
Costs are closely tied to program specifics.
Incentive programs average a one-time cost of
$0.25-0.50 cents per liter ($1 to $2 per gallon) of
water saved per day.
Sediment and Erosion Control
Blankets/Fencing
Netted erosion control blankets average $0.75 per
square meter ($0.65 per square yard) for straw and
$1.35 per square meter ($1.15 per square yard) for
coconut-based material (50 square meter/60 square
yard blankets). Tight-knit coconut fiber rolls, for
long steep slopes, average $2.40-4.20 per square
meter ($2.00-3.50 per square yard). Synthetic
blankets average $4.80 per square meter ($4.00 per
square yard). Silt fences (with pocketed post slots)
are sold by the 30.5 meter (100 foot roll), with
prices starting at $0.11 to $0.15 per linear meter
($0.35 to $0.50 per linear foot), uninstalled.
Vegetative Controls
Vegetative controls include broadcast seeding and
hydroseeding. Typical costs for simple broadcast
seeding with an economical erosion control seed
mix are $245-$620 per hectare ($100-$250 per
acre). Commercial hydroseeding averages $1980-
$2470 per hectare (800-$1000) per acre. The cost
of supplying any needed water to the site can result
in significant additional costs. Devices aimed at
keeping seed in place during germination include
straw mulch ($2.00-$4.00 per bale) and straw
wattles ($4.25 per linear meter, or $1.30 per linear
foot).
Inlet Protection
Catch basin inlet protection can include inlet bags,
grate wraps, woodchip-filled mesh bags, and
rock/block/screens. Inlet bags and grate wraps
average $60-$75 per unit. Woodchip filter bags,
where available, average $2.75 per 25 centimeter by
75 centimeter (10 inch by 30 inch) bag.
Rock/block/screen average $12-$15 per inlet,
although most of this material can later be used for
construction purposes.
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Construction Entrance Protection
Woven geotextile fabric costs average $1.10-$2.30
per square meter ($0.90-$1.90 per square yard).
Three-inch minus rock costs average $6.50-$8.75
per meter ($6.00-$8.00 per yard) plus delivery
charges.
REFERENCES
1. Bryd, R. E., 1987. "A Storm Water-Borne
Pollutant Export From Turfgrass
Established on Soils Amended with
Composted Domestic Wastewater Sludges."
Master's Thesis, Virginia Tech.
2. New York City Department of
Environmental Protection, 1995. City- Wide
Floatables Study. Prepared for the Bureau
of Environmental Engineering, Division of
Water Quality Improvement, byHydroQual,
Inc.
3. U.S. EPA, 1992. Storm Water
Management for Industrial
Activities;DevelopingPollution Prevention
Plans and Best Management Practices.
EPA 832/R-92-006.
4. U.S. EPA, 1992. Storm Water
Management for Construction Activities;
DevelopingPollution Prevention Plans and
Best Management Practices. EPA 832/R-
92-005.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Jefferson County Metro Sewer District
Dan Knowles
700 West Liberty Street
Louisville, KY 40203
King County, Washington
Dave Hancock
Department ofNatural Resources, Water and Land
Resources Division, Drainage Services Section
700 5th Avenue, Suite 2200
Seattle, WA 98104
D - 29
City of New York, New York
Eric Delva
Bureau of Clean Water
New York City Department of Environmental
Protection
96-05 Horace Harding Express Way
Corona, NY 11368
Rouge River Demonstration Project
Vyto Kaunelis
Wayne County Department of Environment
415 Clifford Street, 7th Floor
Detroit, MI 48226
City of South Portland, Maine
Jay Reynolds
City of South Portland Engineering Department
25 Cottage Road
South Portland, ME 04106
The mention oftrade names or commercial products
does not constitute endorsement or recommendation
for the use by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency.
For more infOlmation contact:
Municipal Technology Branch
U.S. EPA
Mail Code 4204
401 M St., S.W.
Washington, D.C., 20460
~MTB
MUNICIPAL TECHNOLOGY BRAN H
D - 30
Combined Sewer Overflow
Management Fact Sheet
Sewer Separation
&EPA
United States
Environmental Protection
Agency
Office of Water
Washington, D.C.
EPA 832-F-99-041
September 1999
DESCRIPTION
Sewer systems that convey both sanitary sewage
and storm water through a single pipe are referred
to as combined sewer systems (CSSs). In dry
weather and during light to moderate rainfall, the
CSS is able to convey all flows to the wastewater
treatment facility. During periods ofheavy rainfall,
however, the capacity ofthe CSS may be exceeded,
often causing untreated combined sewage and storm
water to back up into basements and to overflow
from manholes onto surface streets. Traditionally,
CSS outfalls were designed to discharge directly
into receiving waters during combined sewer
overflows (CSOs). This was done to prevent the
excessive combined flows from directly impacting
public health via basement and street flooding.
In addition to flooding problems, CSOs can cause
problems in receiving water bodies. CSOs can
contain untreated domestic, industrial, and
commercial wastes, as well as storm water runoff.
Contaminants contributed by these sources include
potentially high concentrations ofsuspended solids,
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), oils and grease,
toxics, nutrients, floatables, pathogenic
microorganisms, and other pollutants. CSO
pollution has caused many receiving waters to
exceed water quality standards, resulting in threats
to public health, aquatic species, or aquatic habitat.
CSO pollutants have impaired receiving water body
uses and have contributed to restrictions on shellfish
harvesting, occasional fish kills, and numerous
beach closures. Potential odors and solids deposits
in the receiving water body can also compromise
aesthetics and limit recreational uses of the water
body.
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Many communities have studied and evaluated CSO
control strategies that would effectively reduce, if
not necessarily eliminate, CSOs and their associated
health and ecological risks. One of the strategies
often considered is sewer separation.
Sewer separation is the practice of separating the
combined, single pipe system into separate sewers
for sanitary and storm water flows. In a separate
system, storm water is conveyed to a storm water
outfall for discharge directly into the receiving
water. Based on a comprehensive review of a
community's sewer system, separating part or all of
its combined systems into distinct storm and sanitary
sewer systems may be feasible. Communities that
elect for partial separation typically use other CSO
controls in the areas that are not separated.
APPLICABILITY
Sewer separation can be considered wherever there
is a CSS. However, an evaluation of the most
appropriate CSO control should be performed prior
to selecting sewer separation or any other measure.
Sewer separation has often been the appropriate
technology in areas where one or more of the
following conditions exist:
• Most sewers are already separated;
• Siting constraints and costs prohibit the use
of other structural measures;
• The uses and the assimilative capacities of
receiving waters prohibit the use of other
CSO controls;
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Positive impacts resulting from sewer separation
include: reduction or elimination of basement and
street flooding; reduction or elimination of sanitary
discharges to receiving waters; decreased impacts to
aquatic species and habitat; decreased contact risk
with pathogens and bacteria from domestic sewage
in the receiving water; and relief from CSO
regulations. In addition, incidental infrastructure
One of the largest sewer separation projects
occurred in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and South St.
Paul, MN. The project involved pipe separation in
more than 21,000 acres of drainage area. By
December 1996, 189 miles of storm sewers and
11.9 miles of sanitary sewers had been installed.
This program was needed to reduce the number of
overflows that were estimated to occur an average
of once every three days (American City and
County, 1996). Overflows have been significantly
reduced by this separation project.
Sewer separation has been used effectively in many
communities. Most of the approximately 1,000
communities that are served by CSSs are located in
the Northeast and the Great Lakes region.
Complete or partial separation of CSSs has
occurred in many ofthese areas, as well as in several
locations in the West. Cities that have completely
or partially separated CSSs include: Minneapolis,
St. Paul, and South St. Paul, MN; the metro
Detroit, MI, area; the metro Boston, MA, area;
Salem and Portland, OR; the metro Seattle, WA,
area; Lynchburg, VA; Bangor, ME; Hartford and
Norwich, CT; and Remington, IN. Columbus, OH,
has recently elected to separate its CSS as well.
Separating CSSs may contribute to improvements to
water quality due to the reduction or elimination of
sanitary discharges to receiving water bodies.
However, the increased storm water discharges
resulting from sewer separation could decrease the
positive impacts of the separation unless storm
water discharges are mitigated. Without mitigation,
increased loads ofstorm water pollutants, including
heavy metals, sediments, and nutrients, may run off
into local water bodies. For example, in Atlanta,
GA, sewer separation was predicted to increase
pollution to local creeks (AMSA, 1994) as polluted
storm waterpreviously reaching the treatmentplants
now is discharged directly into receiving waters.
However, in many cases, separating sewers reduces
pollution to receiving waters, as described above for
St. Paul, MN. A second example of successfully
reducing pollution to receiving water bodies has
occurred in Juneau, AK. It has been reported that
in Juneau, where there is in excess of 70 inches of
precipitation a year, the storm water concentrations
conveyed through the recently separated storm
water sewers are rather dilute. This has also been
attributed to large quantities of clean groundwater
that infiltrate into the storm sewer, relatively clean
activities within the watershed, and several
non-point source pollution control programs within
the City (City ofJuneau, 1997). Existing and future
storm water impacts to the receiving water body
should be evaluated prior to implementing sewer
separation.
work (e.g., road repaving and the repair or
replacement ofmiscellaneous utilities, such as water
and cable lines) could be conducted more cost
effectively if it were to coincide with sewer
separation. For example, as a result of the CSO
program in the City of St. Paul, MN, streets were
paved and handicap ramps were added to sidewalks,
gas and water mains were installed, gas services
were renewed or replaced, lead water service
connections were replaced, and street lights were
installed.
Negative impacts associated with sewer separation
include extensive construction and construction
related impacts (e.g., noise, dust, erosion),
disruption to residents and businesses, possible
disruptions in sewer service, and the need for storm
water controls or best management practices.
Other CSO strategies are not publicly
acceptable;
Elimination of CSOs is desired; and/or
The combined system is undersized;
Additional infrastructure improvements,
such as road repaving, are also required;
Other CSO measures are not able to achieve
the community's goals.
•
•
•
•
•
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In addition, complete separation of sanitary and
stonn water flows can be hard to accomplish
whether the combined sewer is converted to a stonn
sewer or to a sanitary sewer. Complete separation
of a CSS would involve disconnection of all stonn
water drainage structures, sump pumps, and roof
and footer drains. Disconnection of footer drains is
often not cost effective. Some communities have
offered financial incentives to homeowners and
businesses for voluntarily disconnecting some of
these stonn water sources from sanitary sewers.
Many communities have also passed ordinances
requiring the disconnection. Despite these
provisions, there is still potential for some stonn
water flows to remain connected to sanitary sewers.
Likewise, complete disconnection of sanitary flows
from a converted stonn water sewer may be difficult
to accomplish, but is usually more successful than
eliminating all stonn flow connections from
connected sanitary sewers.
KEY PROGRAM COMPONENTS
Decisions for a CSO control strategy should be
made on a site-by-site basis utilizing drainage area
data, receiving water use and water quality data, and
sewer system data. Sewer system infonnation can
be obtained from review of sewer plans, television
inspection, and flooding records. Communities may
consider perfonning house to house inventories of
house connections to the combined system (i.e.,
sanitary and roofdrains). This was successfully done
in parts of the metropolitan Boston area. Modeling
and Geographical Infonnation Systems (GIS) may
be useful data analysis and prediction tools.
Using these data, communities should detennine
what CSO controls, or combination ofcontrols, will
meet perfonnance goals established by the
community. Other factors, such as cost
effectiveness, natural and urban topography and soil
types, siting constraints, location of current and
future utilities, land use and cover, existing sewer
capacity, layout, and condition, pump and treatment
plant capacities, and requirement for other
infrastructure work in the same area, should be
considered before finalizing project plans. For
example, sewer separation was selected in
Minneapolis, South St. Paul, and St. Paul, MN, due
to local needs for eliminating sewage backups into
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basements, reducing street flooding, and
reconstructing aging portions of the sewer system
(MWCC, 1984).
Sewer separation can be accomplished through
installing new stonn or sanitary sewers to be used in
conjunction with the existing sewer. Economics,
capacity, condition, and layout of the combined
sewer are the typical factors used in deciding the
existing line's post-separation use.
An advantage ofconverting the combined sewer to
a sanitary sewer (referred to as a converted sanitary
sewer in this document) is that all sanitary flows are
already connected to the converted sanitary sewer.
Using the existing combined sewer as the sanitary
sewer and installing a new stonn sewer would likely
require that any overflow weirs, gates, or other
regulating devices remaining in the converted
sanitary system be bulkheaded or otherwise disabled
to eliminate the potential for sewage to overflow.
In addition, stonn water drainage structures, sump
pumps, and roof drains must be disconnected from
the converted sanitary system and connected to the
new stonn water sewer. This will provide more
capacity in the converted sanitary sewer and will
reduce the possibility ofoverflows. Building footer
drains, however, are often left connected to the
existing combined system and do consume some of
the converted sanitary sewer capacity.
Rehabilitation or relining of the converted sanitary
system, storage tanks, and/or equalization basins
may be required if inftltration is a significant
problem due to cracks or inadequate construction
materials (e.g., brick sewers). In some cases, such
as in Juneau, AK, the existing combined sewer may
be in such poor condition that new sanitary sewers,
as well as new stonn sewers, are constructed.
There are some circumstances that may make the
conversion ofthe combined sewer to a stonn sewer
(referred to as a converted stonn sewer in this
document) more appropriate. For instance,
combined sewers that have a large diameter and
have little slope (less than 3 percent) would not
have the flushing velocity required of a sanitary
sewer. In cases such as this, the existing CSS may
be more appropriately converted to a stonn sewer,
provided that the sewer has sufficient capacity for
safe conveyance of the local design stonn. A
smaller sewer should be appropriately designed,
sized, and constructed to convey the sanitary flows.
Storm, roof, and footer drains, as well as
catchbasins could remain connected to the
converted storm sewer. Sanitary connections,
however, would need to be disconnected and
conveyed to the new sanitary line. Any remaining
sanitary lines connected to the converted storm
sewer will cause direct discharges of sanitary flows
to the receiving water body. Post-separation
sampling and monitoring of the converted storm
sewer is typically required to confirm that all
sanitary flows have been removed from the
converted storm sewer and redirected into the
sanitary sewer. Conversion of the combined sewer
to a storm sewer would also require that the
interceptor connection at the regulating device (e.g.,
weir or gate) be plugged, and may potentially
require modifications to prevent water from
stagnating upstream of the regulator.
Consideration should be given to coordinating
sewer separation with improvements to other
utilities, as this enhances the cost-effectiveness of
both/all projects and minimizes disruption to the
public.
IMPLEMENTATION
Sewer separation reduces and often eliminates
untreated sanitary discharges from discharging into
receiving water bodies, and therefore positively
impacts receiving water quality. Sewer separation,
however, greatly increases untreated storm water
discharges to the receiving water body. In a CSS,
at least some of the storm water flows are treated at
the treatment plant. The performance achieved with
sewer separation will vary depending on the existing
storm water pollutant loading and the existing
sanitary pollutant loading. For example, a study
performed for North Dorchester Bay, MA,
estimated that the overall fecal coliform removal
potentially achieved by sewer separation was only
45 percent (Metcalf & Eddy, 1994). This was
attributed to the increase in storm water discharges
to the receiving water body, and the corresponding
increase in non-point runoffpollutants.
Actual fecal coliform removal rates have been
determined for several sites where sewer separation
has been implemented. Water quality monitoring
data collected in St. Paul and Minneapolis from
1976 to 1996 indicated a fecal coliform
concentration reduction of 70 percent. One of the
four sites where data was collected reduced fecal
coliform concentrations from an average of 500
organisms per 100 mL to 150 organisms per 100
mL. At another site, fecal coliforms were reduced
from 489 organisms per 100 mL to 143 organisms
per 100 mL (Richman, 1996). This reduction has
been attributed to sewer separation and to the
reduction in the number of overflows occurring
every year.
Sewer separation may also result in other related
improvements to water quality. In stretches of the
Mississippi, water quality improvements attributed
to sewer separation projects have resulted in the
return of the pollution-sensitive Hexagenia mayfly
after a 30 year absence; the return ofBald Eagles to
the area; and the recovery of fish populations and
diversity from 3 species to over 25 species (Cities of
Minneapolis, et. aI., 1996).
Monitoring the performance of CSO control
strategies at the Rouge River Demonstration
Program has been underway since the summer of
1997. Part of the monitoring program will identify
the effectiveness of sewer separation in terms of
improvements to water quality. Instream
monitoring is also occurring in Portland, OR. The
supplemental data will add to the performance data
collected in Minnesota (70 percent fecal coliform
reduction) and estimated for Massachusetts (45
percent fecal coliform reduction).
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE
The Operations and Maintenance (O&M
requirements of separated sewers are generally the
same as those ofother sewer systems. Maintenance
must be conducted on pump stations (including
routinely cleaning wet wells, testing for adequate
pumping capacity, and exercising pumps and
stand-by generators), sewer lines, and catchbasins
and grit chambers. Catchbasins and grit chambers
located in the sanitary or storm sewer system will
require routine cleaning to prevent accumulation of
sediment. Jet spray cleaning, pumping, and
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vacuuming are common methods for cleaning
catchbasins and grit chambers.
In addition, all sewer lines, and in particular sewers
that were previously combined, need to be
monitored to verify hydraulic capacity and to
identify infiltration and inflow. Basement or street
flooding is a likely indication of hydraulic capacity
or gradient problems in the sewer and may require
major repairs. Excessive infiltration into a converted
sanitary sewer may require rehabilitation of the
sewer system. Methods for assessing the condition
of the sewers include modeling, smoke testing, and
television inspection. Monitoring will identify
cracked and collapsed sewers that will need to be
repaired. In addition, monitoring can identify the
location and cause of sewer blockages. To prevent
blockages, lodged debris, sediment, and grit must be
removed on a regular basis.
Post-separation monitoring and sampling may be
required to ensure that no sanitary flows are still
connected to the storm sewer and being directly
discharged to the receiving water body.
Alternatively, simple dye studies can be employed to
verify separation.
COSTS
Separation costs vary considerably due to the
location and layout ofexisting sewers; the location
ofother utilities that will have to be avoided during
construction; other infrastructure work that may be
required; land uses and costs; and the construction
method used (e.g., open cut verses microtunneling).
Communities that have other infrastructure
requirements (such as road repairs) in addition to
sewer separation may find that upgrading the
facilities simultaneously can result in a much lower
cost relative to upgrading them independently.
Construction occurring in existing right-of-ways
would probably not require land acquisition, and
thus would not add to the project cost. Project
costs could increase depending on the land use. For
example, project construction occurring in an
industrial area that contained hazardous materials or
wastes would likely increase the project cost.
Methods ofconstruction, such as the need to tunnel
or bore versus open cutting, can also add to the
cost. Project costs could also increase if sanitary
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equalization basins are required as part of the
separation project or if storm water best
management practices are required to control the
increased storm water discharges to the receiving
water body.
Actual construction costs are available from the St.
Paul sewer separation project. For that project,
sewer separation costs ranged from $8,350/acre
to$40,060/acre, with an average cost of
$15,400/acre (all costs are in 1984 dollars).
Estimates from the City ofPortland and Detroit are
$18,000/acre and $67,800/acre, respectively.
The Rouge River project has also generated good
cost data for sewer separation. Costs were
approximately $377,000 for separating
approximately 600 meters of pipe on a small
residential street (CSO Area 42, Windsor Avenue),
which included costs for removing existing
pavement, laying a new sewer line, and re-paving
and re-sodding. A second project (CSO Area uing
cost $1.3 million to separate approximately 2,600
meters of pipe. All costs are presented in 1995
dollars.
The cost of operation and maintenance (O&M) of
the separated sewer system is difficult to predict.
Factors contributing to the O&M costs include the
age and the condition of the previously combined
sewer, the length and diameter of the sewers, the
frequency and the amount ofsand and grit removed,
and the size of drainage areas.
Sewer separation can reduce treatment and O&M
costs at the receiving treatment plant by potentially
eliminating storm water flows to the plant. Energy
costs for transporting flows to the treatment plant
could also be reduced due to the reduced flow
volume.
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DESCRIPTION pose risks to human health, threaten aquatic species,
and damage the waterways.
Combined sewer systems (CSSs), as shown in
Figure 1, are single-pipe sewer systems that convey
sanitary wastewaters (domestic, commercial and
industrial) and storm water runoff to a publicly
owned treatment works. During periods of heavy
rainfall, however, the sanitary wastewaters and
storm waters can overflow the conveyance system
and discharge directly to surface water bodies. This
is called a combined sewer overflow (CSO).
CSOs may contain high levels of suspended solids,
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), oil and grease,
floatables, toxic pollutants, pathogenic
microorganisms and other pollutants. These
pollutants can exceed water quality standards and
Because ofthe pollution potential from CSOs, EPA
issued the CSO Control Policy on April 19, 1994.
This policy states that permittees with CSSs that
have CSOs should be able to provide, at a
minimum, primary treatment and disinfection, when
necessary, to 85 percent of the volume captured in
a CSS on an annual average basis. The policy also
includes nine minimum control requirements for
inclusion in the CSO discharge permit. One of
these minimum controls is proper operation and
regularmaintenance (O&M) programs for the sewer
systems with CSOs.
KEY PROGRAM COMPONENTS
• Scheduling routine inspections,
maintenance and cleaning of the CSS,
regulators and outfalls.
Proper O&M of combined sanitary sewers and
overflows is not significantly different from that of
sanitary sewer systems, with the objective being to
maintain maximum flow to the wastewater
treatment plant and to maximize either in-line
storage capacity or detention upstream of the
system inlets. There are several key components of
an O&M program that a municipality/authority
must provide to ensure proper O&M and to meet
the minimum control requirement. These program
components include:
Source: u.s. EPA, 1989.
FIGURE 1 COMBINED SEWER SYSTEM
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•
•
Developing O&M reporting and record
keeping systems with maintenance
procedures and inspection reports.
Providing training for O&M personnel.
• Reviewing the O&M program periodically
to up-date and revise procedures as
necessary.
These components are further described below.
Operational Review
Prior to developing an O&M program, the
municipality should undertake an operational
review ofits system to inventory and assess existing
facilities, operating conditions and maintenance
practices. The municipality should have a complete
plan of the collection system, showing all sewers
and points where CSOs and outfalls are located.
This plan should reference streets and other utilities
to enable the maintenance crews to locate the
structures and CSOs quickly. This plan may also
aid in scheduling and planning the inspection and
maintenance of the CSS system and overflows; for
example, the regions or areas that are prone to
flooding or premature overflows should be
inspected first after a major storm.
The nine minimum CSO control requirements
include conducting a characterization of the CSS.
This characterization should include documentation
of overflow occurrences and correlation of these
events with rainfall patterns (e.g., volume, intensity,
duration). The results of the CSS characterization
are critical to designing an O&M program that is
effective in optimizing system operations. As part
of these studies, it is important to measure actual
system flows and the response to various operating
and wet weather conditions. This information will
be critical during the development of specific
operation and maintenance procedures that will be
part of the O&M program.
Municipalities may eventually be able to use data
from their Long-term CSO Control Plans to
supplement their O&M programs. As part ofthese
plans, a system may conduct modeling of the
integrated system (sewers, regulators, and treatment
plant) to analyze operational improvements. These
modeling efforts typically identify operational
modifications that maximize storage and transport,
provide improved treatment in the existing system,
and decrease untreated CSO discharges. Because
many municipalities will implement their O&M
programs before their Long-term CSO Control
Plans are completed, the results of the CSS
modeling may not be available during the early
phase of the O&M program. However, the O&M
program should be updated periodically to address
this type of additional information.
Record Keeping System
The O&M program should include a record keeping
component. The record keeping system should
document maintenance procedures through
inspection reports. These reports should include
information about when the system was inspected,
and, if applicable, what maintenance action was
taken, including the equipment used and the
personnel involved. Geographical information
systems (GIS) and desktop mapping may be useful
in storing O&M data on the CSO system, as well as
in developing a database of problem areas.
System Operating Procedures
Each municipality should have written policies,
procedures, or protocols for training O&M
personnel and should conduct periodic reviews and
revisions of the O&M program. Some
municipalities have reported that alternating crews
between O&M and other functions has proven
beneficial because it reduces the tedium ofthe work
by making it less routine, and it promotes the cross-
training ofemployees. Other municipalities prefer
devoting personnel strictly to O&M because it
keeps the work assignments simple.
Training
The O&M Program should have established
training goals, procedures, and schedules. Training
should provide the maintenance personnel with an
understanding of the CSS operations and system
characteristics. Hands-on training illustrates the
specific O&M procedure to those directly
responsible for performing these activities. In
addition, the nature of the O&M work may require
employees to work in confined spaces or to be
exposed to dangerous gases. Providing proper
safety training, in accordance with Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
standards, is imperative. Safety programs should be
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reviewed, and, if necessary, updated periodically.
Tide gates that require underwater inspection
should only be inspected by a certified diver.
ROUTINE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES
Proper operation of the CSO system begins with
proper operation and maintenance ofthe individual
components - the regulators, tide gates, pump
stations, sewer lines, and catch basins; and
implementation of an organized plan that provides
regular, consistent, and response-oriented O&M. In
addition, operators must develop plans for
determining where CSOs occur, and for conducting
system-specific repairs to prevent future CSOs.
Regulator/Tide Gate Maintenance
Because ofthe debris normally present in combined
sewage, regulators are particularly susceptible to the
accumulation of materials that cause clogging and
blockages. Trash blockages at the entrance to the
orifice of the interceptor increase the headloss
through the orifice and causes the majority of
unnecessary overflows in passive regulators. Other
causes of unnecessary diversions at regulators
include weir plates or dams that are improperly set,
damaged, or broken off. Similarly, tide gate failure
can often be attributed to trash or debris becoming
lodged in the gate, or corrosion of the gate or
deterioration of the gate gaskets. Tide gate failure
allows the receiving water to enter the CSS,
reducing the storage and flow capacity. For more
information on solids and floatables control, refer to
the EPA's CSO Technology Fact Sheets on Screens
(EPA 832-F-99-027) and Floatables Control (EPA
832-F-99-008).
Frequent inspection of CSO regulators and tide
gates for the problems outlined above, and
subsequent program to implement corrective
measures (such as cleaning orrepair ofthe regulator
or tide gate) will ensure maximum storage or flow
capacity. Inspection of tide gates is most easily
performed during dry weather and at low tide, when
most installations are above the water level of the
receiving water. Tide valves that are below the
level ofthe receiving water at all times may require
a diver to perform the inspection. Regulators which
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have proven to be problematic should be inspected
after every rainfall event.
There are many different ways ofdetermining ifan
overflow has occurred at a regulator or tide gate,
how long it lasted, and what volume was
discharged. For instance, some municipalities have
installed switches on their tide gates that sense
when the gate is open; others have installed
instrumentation in the discharge line upstream of
the tide gate that senses when there is water in the
line. In both cases, the signal from the
instrumentation is sent to the operating municipality
via telemetry to alert the operator of a possible
overflow. This type of system may be especially
useful if the tide gate is inaccessible or difficult to
inspect. These types ofsystems should be regularly
tested to ensure proper operation.
An inexpensive way ofpassively determining if an
overflow occurred at the CSO is to place a small
wooden block on the static weir; if the block is not
present after a rainfall event, then it was carried off
with the overflow. If the wooden block disappears
after a period of dry weather flows, then the
overflow structure needs to be recalibrated. Base
sanitary flows can increase over time as a result of
changes in the drainage basin, (e.g., more paved
areas), higher sanitary flows, and increased 1&1. An
increase in base sanitary flow could cause dry
weather overflows that need to be identified and
eliminated. Another inexpensive method to
determine overflows is to install a portable water
level or depth gauge (e.g., sonic meter or bubbler)
in the combined sewer line and to check dry
weather head relative to overflow control structure
elevation. This method can quickly determine ifthe
overflow weir or other device needs to be adjusted.
Pump Station Maintenance
Pump stations should be maintained to operate at
the design conditions. Wet wells should be
routinely cleaned because grit and solids deposition
in the wet well can damage or restrict the flow of
wastewater into the pump.
Inadequate or improper pump station operation can
lead to reduced storage and hydraulic capacity
during wet weather, and, if the pumping capacity is
severely restricted, dry weather overflows can
result. In general, inadequate pumping capacity is
caused by:
• Mechanical, electrical, or instrumentation
problems.
• Changes in the upstream drainage area that
cause storm runoff to exceed the original
design basis.
• Changes in the discharge piping (e.g., tying-
in or manifolding with another pressure
system) that creates more headloss in the
discharge system.
Ifconditions upstream of the pump station (such as
development) increase the flow above the design
values, steps should be taken to upgrade the station
to meet the increased flowrate. Pump station
upgrading may include such items as:
• Installing new pumps and motors.
• Changing out impellers.
• Upgrading/changing pump controls to
maximize use of all pumps during wet
weather.
• Modifying system piping to improve the
system
• head curve.
• Installing additional force main piping for
wet weather pumping.
Depending on the complexity of the system,
changes to the downstream discharge conditions
that may affect the system head curve may require
extensive study and should be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis.
Sewer Line Maintenance
Sewer line maintenance can be broken down into
two main components, which include the use of
diagnostic methods to identify potential trouble
spots in the line; and actual physical inspections of
the lines for cracks, breaks, or blockages.
The use of diagnostic methods allows system
operators to predict where problems may occur in
the lines, thus allowing a more efficient use of
O&M resources. Proper maintenance of a sewer
system requires a knowledge of the system,
including information about the age of the system,
the drainage areas served, the elevations of the
drainage structures, and slopes of the sewer lines.
Adequate knowledge ofthe age ofthe sewer system
is crucial because many older systems are
constructed ofweaker materials (such as clay pipe)
that are prone to cracking and collapsing. Cracked
and collapsed sewers canpose significantproblems,
such as infiltration of the sewer flow into the
groundwater and the introduction of sediment into
the system. This may lead to hydraulic restrictions.
Knowing which sections of the sewer system are
the oldest or identifying sections that are made of
less sturdy materials will allow the system operators
to track the most likely trouble spots in the system.
Information regarding the elevations of the sewer
system is important for determining the likelihood
ofsediment accumulation in the line. The slope of
a sewer line is directly proportional to the line
capacity and velocity. When the wastewater
velocity in the line is below the self-cleaning
velocity of 2 feet per second, solids tend to settle
out, creating a flow restriction. Oversized sewers
placed on very flat gradients are especially prone to
conveying the wastewater at low velocities, and, as
a result, filling with sediment. Small- and mid-
sized storms are ofsignificant concern because the
flow velocity from these storms may be below the
self-cleaning velocity. Therefore, areas that are
prone to deposition should be inspected frequently.
Sewer lines with a history of sediment deposition
and blockages should be identified and scheduled
for routine cleaning.
Modeling a sewer to evaluate the need for
improvements can be especially beneficial in
avoiding future problems. For instance, increasing
the flow in an upstream sewer can create problems
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downstream ifthe downstream sewer does not have
the capacity to handle the increased flow. Other
problems, such as flow backing up into basements,
may appear as a result. In cases where there is
concern about back-ups into basements, a backflow
preventor may be warranted. Modeling will help to
determine how raising a weir will decrease CSOs.
Methods of increasing the flow through sewers
include increasing the pumping rate from the
upstream pumping station and injecting polymer to
reduce the sewer roughness coefficient (Field et aI.,
1994).
Determining whether an overflow occurred in a
discharge sewer is important in understanding how
the system works and for requirements on reporting.
An inexpensive method for determining the
maximum depth of flow in the discharge line is to
draw a chalk line around the inner circumference of
the discharge sewer. The overflow water will
dissolve this substance to the maximum depth of
flow. More advanced techniques include
employing instrumentation that measures the flow
in a discharge and relays this information via
telemetry to the municipality.
The second part of a sewer line maintenance
program is physical inspection of the lines. If
possible, CSSs and CSOs should be inspected
regularly to ensure peak performance. Sewers are
commonly inspected by television cameras, but if
the sewers are large enough and flow conditions are
low enough, manual inspection may be possible. If
manual inspection is the chosen method, the
inspector must follow the OSHA confined space
entry guidelines.
Inspections should be used to identify blockages,
cracks, or other problems in the lines. Blockages
are typically the result of sediment and grit
accumulating in the sewer system, although
dislodged vegetation and debris restrict flow as
well. Another common cause ofsewer blockages is
tree roots, which can grow through cracked sewers.
System blockages in sewer systems can decrease
both the hydraulic capacity of the sewer and its
effective storage capacity. This can cause flow to
back up and overflow the sewer system.
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Once these problems have been identified,
maintenance crews must be dispatched to correct
them. Crews should ensure that all lines are cleared
ofall lodged debris. They should check and empty
any in-line grit chambers or flushing stations where
sediment routinely causes blockages in the system.
Cracked sewers should be repaired and collapsed
sewers should be replaced to restore the system
capacity and prevent infiltration.
Catch Basin and Grit Chamber Maintenance
Catch basins and grit chambers are inlet chambers
that provide sumps for the retention of sediment,
grit, and debris. These basins should be cleaned on
a routine basis to prevent grit and sediment from
filling the structure and passing untreated flow into
the CSS. Cleaning methods include utilizing
vacuum trucks, jet sprays, submersible pumps that
can handle grit and slurry mixtures, and clamshell
buckets.
Sediment Control
As sediment is a significant source of the problems
in combined sewer systems, control of sediment
from the source can prove beneficial. An example
of source control includes implementing and
maintaining effective erosion control practices for
construction in the drainage area. These practices
will prevent sediment from being transported to the
sewer inlet during a rainfall event. Frequent street
sweeping has also proven effective in decreasing
the sediment load to the sewer system.
Infiltration & Inflow
Sewer system evaluation studies (SSES), such as
smoke testing and television inspection, are
effective methods of determining infiltration and
inflow ofgroundwater into the sewer system. This
is the result of structural failure of the piping
system that allows groundwater into the piping
system and is a common problem in older sewer
systems. Often, tree roots will grow into the broken
piping system, causing more blockage problems in
the sewer. This problem is a serious one not only
because it introduces additional flow into the sewer
system which can lead to surcharges and overflows,
but also because it can introduce sediment into the
system, which can cause the problems outlined
above.
COST
The cost of operating and maintaining CSOs and
CSSs is especially difficult to determine because it
is a function ofmany different factors, including the
age of the system, the type(s) of overflow
structure(s), the size of the system (both in linear
footage and in the diameter of combined sewer),
and the drainage areas. Cost data for key
components of proper O&M of CSO systems is
summarized in other EPA Fact Sheets, including
"Sewer Cleaning and Inspection" (EPA 832-F-99-
018) and "Catch Basin Cleaning" (EPA 832-F-99-
011). For example, average costs for catch basin
cleaning can range from $8-$16 per catch basin
depending on whether the cleaning is done
manually or with a vacuum sweeper. Table 1
summarizes average national cost data for cleaning
and inspecting sewers, another key component of
proper CSO system O&M..
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TABLE 1 NATIONAL SUMMARY OF MAINTENANCE COSTS
Identifier Range of Costs Average Cost
Total O&M cosUmile*year $951-$46,9731 $2,8233
Labor (cosUmile/year) $695 -$19,831 1 $3,6261
Fringe Benefits (cosUmile/year) $192 -$9,0331 $1,1851
Chemicals (cosUmile/year) $0.3 -$7,6161 $5121
Hydroflush Cleaning (cosUmile) $475 -5,2302 $1,7001
Television Inspection (cosUmile) $1,000 -$11,4502 $4,6001
Preventive Maintenance 63% of Total Maintenance Costs (excludes depreciation)
Source. 1 Water Environment Research Foundation, 1997.
2 Arbour and Kerri, 1997.
3 Black & Veatch/ASCE, 1998.
13. U.S. EPA Storm & Combined Sewer
Pollution Control Program, 1995. Richard
Field, U.S. EPA Storm & Combined Sewer
Pollution Control Program personal
communication with Parsons Engineering
Science, Inc..
14. Water Environment Research Foundation
(WERF), 1997. Benchmarking Wastewater
Operations - Collection, Treatment, and
Biosolids Management. Project 96-CTS-5.
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Guidance: Coordinating CSO Long-Term Planning
with Water Quality Standards Reviews
The US. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is issuing Guidance: Coordinating Combined
Sewer Overflow (CSO) Long-Term Planning with Water Quality Standards Reviews. The
guidance is designed to address questions raised since the publication ofthe csa Control Policy
in 1994 on integrating the long-term controlplan (LTCP) development process with the water
quality standards review. As outlined in the guidance, EPA will continue to implement the csa
Control Policy through its existing statutory and regulatory authorities.
Background
EPA issued the Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy in April 1994. Since then, the
agency has released seven related guidance documents and worked with stakeholders to foster
implementation of the policy. The CSO Control Policy calls for the development ofa long-term
control plan (LTCP), which includes measures that provide for compliance with the Clean Water
Act, including attainment of water quality standards. The CSO Control Policy provides that the
LTCP should be coordinated with the review and revision (as appropriate) of water quality
standards and implementation procedures on waters impacted by CSOs. This process is intended
to ensure that long-term controls will be sufficient to meet water quality standards. In the six
years since EPA issued the CSO Control Policy, implementation of this principle has not
progressed as quickly as expected.
CSO communities need clear guidance on how they should implement CSO and other wet
weather water pollution control programs to attain water quality standards. As part ofEPA's FY
1999 appropriation, Congress directed EPA to develop guidance on reviews ofwater quality
standards and designated uses in CSO-receiving waters, and urged EPA to provide technical and
financial assistance to states and EPA Regions to conduct these reviews. Further, in December
2000, amendments to the Clean Water Act required EPA to publish final guidance on this subject
by July 31,2001.
This guidance was published as a draft in January 2001 and titled: Draft Guidance on
Implementing the Water Quality-Based Provisions in the Combined Sewer Overflow Control
Policy. EPA received comments from 27 interested parties. EPA reviewed the comments and
made appropriate changes to the draft guidance in response to the submitted comments.
The guidance addresses impediments to implementing the water quality-based provisions in the
CSO Policy, and actions that State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Directors and CSO
communities should take to overcome these impediments.
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Guidance: Coordinating CSO Long-Term Planning with Water Quality Standards Reviews
Integrating CSO long-term control planning with water quality standards reviews requires
extensive coordination among CSO communities, states and the public. Although this
coordination is an intensive process, it provides greater assurance that CSO communities will
implement affordable CSO control programs that support the attainment of appropriate water
quality standards. The guidance describes a process for integrating LTCP development and
implementation with the water quality standards review. This process is the essence ofEPA's
commitment to facilitating the review and revision, as appropriate, of water quality standards for
waters affected by CSOs.
Additional Information
Interested persons may obtain a copy of the guidance from EPA's NPDES website at
www.epa.gov/npdes or by contacting the Office of Water Resources Center at 202-260-7786 (e-
mail: center.water-resource@epa.gov); mailing address: Office ofWater Resources Center, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, RC-4100, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
20460. Please request Guidance: Coordinating CSO Long-Term Planning with Water Quality
Standards Reviews (EPA Number EPA-833-R-OI-002; July 2001). For additional information,
contact Tim Dwyer, Office of Wastewater Management, Water Permits Division, MC 4203M,
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington DC, 20460, phone number 202-564-0717.
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UNITED STATES AND OHIO REACH SETTLEMENT WITH CINCINNATI AND
HAMILTON COUNTY TO END YEARS OF SEWER OVERFLOWS
Sewer district could spend more than $450 million to fix antiquated sewer discharge pipes
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The Justice Department, the Environmental
Protection Agency and the State of Ohio today announced a partial
settlement with the Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County and the
City of Cincinnati that will eliminate long-standing and significant
sewage discharges from its sanitary sewer system. Under the settlement,
the Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati (MSD) could spend
upwards of $450 million toward eliminating these discharges. This decree
will result in approximately I00 million gallons of raw sewage discharges
eliminated annually.
EPA estimates that there are at least 40,000 sanitary sewer overflows
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(SSOs) nationally each year. The untreated sewage from these overflows
can contaminate waters with bacteria, pathogens and other harmful
pollutants, causing serious water quality problems. It can also back-up
into basements, damage property and threaten public health.
"The Justice Department is committed to enforcing our nation's clean
water laws to protect human health and the environment with the highest
water quality standards," said Attorney General John Ashcroft. "We are
pleased the State of Ohio joined us as plaintiffs in this settlement, as it
will go a long way toward improving the health of the Ohio River and its
tributaries in the Cincinnati area."
"Sanitary sewer overflows are a chronic and growing problem in the
country, and pose a severe risk to public health and the environment.
Communities must find problems in their sewer systems, and fix or
upgrade them to reduce or eliminate SSOs. I'm confident that this
settlement will do just that for the citizens of Hamilton County and City
of Cincinnati," said EPA Administrator Christie Todd Whitman.
For years, the city and county have discharged untreated sewage when it
rains through overflow pipes, or sanitary sewer outfalls, including some
that were constructed long ago in MSD's aging sanitary sewer system.
Discharges from these outfalls are illegal under the Clean Water Act
(CWA).
Today's partial settlement will make important progress toward
eliminating the city and county's SSO violations. However, the settlement
does not address the city and county's other extensive problems with
overflows from sewers that carry both sewage and stormwater, known as
combined sewer overflows (CSOs). Neither does it resolve the United
States' and the State of Ohio's claims for civil penalties due to all the City
and County's CWA violations. The parties have agreed to continue
negotiations to resolve these issues as soon as the partial settlement is
approved by the court.
Specifically, the settlement puts the city and county on an enforceable
schedule to construct major capital
improvement projects, estimated to cost $43 million, to eliminate the
worst of their SSOs. Most of these projects will
be completed in the next three to five years. However, Cincinnati's worst
and most prolific SSO, SSO 700, will
require significantly more time and money to fix.
Currently, MSD is evaluating building a large, deep tunnel with the U.S.
Army Corps ofEngineers for flood
control. The tunnel under consideration would be more than 16 miles
long, 30 feet in diameter, and 300 feet deep
and would end the area's chronic flooding problems. It would also help
eliminate significant overflow problems that
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MSD is experiencing from its combined sewers. In tum, the combined
sewers could then be used to store and carry
excess sewage that is frequently discharged from SSO 700 when it rains,
thus eliminating these SSO 700 overflows.
MSD's share of the costs of building the tunnel and related sewer pipes to
eliminate this one SSO could amount to an
estimated $210 - 410 million.
Because the tunnel and other fixes being contemplated for SSO 700 could
take until 2016 or longer to build,
the settlement requires the defendants to build a $10 - 15 million interim
treatment facility at this outfall to reduce the
environmental impact from SSO 700 while the final measures are being
planned and built.
Finally, the agreement requires the defendants to thoroughly assess their
sewer system, using sophisticated models to determine the current and
future capacity. Once the sewer assessment is completed, which itself will
cost over $14 million, the city and county must develop a comprehensive
plan for projects to eliminate all the rest of their SSOs and provide
adequate capacity for the future. There is currently no estimate as to how
much more the city and county will have to spend on these additional
projects.
The Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati (MSD) is a
department of the City of Cincinnati. The District serves more than
800,000 customers throughout Cincinnati and Hamilton County and
operates seven major wastewater treatment plants. Over 200,000 separate
sewer connections tie into MSD's 3,000-plus miles of sanitary and
combined sewers.
"We are pleased to be able to resolve this matter for the good of the
environment and the health of residents in Cincinnati and Hamilton
County," Ohio Attorney General Betty D. Montgomery said. "It's
important that we now focus our energies on reaching a resolution on the
remaining issues relating to the operation ofMSD."
"For years, Cincinnati has struggled to address environmentally damaging
sewer overflows," said Ohio EPA Director Christopher Jones. "This
settlement will change that course, as a result of a cooperative effort
between state, local and federal agencies to clean Cincinnati's
waterways."
The Justice Department and the federal EPA, often joined by the States,
are taking an active lead in municipal CWA enforcement across the
country. The United States has already entered into CWA settlements
with numerous municipalities, including Atlanta, Baton Rouge, Boston,
Honolulu, Jefferson County, Ala., Miami, Mobile, Ala., New Orleans and
San Diego.
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The settlement was lodged in U.S. District Court in the Southern District
of Ohio and is subject to a 30-day public comment period and final court
approval.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
THE STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No.
v.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS OF HAMILTON
COUNTY, OHIO and THE CITY OF )
CINCINNATI, )
Defendants. )
---------------)
INTERIM PARTIAL CONSENT DECREE ON SANITARY SEWER OVERFLOWS
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- ii -
WHEREAS, plaintiff United States of America ("United States"),
on behalf of the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("U.S.
EPA"), is filing a Complaint herein concurrently with lodging of this
Partial Consent Decree ("Consent Decree" or "Decree"), alleging that
Defendants Board of County Commissioners of Hamilton County, Ohio
(the "County") and the City of Cincinnati (the "City") (collectively,
"Defendants"), acting through the Metropolitan Sewer District of
Greater Cincinnati ("MSD"), have Sanitary Sewer Overflows ("SSOs") in
the MSD Sanitary Sewer System which have violated and continue to
violate Section 301 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the
"Clean Water Act" or the "Act"), 33 U.S.C. § 1311;
WHEREAS, Plaintiff State of Ohio, on behalf of the Ohio EPA, is
filing a separate Complaint against Defendants concurrently with the
lodging of this Consent Decree concerning the SSOs, alleging
violations of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 ~ ~., and Chapter 6111 of
the Ohio Revised Code ("O.R.C"), and all Parties agree that the
Complaints filed by the United States and the State of Ohio should be
consolidated;
WHEREAS, the Complaints allege that Defendants have discharged
pollutants from their Sanitary Sewer System, which discharges were
5
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not authorized under Section 301(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a),
and the Complaints seek injunctive relief for these SSOs, but not
civil penalties at this time;
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs maintain that various other wet weather
issues, including Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs) from Defendants'
Combined Sewer System and capacity-related issues at certain of
Defendants' Wastewater Treatments Plants ("WWTPs"), have led to
additional violations of the Act beyond those alleged in the
Complaints, but Plaintiffs' claims for these violations are not
addressed by this Consent Decree, because they will be resolved
through later negotiations designed to find a global solution to
these issues, and/or by other future enforcement efforts;
WHEREAS, in response to orders issued by Ohio EPA, Defendants
have already taken some measures to address SSOs through a program
established in 1992 designed to identify SSOs and remedy them through
an infiltration/inflow reduction program, and rehabilitation and
construction of new sewers, which have resulted in the elimination of
a number of SSOs;
WHEREAS, MSD asserts that it is in compliance with the 1992
State of Ohio Director's Final Findings and Orders ("DFFO") regarding
SSOs;
WHEREAS, MSD has engaged in environmental research both through
studies and pilot-scale operations conducted by its own staff and
3
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funding of cooperative research performed by the University of
Cincinnati, the Water Environment Research Foundation, the Ohio River
Valley Water Sanitation Commission ("ORSANCO"), u.s. EPA and other
organizations;
WHEREAS, MSD has been an active participant in the national
discussion of SSO policy through the Association of Metropolitan
Sewerage Agencies and the Water Environment Federation;
WHEREAS, the Parties are entering into this Partial Consent
Decree because they recognize the need for the Defendants: l} to
continue work they have already begun to address certain SSOs by
implementing certain capital improvement projects, which Defendants
had already planned; 2} to implement interim and permanent remedial
measures at SSO 700; and 3} to evaluate their Sewer System in order
to allow them to develop and propose a comprehensive SSO elimination
program;
WHEREAS, the Parties nevertheless recognize that wet weather
issues in and remedial measures for the Sanitary Sewer System are
directly related to wet weather issues in and remedial measures for
other parts of MSD's collection system. This is especially true with
respect to CSOs from Defendants' Combined Sewer System and capacity-
related issues at certain of Defendants' WWTPs;
WHEREAS, MSD asserts that it has undertaken a program to
address CSOs by implementation of the Nine Minimum Controls and
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preparation and submission to u.s. EPA and Ohio EPA of a Long Term
Control Plan, which efforts will be the subject of future discussions
with the Plaintiffs;
WHEREAS, the confluence of these and other factors requires an
integrated and costly response that addresses SSOs, CSOs and WWTP
issues;
WHEREAS, Defendants are in the process of analyzing and
considering global solutions for these wet weather issues and other
Sewer System challenges, including possible construction of a deep
storage tunnel beneath Mill Creek that will be approximately 16 miles
in length and in excess of thirty feet in diameter ("the Mill Creek
Deep Tunnel");
WHEREAS, the Parties recognize the need expeditiously to
commence discussions concerning global solutions to address the
remaining Sewer System issues; and further recognize that because the
schedule for implementing the SSO remedial measures that are to be
proposed under the Capacity Assurance Program Plan required by this
Decree is related to certain other Sewer System solutions, this
Decree neither requires implementation of, nor provides a final
construction completion date for, the SSO remedial measures that will
be proposed under the Capacity Assurance Program Plan pursuant to
this Decree;
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WHEREAS, the Parties intend expeditiously to commence
negotiations concerning: provisions for implementation of the
Capacity Assurance Program Plan's SSO remedial measures, including a
completion date for such measures; solutions for other alleged
violations of the Act (including, among other things, CSOs and
certain WWTPs); and for a civil penalty to address both the
unauthorized discharges from the Sanitary Sewer System (some of the
injunctive relief for which is incorporated in this Partial Consent
Decree) and the other alleged violations;
WHEREAS, the Parties recognize that if they are unable to
timely negotiate a resolution of these issues, future litigation may
be necessary;
WHEREAS, the Parties explicitly recognize that this Partial
Consent Decree does not resolve any claims the Plaintiffs may have
for penalties for the SSO violations alleged in the Complaints; that
this Partial Consent Decree does not fully resolve Plaintiffs' claims
for injunctive relief arising from the SSO violations alleged in the
Complaints because it does not require implementation of the remedial
measures to be proposed under the Capacity Assurance Program Plan;
that this Partial Consent Decree does not resolve any claims
Plaintiffs may have for penalties or injunctive relief for violations
that have not yet been alleged in any complaint; and that the Parties
6
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reserve all claims and defenses that they may have concerning all
these matters; and
WHEREAS, the Parties agree and the Court, by entering this
Decree, finds that settlement of this matter without further
litigation is in the public interest and that entry of this Consent
Decree is the most appropriate means of resolving the matter;
NOW, THEREFORE, upon consent of the Parties hereto, before the
taking of testimony, without any adjudication of issues of fact or
law, and without admission by the Defendants of the non-
jurisdictional allegations in the Complaint, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this action and over the Parties, pursuant to Section 309(b) of the
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345, and 1355. This
Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the
State of Ohio pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The United States'
Complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Section 309 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319. The State's Complaint
states claims upon which relief can be granted pursuant to O.R.C. §§
6111.07 and 6111.09. The Defendants agree not to contest the
jurisdiction of the Court to enter and enforce this Decree.
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B. Venue is properly in this District pursuant to Section
309(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), and under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391
and 1395.
II. PARTIES
A. Plaintiff, United States of America, is acting at the
request and on behalf of the Administrator of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency.
B. Plaintiff, State of Ohio, is acting at the written request
of the Director of Environmental Protection of the State of Ohio.
C. Defendant Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County ("the
County") is the duly authorized governing body of Hamilton County,
Ohio, pursuant to the laws of the State of Ohio. The County is the
holder of various NPDES permits that govern discharges from the
County's Wastewater Treatment Plants and Sewer System. As such, it
is responsible for operating the County's Wastewater Treatment Plants
and Sewer System. The County has established the MSD, a county sewer
district established pursuant to Chapter 6117 of the Ohio Revised
Code, and acts as the principal of MSD, including maintenance of
funding authority for MSD. Prior court decisions in Ohio hold that
MSD cannot be sued in its own name, and thus, MSD is not made a Party
to this action.
D. Defendant City of Cincinnati ("the City") is a chartered
municipal corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the
8
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State of Ohio. Pursuant to an agreement with the County, and subject
to the pertinent provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, the City also
serves as the agent for the County in the management and operation of
MSD. It is in this capacity that the City is named as Defendant.
III. BINDING EFFECT
A. The provisions of this Consent Decree shall apply to, and
be binding upon the Defendants and their officers, directors,
employees, agents, servants, successors and assigns, and upon all
persons, firms and corporations in active concert or participation
with the Defendants or the Defendants' officers, directors,
employees, agents, servants, successors or assigns, and upon the
United States and the State of Ohio.
B. Effective from the Date of Lodging of this Consent Decree
until its termination, any sale or transfer of either Defendant's
interests in or operating role with respect to the Sewer System or
WWTPs shall not in any manner relieve either Defendant of its
responsibilities for meeting the terms and conditions of this Consent
Decree, except as provided in Paragraph C.
C. If either Defendant seeks to name a successor in interest
to assume any or all of its interests in, or operating role with
respect to, the Sewer System or WWTPs, such Defendant may request
modification of this Consent Decree from U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA to amend
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this Consent Decree in accordance with the role to be assumed by the
proposed successor in interest. Upon such Defendant's request, the
Parties shall discuss the matter. If the Parties agree on a proposed
modification to the Consent Decree, they shall prepare a joint motion
to the Court requesting such modification and seeking leave to join
the proposed successor in interest. If the Parties do not agree, and
the Defendant still believes modification of this Decree and joinder
of a successor in interest is appropriate, it may file a motion
seeking such modification in accordance with Federal Rule of civil
Procedure 60(b); provided, however, that nothing in this Paragraph is
intended to waive the Plaintiffs' right to oppose such motion and to
argue that such modification is unwarranted.
D. If this Consent Decree is modified to allow a successor in
interest to assume any or all of the obligations hereunder,
Defendants shall give written notice of and provide a copy of this
Consent Decree to any such successor in interest prior to transfer of
ownership or operation of any portion of their WWTPs or Sewer System.
E. Defendants shall notify U.S. EPA and Ohio EPA in writing,
as specified in Section XX, of any successor in interest at least
twenty-one (21) days prior to any such transfer.
F. Defendants shall advise each engineering, consulting and
contracting firm to be retained to perform any activities described
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in this Decree of the existence of this Decree and shall make copies
of this decree available to such firms upon execution of any contract
relating to such work. Defendants shall also advise each
engineering, consulting and contracting firm, already retained for
such purpose, of the existence of this Decree and shall make copies
of this Decree available to such firms no later than thirty (30) days
after the Date of Lodging of this Consent Decree.
IV. OBJECTIVES
It is the express purpose of the Parties entering into this
Partial Consent Decree to further the objectives set forth in Section
101 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, and to partially resolve the claims
of the Plaintiffs for injunctive relief for unpermitted discharges
from the Defendants' Sanitary Sewer System, as alleged in Plaintiffs'
Complaints. In light of these objectives, Defendants agree, inter
~: to use sound engineering practices, consistent with industry
standards, to perform investigations, evaluations and analyses and to
design and construct any remedial measures required by this Decree;
to use sound management, operational, and maintenance practices,
consistent with industry standards, to implement all the requirements
of this Consent Decree; and to achieve expeditious implementation of
the provisions of this Decree with the goal of eliminating all
Sanitary Sewer Overflows.
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v. DEFINITIONS
A. Unless otherwise defined herein, terms used in this
Consent Decree shall have the meaning given to those terms in the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 ~~, and the regulations
promulgated thereunder.
B. The following terms used in this Consent Decree shall be
defined as follows:
"Calendar Quarter" shall mean the three-month periods ending on
March 31st, June 30th, September 30th, and December 31 st •
"City" shall mean the City of Cincinnati, Ohio.
"Combined Sewer System" means the portion of the Defendants'
Sewer System designed to convey municipal sewage (domestic,
commercial and industrial wastewaters) and stormwater runoff through
a single-pipe system to the Defendants' Wastewater Treatment Plants
or Combined Sewer Overflows.
"Consent Decree" shall mean this Consent Decree.
"County" shall mean Hamilton County, Ohio and the Board of
County Commissioners of Hamilton County.
"Date of Entry" shall mean the date the Consent Decree is
approved and signed by a United States District Court Judge.
"Date of Lodging" shall mean the date the Consent Decree is
filed for lodging with the Clerk of the Court for the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division.
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"Day" or "Days" as used herein shall mean a calendar day or
calendar days, unless otherwise indicated. When the day a report or
other deliverable is due under this Consent Decree falls on a
Saturday, Sunday, federal holiday or legal holiday for Defendants,
Defendants shall have until the next calendar day that is not one of
the aforementioned days for submittal of such report or other
deliverable.
"Infiltration" shall mean the water entering a sewer system and
service connections from the ground, through such means as, but not
limited to, pipes, pipe joints, connections, or manhole walls.
"Inflow" shall mean the water discharged into a sewer system,
including service connections, from such sources as, but not limited
to: roof leaders; cellars, yard and area drains; foundation drains;
cooling water discharges; drains from springs and swampy areas;
manhole covers; cross connections from storm sewers; surface run-off;
street wash waters; or drainage.
"1/1" shall mean the total quantity of water from both
infiltration and inflow without distinguishing the source.
"Mill Creek Deep Tunnel" shall mean a tunnel designed to
provide flood control and CSO control in the Mill Creek drainage
basin.
"Non-MSD Sewer System" shall mean any wastewater collection and
transmission system or piping that is designed to collect and convey
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domestic, commercial or industrial sewage and/or stormwater, but that
is not owned or controlled by MSD at the time of lodging of this
Consent Decree. The wastewater collection and transmission system
and the piping comprising the Non-MSD Sewer System are generally
depicted in Exhibit 1 to this Decree.
"Paragraph" shall mean a portion of this Consent Decree
identified by an uppercase letter.
"Sanitary Sewer Discharge" and "SSD" shall mean any discharge
to waters of the State or United States from Defendants' Sanitary
Sewer System through a point source not specified in any NPDES
permit.
"Sanitary Sewer Overflow," "SSO," and "Overflow" shall mean any
discharge to waters of the State or United States from Defendants'
Sanitary Sewer System through point sources not specified in any
NPDES permit, as well as any release of wastewater from Defendants'
Sanitary Sewer System to public or private property that does not
reach waters of the United States or the State, such as a release to
a land surface or structure that does not reach waters of the United
States or the State; provided, however, that wastewater backups into
buildings that are caused by blockages, flow conditions, or
malfunctions in a building lateral, other piping or conveyance system
that is not owned or operationally controlled by Defendants are not
SSOs for the purposes of this Consent Decree.
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"Sanitary Sewer Overflow 700," or "SSO 700," shall mean the SSO
located at State plane coordinates E 1,418,903; N 455,867.
"Sanitary Sewer System" or "SSS" shall mean all portions of the
Defendants' Sewer System that are not a part of the Defendants'
Combined Sewer System. SSS does not include any non-MSD Sewer
System.
"Section" shall mean a portion of this Consent Decree
identified by an uppercase Roman Number.
"Sewage" means municipal sewage, including domestic, commercial
and industrial sewage.
"Sewer System" means the wastewater collection and transmission
system owned or operated by Defendants designed to collect and convey
municipal sewage (domestic, commercial and industrial) to the
Defendants' Wastewater Treatment Plants or overflow structures.
"Sub-Basin" means the following portions of the Defendants'
Sewer System: West Branch Mill Creek, East Branch Mill Creek, South
Branch Mill Creek, Polk Run, Sycamore, California, Dry Run-Newtown-
Clough, Duck Creek, Delta, Muddy Creek, Taylor Creek, Rapid Run,
Muddy Creek-Ohio River and Cleves.
"Surcharge" means the condition that exists when the surface of
the wastewater in manholes rises above the top of the sewer pipe, or
the sewer is under pressure or head, rather than at atmospheric
pressure.
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"Ten-Year Storm" shall mean a SCS Type II storm with a ten-year
return and 24-hour duration.
"u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA" shall mean "u.s. EPA and Ohio EPA" unless
Plaintiffs jointly elect (in their unreviewable discretion) to assign
a particular task or responsibility to one of them. To make that
election, Plaintiffs shall notify Defendants in writing of the task
or responsibility that u.s. EPA or Ohio EPA is assigned.
Collectively, u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA are referred to as "Plaintiffs," and
each individually is a "Plaintiff" under this Decree.
"Wastewater Treatment Plant(s)" ("WWTP(s)") shall refer to: 1)
the following wastewater treatment plants: Mill Creek, Little Miami,
Muddy Creek, Sycamore, Polk Run, Indian Creek, and Taylor Creek; and
2) the permitted treatment facilities owned or operated by Defendants
identified in Exhibit 2 to this Decree.
VI. CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS AND SSO 700
A. Capital Improvement Projects
1. Defendants shall construct Capital Improvement
Projects (CIP) consistent with the descriptions set forth in Exhibit
3 and in accordance with the Construction Complete Dates for each
project set forth in Exhibit 3; provided however, that Defendants may
seek to modify the project descriptions and schedule set forth in
Exhibit 3 to address deficiencies in these projects identified by the
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Sanitary Sewer System Hydraulic Model completed pursuant to Paragraph
VII.B of this Consent Decree. Any such new schedule proposed by
Defendants shall be as expeditious as practicable. Defendants shall
submit any proposed modifications to the project descriptions and/or
schedule set forth in Exhibit 3 to U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for review and
approval.
2. U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA may approve the submittal or
decline to approve it and provide written comments. Within 60 days
of receiving U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, Defendants shall
either: (i) alter the submittal consistent with U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's
written comments, and submit the submittal to U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for
final approval; or (ii) submit the matter for dispute resolution
under Section XIV of this Decree.
3. Upon receipt of U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's final approval of
the submittal, or upon completion of the submittal pursuant to
dispute resolution, Defendants shall implement the revised Capital
Improvement Project(s) in accordance with the schedule in the
approved submittal.
B. SSO 700 Interim Measures
1. No more than eleven months from the lodging of this
Consent Decree, Defendants shall submit an SSO 700 Interim Remedial
Measures (IRM) Plan to build a Chemically Enhanced High Rate Settling
(CEHRS) and Storage Facility, to reduce the amount of contaminant
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loading and improve the quality of discharges from ssa 700 while
alternatives for final remedial measures for ssa 700 are being
developed, evaluated and implemented. The CEHRS and Storage Facility
will consist of a storage basin, a Chemically Enhanced High Rate
Settling (CEHRS) treatment system, and the piping, pumps, controls
and equipment necessary to allow the system to operate as both a
storage and treatment facility. The CEHRS treatment system shall
utilize the ballasted flocculation process (in which chemicals and a
fine sand are added to the wastewater prior to settling, to improve
solids removal rates and treatment system capacity) or another CEHRS
treatment process that will provide an equivalent or better reduction
in discharge volume and pollutant load to the Mill Creek. Defendants
shall spend a minimum of $10 million and up to $15 million in total
project costs on the CEHRS and Storage Facility. Defendants shall
utilize their available hydraulic modeling capabilities to assess
whether marginal increases in system capacity and total project cost
above $10 million (up to $15 million) are justified based on a "knee
of the curve" analysis. The IRM Plan shall contain the results of
such an evaluation of system cost/performance, and a discussion of
proposed system capacities and capital costs, based on those
cost/performance analyses. The IRM Plan shall also provide a detailed
technical description of the proposed CEHRS and Storage Facility,
including its proposed design performance characteristics (including
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expected treatment capacity and associated "design" storm magnitude,
hydraulic loading rates, ballast and chemical feed rates, expected
modes of operation, etc.); its expected impact on SSO 700 activation
frequency, duration and volume of discharge in a "typical" year; and
associated pollutant loads in a "typical" year (under both current
uncontrolled conditions and following implementation of the CEHRS and
Storage Facility). The IRM Plan shall also include a schedule that
is as expeditious as practicable, and that achieves completion of
construction by no later than December 31, 2007. At a minimum, the
schedule shall include critical construction milestones, including,
at a minimum, deadlines for submission of a Permit to Install;
commencement of construction, and completion of construction.
2. U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA may approve the IRM Plan or decline
to approve it and provide written comments. Within 60 days of
receiving U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, Defendants shall
either: (i) alter the IRM Plan consistent with U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's
written comments, and submit the IRM Plan to U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for
final approval; or (ii) submit the matter for dispute resolution
under Section XIV of this Decree.
3. Upon receipt of U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's final approval of
the IRM Plan, or upon completion of the IRM Plan pursuant to dispute
resolution, Defendants shall implement the IRM Plan in accordance
with the schedule in the approved Plan.
19
D-n
4. Once construction is completed and the CEHRS and
Storage Facility is placed in service, Defendants shall operate and
maintain the CEHRS and Storage Facility in a manner consistent with
the goals of (1) reducing SSO 700 pollutant discharges and, (2)
successfully completing the CEHRS and Storage Facility Effectiveness
Study, required by subparagraph VI.B.6, in accordance with the
approved CEHRS and Storage Facility Effectiveness Study Plan.
5. Within 60 days of completion of construction of the
CEHRS and Storage Facility, Defendants shall provide u.S. EPA and
Ohio EPA with documentation regarding the total project cost, and the
components of that total cost (~, land acquisition, design,
equipment acquisition and construction, etc.), of the CEHRS and
Storage Facility.
6. CEHRS and Storage Facility Effectiveness Study.
(a) Within 30 months of the entry of this
Consent Decree, Defendants shall submit to u.S. EPA and Ohio EPA, for
approval, a work plan for conducting a two year study ("CEHRS and
Storage Facility Effectiveness Study") of the effectiveness of the
CEHRS and Storage Facility. The study shall commence immediately
after completion of construction of the CEHRS and Storage Facility
and shall include, but not be limited to, an analysis of: (a) the
effectiveness of those facilities at removing suspended solids,
carbonaceous biochemical oxygen demand (or biochemical oxygen
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demand), total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN) , ammonia and total
phosphorus; (b) any difficulties encountered in or limitations
involved with using those facilities over a range of flow conditions,
chemical feed rates and other operational control parameters; and (c)
measures that MSD has taken to optimize use of those facilities. The
work plan shall also include a schedule for the study and for
production of a report that presents the results of the study.
(b) u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA may approve the CEHRS
and Storage Facility Effectiveness Study Plan or decline to approve
it and provide written comments. Within 60 days of receiving u.S.
EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, Defendants shall either: (i) alter
the CEHRS and Storage Facility Effectiveness Study Plan consistent
with u.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, and submit the CEHRS and
Storage Facility Effectiveness Study Plan to u.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for
final approval; or (ii) submit the matter for dispute resolution
under Section XIV of this Decree.
(c) Upon receipt of u.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's final
approval of the CEHRS and Storage Facility Effectiveness Study Plan,
or upon completion of the CEHRS and Storage Facility Effectiveness
Study Plan pursuant to dispute resolution, Defendants shall implement
the CEHRS and Storage Facility Effectiveness Study Plan in accordance
with the schedule in the approved Plan.
c. Permanent Remedial Measures for SSO 700
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1. As soon as sufficient information becomes available
on which to base their decision, but no later than December 31, 2005,
Defendants shall submit to u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA a notice concerning the
Mill Creek Deep Tunnel ("Tunnel Notice"). The Tunnel Notice shall
contain a statement either: (a) that Defendants will pursue
construction of the Mill Creek Deep Tunnel; or (b) that Defendants
will not pursue construction of the Mill Creek Deep Tunnel.
2. It is the current understanding of the Parties that
Defendants intend to pursue construction of the Mill Creek Deep
Tunnel with assistance and/or funding from a third party project
sponsor, which is not a signatory to this Consent Decree. However,
whether or not Defendants actually receive such assistance and/or
funding shall have no effect on Defendants' obligations under this
Consent Decree, including, but not limited to, the requirement that
Defendants complete construction of permanent remedial measures for
SSO 700 in the manner and in accordance with the applicable schedule
set forth in subparagraph VI.C.3.
3. Defendants shall submit to u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA an SSO
700 Remedial Plan by December 31, 2009. The SSO 700 Remedial Plan
shall set out a plan for installation of remedial measures that have
the goal of eliminating SSOs from SSO 700. The SSO 700 Remedial Plan
shall provide a schedule for design and construction of the proposed
remedial measures, which shall include critical construction
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milestones, including, at a minimum, deadlines for submission of a
Permit to Install; commencement of construction, and completion of
construction. If Defendants intend to address SSOs from SSO 700 in
whole or in part by the operation of the Mill Creek Tunnel, the
schedule shall be as expeditious as practicable and shall achieve
construction of the Tunnel and any other proposed remedial measures
by December 31, 2016. If Defendants intend to address SSOs from SSO
700 by means other than the operation of the Mill Creek Tunnel, the
schedule shall be as expeditious as practicable and shall achieve
construction of the proposed remedial measures by December 31, 2022.
The SSO 700 Remedial Plan shall also include a detailed technical
description of the proposed remedial measures, estimated costs
(capital, annual operation and maintenance (O&M) and either present
value or annualized costs), and information regarding the expected
performance of the proposed remedial measures (including the expected
performance of the measures during storms of various sizes and the
maximum storm that the measures can be expected to capture or
otherwise address). In addition, the Plan shall indicate whether the
CEHRS and Storage Facility will remain in operation after
construction of the proposed remedial measures, and if so, in what
capacity and with what expected performance results.
4. U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA may approve the SSO 700 Remedial
Plan or decline to approve it and provide written comments. Within
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90 days of receiving U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, Defendants
shall either: (i) alter the SSO 700 Remedial Plan consistent with
U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, and submit the SSO 700 Remedial
Plan to U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for final approval; or (ii) submit the
matter for dispute resolution under Section XV of this Decree.
5. Upon receipt of U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's final approval of
the SSO 700 Remedial Plan, or upon completion of the SSO 700 Remedial
Plan pursuant to dispute resolution, Defendants shall implement the
SSO 700 Remedial Plan in accordance with the schedule in the approved
Plan.
D. Evaluation and Correction Period.
1. After the completion of the permanent remedial
measures for SSO 700, Defendants may evaluate the effectiveness of
the rehabilitative work completed. Defendants may have two years
after the completion of construction date for the remedial measures
set forth in the SSO 700 Remedial Plan to evaluate system
performance.
2. If Defendants need additional time to eliminate SSOs
from SSO 700 or to correct other problems identified during the
evaluation period, they may petition U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for an
extension of the previously applicable deadline for completion of
construction of the SSO 700 remedial measures to allow for the
implementation of additional remedial measures. Such petition shall
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include the reason(s) that the deadline extension is deemed necessary
and shall be submitted within thirty (30) days of the end of the two-
year evaluation period. Defendants shall submit a petition as soon
as practicable after they identify a problem(s) that they believe
warrants correction, and may submit more than one petition if they
identify multiple problems.
3. U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA may approve the petition or decline
to approve it and provide written comments, provided however, that
U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's approval shall not be arbitrarily and
capriciously denied if the permanent remedial measures have been
designed and constructed in accordance with the SSO 700 Remedial Plan
approved by U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA pursuant to Paragraph VI.C of this
Decree. Within 45 days of receiving U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written
comments, Defendants shall either: (i) alter the petition consistent
with U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, and submit the petition to
U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for final approval; or (ii) submit the matter for
dispute resolution under Section XIV of this Decree.
4. Upon receipt of U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's final approval of
the petition, or upon completion of the petition pursuant to dispute
resolution, Defendants shall have 90 days to submit a Revised SSO 700
Remedial Plan (including a schedule that is as expeditious as
practicable for completion of the additional remedial measures) to
U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for review and approval.
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5. U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA may approve the Revised SSO 700
Remedial Plan or decline to approve it and provide written comments.
Within 90 days of receiving u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments,
Defendants shall either: (i) alter the Revised SSO 700 Remedial Plan
consistent with u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, and submit the
Revised SSO 700 Remedial Plan to u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA for final
approval; or (ii) submit the matter for dispute resolution under
Section XV of this Decree.
6. Upon receipt of u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA's final approval of
the Revised SSO 700 Remedial Plan, or upon completion of the Revised
SSO 700 Remedial Plan pursuant to dispute resolution, Defendants
shall implement the revised SSO 700 Remedial Plan in accordance with
the schedule included in the approved revised Plan.
E. Modification of the Tunnel Notice or Remedial Plan
1. At any time after submission of the Tunnel Notice, or
the SSO 700 Remedial Plan, if Defendants reasonably believe in good
faith that the decision reflected in the Tunnel Notice or the SSO 700
Remedial Plan should be significantly modified or that alternative
remedial measures that have the goal of eliminating SSOs from SSO 700
should be implemented, Defendants may submit to u.s. EPA and Ohio EPA
a Revised Tunnel Notice and/or a Revised SSO 700 Remedial Plan. The
Revised Tunnel Notice and/or the Revised SSO 700 Remedial Plan will
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set out the nature of the modification to the Tunnel Notice and/or
the SSO 700 Remedial Plan and the reasons for such modifications.
u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA shall review the submittal and in their sole and
unreviewable discretion may approve or disapprove the proposed
submittal. Upon receipt of u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA's approval of the
submittal, Defendants shall implement the approved submittal in
accordance with its terms.
2. If u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA do not approve the submittal,
and Defendants believe modification of this Decree is appropriate,
they may file a motion seeking such modification in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b); provided, however, that
nothing in this subparagraph is intended to waive the Plaintiffs'
right to oppose such motion and to argue that such modification is
unwarranted.
VII. COMPREHENSIVE SSO REMEDIATION PROGRAM
A. Introduction
1. As further set forth in this Section, Defendants
shall undertake a comprehensive program to evaluate and propose
rehabilitation measures for their Sanitary Sewer System in order to
meet the objectives of this Consent Decree as described in Section IV
and as further described in this Section VII. This program builds
upon the Capital Improvement Projects required by Section VI and
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Exhibit 3 of this Consent Decree, will take place in phases, and
includes the following elements:
Data Collection and Modeling
• Sanitary Sewer System Hydraulic Model (and
associated monitoring and data collection)
(~VII.B)
Analysis and Assessment
• Capacity Assessment Plan (~VII.C)
• Capacity Assessment Report (~VII.D)
Program Development and Implementation
• Capacity Assurance Program Plan Development
(~VII.E)
• SSO Monitoring and Reporting Program (~VII.F)
• Sewer Overflow Response Program (~VII.G)
• Operation and Maintenance Program (~VII.H)
• Industrial Waste SSO/CSO Management and
Minimization Program (~VII.I)
• Pump/Lift Station Operating and Management
Procedures (~VII.J)
• Short Term Adequate Capacity Program Plan
(§VIII)
2. Defendants' plans, programs, and other submittals
shall be based on good engineering practices and industry standards
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and shall be consistent with the following standard references, or
revisions thereto, as applicable:
• EPA's Handbook: Sewer System Infrastructure
Analysis and Rehabilitation, EPA/625/6-91/030,
Oct. 1991;
• Water Environment Federation's Manual of
Practice FD-6/ASCE Report No. 62, Existing
Sewer Evaluation & Rehabilitation, 1994.
B. Sanitary Sewer System Hydraulic Model
1. Defendants shall develop and employ, as required by
Paragraph VII.C, a hydraulic model of Defendants' Sanitary Sewer
System ("the Sanitary Sewer System Model" or "the Model) in
accordance with the "Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater
Cincinnati Model and Data Collection Work Plan and Addendum (August
2001) (Model Plan) which is attached as Exhibit 4 to this Consent
Decree.
2. The Model Plan describes how Defendants will develop
and implement a hydraulic model of their Sewer System. The Model
Plan also describes the extensive Sewer System precipitation,
groundwater, flow, and other monitoring and data collection that
Defendants have performed or will be performing, and how Defendants
will use those data in calibrating and validating the Model.
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3. Defendants shall complete calibration and validation
of the Model through actual flow measurements by October 31, 2003,
unless there have not been adequate precipitation events to allow for
the technically sound calibration and validation of the Model. If
there have not been adequate precipitation events, Defendants shall
so notify u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA in writing and then shall complete
calibration and validation of the Model through actual precipitation
and flow measurements as expeditiously as practicable. Defendants
shall immediately notify u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA in writing when validation
has been completed.
C. Capacity Assessment Plan
1. Defendants shall carry out an assessment of the
capacities of the following portions of their Sanitary Sewer System:
all pump stations, all gravity sewer lines of 12 inches diameter or
greater, force mains and syphons (as specified in the Model Plan),
all known overflow points, specified sewers that hydraulically affect
all known overflow points, and any other portions of the Sewer System
(including portions of the Combined Sewer System 18 inches or
greater, such as interceptors) that must be assessed so as to allow
the technically sound evaluation of the causes of all known capacity-
related SSOs, and the identification of appropriate measures that
have the goal of eliminating those capacity-related SSOs. This
assessment shall specifically identify the hydraulic capacities of
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the aforementioned portions of the Sewer System, and compare those
capacities to existing and future projected (through year 2025, or
another future date chosen consistent with industry standards)
average and peak, dry and wet weather flows. This capacity
assessment shall take into account impacts on future collection
system capacities that may result from the completion of the Capital
Improvement Projects required pursuant to Section VI and Exhibit 3.
This assessment shall identify, within the aforementioned portions of
Defendants' Sewer System, those portions of the Sewer System that
experience and/or are expected to experience and/or cause SSOs and/or
Surcharge conditions under existing and future projected (through
year 2025, or another future date chosen consistent with industry
standards), average and peak, dry and wet weather flows, and the
degree to which those portions experience or cause, under current or
projected future conditions, SSOs and/or Surcharge conditions. It is
specifically noted that the programs in this Consent Decree do not
seek, ~~, to eliminate all Surcharge conditions in Defendants'
Separate Sewer System; rather, identification of Surcharge conditions
is required as Surcharge conditions are typically indicative of
limited additional capacity in a sewer line.
2. This assessment shall consider local rainfall data
and the impact of appropriate rainfall events on peak wet weather
flows within those portions of Defendants' Sewer System identified in
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subparagraph C.1, above. Defendants shall use the Model, as
described in the Model Plan attached as Exhibit 4, to accomplish this
assessment.
3. Defendants shall submit to u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA for
review and approval a comprehensive Capacity Assessment Plan within
120 days of completion of validation through actual flow measurements
of the model developed pursuant to the Model Plan attached to this
Decree as Exhibit 4. This Capacity Assessment Plan shall describe
how Defendants will undertake an engineering study to comprehensively
evaluate the hydraulic capacities of specified portions of the Sewer
System, as described above in subparagraph VII.C.1. The Plan shall
also include a schedule that is as expeditious as practicable for the
completion of that Assessment for the completion and submission to
u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA of a Report summarizing the Assessment, and for the
completion and submission of a Capacity Assurance Program Plan,
pursuant to the requirements of Paragraph VII.E.
4. U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA may approve the Capacity Assessment
Plan or decline to approve it and provide written comments. Within
60 days of receiving u.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, Defendants
shall either: (i) alter the Capacity Assessment Plan consistent with
u.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, and submit the Capacity
Assessment Plan to u.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for final approval; or (ii)
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submit the matter for dispute resolution under Section XIV of this
Decree.
5. Upon receipt of U.S. EPA's/Ohio EPA's final approval
of the Plan, or upon completion of the Capacity Assessment Plan
pursuant to dispute resolution, Defendants shall implement the
Capacity Assessment Plan in accordance with the schedule included in
the approved Plan.
D. Capacity Assessment Report
1. Defendants shall submit a Report, consistent with the
schedule in the approved Capacity Assessment Plan required pursuant
to Paragraph VII.C, that presents and summarizes the results of
implementation of the Capacity Assessment Plan to U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA
for review, comment and approval. This Capacity Assessment Report
shall describe the analyses carried out, and shall specifically
identify, both in narrative and using schematics and maps, within the
aforementioned portions of Defendants' Sewer System, portions of the
Sewer System experiencing or causing SSOs and/or Surcharge, and/or
having inadequate capacity under current and future conditions, and
both dry and wet weather conditions, and shall characterize those
capacity limitations. The Report shall provide detailed information
demonstrating that the assessment has been carried out in accordance
with the approved Plan.
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2. U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA may approve the Capacity Assessment
Report or decline to approve it and provide written comments. Within
60 days of receiving U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, Defendants
shall either: (i) alter the Capacity Assessment Report consistent
with U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, and submit the Capacity
Assessment Report to U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for final approval; or (ii)
submit the matter for dispute resolution under Section XIV of this
Decree. Upon receipt of U.S. EPA's/Ohio EPA's final approval of the
Capacity Assessment Report, or upon completion of the Report pursuant
to dispute resolution, Defendants shall utilize the assessment to
develop the Capacity Assurance Program, pursuant to the requirements
of Paragraph VII.E.
E. Capacity Assurance Program Plan
1. Defendants shall develop a Capacity Assurance Program
Plan, based upon the system capacities revealed by the Capacity
Assessment pursuant to Paragraphs VII.C-VII.D, Defendants' knowledge
of the condition of their Sewer System, and projected impacts of the
Capital Improvement Projects required pursuant to Section VI and
Exhibit 3, and any other planned improvements, changes, or additions
to Defendants' Sewer System. The Capacity Assurance Program Plan
shall identify additional feasible remedial measures that have the
goal of eliminating all capacity-related SSOs and/or that are
necessary to insure that there is adequate capacity in the SSS under
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current and projected future conditions so that there will be no
capacity-related SSOs under projected future conditions (as defined
in subparagraph VII.C.I). If insufficient capacity, compared to
current or projected future conditions (as defined in subparagraph
VII.C.l), exists in any portion of the Defendants' Sanitary Sewer
System or those other portions of Defendants' Sewer System that
convey sanitary Sewage to the WWTPs, Defendants shall identify
additional feasible measures needed to provide adequate capacity
under current and projected future conditions and/or that have the
goal of eliminating capacity-related SSOs and shall provide detailed
information on the methodologies used to select the proposed remedial
measures. It is the intent of the Parties that the Capacity
Assurance Program Plan shall identify only those measures the
construction or implementation of which is necessary in light of
information and analyses developed pursuant to Sections VI and VII,
which construction and/or implementation shall not be required under
this decree and shall only be required pursuant to future
negotiations and/or other enforcement action.
2. Measures proposed by Defendants to address capacity
limitations may include removal of 1/1 sources, increases in pump
station and sewer capacities in both the Sanitary Sewer System and
the Combined Sewer System, storage/equalization facilities, or
increases in wastewater treatment plant capacity.
35
n-oo
3. The Capacity Assurance Program Plan shall provide
information regarding the effectiveness of the Capital Improvement
Projects required pursuant to Section VI and Exhibit 3, and their
compatibility with the other remedial projects chosen and the
ultimate goal of eliminating SSOs.
4. The Plan shall provide estimated costs (capital,
annual O&M and either present value or annualized costs) and
information regarding the expected performance of all considered and
proposed measures. u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA shall consider the information
concerning costs and performance of measures in their review of
Defendants' Plan.
5. The Plan shall provide a schedule that is as
expeditious as practicable for design and construction of all
proposed measures. The schedule shall be broken out by Sub-Basin,
and shall specify critical construction milestones for the projects
in each Sub-Basin, including, at a minimum, deadlines for submission
of Permit(s) to Install, commence construction, and complete
construction, for each project, and a deadline for the completion
date of all work in each Sub-Basin.
6. It is the intent of the Parties that this Partial
Consent Decree does not include a specific date by which all design
and construction in all Sub-Basins must be accomplished, but that
this date will be proposed by Defendants in the schedule required by
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subparagraph VII.E.5, and will be subject to future negotiations
and/or dispute resolution in connection with the review and approval
process for the Capacity Assurance Program Plan under subparagraph
VII.E.8.
7. The Plan shall be submitted to U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for
review and approval, in accordance with the schedule in the approved
Capacity Assessment Plan required pursuant to Paragraph VII.C.
8. U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA may approve the Capacity Assurance
Program Plan or decline to approve it and provide written comments.
Within 90 days of receiving U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments,
Defendants shall either: (i) alter the Capacity Assurance Program
Plan consistent with U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA's written comments, and submit
the Capacity Assurance Program Plan to U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for final
approval; or (ii) submit the matter for dispute resolution under
Section XIV of this Decree.
9. It is the intent of the Parties that implementation
of the Capacity Assurance Program Plan shall not be required under
this Decree, but shall only be required pursuant to future
negotiations and/or other enforcement action.
F. SSO Monitoring And Reporting Plan
Defendants shall implement the SSO Monitoring and
Reporting Plan attached to this Consent Decree as Exhibit 5.
G. Sewer Overflow Response Plan
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Defendants shall implement the Sewer Overflow Response Plan
attached to this Consent Decree as Exhibit 6.
H. Operation and Maintenance Program
Defendants shall implement the Operation and Maintenance
Program attached to this Consent Decree as Exhibit 7.
I. Industrial Waste SSO/CSO Discharge Management and
Minimization Plan
Defendants shall implement the Industrial Waste SSO/CSO
Discharge Management and Minimization Plan attached to this Consent
Decree as Exhibit 8.
J. Pump/Lift Station Operation and Maintenance Procedures
Defendants shall implement the Pump/Lift Station Operation and
Maintenance Procedures attached to this Consent Decree as Exhibit 9.
VIII.SHORT-TERM ADEOUATE CAPACITY
A. Defendants shall implement the Short-Term Adequate
Capacity Program Plan (STACP Plan) attached to this Consent Decree as
Exhibit 10. Defendants shall authorize only those new sewers or
sewer extensions or an increase in flow associated with new
development that are in conformance with this Plan. The conditions
of this Plan shall apply to each Sub-Basin or part of a Sub-Basin
only until such time as the Sub-Basin remedial measures set forth in
Defendants' Capacity Assurance Program Plan, required pursuant to
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Paragraph VII.E above, have been satisfactorily completed. Nothing
contained in the STACP Plan shall be construed as setting standards
for, or changing any of the requirements for or objectives of, the
remedial measures for the Defendants' Sewer System as required above
by Paragraph VII.E of this Consent Decree.
B. The STACP Plan describes the process (es) that shall be
used for authorizing those new sewers and/or sewer extensions
including forms, procedures, methods, equations, staffing plans, flow
meter locations, and the information or methods for obtaining
information necessary to support such authorizations.
C. The objective of the STACP Plan is to prevent any
wastewater flows from new development from aggravating or in any way
adding to the quantity discharged from any downstream SSo.
Specifically, the objective of the STACP Plan is to ensure that more
flow is removed from the system than is added from a proposed new
sewer, sewer extension, or increased flow associated with new
development upstream of the SSO, as determined by the criteria and
formulae set out in the STACP Plan. The current STACP Plan utilizes
a removal credit trade ratio, as determined by the criteria and
formulae set out in the Plan, that a minimum of 5 gallons of flow
from a downstream SSO is to be removed for every gallon of flow added
from the proposed new sewer, sewer extension, or increased flow
associated with new development upstream of the SSO. In evaluating
39
~
i
r
i·
~j.
the proposed removal/addition for consistency with the STACP Plan,
Defendants shall use design 1&1 conditions and estimated peak flow
from the new development.
D. The STACP Plan may be modified to incorporate new or
revised flow figures or methodologies for improvements undertaken by
the Defendants to remove extraneous water (1/1) from the SSS, or to
change the removal credit trade ratio. Any such modification shall
be subject to the modification process set out in Section 6.0 of the
STACP Plan.
E. Defendants agree to notify the public and permit
applicants no later than 90 days after lodging of this Decree, of the
program requirements in this Section.
IX. REPORTING REOUIREMENTS
A. Beginning within the thirty (30) days of the close of the
first full Calendar Quarter following the Date of Lodging of this
Consent Decree, and within thirty (30) days of the close of each
subsequent Calendar Quarter, Defendants shall submit to u.S. EPA and
Ohio EPA, a summary report containing the following information
pertaining to the Calendar Quarter just concluded: a brief synopsis
of the current status of the major remedial measures (~, each CIP
project, the development of the Model and associated data collection
activities, the Capacity Assessment, the Capacity Assurance Program,
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and the deliverables associated with, and implementation of, these
remedial measures) specified in Sections VI and VII of this Consent
Decree and progress made with respect to such remedial measures since
the last report; a brief synopsis of the implementation of the SSO
Monitoring and Reporting Plan, Sewer Overflow Response Plan.
Operation and Maintenance Program, Industrial Waste SSO/CSO
Management and Minimization Plan, Pump/Lift Station Operating and
Management Procedures, and Short Term Adequate Capacity Program Plan
(~, compliance with performance measures); the number of Permit(s)
to Install that have been applied for and/or issued; and a
description of compliance or non-compliance with the requirements of
this Consent Decree and its attachments and, if applicable, reasons
for non-compliance. This report shall also identify any anticipated
delays in the completion of any of the remedial measures specified in
Sections VI and VII of this Consent Decree. It is anticipated that
these reports will provide summary information, preferably in the
form of narrative tables. Notification to u.S. EPA or Ohio EPA
pursuant to this Paragraph of any anticipated delay, shall not, by
itself, excuse the delay.
B. Along with the quarterly reports required by Paragraph
IX.A, Defendants shall also submit at the same time to u.S. EPA
copies of monthly summaries of SSO information and certifications
that Defendants have submitted to Ohio EPA pursuant to the SSO
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Monitoring and Reporting Plan and the Short Term Adequate Capacity
Program Plan in the previous Calendar Quarter.
C. Beginning within the 30 days of the first year anniversary
of the Date of Lodging of the Consent Decree, and within 30 days of
each subsequent anniversary, Defendants shall submit to u.S. EPA/Ohio
EPA notice of: any staffing changes that occurred in the prior year
as required by Exhibit 6 (Sewer Overflow Response Plan) i any
revisions to the procedures or schedules set forth in Appendices C or
D to Exhibit 9 (Pump/Lift Station O&M Procedures) i any revisions to
the equipment owned by MSD as set forth in Appendix A to Exhibit 7
(O&M Program) i any changes to permanent monitoring locations that
Defendants made in the prior year as required by Exhibit 4 (Model
Plan) i and any other revisions made in accordance with the terms of
Exhibits 5-10.
x. DOCUMENT RETENTION/CERTIFICATION OF SUBMISSIONS
A. Defendants shall maintain copies of any underlying
research and data in their possession, custody or control for any and
all documents, reports, or permits submitted to u.S. EPA/Ohio EPA
pursuant to this Consent Decree for a period of five (5) years after
submission. Defendants shall require any independent contractor(s)
implementing this Consent Decree to also retain such materials for a
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period of five (5) years. Defendants shall submit such supporting
documents to u.s. EPA/Ohio EPA upon request.
B. At the conclusion of this document retention period,
Defendants shall notify u.s. EPA, Ohio EPA, U.S. Department of
Justice, and the Ohio Attorney General at least 90 days prior to the
destruction of any such materials, and upon request by any of these
agencies, Defendants shall deliver any such materials to that agency
or other specified agency.
C. In all notices, documents or reports submitted to the
United States and State pursuant to this Consent Decree, Defendants
shall, by a senior management official, sign and certify such
notices, documents and reports as follows:
I certify under penalty of law that this document and all
attachments were prepared under my direction or
supervision in accordance with a system designed to assure
that qualified personnel properly gather and evaluate the
information submitted. Based on my inquiry of the person
or persons who manage the system, or those persons
directly responsible for gathering such information, the
information submitted is, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, true, accurate and complete. I am aware that
there are significant penalties for submitting false
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information, including the possibility of fine and
imprisonment for knowing violations.
XI. STIPULATED PENALTIES
A. Defendants shall pay stipulated penalties, as set forth
below, for each day they fail to timely submit submittals or meet any
of the milestones or requirements set forth in Paragraphs XI.C
through XI.G below. Fifty (50%) percent of the total stipulated
penalty amount due shall be paid to the United States and fifty (50%)
percent shall be paid to the State. All stipulated penalties arising
under this Section shall, in the first instance, be levied against
funds collected under Section 6117 of the Ohio Revised Code for the
operation of MSD to the extent such funds are available, without
limitation on recourse by the United States or the State in the event
that such funds are not available within the sixty (60) day period
for payment specified by Paragraph XI.I or are insufficient to pay
such stipulated penalties.
B. "Timely submit", as used in this Section, shall mean that
the submittal is made by the date specified in this Consent Decree or
in a document approved pursuant to this Consent Decree. "Timely
\j •
submit" shall further mean that the submittal must include all of the
elements pertaining to the submittal as set forth in this Consent
Decree or in a document approved pursuant to this Consent Decree.
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C. Stipulated Penalties for Critical Path Submittals and
Critical Remedial Milestones
1. Defendants shall be subject to the following
stipulated penalties for a failure to timely submit the submittals
listed in subparagraph XI.C.2, below, or for a failure to meet the
critical remedial milestones set forth in subparagraph XI.C.2, below,
in accordance with all requirements, and objectives provided under
this Consent Decree or in submittals subsequently approved by u.s.
EPA/Ohio EPA pursuant to the provisions of this Consent Decree:
1-30 days
31-60 days
over 60 days
$1500/day
$3000/day
$5000/day
2. The following submittals are "critical path
submittals," subject to the stipulated penalties of subparagraph
XI.C.1, above:
• SSO 700 Interim Remedial Measures Plan
• CEHRS & Storage Facility Effectiveness Study Plan
• Tunnel Notice
• SSO 700 Remedial Plan
• Capacity Assessment Plan
• Capacity Assessment Report
• Capacity Assurance Program Plan
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The following deadlines are "critical milestones," subject to
the stipulated penalties of subparagraph XI.C.l, above:
• the Construction Completion Date for each Capital
Improvement Project set forth in Exhibit 3
• the critical milestones, as required by subparagraph
VI.B.l, set forth in the construction schedules
contained in the approved sse 700 Interim Remedial
Measures Plan; provided, however, that Defendants
shall not be subject to stipulated penalties in
connection with achievement of the "proposed design
performance characteristics, expected impact on sse
700 activation frequency, duration and volume of
discharge," or expected impact on "pollutant loads"
set forth in the sse 700 Interim Remedial Measures
Plan, as required by subparagraph VI.B.l.
• the critical milestones, as required by subparagraph
VI.C.3, set forth in the construction schedules
contained in the approved sse 700 Remedial Plan
•
•
D.
the date for calibration of the sanitary Sewer System
Model, as set forth in subparagraph VII.B.3
the final date for implementation of the Sanitary
Sewer System Model, as set forth in Exhibit 4
Stipulated Penalties for Reporting Requirements
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Defendants shall be subject to the following stipulated
penalties for a failure to timely submit any of the reports required
by Section IX of this Consent Decree:
1-7 days
8-60 days
over 60 days
$500/day
$1000/day
$1500/day
E. Stipulated Penalties for SSDs
1. Pre-Remedial Measures SSps
For the time periods set forth below, Defendants shall be
subject to stipulated civil penalties of $3000 per day for each day
of each SSD 1) that was caused by Defendants' failure to comply with
their Operation and Maintenance Program or for which Defendants'
failure to comply with their O&M Program contributed to the volume or
the duration of such SSD; or 2) for which Defendants failed to follow
their SSO Response Plan in responding to and mitigating the impact of
the discharge:
• For an SSD from any location (other than from SSO
700) within any Sub-Basin, prior to the completion of
the remedial measures for that Sub-Basin in
accordance with the approved Capacity Assurance
Program Plan;
• For an SSD from SSO 700, prior to the later of the
completion of construction date set forth in the SSo
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700 Remedial Measures Plan required pursuant to
subparagraph VI.C.3 or any schedule completion date
extensions or revisions that are be made pursuant to
Paragraph VI.D of this Consent Decree.
These stipulated civil penalties shall be in lieu of any stipulated
penalties under Section XI.H below for Defendants' failure to comply
with their Operation and Maintenance Program or their SSO Response
Plan.
2. SSDs Following Completion of Permanent Remedial
Measures for SSO 700
(a) Except as provided in subparagraphs
XI.E.2(b)-(c), Defendants shall be subject to a stipulated penalty of
$3000 per day for each day of each SSD from SSO 700 that occurs after
the later of: (1) the date for completion of all SSO 700 remedial
measures pursuant to the SSO 700 Remedial Plan of this Consent
Decree; or (2) any schedule completion date extensions or revisions
that are be made pursuant to Paragraph VI.D of this Consent Decree.
However, U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA will not demand payment for stipulated
penalties under this subparagraph until after the two-year evaluation
period set forth in Paragraph VI.D of this Consent Decree and shall
not be entitled to stipulated penalties under this subparagraph for
SSDs that occur prior to the later of the date for completion of all
SSO 700 remedial measures pursuant to the SSO 700 Remedial Plan of
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this Consent Decree or any schedule completion date extensions or
revisions that are made pursuant to Paragraph VI.D of this Consent
Decree.
(b) Defendants shall not be liable for
stipulated penalties under subparagraph 2(a) during the six month
period (a "shake down" period) following the date for completion of
all SSO 700 remedial measures pursuant to the SSO 700 Remedial Plan.
(c) Defendants shall not be liable for
stipulated penalties for SSDs that are caused by a ten-year or
greater storm event.
F. Stipulated Penalties for Improper Sewer Connections
Defendants shall be subject to a stipulated penalty of
$5,000.00 for each connection authorized by Defendants other than in
full compliance with the requirements of Section VIII of this Consent
Decree.
G. Stipulated Penalties for Violations of Exhibits and
Submittals
Failure to comply with any requirements set
forth in the following attached Exhibits to this Consent Decree, or
in the following submittals (subsequently approved by u.s. EPA/Ohio
EPA pursuant to the provisions of this Consent Decree) shall subject
Defendants to a stipulated penalty of $2,000 per day for each
violation:
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• CEHRS & Storage Facility Effectiveness Study
Plan
• SSO 700 Remedial Plan or Revised Remedial Plan
• Model Plan (Exhibit 4)
• Capacity Assessment Plan
• SSO Monitoring and Reporting Program (Exhibit
5)
• Sewer Overflow Response Program (Exhibit 6)
• Operation and Maintenance Program (Exhibit 7)
• Industrial Waste SSO/CSO Discharge Management
and Minimization Program (Exhibit 8)
• Pump/Lift Station Operation and Maintenance
Procedures (Exhibit 9)
• Short-Term Adequate Capacity Program Plan
(Exhibi t 10).
H. Stipulated civil penalties shall automatically begin to
accrue on the first day Defendants fail either to meet any of the
schedules of performance required by this Consent Decree or to
satisfy any other obligation or requirement of this Consent Decree.
1. Stipulated civil penalties shall be paid to~
Plaintiffs within sixty (60) days of a written demand by either
Plaintiff for payment of any stipulated penalty owing pursuant to
this Consent Decree. The Plaintiff making a demand for payment of a
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stipulated penalty shall simultaneously send a copy of the demand to
the other Plaintiff. Either Plaintiff may, in the exercise of its
unreviewable discretion, waive its right to any or all of its portion
of the stipulated penalty amount.
J. Penalties owed to the United States shall be paid by
submitting a cashier's or certified check payable to "Treasurer,
United States of America", and shall be tendered to U.S. EPA Region
v, Post Office Box 70753, Chicago, Illinois 60673. The transmittal
letter accompanying the check shall specify the caption and docket
number of this action, the facility and the violations for which the
stipulated penalties are being paid, and DOJ Ref. No. 90-5-1-6-341A.
A copy of the letter and the check shall simultaneously be sent to
U.S. EPA Region V, Water Compliance Branch, Compliance Section, WCC-
15J, 77 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois 60604, and to
Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, United States Department of
Justice, Post Office Box 7611, Washington, D.C. 20044-7611.
K. Penalties owed to the State shall be paid by submitting a
I
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cashier's or certified check payable to "Treasurer, State of Ohio",
and shall be tendered to Administrative Assistant, Ohio Attorney
General's Office, 30 E. Broad Street, 25 th floor, Columbus, Ohio
43215-3428. The transmittal letter accompanying the check shall
specify the caption and docket number of this action and the facility
and the violations for which the stipulated penalties are being paid.
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A copy of the letter and the check shall simultaneously be sent to
Enforcement Coordinator, Division of Surface Water, P.O. Box 1049,
Columbus, Ohio 43216.
L. In the event that a stipulated civil penalty is not paid
within sixty (60) days of a written demand as required by Paragraph
XI.I, the stipulated civil penalty shall, upon written demand of the
United States, be payable with interest from the original due date
(sixty days after the written demand) to the date of paYment, at the
statutory judgment rate set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).
M. PaYment of stipulated civil penalties as set forth above
shall be in addition to any other rights or remedies that may be
available to the United States, the State, or their agencies by
reason of the Defendants' failure to comply with requirements of this
Consent Decree, and all applicable Federal, state or local laws,
regulations, NPDES permit(s) and all other applicable permits. The
paYment of such stipulated penalties shall not be construed to
relieve Defendants from specific compliance with this Decree or
applicable federal or State law, nor shall it limit the authority of
U.S. EPA or Ohio EPA to require compliance with such laws.
XII. FORCE MAJEURE BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND THE UNITED STATES
A. If any event occurs that causes or may cause Defendants to
violate any provision of this Consent Decree, Defendants shall notify
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u.s. EPA in writing within fourteen (14) days from the date
Defendants first knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known, that compliance with the Consent Decree would be
prevented or delayed. The notice shall reference this Section of the
Consent Decree and shall describe in detail the anticipated length of
time the violation may persist, the precise cause or causes of the
violation, the measures taken or to be taken by Defendants to prevent
or minimize the violation and the timetable by which those measures
will be implemented. Defendants shall adopt all reasonable measures
to avoid or minimize any such violation. Defendants shall make all
reasonable efforts to identify events that cause or may cause a
violation of this Consent Decree. Failure by Defendants to comply
with the notice requirements of this Paragraph shall constitute a
waiver of Defendants' rights to obtain an extension of time or other
relief under this Section based on such incident.
B. If u.S. EPA agrees that the violation has been or will be
caused by circumstances beyond the control of Defendants or any
entity controlled by it, including its consultants and contractors,
and that Defendants could not have prevented such violation, the time
for performance of the requirement in question may be extended for a
period not to exceed the actual delay resulting from such
circumstance, and stipulated penalties shall not be due for such
delay or non-compliance. In the event u.S. EPA does not agree that
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the violation was caused by circumstances beyond the control of the
Defendants and notifies Defendants of such determination, Defendants
may invoke the dispute resolution provisions in Section XIV of this
Consent Decree.
C. If Defendants invoke dispute resolution and u.S. EPA or
the Court determines that the violation was caused by circumstances
beyond the control of Defendants or any entity controlled by it, and
that Defendants could not have prevented such violation, Defendants
shall be excused as to that violation, but only for the period of
time the violation continues due to such circumstances.
D. Defendants shall bear the burden of proving that any delay
or violation has been or will be caused by circumstances beyond its
control, and that Defendants could not have prevented such violation,
as set forth above. Defendants shall also bear the burden of
establishing the duration and extent of any delay or violation
attributable to such circumstances, that such duration or extent is
or was warranted under the circumstances and that, as a result of the
delay, a particular extension period is appropriate. An extension of
one compliance date based on a particular circumstance beyond
Defendants' control shall not automatically extend any subsequent
compliance date or dates.
E. Changed financial circumstances or unanticipated
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or increased costs or expenses associated with implementation of this
Consent Decree, shall not serve as a basis for excusing violations of
or granting extensions of time under this Decree. Failure to apply
for a required permit or approval or to provide in a timely manner
all information required to obtain a permit or approval that is
necessary to meet the requirements of this Consent Decree shall not,
in any event, be considered Force Majeure events.
F. Defendants shall make a showing of proof regarding the
cause of each delayed incremental step or other requirement for which
an extension is sought. Defendants may petition for the extension of
more than one compliance date in a single request.
XIII.POTENTIAL FORCE MAJEURE BETWEEN DEFENDANTS AND THE STATE
A. If any event occurs that causes or may cause the
Defendants to violate any provision of this Consent Decree,
Defendants shall notify the Ohio EPA in writing within fourteen (14)
days from when it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
under the circumstances should have known, that compliance with the
Decree would be prevented or delayed, describing in detail the
precise cause or causes of the delay or violation, the anticipated
length of the delay if applicable, the measures taken by Defendants
to prevent or minimize the delay and the timetable by which those
measures will be implemented. Defendants shall adopt all reasonable
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measures to avoid or minimize any such violation. Defendants shall
make all reasonable efforts to identify events that cause or may
cause a violation of this Consent Decree.
B. In any action by the State of Ohio to enforce any of the
provisions of this Consent Decree, Defendants may raise at that time
the question of whether they are entitled to a defense that its
conduct was caused by circumstances beyond their control such as, by
way of example and not limitation, acts of God, strikes, acts of war
or civil disturbances. While the State of Ohio does not agree that
such a defense exists, it is, however, hereby agreed by Defendants
and the State of Ohio that it is premature at this time to raise and
adjudicate the existence of such a defense and that the appropriate
point at which to adjudicate the existence of such a defense is at
the time, if ever, that the proceeding to enforce this Consent Decree
is commenced by the State. At that time the burden of proving that
any delay was or will be caused by circumstances beyond the control
of Defendants shall rest with Defendants. Failure by Defendants to
timely comply with the notice requirements of Paragraph XIII.A shall,
at the option of Ohio EPA, constitute a waiver by Defendants of any
right they may have to raise such a defense. Changed financial
circumstances or increased costs associated with the implementation
of any action required by this Consent Decree shall not in any event
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constitute circumstances entirely beyond the control of Defendants or
serve as a basis for an extension of time under this Decree.
XIV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. This Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for
the purposes of implementing and enforcing the terms and conditions
of this Consent Decree and for the purpose of adjudicating all
disputes among the Parties that may arise under the provisions of
this Consent Decree, to the extent that Paragraph C, below, provides
for resolution of disputes by the Court.
B. The issuance, renewal, modification, denial or revocation
of a permit and the issuance of orders or other actions of the
Director of Environmental Protection (Ohio EPA) are not subject to
dispute resolution under this Decree but, rather, shall be subject to
challenge under Chapter 3745, Ohio Revised Code. The term "actions
of the Director of Environmental Protection" shall be consistent with
the definitions set forth in Chapter 3745, Ohio Revised Code.
C. Except as provided in Paragraph B, above, any dispute that
arises with respect to the meaning, application, implementation,
interpretation, amendment or modification of this Consent Decree, or
with respect to Defendants' compliance herewith (including the
adequacy of the Defendants' performance of the remedial measures and
adequacy of the submittals required by this Decree) or any delay
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hereunder, the resolution of which is not expressly provided for in
this Consent Decree, shall in the first instance be the subject of
informal negotiations. If any Party believes it has a dispute with
any other Party, it shall notify all the other Parties in writing,
including notice to the U.S. Department of Justice and the Ohio
Attorney General, setting forth the matter(s) in dispute, and the
Parties will proceed initially to resolve the matter in dispute by
informal means. Such period of informal negotiations shall not
exceed thirty (30) days from the date the notice was sent, unless the
Parties agree otherwise.
D. If the informal negotiations are unsuccessful, the
position of the United States and the State shall control unless,
within twenty (20) days after the conclusion of the informal
negotiation period, the Defendants invoke the formal dispute
resolution procedures of this Section by serving on the United States
and the State a written statement of position on the matter in
dispute.
I; E. Within thirty (30) days of receiving the Defendants'
statement of position, the United States and/or the State will serve
on the Defendants its/their written statement of position.
F. The United States' and/or the State's statement of
position shall be binding upon the Defendants unless Defendants file
a petition with the Court describing the nature of the dispute and a
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proposal for its resolution. Defendants' petition must be filed no
more than twenty (20) days after receipt of the United States' and/or
the State's statement of position. The United States and/or the
State shall then have 30 days to file a response setting forth
its/their position and proposal for resolution. In any such dispute,
the petitioner shall have the burden of proof, and the standard of
review shall be that provided by applicable law.
G. Submission of any matter to the Court for resolution shall
not extend any of the deadlines set forth in this Consent Decree,
unless the Parties agree to such extension in writing or the Court
allows the extension upon motion.
H. If the United States and the State provide Defendants with
materially different or irreconcilable positions on the issue(s) in
dispute, Defendants' obligation to perform an action necessarily
affected by the materially different or irreconcilable positions (and
Defendants' liability for stipulated penalties concerning such
obligation) shall be stayed until the dispute is resolved.
I. Stipulated penalties with respect to any disputed matter
(and interest thereon) shall accrue in accordance with Paragraphs
XI.H and L; however, payment of stipulated penalties, and any accrued
interest, shall be stayed pending resolution of the dispute, as
follows:
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1. If the dispute is resolved by informal agreement
before appeal to this Court, accrued penalties (and interest), if
any, determined to be owing shall be paid within 60 days of the
agreement or the receipt of the United States' and/or the State's
final position in writing.
2. If the dispute is appealed to this Court and the
United States and/or the State prevails in whole or in part,
Defendants shall pay all accrued penalties (and interest) determined
to be owed within 60 days of the Court's decision or order.
3. In the event of an appeal, Defendants shall pay all
accrued penalties (and interest) determined to be owed within 60 days
of a final decision no longer subject to judicial review has been
rendered.
j
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xv. RIGHT QF ENTRY
A. Until termination of this Consent Decree, the United
States and the State, and their authorized representatives and
contractors, shall have authority at all reasonable times, upon the
presentation of credentials, to enter Defendants' premises to:
1. Monitor the progress of activities required by this
Consent Decree;
2. Verify any data or information submitted to the
United States and/or the State;
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3. Obtain samples from the WWTPs and Sewer System;
4. Inspect and evaluate Defendants' WWTPs and Sewer
System; and
5. Inspect and review any records required to be kept
under the terms and conditions of this Consent Decree or any NPDES
Permit and the Clean Water Act.
B. The United States and the State agree to provide
Defendants an opportunity to obtain split samples of wastewater
samples taken by the United States or the State from the Sewer
System. The United States and the State further agree to provide
Defendants with the quality assured/quality controlled laboratory
analytical results of samples obtained from the Sewer System, and any
non-privileged (including non-attorney work product) reports prepared
concerning such results. The United States and the State will use
best efforts to coordinate field inspections of the Sewer System with
Defendants by notifying them, if practicable, of such inspections
prior to arrival at the field inspection location.
XVI. NOT A PERMIT/COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER STATUTES/REGULATIONS
A. This Consent Decree is not and shall not be construed as a
permit, or a modification of any existing permit, issued pursuant to
Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, nor shall it in
any way relieve Defendants of their obligations to obtain permits for
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their wastewater treatment facilities and to comply with the
requirements of any NPDES permit or with any other applicable federal
or state law or regulation, including the obligation to obtain
Permits to Install. Any new permit, or modification of existing
permits, must be complied with in accordance with applicable federal
and State laws and regulations.
B. The pendency or outcome of any proceeding concerning
issuance, reissuance or modification of any NPDES permit shall not
affect or postpone Defendants' responsibilities under this Decree.
However if a permitting authority receives a timely, approvable
application for a permit, renewal or modification, and the permitting
authority does not issue the permit, renewal or modification or take
a proposed action on the application in a timely manner, the
Defendants may seek relief under the force majeure provisions of this
Consent Decree.
C. Nothing herein, including the United States' and the
States' review or approval of any plans, reports, policies or
procedures formulated pursuant to this Consent Decree, shall be
construed as relieving Defendants of the duty to comply with the
Clean Water Act, the regulations promulgated thereunder, and all
applicable permits issued thereunder, or as relieving Defendants of
their duty to comply with State law and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.
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XVII.FAILURE OF COMPLIANCE
The United States and State do not, by their consent to the
entry of this Consent Decree, warrant or aver in any manner that
Defendants' complete compliance with this Consent Decree will result
in compliance with the provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251 ~ ~., R.C. 6111, or with Defendants' NPDES permits.
XVIII.
A.
EFFECT OF CONSENT DECREE AND NON-WAIVER PROVISIONS
Nothing contained in this Consent Decree shall be
construed to prevent or limit the United States' or the State's
rights to obtain penalties or further or additional injunctive relief
under the Clean Water Act or other federal statutes or regulations,
including, but not limited to, criminal punishment under Section
309(c) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), or state laws and regulations
respectively except as expressly specified herein.
B. This Consent Decree resolves the civil claims of the
United States and the State for injunctive relief for the SSO
violations alleged in the Complaints filed herein through the date of
Lodging of this Decree, except that this Consent Decree does not
resolve, and the United States and the State specifically reserve,
claims for injunctive relief concerning implementation of the
remedial measures set forth in the approved Capacity Assurance
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Program Plan. The United States and State specifically reserve any
and all claims for penalties associated with the violations alleged
in the Complaints filed herein.
C. The United States and State further reserve all rights
against the Defendants with respect to any SSG violations by
Defendants that occur after the Date of Lodging of this Consent
Decree, and/or for any violations of the Clean Water Act not
specifically alleged in the Complaints filed herein, whether they
occurred before or after the Date of Lodging of this Decree.
D. The Parties agree that in any future civil action pursuant
to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) for injunctive relief to address SSG
violations at SSG 700 that occur after the date of lodging of this
Consent Decree, Defendants' compliance or noncompliance with the
remedial measures set forth in this Consent Decree may be taken into
account by a District Court in fashioning appropriate injunctive
relief. The Parties further agree that in any future civil action
pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) for penalties for SSG violations that
occur after the date of lodging of this Consent Decree, Defendants'
compliance or noncompliance with the remedial measures set forth in
this Consent Decree shall be considered to be among the factors
specified in 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d) that may be taken into account by a District Court in
determining the amount of a civil penalty.
64
D - 119
E. In any subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding
initiated by the United States or the State for injunctive relief,
penalties, or other appropriate relief relating to Defendants'
violation of the Clean Water Act, Defendants shall not assert, and
may not maintain, any defense or claim based upon the principles of
waiver, ~ judicata, collateral estoppel, issue preclusion, claim-
splitting, or other defenses based upon any contention that the
claims raised by the United States or the State in the subsequent
proceeding were or should have been brought in the instant case,
except with respect to claims that have been specifically resolved
pursuant to Paragraph B of this Section.
F. The Consent Decree in no way affects or relieves
Defendants of any responsibility to comply with any federal, state,
or local law or regulation.
G. The Parties agree that Defendants are responsible for
achieving and maintaining complete compliance with all applicable
federal and state laws, regulations, and permits, and that compliance
with this Consent Decree shall be no defense to any actions commenced
pursuant to said laws, regulations, or permits, except as set forth
herein.
H. This Consent Decree does not limit or affect the rights of
the Parties as against any third parties that are not Parties to this
Consent Decree. The Parties recognize that this Consent Decree
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resolves only matters between Plaintiffs and Defendants and that its
execution does not preclude Defendants from asserting any legal or
factual position in any action brought against them by any person or
entity not a Party to this Consent Decree.
r. The United States and the State reserve any and all legal
and equitable remedies available to enforce the provisions of this
Consent Decree.
J. This Consent Decree shall not limit any authority of the
United States or the State under any applicable statute, including
the authority to seek information from Defendants, to require
monitoring, to conduct inspections, or to seek access to the property
of Defendants; nor shall anything in this Consent Decree be construed
to limit the authority of the United States or the State to undertake
any action against any person, including Defendants, in response to
conditions that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment
to the environment or to the public health or welfare.
K. Application for construction grants, State Revolving Loan
Funds, or any other grants or loans, or other delays caused by
inadequate facility planning or plans and specifications, on the part
of Defendants shall not be cause for extension of any required
compliance date in this Consent Decree.
L. Obligations of Defendants under the provisions of this
Consent Decree to perform duties scheduled to occur after the
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signing, but prior to the Date of Entry, shall be legally enforceable
from the date this Consent Decree is signed by Defendants. Liability
for stipulated penalties, if applicable, shall accrue for violation
of such obligations and payment of such stipulated penalties may be
demanded by the United States as provided in this Consent Decree.
The contempt authority of this Court shall also extend to violations
of such obligations.
XIX. COSTS OF SUIT
Each Party shall bear its own costs and attorneys' fees with
respect to matters related to this Consent Decree.
XX. NOTICES
All notices and correspondence under this Decree shall be sent
to the following addresses:
For U.S. EPA:
Chief, Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance Branch
Water Division (WCC-15J)
U.S. EPA, Region V
77 West Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, Illinois 60604
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For U,S. Department of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section
Environment and Natural Resources Division
Post Office Box 7611
Washington, D.C. 20044-7611
Reference DJ # 90-5-1-6-341A
For Ohio EPA:
Ohio EPA Southwest District Office
ATTN: DSW Enforcement Group Leader
401 East Fifth Street
Dayton, Ohio 45402-2911.
For Ohio Attorney General
Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section
Ohio Attorney General's Office, 25 th floor
30 E. Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428
For the County:
Hamilton County Board of County Commissioners
County Administration Building
138 East Court Street, Suite 603
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
For the City of Cincinnati:
W. Peter Heili
Deputy City Solicitor for the City of Cincinnati
801 Plum Street, Suite 214
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
For MSD:
Director
Metropolitan Sewer District of Greater Cincinnati
1600 Gest Street
Cincinnati, Ohio 45204
XXI. MODIFICATION
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A. Except as further set forth in this Paragraph, there shall
be no material modification of this Consent Decree, Exhibits attached
to this Consent Decree, or the submittals approved under this Consent
Decree without written approval by all of the Parties and the Court;
and any non-material modification of this Consent Decree, its
Exhibits, or approved submittals shall be in writing and signed by
the Parties. , Modifications (whether material or not) to the
attached Exhibits or subsequently approved submittals that are
specifically allowed under the terms of those Exhibits or submittals
may be made in accordance with the terms of those Exhibits or
approved submittals.
B. It is the intention of the Parties to this Consent Decree
that the Defendants shall have the opportunity, consistent with
applicable law, to conform compliance with this Consent Decree to any
modifications in U.8. EPA's regulations or national policies
governing 880s.
1. Consequently, upon issuance of any new U.8. EPA final
regulation (as promulgated in the Federal Register) or national
policy governing 880s, Defendants may request modification of this
Consent Decree from U.8. EPA/Ohio EPA to conform this Consent Decree
to such regulation or national policy. For the purposes of this
Paragraph, "national policy" refers to a formal written policy
statement issued by the Assistant Administrator for the Office of
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Water and the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance. Upon Defendants' request, the Parties
shall discuss the matter. If the Parties agree on a proposed
modification to the Consent Decree, they shall prepare a joint motion
to the Court requesting such modification.
2. If the Parties do not agree, and Defendants still
believe modification of this Decree is appropriate, they may file a
motion seeking such modification in accordance with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b); provided, however, that nothing in this
subparagraph is intended to waive the Plaintiffs' rights to oppose
such motion and to argue that such modification is unwarranted.
3. Following the filing of a motion under Rule 60(b),
stipulated penalties shall accrue due to Defendants' failure, if any,
to continue performance of obligations under the Decree that are
necessarily the subject of the Rule 60(b) motion; provided, however,
that such penalties need not be paid unless the Court resolves the
Rule 60(b) motion in the Plaintiffs' favor. If the Court resolves
the motion in Defendants' favor, Defendants shall comply with the
Decree as modified.
XXII.REVIEW OF SUBMITTALS
A. U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA agree to use their best efforts to
expeditiously review and comment on deliverables that Defendants are
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required to submit to U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for approval pursuant to the
terms and provisions of this Consent Decree. Where the Consent
Decree both requires Defendants to submit a plan or report or other
submittal to U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA for review and approval and
establishes a specific timeline for Defendants to resubmit such plan,
report or other submittal after comments by U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA, U.S.
EPA/Ohio EPA shall, as expeditiously as possible, review and approve
or decline to approve and provide written comments to the Defendants
on the submittal.
B. If U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA cannot complete their review of the
submittal within 60 days of receipt of the submittal, U.S. EPA/Ohio
EPA shall so notify Defendants. Such notice shall be given within the
60-day period following receipt of the submittal, and U.S.EPA/Ohio
EPA shall identify a schedule for completion of their review.
C. If U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA fail to approve or decline to approve
and provide written comments within 60 days of receipt of the
submittal, any subsequent milestone date dependent upon such approval
or any resubmission dependent upon such comments shall be extended by
the number of days beyond 60 days that U.S. EPA/Ohio EPA use for
their comment or decision on that submittal.
XXIII. CONTINUING JURISDICTION
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The Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms and
conditions and achieve the objectives of this Consent Decree and to
resolve disputes arising hereunder as may be necessary or appropriate
for the construction, modification, implementation or execution of
this Decree.
XXIV.CONTINGENT LIABILITY OF STATE OF OHIO
Section 309(e) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(e), requires that
the State be a Party to this action insofar as it may be liable in
the event the laws of Ohio prevent Defendants from raising revenues
needed to comply with this Decree. The State of Ohio, by signing
this Decree, certifies that the current laws of the State do not
prevent Defendants from raising revenues needed to comply with this
Decree. Except as required by Section 309(e) of the Act, the State
of Ohio shall have no liability under this Consent Decree.
xxv. TERMINATION
A. Upon motion filed with the Court by the United States,
State or Defendant, the Court may terminate the terms of this Consent
Decree after each of the following has occurred:
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1. Defendants have achieved compliance with all
provisions contained in this consent Decree, including the completion
of any additional remedial measures determined to be necessary
pursuant to Paragraph VI.D, and subsequently have maintained
compliance with each and every provision of this Consent Decree for
twelve consecutive months;
2. Defendants have paid all penalties and other monetary
obligations due hereunder and no penalties or other monetary
obligations due hereunder are outstanding or owed to the United
States or the State;
3. Defendants have certified compliance pursuant to
Paragraphs A and B above to the Court and all Parties; and
4. The United States and the State, within forty-five
(45) days of receiving such certification from the Defendants has not
contested, in writing, that such compliance has been achieved.
B. If the United States and/or the State dispute(s)
Defendants' full compliance, this Consent Decree shall remain in
effect pending resolution of the dispute by the Parties or the Court.
XXVI.PUBLIC COMMENT
This Consent Decree shall be lodged with the Court for a period
of not less than 30 days, for public notice and comment in accordance
with the provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 50.7. The United States reserves
73
D - 128
the right to withdraw or withhold its consent if the comments
received disclose facts or considerations which indicate that the
Consent Decree is inappropriate, improper or inadequate. Defendants
hereby agree not to withdraw from, oppose entry of, or to challenge
any provision of this Consent Decree, unless the United States has
notified Defendants in writing that it no longer supports entry of
the Consent Decree.
XXVII.
A.
SIGNATORIES/SERVICE
This Consent Decree may be executed in two or more
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of
which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.
B. The Assistant Attorney General for the Environment and
Natural Resources Division of the United States Department of
Justice, on behalf of the United States, the Ohio Assistant Attorney
General signing this Decree, on behalf of the State, and the
undersigned representatives of the Defendants each certifies that he
or she is authorized to enter into the terms and conditions of this
Consent Decree and to execute and bind legally such Party to this
document.
C. Each Defendant shall identify, on the attached signature
page, the name and address of an agent who is authorized to accept
service of process by mail on behalf of that Party with respect to
all matters arising under or relating to this Consent Decree.
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Defendants hereby agree to accept service in that manner and to waive
the formal service requirements set forth in Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and any applicable local rules of this
Court, including but not limited to, service of a summons. The
Parties agree that Settling Defendants need not file an answer to the
complaints in this action unless or until the Court expressly
declines to enter this Consent Decree.
SO ORDERED, this day of 2002.
United States District Judge
THE UNDERSIGNED Parties enter into this Consent Decree, subject to
the public notice requirements of 28 C.F.R. § 50.7, and submit it to
the Court for entry.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
THOMAS L. SANSONETTI
Assistant Attorney General
Environment and Natural
Resources Division
U.S. Department of Justice
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LESLIE ALLEN
Senior Attorney
Environmental Enforcement Section
Environmental and Natural
Resources Division
u.S. Department of Justice
P.o. Box 7611
Washington, D.C. 20044-7611
(202) 514-4114
GREGORY G. LOCKHART
United States Attorney for the
Southern District of Ohio
By: _
DONETTA D. WIETHE
Assistant United States Attorney
221 E. 4th Street
Atrium II, Suite 400
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
513-684-3711
THOMAS V. SKINNER
Regional Administrator
u.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Region V
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GARY PRICHARD
Associate Regional Counsel
u.s. Environmental Protection
Agency, Region V
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SYLVIA K. LOWRANCE
Acting Assistant Administrator
for Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
JOSEPH G. THEIS
Attorney-Advisor
Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
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FOR STATE OF OHIO:
BETTY D. MONTGOMERY
Attorney General of Ohio
By: _
MARGARET A. MALONE
Assistant Attorney General
Environmental Enforcement Section
30 East Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio 43266-0410
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FOR BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
By: _
DAVID J. KRINGS
COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR
AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS:
PETER MURPHY
Gibson, Dunn and
1050 Connecticut
Washington, D.C.
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Crutcher
Avenue, N.W.
20036-5306
FOR CITY OF CINCINNATI, OHIO
By:
TIMOTHY M. RIORDAN
ACTING CITY MANAGER
AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS:
PETER MURPHY
Gibson, Dunn and
1050 Connecticut
Washington, D.C.
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Avenue, N.W.
20036-5306
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SECTIONE

"REAL ESTATE RECYCLING" - VERP REGULATIONS:
A NUTS AND BOLTS APPROACH
Lloyd R. ("Rusty") Cress, Jr.
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC
229 W. Main St., Suite 101
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
(502) 875-0050
"REAL ESTATE RECYCLING" - VERP REGULATIONS:
A NUTS AND BOLTS APPROACH
I. Purpose ofKentucky Voluntary Environmental Remediation Act ("VERA")
A. It is "intended to establish an efficient and predictable process ... to promote voluntary
cleanup and redevelopment of properties suspected of environmental contamination ...
while stimulating economic development and job creation through the construction of
new residential, commercial, and industrial facilities." KRS 224.01-510.
B. Provides property owners with certainty in:
1. Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet remediation review time lines; and,
2. Level of comfort following completion of remediation activities, without
stymieing remediation management at site.
II. Remediation Statutes
A. KRS 224.01-400.
1. Any person possessing or controlling a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant which is released to the environment, or any person who caused a release to
the environment of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, shall characterize
the extent of the release as necessary to determine the effect of the release on the
environment, and shall take actions necessary to correct the effect of the release on the
environment.
2. Four options:
a. Demonstrating that no action is necessary to protect human health, safety,
and the environment;
b. Managing the release in a manner that controls and minimizes the harmful
effects of the release and protects human health, safety, and the environment, provided
that the management may include any existing or proposed engineering or institutional
controls and the maintenance of those controls;
c. Restoring the environment through the removal of the hazardous
substance pollutant or contaminant; or,
d. Any combination of paragraphs (a), (b), and (c).
B. KRS 224.01-405.
1. For releases of petroleum or petroleum products from sources other than
petroleum storage tanks, any person who owns or operates the source from which the
release occurred or any person who caused the release shall characterize the extent of the
release as necessary to determine the effect of the release on the environment and shall
perform corrective action.
2. Corrective action means those actions necessary to protect human health, safety,
and the environment, and includes: remedial actions to clean up contaminated media;
actions to address residual effects after initial corrective action is taken; actions to restore
or replace potable water supplies; and actions necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate a
release, as well as actions necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the effectiveness of
remedial action.
C. KRS 224.01-450 to 465
1. In 1996, the legislature created a law providing for the issuance of a No Further
Remediation Letter to a public entity for a site when a remediation plan has been
successfully completed.
2. Letter intended to signify a release from further responsibilities for a remediation
plan approved under KRS 224.01-460 and any further responsibilities under KRS
224.01-400 to undertake any other remedial action on the site.
3. Well-intended, but ineffective - not available for private lands and scarcely
utilized by public entities.
D. KRS 224.01-510 to 532
1. Establishes Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program - applies to sites
under KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405.
2. Ineligible sites.
a. The property is part of or contains a site which is on the National Priorities
List established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency;
b. The property is part of or contains a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or
disposal facility for which a permit has been issued, or the site is otherwise
the subject ofhazardous waste closure or corrective action pursuant to
KRS 224.46-520 or KRS 224.46-530;
c. The property or site is the subject of state or federal environmental
enforcement action relating to the release, for which the application is
submitted; or
d. The property or site presents an environmental emergency, as defIned in
KRS 224.01-400.
3. Program requirements.
a. Application, including standard form
b. Filing fee:
• Site size up to 3 acres = $1,000
• Site size 3 - 10 acres = $2,500
• Site size greater than 10 acres = $3,500
• Possible fee waiver
c. Characterization Plan - Identify any hazardous substance and any
petroleum released or believed to be released to the environment at the site and
provide a characterization plan for the releases or threatened releases adequate to
comply with KRS 224.01-400, 224.01-405, 224.01-510 to 224.01-532, and any
administrative regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
d. Public notice
i. Upon fIling of application, the applicant shall notify the chief
executive of local governmental units in which the property or site that is
the subject of the application is located and shall provide the chief
executives with a copy ofthe application.
ii. Publish notice of the application in the newspaper of largest
circulation in the county in which the site is located.
e. EPPC time for approval or disapproval- 45 days.
4. Voluntary Remediation Agreed Order:
a. Agreement to identify and characterize releases at site and submit
characterization report.
b. Agreement to submit corrective action plan and fInal report which certifIes
that the work has been completed in accordance with the Corrective Action Plan.
c. Listing of costs to be reimbursed to Cabinet for oversight and review and a
payment schedule (costs must be reasonable, actual, and necessary).
d. DefInite remediation schedule.
e. Agreement that applicant may withdraw from agreed order prior to
issuance of covenant not to sue (must pay Cabinet costs).
f. Other provisions necessary to protect human health and the environment.
5. Work plans set forth in Agreed Order must be completed
a. Submittal of Site Characterization Report and Corrective Action Plan (120
days from entry ofAgreed Order) - Site characterization and corrective action
must comply with KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405.
b. Must include plan of action to inform public of remediation and provide
for public comment.
c. EPPC review of plan (120 days).
d. Reasons Cabinet may disapprove Corrective Action Plan:
i. Failure to comply with KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405.
11 Failure to respond to request for information.
e. Implementation ofplan on approved schedule.
f. Corrective Action Completion Report.
6. Public notice and participation (includes notice of activities, availability of
information, and opportunity for comment).
a. Publish notice of application in newspaper.
b. Notification to local government unit officials of filing of application,
along with providing copy of application.
c. Notification to local government unit of corrective action plan.
d. Publish notice of Corrective Action Plan and request for comment in
newspaper.
e. 30-day comment period and possible public hearing.
f. Property sign stating that property is undergoing remediation and location
of information.
g. Documents to be maintained in local public library:
1. Agreed Order;
ii. Characterization Plan;
111. Characterization Report;
IV. Corrective Action Plan;
v. Corrective Action Completion Report;
VI. Notices of Deficiency and responses thereto;
Vll. Covenant not to sue.
7. Covenant not to sue.
a. Covers releases identified in Corrective Action Plan for:
1. No further remediation.
11. Prosecution of civil or administrative enforcement for failure to
perform remediation under state and federal law; injunctive relief;
lien assertion; reimbursement ofcosts; and, civil penalties.
b. Does not cover:
1. Releases not identified in Corrective Action Plan;
11. Failure to comply with Agreed Order or plans required;
111. Exacerbation of releases;
IV. Criminal liability;
v. Underground storage tanks;
vi. Misrepresentation or intentional omissions;
Vll. Conditions not known to the Cabinet which prevent remedy from
being protective;
viii. Changes in scientific knowledge indicating that remedy is no
longer protective;
IX. Environmental emergencies;
x. Natural Resource Damages under CERCLA.
8. Screening levels and remediation standards (applicable to all sites, whether
participating in VERP or not).
a. Use of U.S. EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals as screening
levels.
b. Promulgation of remediation standards.
III. Implementing Regulations - 401 KAR 100:030
A. Governs remediation pursuant to KRS 224.01-400(18)-(21), 224.01-405(1),
224.01-450 to 224.01.465, and 224.01-510 to 224.01-532.
B. Allows for a notice of completion, a no further remediation letter, or a covenant
not to sue to be issued by the EPPC only for those sites at which remediation is
conducted under Cabinet oversight or is otherwise approved by the Cabinet.
1. Notice of completion - upon approval of remediation in accordance with
KRS 224.01-400 or 224.01-405.
2. No further remediation letter (public entities) - upon approval of
remediation in accordance with KRS 224.01-450 to 465.
3. Covenant not to sue - must apply under Voluntary Environmental
Remediation Program and remediation must be approved in accordance with KRS
224.01-510 to 224.01-532.
4. None of the above are required to be issued unless the EPPC has reviewed
and approved the remediation.
C. A person conducting characterization and remediation, with or without Cabinet
oversight as provided by KRS 224.01-400(19), shall have all the options ofKRS 224.01-
400.
D. Initial Property Screening
1. Contamination that does not exceed the residential value in the Region 9
PRGs does not "rise to a level of concern under KRS 224.01-530."
2. Contamination which exceeds the residential value but does not exceed the
industrial value in the Region 9 PRGs does not "rise to a level of concern under
KRS 224.01-530" if the property is restricted to industrial use by a deed
instrument in the property's chain of title that industrial exposures have been
assumed at the site and is recorded with the county clerk for the county in which
the property exists.
3. The Cabinet may require further characterization and remediation of any
release (if appropriate under statute or regulation) regardless of the application of
the Region 9 PRGs.
E. VERP Mechanics (not required unless seeking covenant not to sue)
1. "Application to Enter Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program,"
DEP Form 6059, October 22,2003;
2. The tear sheet for the public notice required by KRS 224.01-514(3)(d);
3. Site characterization plan; and,
4. Nonrefundable application fee, if required by KRS 224.01-514(3).
F. Site Characterization
1. "Party" or "Applicant" must submit a site characterization plan that
identifies or includes:
a. The location and ownership of the property and site; the history of
the use of the property and site, surrounding land use and ownership;
information regarding the circumstances surrounding known or suspected
releases at the property and site, including the types ofhazardous
substances or petroleum released, approximate volumes or amounts of
releases, and actions taken in response to known or suspected releases to
date;
b. The site conditions and physical setting including soils,
groundwater, geology, and other pertinent features; a 7.5 minute USGS
topographic quadrangle map or the appropriate part of this map indicating
the location of the property, a 7.5 minute USGS geological quadrangle
map or the appropriate part of such a map indicating the location of the
property; and a base map, at an appropriate scale, accuracy, and detail
depicting property lines, surrounding land ownership and uses, significant
structures and infrastructure; and significant environmental or geological
features;
c. A soil sampling plan to identify and characterize the horizontal and
vertical extent of contamination and the variation in types and
concentrations of hazardous substances and petroleum sufficient to
support selection of remediation options for the site;
d. A plan to determine whether a groundwater assessment is
necessary (see groundwater assessment guidance);
e. A plan to determine whether air quality, surface water and its
associated sediments, or terrestrial or aquatic habitat have been affected by
a release;
f. A plan to determine whether an ecological risk assessment is
necessary;
g. A statement specifying that sample collection and analysis
requirements, quality assurance, and quality control will be met in
accordance with "Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Wastes: Physical
Chemical Methods (EPA Publication No. SW-846) Third Edition"; and
h. A proposed schedule for implementation of the characterization
plan and submittal of a site characterization report.
2. "Applicant" is defined as a person who has applied to participate in the
Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program
3. "Party" is defined as a person who is: (a) conducting remediation in
accordance with KRS 224.01-400(18) or 224.01-405(1), who is seeking a notice
of completion from the Cabinet; or (b) conducting remediation in accordance with
KRS 224.01-400(18) or 224.01-405(1), and seeking a no further remediation
letter in accordance with KRS 224.01-450 to 224.01-465.
4. If remediation and characterization are conducted with or without EPPC
oversight, Region 9 PRGs may be used to screen sites and identify contaminants
ofconcern, but the EPPC shall not approve the adequacy of the Region 9 PRGs
without review of site-specific conditions.
5. Once plan implemented, a site characterization report must be submitted
including:
a. A list of the contaminants of concern at the site identified using
Region 9 PRGs, 1. The party or applicant shall identify contaminants of
concern at the site using the Region 9 PRGs considering: (a) the
frequency of detection of the contaminants; (b) the effects on human
health due to the interaction between contaminants, including additivity;
and (c)ambient background conditions.
b. A determination of the extent of the contamination in all media
impacted by contaminants of concern:
1. The horizontal and vertical extent of contamination in soils;
ii. The results of the groundwater assessment determination;
111. The results of the determination ofwhether air quality,
surface water and its associated sediments, or terrestrial or aquatic
habitat have been affected by a release, and the extent of the effect
of the release on these media; and
iv. A determination by way of screening or risk assessment, as
appropriate, of the human health and ecological risks posed by
contamination at the site or resulting from the site.
O. Corrective Action Plan
1. "Party" or "Applicant" must submit a corrective action plan that addresses
contaminants of concern in impacted media, and unacceptable ecological risks.
2. If conducting corrective action without EPPC oversight, Region 9 PROs
may be used to identify final remediation goals, but the EPPC shall not approve
the adequacy of the Region 9 PROs as final remediation goals without review of
site-specific conditions.
3. Must employ one of following options (consistent with KRS 224.01-400):
a. No action necessary.
i. Demonstrate that the risk posed by contaminants of concern
does not exceed target risk levels (defmed as an excess cancer risk
of one in one million for carcinogenic endpoints and a hazard
index of 1.0 for noncancer endpoints) for unrestricted land use and
does not exceed ecological risk endpoints in U.S. EPA guidance;
or
ii. Demonstrate that organic contaminants of concern do not
exceed target risk levels for unrestricted land use, that inorganic
contaminants of concern do not exceed ambient background levels
for the respective media, and do not exceed ecological risk
endpoints.
111. Region 9 PROs may be used as the final remediation goals
for human health at sites that do not have multiple contaminants of
concern that result in an additive risk above the target risk level
and for which the assumptions used in developing the Region 9
PROs are applicable.
b. Management in place
i. The goal of management in place is to attain target risk
levels at the point of exposure, and be protective ofecological
health.
ii. Includes engineering and institutional controls amounting
to containment of the release, and either elimination of exposure
pathways, or reduction of exposure and must consider current and
proposed land use in selecting the remedy.
iii. Methods for maintenance ofengineering and institutional
controls include:
• Inspections of the engineering and institutional
controls;
• Certification that the engineering and institutional
controls remain protective ofhuman health, safety
and the environment; and
• A deed instrument, filed with the EPPC, containing
an enforceable restrictive covenant which is
transferable and is binding on current and
subsequent property and recorded with the county
clerk for the county in which the property exists
iv. If the target risk levels at the point ofexposure will not be
achieved, the party or applicant must demonstrate the
protectiveness of the remedy using the following criteria (with
emphasis on the first four listed):
• The overall protection of human health and the
environment;
• The compliance with any other applicable
requirements;
• The long-term effectiveness and permanence of the
remedial option;
• The reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume
through the use of treatment;
• The short-term effectiveness of the remedy;
• The ability to implement the remedy;
• The cost of the remedy; and
• Community acceptance of the remedy.
v. If the proposed remedy will not achieve target risk levels at
the point of exposure, public notice and opportunity for comment
shall be given, including a summary of the contamination at the
site, the remedial actions taken, and the residual risks associated
with the site.
c. Restoration
• Restoration of the environment through removal of the
contaminants of concern to ambient background levels, target
risk levels at the point ofexposure, or levels derived from a
site-specific risk assessment approved by the Cabinet, that do
not require engineering or institutional controls.
d. Combination ofoptions described in a through d
4. EPPC review and approval
5. Corrective Action Completion Report
a. Submitted to EPPC
b. Must include:
i. Documentation that the corrective actions implemented
comply with the corrective action plan;
ii. Documentation of the completion of all the activities
specified in the corrective action plan:
• Documentation of any modification from the approved
corrective action plan;
• Documentation of the weight, volume, and classification ofany
material removed as part of the corrective action;
• Copies of signed manifests and any other pertinent waste
disposal forms;
• Sampling procedures used for waste profile determination and
restoration conformation;
• Results from any confirmatory sampling; and
• Copies of all laboratory analytical reports, and information
regarding backfill material, where it was obtained, and any
attendant analytical results.
111. Documentation of all engineering and institutional controls
implemented to contain the release, eliminate pathways of
exposure, reduce exposure, or achieve a combination thereof; and
iv. A statement signed by the party or applicant certifying that
the document and all attachments were prepared under the party or
applicant's direction or supervision, and the information submitted
is, to the best knowledge ofthe party or applicant, true, accurate,
and complete.
c. EPPC review and approval of report.
IV. Financial Incentives
A. Moneys expended under VERP are qualifying costs under:
1. Economic development laws;
2. Infrastructure projects.
B. Agricultural Warehousing Sites Cleanup Fund
1. Administered by the Cabinet for Economic Development.
2. The purpose of the agricultural warehousing sites cleanup fund is to
provide financial assistance to persons who did not cause or contribute to the
contamination on property used for agricultural warehousing activity, and who
propose to undertake a voluntary cleanup ofthe property.
3. The financial assistance shall be in an amount ofup to seventy-five
percent (75%) ofthe costs incurred for completing an environmental study and
implementing a cleanup plan by an eligible applicant.
4. Financial assistance may be in the form of grants or low-interest loans, to
be lent at a rate not to exceed two percent (2%).
5. Loans may be made to the following categories of applicants:
a. Local economic development agencies;
b. Political subdivisions or their instrumentalities; and
c. Other persons determined to be eligible by the Cabinet for
Economic Development.
6. The Cabinet for Economic Development is required to take all of the
following factors into consideration when determining which applicants shall
receive financial assistance:
a. The benefit of the remedy to human health, safety, and the
environment;
b. The permanence of the remedy;
,c. The cost-effectiveness of the remedy in comparison with other
alternatives;
d. The financial condition of the applicant;
e The financial or economic distress of the area in which the cleanup
is being conducted; and
f. The potential for economic development.
7. Loans may be made based upon the ability to repay from future revenue to
be derived from the cleanup, by a mortgage or other collateral, or on any other
fiscal matters which the Cabinet for Economic Development deems appropriate.
C. 2005 House Bill 272
1. Applies to a "qualifying voluntary environmental remediation property" -
real property subject to the provisions ofKRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405
for which the EPPC has made a determination that:
a. The responsible parties are financially unable to carry out the
obligations in KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405; and
b. The property was acquired after the effective date of the Act by a
bona fide prospective purchaser as defmed in 42 U.S.C. sec. 9601(40).
2. Applies to "expenditures" - payment for work to characterize the extent of
contamination and to remediate the contamination at a qualifying voluntary
environmental remediation property.
3. Creates a nonrefundable credit against income taxes for:
a. Expenditures;
b. Made at a qualifying voluntary environmental remediation
property;
c. In order to meet the requirements of an agreed order entered into
by the taxpayer under the provisions ofKRS 224.01-518;
d. Provided that the taxpayer has obtained a covenant not to sue from
the EPPC.
4. Maximum total credit for each taxpayer not to exceed $150,000.
401 KAR 100:030. Remediation requirements.
RELATES TO: KRS 224.01-400, 224.01-405, 224.01-450-224.01-465, 224.01-510-224.01-532, 224.40-
100
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 224.10-100(30), 224.40-100, 224.01-400(2), 224.01-405(2), 224.01-
530(2), 224.01-532
NECESSITY, FUNCTION AND CONFORMITY: KRS 224.01-530(2) requires the cabineUo promulgate
administrative regulations establishing standards under KRS 224.01-400 and 224.01-405 with respect to
hazardous substances, pollutants, contaminants, petroleum, or petroleum products, that are protective of
human health, safety, and the environment. KRS 224.01-532 authorizes the cabinet to promulgate
administrative regulations to implement KRS 224.01-510 to 224.01-532. This administrative regulation
governs remediation under KRS 224.01-400 and 224.01-405, 224.01-510 through 224.01-532, and
224.01-450 to 224.01-465.
Section 1. Definitions. (1) "Ambient background" means the concentrations of naturally-occurring
inorganic substances and ubiquitous anthropogenic inorganic substances in the environment that are
representative of the region surrounding the site and not attributable to an identifiable release.
(2) "Applicant" means a person who has applied to participate in the Voluntary Environmental
Remediation Program in accordance with KRS 224.01-514.
(3) "Application" means Application to Enter the Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program, DEP
Form 6059 (October 22, 2003), including any additions, revisions, or modifications and any narrative and
drawings.
(4) "Contaminant of concern" means a hazardous substance or petroleum that is sufficiently present in
frequency and concentration in the environment to require further evaluation of human and ecological
health effects.
(5) "Industrial" means a type of property not used for residential purposes or for other purposes with a
similar potential for human exposure.
(6) "Notice of completion" means a letter from the cabinet to the person indicating that the person has
satisfactorily completed the requirements of KRS 224.01-400(18) and 224.01-405(1) and Sections 6
through 9 of this administrative regulation.
(7) "Party" means a person as defined in KRS 224.01-010(17) who is:
(a) Conducting remediation in accordance with KRS 224.01-400(18) or 224.01-405(1), who is seeking a
notice of completion from the cabinet; or
(b) Conducting remediation in accordance with KRS 224.01-400(18) or 224.01-405(1), and seeking a no
further remediation letter in accordance with KRS 224.01-450 to 224.01-465.
(8) "Region 9 PRGs" means the U.S. EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals, (October 1, 2002)
used in accordance with the U.S. EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals Table User's
GuidelTechnical Background Document (October 1, 2002).
(9) "Residential" means a type of property used:
(a) As a residence or dwelling, including a house, apartment, or condominium; or
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(b) For other purposes with a similar potential for human exposure.
(10) "Target risk" means an excess cancer risk of one in one million for carcinogenic endpoints and a
hazard index of 1.0 for noncancer endpoints.
(11) "Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program" (VERP) means the process for site remediation
established in this administrative regulation and KRS 224.01-510 to 224.01-532.
Section 2. Applicability. This administrative regulation shall govern remediation pursuant to KRS 224.01-
400(18)-(21),224.01-405(1),224.01-450 to 224.01.465, and 224.01-510 to 224.01-532.
Section 3. Eligibility (1) A notice of completion, a no further remediation letter, or a covenant not to sue
shall be issued by the cabinet only for those sites at which remediation is conducted under cabinet
oversight or is otherwise approved by the cabinet.
(2) Upon approval of a remediation done in accordance with KRS 224.01-400 or 224.01-405 and Sections
6 through 9 of this administrative regulation, the cabinet shall issue a notice of completion to the person.
(3) Upon approval of a remediation done in accordance with KRS 224.01-450 to 465 and Sections 6
through 9 of this administrative regulation, the cabinet shall issue a no further remediation letter to the
eligible public entity.
(4) Eligible participants seeking a covenant not to sue from the cabinet shall apply to enter the Voluntary
Environmental Remediation Program. Upon approval of a remediation done in accordance with KRS
224.01-510 to 224.01-532 and Sections 5 through 9 of this administrative regulation, the cabinet shall
issue a covenant not to sue to the applicant.
(5) A person conducting characterization and remediation, with or without cabinet oversight as provided
by KRS 224.01-400(19), shall have all the options of KRS 224.01-400 and of this administrative
regulation.
Section 4. Initial Property Screening. (1) KRS 224.01-530 establishes the Region 9 PRGs as screening
values. Contamination on a property that does not exceed the residential value in the Region 9 PRGs and
does not otherwise require action under KRS 224.01-400 or 224.01-405, shall not rise to a level of
concern under KRS 224.01-530.
(2) Contamination on a property which exceeds the residential value but does not exceed the industrial
value in the Region 9 PRGs and does not otherwise require action under KRS 224.01-400 or 224.01-405,
shall not rise to a level of concern under KRS 224.01-530 if the property is restricted in use to industrial
use by a deed instrument in the property's chain of title that industrial exposures have been assumed at
the site and is recorded with the county clerk for the county in which the property exists.
(3) The cabinet shall not issue a covenant not to sue for sites described by subsections (1) and (2) of this
section unless the owner of the property applies to the Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program
and complies with Sections 5 through 9 of this administrative regulation.
(4) The cabinet may require further characterization and remediation of any release pursuant to and in
compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations regardless of the application of subsections (1)
and (2) of this section.
Section 5. Application. In order to enter into the Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program an
applicant shall submit to the cabinet:
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(1) A completed "Application to Enter Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program," DEP Form 6059,
October 22,2003;
(2) The tear sheet for the public notice required by KRS 224.01-514(3)(d);
(3) A site characterization plan prepared in accordance with Section 6 of this administrative regulation;
and
(4) A nonrefundable application fee, if required by KRS 224.01-514(3).
Section 6. Site Characterization Plan. The party or applicant shall submit to the cabinet a site
characterization plan that complies with KRS 224.01-400(18) to (21) or 224.01-405(1) and Section 7(2) of
this administrative regulation, and shall include:
(1) To the extent known or reasonably obtained, the location and ownership of the property and site; the
history of the use of the property and site, surrounding land use and ownership; information regarding the
circumstances surrounding known or suspected releases at the property and site, including the types of
hazardous substances or petroleum released, approximate volumes or amounts of releases, and actions
taken in response to known or suspected releases to date;
(2) The site conditions and physical setting including soils, groundwater, geology, and other pertinent
features; a 7.5 minute USGS topographic quadrangle map or the appropriate part of this map indicating
the location of the property, a 7.5 minute USGS geological quadrangle map or the appropriate part of
such a map indicating the location of the property; and a base map, at an appropriate scale, accuracy,
and detail depicting property lines, surrounding land ownership and uses, significant structures and
infrastructure; and significant environmental or geological features;
(3) A soil sampling plan to identify and characterize the horizontal and vertical extent of contamination
and the variation in types and concentrations of hazardous substances and petroleum sufficient to
support selection of remediation options for the site;
(4) A plan to determine whether a groundwater assessment is necessary;
(5) A plan to determine whether air quality, surface water and its associated sediments, or terrestrial or
aquatic habitat have been affected by a release;
(6) A plan to determine whether an ecological risk assessment is necessary;
(7) A statement specifying that sample collection and analysis requirements, quality assurance, and
quality control will be met in accordance with "Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Wastes: Physical
Chemical Methods (EPA Publication No. SW-846) Third Edition"; and
(8) A proposed schedule for implementation of the characterization plan and submittal of a site
characterization report.
Section 7. Site Characterization and Site Characterization Report. (1) The party or applicant shall conduct
a site characterization that complies with the site characterization plan, as required in Section 6 of this
administrative regulation.
(2) The party or applicant shall submit a site characterization report that includes:
(a) A list of the contaminants of concern at the site that complies with the following requirements:
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1. The party or applicant shall identify contaminants of concern at the site using the Region 9 PRGs;
2. In identifying contaminants of concern the party or applicant shall consider the following:
a. The frequency of detection of the contaminants;
b. The effects on human health due to the interaction between contaminants, including additivity.
Additivity of contaminants of concern shall be evaluated using the screening index described in the "U.S.
EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals Table User's GuidelTechnical Background Document
(October 1, 2002)";
c. Ambient background conditions, including ambient background based on generic statewide ambient
background levels as presented in Table 2 of the Kentucky Guidance for Ambient Background
Assessment, or site-specific ambient background conditions determined in accordance with the Kentucky
Guidance for Ambient Background Assessment; and
d. Any other applicable requirements; and
3. A person conducting characterization and screening with or without cabinet oversight as provided by
KRS 224.01-400(19), may use Region 9 PRGs to screen sites and identify contaminants of concern, as
described in KRS 224.01-530(1). However, the cabinet shall not approve the adequacy of the Region 9
PRGs without review of site-specific conditions;
(b) A determination of the extent of the contamination in all media impacted by contaminants of concern
including:
1. The horizontal and vertical extent of contamination in soils;
2. The results of the determination of whether a groundwater assessment is necessary, conducted in
accordance with the "Kentucky Guidance for Groundwater Assessment Screening", or other method
selected by the party or applicant and approved by the cabinet;
3. The results of the determination of whether air quality, surface water and its associated sediments, or
terrestrial or aquatic habitat have been affected by a release, and the extent of the effect of the release on
these media; and
(c) A determination by way of screening or risk assessment, as appropriate, of the human health and
ecological risks posed by contamination at the site or resulting from the site:
1. Human health risk assessments shall comply with the "Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund:
Volume 1, Human Health Evaluation Manual, Part A, Part B, and Part C"; and
2. Ecological risk assessments shall be conducted in accordance with "Ecological Risk Assessment
Guidance for Superfund: Process for Designing and Conducting Ecological Risk Assessments (1997)",
and "Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment (1998)".
Section 8. Corrective Action Plan. (1) The party or applicant shall submit a corrective action plan to the
cabinet that addresses contaminants of concern in impacted media, and unacceptable ecological risks.
The corrective action plan shall contain a proposed schedule for implementation of the corrective action.
(2) A person conducting corrective action pursuant to KRS 224.01-400(19) may use the Region 9 PRGs
in order to identify final remediation goals. However, the cabinet shall not approve the adequacy of the
Region 9 PRGs as final remediation goals without review of site-specific conditions.
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(3) The corrective action plan shall employ one (1) of the following options:
(a) No action necessary.
1. No action is necessary in accordance with KRS 224.01-400(18)(a) if the party or applicant:
a. Demonstrates to the cabinet that the risk posed by contaminants of concern does not exceed target
risk levels for unrestricted land use and does not exceed ecological risk endpoints in accordance with
"Ecological Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: Process for Designing and Conducting Ecological
Risk Assessments (1997)" and "Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment (1998)"; or
b. Demonstrates to the cabinet that organic contaminants of concern do not exceed target risk levels for
unrestricted land use and inorganic contaminants of concern do not exceed ambient background levels
for the respective media. Contaminants of concern shall not exceed ecological risk endpoints in
accordance with "Ecological Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: Process for Designing and
Conducting Ecological Risk Assessments (1997)" and "Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment
(1998)".
2. The party's or applicant's attempt to demonstrate that no action is necessary to protect human health,
safety and the environment may include demonstrations by the party or applicant that the remaining
organic constituents in soil are naturally occurring or are not attributable to an identifiable release.
3. The party's or applicant shall consider any applicable requirements when demonstrating no action is
necessary.
4. Region 9 PRGs may be used as the final remediation goals for human health at sites:
a. That do not have multiple contaminants of concern that result in an additive risk above the target risk
level. Additivity of contaminants of concern shall be evaluated using the screening index described in the
"U.S. EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals Table User's GuidelTechnical Background Document
(October 1, 2002)"; and
b. For which the assumptions used in developing the Region 9 PRGs are applicable.
(b) Management in place. KRS 224.01-400(18)(b) shall apply to sites where the party or applicant will
manage releases in place. The goal of management in place shall be to attain target risk levels at the
point of exposure, and be protective of ecological health.
1. Management of the release shall include engineering and institutional controls amounting to
containment of the release, and either elimination of exposure pathways, or reduction of exposure.
2. The party or applicant shall consider current and proposed land use in selecting the remedy. Proposed
land use shall not be in conflict with local zoning codes and other applicable ordinances.
3. The party or applicant shall describe to the cabinet the method for maintenance of engineering and
institutional controls, including:
a. Annual (or other approved frequency) inspections of the engineering and institutional controls, as
approved by the cabinet in the corrective action plan;
b. Annual (or other approved frequency) certification to the cabinet that the engineering and institutional
controls remain protective of human health, safety and the environment; and
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c. A deed instrument containing an enforceable restrictive covenant which is transferable and is binding
on current and subsequent property and recorded with the county clerk for the county in which the
property exists. A copy of the restrictive covenant shall be filed with the cabinet.
4. If the target risk levels at the point of exposure will not be achieved by the proposed remedy, the party
or applicant shall demonstrate to the cabinet the protectiveness of the remedy using the criteria listed in
clauses a through h of this subparagraph. The cabinet shall place emphasis on criteria listed in clauses a
through d of this subparagraph when evaluating the remedy selected.
a. The overall protection of human health and the environment;
b. The compliance with any other applicable requirements;
c. The long-term effectiveness and permanence of the remedial option;
d. The reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume through the use of treatment;
e. The short-term effectiveness of the remedy;
f. The ability to implement the remedy;
g. The cost of the remedy; and
h. Community acceptance of the remedy.
5. If the proposed remedy will not achieve target risk levels at the point of exposure the party or applicant
shall provide a public notice of the remedy, including a summary of the contamination at the site, the
remedial actions taken, and the residual risks associated with the site. The cabinet shall receive public
comments on the proposed remedy for at least thirty (30) days following publication of the notice. For
VERP participants, the public notice and comment period required by KRS 224.01-524 shall serve as the
required public notice.
(c) Restoration. KRS 224.01-400(18)(c) shall apply to sites where the party or applicant restores the
environment through removal of the contaminants of concern to ambient background levels, target risk
levels at the point of exposure, or levels derived from a site-specific risk assessment approved by the
cabinet, that do not require engineering or institutional controls.
(d) Combination of options. The party or applicant shall have the option to employ a combination of the
remedial options described in this section.
(4) The cabinet shall review and approve or disapprove the corrective action plan pursuant to KRS
224.01-522 or 224.01-400(22), as applicable.
Section 9. Corrective Action Completion Report. (1) The party or applicant shall submit to the cabinet a
corrective action completion report.
(2) The corrective action completion report shall include:
(a) Documentation that the corrective actions implemented comply with the corrective action plan
approved by the cabinet;
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(b) Documentation of the completion of all the activities specified in the corrective action plan required in
Section 7 of this administrative regulation, including documentation of any modification from the approved
corrective action plan, documentation of the weight, volume, and classification of any material removed
as part of the corrective action, copies of signed manifests and any other pertinent waste disposal forms,
sampling procedures used for waste profile determination and restoration conformation, results from any
confirmatory sampling and copies of all laboratory analytical reports, and information regarding backfill
material, where it was obtained, and any attendant analytical results;
(c) Documentation of all engineering and institutional controls implemented to contain the release,
eliminate pathways of exposure, reduce exposure, or achieve a combination thereof; and
(d) A statement signed by the party or applicant certifying that the document and all attachments were
prepared under the party or applicant's direction or supervision, and the information submitted is, to the
best knowledge of the party or applicant, true, accurate, and complete.
(3) The cabinet shall review and approve or disapprove the corrective action completion report pursuant
to KRS 224.01-522 or 224.01-400(22), as applicable.
Section 10. Incorporation by Reference. (1) The following material is incorporated by reference:
(a) "Application to Enter Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program, DEP Form 6059 (October 22,
2003)";
(b) "U.S. EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals, and the Region 9 PRGs Table User's
Guide/Technical Background Document (October 1,2002)";
(c) "Kentucky Guidance for Ambient Background Assessment (January 8,2004) ";
(d) "Kentucky Guidance for Groundwater Assessment Screening (January 15, 2004) ";
(e) "Ecological Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: Process for Designing and Conducting
Ecological Risk Assessments (1997)" Interim Final. U.S. EPA Environmental Response Team, Edison,
NJ;
(f) "Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment (1998)" U.S. EPA Risk Assessment Forum, Washington,
DC. EPAl630/R-95/002F;
(g) "SW-846 Test Methods for the Evaluation of Solid Waste, Physical/Chemical: Methods, Third Edition,
Integrated Version (June 1997)";
(h) "Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: Volume 1, Human Health Evaluation Manual, Part A,
Interim Final Version (December 1989);
(i) "Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: Volume 1, Human Health Evaluation Manual, Part B,
Development of Risk-based Preliminary Remediation Goals, Interim Version (December 1991); and
0) "Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund: Volume 1, Human Health Evaluation Manual, Part C, Risk
Evaluation of Remedial Alternatives, Interim Version (October 1991).
(2) This material may be inspected, copied, or obtained, subject to applicable copyright law, at the
Division of Waste Management, 14 Reilly Rd, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601, (502) 564-6716, Monday
through Friday, 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Eastern time, excluding state holidays. (30 Ky.R. 1707; Am. 1961;
2021; eft. 3-18-2004.)
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Kentucky Guidance for Ambient Background Assessment
January 8, 2004
Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet
Introduction
This guidance document is intended to assist in comparing site data and background data for
sites undergoing environmental assessment. These procedures provide a simplified statistical
procedure for determining if the site data is part of the background population. It also provides
generic statewide background values for inorganic chemicals that may be used in lieu of
collecting site-specific background samples. The statistical procedures may be used for site-
specific data or the generic statewide values in Tables 1 and 2. This guidance does not preclude
other appropriate statistical comparisons from being made, but rather a simplified screening
method that does not require a deep knowledge of statistics. If the site data set fails the statistical
procedures in this guidance, it may be appropriate to perform a more complete statistical
comparison.
Background, as defined in 401 KAR 42:005 (definitions codified to support the Underground
Storage Tank regulations), means the concentration of substances consistently present in the
environment at, or regionally proximate to, a release but outside the influence of the release.
There are two types ofbackground:
a) Natural background is the amount of naturally occurring substances in the environment,
exclusive of that from anthropogenic sources.
b) Ambient background means the concentrations of naturally occurring inorganic substances
and ubiquitous anthropogenic inorganic substances in the environment that are representative
of the region surrounding the site and not attributable to an identifiable release.
Since sites undergoing environmental assessment are often found in industrialized and
potentially contaminated areas, the determination of site-specific background concentrations is
difficult. Generic ambient background values applicable to all sites in Kentucky would be useful
for comparison to site data for the purpose of identifying those constituents requiring remedial
action (i.e., removal or exposure control). These generic ambient background values would
provide an alternative to attempting to identify site-specific background soils in areas that are
likely contaminated.
Methodology
To provide an alternative to site-specific background sampling, the NREPC used background
sample values provided by regulated facilities, as well as background sample values collected by
cabinet employees. These samples were collected from areas generally considered to be outside
of the influence of site activities, but were potentially impacted by regional or urban activity.
Therefore, these samples represent "ambient," as opposed to "natural," background. From 400
to over 800 samples for each constituent were used in the analysis. For each constituent, a 95%
Dpper Confidence Limit (DCL) of the arithmetic mean, 60th percentile, and 95th percentile were
calculated. The 95% DCL is the value below which the true mean of the data set falls, with 95%
confidence. The 60th and 95th percentiles indicate that 60 percent and 95 percent of the data falls
below those values.
The following methodology was employed to calculate ambient background:
1. Values reported as "non-detected" were retained in the database at half the reporting limit
(USEPA, 1998).
2. As the data sets came from areas having varied uses (e.g., industrial, commercial,
residential, agricultural, woodlands, etc.), the probability that some of the samples were
taken in contaminated areas is significant. Data sets were tested for outliers by the
Grubb's test, and individual samples that had a calculated Z-score above 3.8 were
generally removed from the background data set. The Grubb's test formula is as follows:
Ipopulation mean - value of individual samplel
Z = "'------------------....:..
standard deviation
3. The descriptive statistics of mean and standard deviation were calculated by standard
parametric methods assuming normality and are listed in Table 1. Parametric methods
were used to allow for comparisons between these generic ambient background values
and the results of other published studies ofbackground.
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a. Standard deviation was calculated by the "nonbiased" method employing the formula:
_~L{x; -x),S.D.-
n-l
b. Mean was calculated as the sum of all individual scores divided by the total number of
observations.
4. The data sets were analyzed with Lillefor's test for normality. Since the data sets are not
normally or lognormally distributed, the parameters that are to be used in determining if
site samples are consistent with background (i.e. 95% UCL ofmean, 60th percentile and
95th percentile) were calculated by nonparametric methods and are listed in Table 2.
5. The 95% UCL of the arithmetic mean for each constituent was calculated on the trimmed
data set using ProUCL. ProUCL is a statistical package developed by Lockheed Martin
under contract with the u.S. EPA.
6. The 60th percentile value is used as the midpoint for each constituent. It was calculated
as follows:
a. The constituent values were ranked in increasing order ofmagnitude.
b. The quantity 60(n)/100 was used to identify the measurement with the resulting rank.
7. The 95th percentile value is used as the upper bound value for each constituent and was
calculated as follows:
a. The constituent values were ranked in increasing order ofmagnitude.
b. The quantity 95(n)/100 was used to identify the measurement with the resulting rank.
The thallium data were characterized by a large number ofnon-detects (633 non-detects verses
54 detects). Due to the large number of non-detects, non-detects were not entered as ~ the non-
detect concentration. Each non-detect sample was assumed to have a concentration equal to the
recorded non-detect concentration. Considering the number ofnon-detects and the likelihood that
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the recorded values skew thallium concentrations upward, only the 95th percentile of the total
data is cited in Table 2.
Procedure for Comparison to Background
The site data should be segregated by surface and subsurface data. The surface and subsurface
site data may be compared to the statewide numbers in Table 2, or to site-specific background
samples. The following three criteria may be used to demonstrate that the site data is
background:
1. The mean site concentration for inorganic constituents must be below the 95% VeL of
the mean concentrations of background for inorganic constituents.
2. At least half of the data points should be less than the 60th percentile.
3. No data points should be above the upper bound value (95th percentile).
These procedures provide a tool for comparing site data with either generic statewide or site-
specific background using the statistical characteristics of the two populations. Other statistical
comparisons may be used, if appropriate.
Determining Site-specific Background
Site-specific ambient background levels may be determined at the site. The site-specific ambient
background data set shall consist of an appropriate number of samples for the statistical method
employed. The number of samples necessary to characterize site-specific background will vary
based on the variability of the data. Twenty data points may be used as a minimum number of
samples per horizon (surface and subsurface) as a default number, unless other statistical
methods can be used to develop a different number. A site-specific determination of the number
of required samples may be calculated based on the statistical characteristics of the background
population.
Vpgradient groundwater samples are to be obtained from the same hydrogeological unit as the
groundwater contamination at the site. The background monitoring wells shall be located
hydrogeologically upgradient from the release(s) of concern, unless it can be demonstrated to the
cabinet that the upgradient location is undefinable or infeasible.
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Background soil samples should be collected from native soil in areas of similar soil type as
found at the site. Background concentrations should be determined separately for surface and
subsurface areas that are consistent with the on-site investigation.
The following areas are inappropriate to sample when determining soil background unless
otherwise necessary to reach a corrective action decision or identify potential sources of
contamination:
1. Fill areas;
2. Areas in which management, treatment, handling, storage or disposal activities of any
ofthe following are known or suspected to have occurred: hazardous substances or
petroleum, solid or hazardous wastes, or waste waters;
3. Areas within three feet of a roadway;
4. Parking lots and areas surrounding parking lots or other paved areas;
5. Railroad tracks or railway areas or other areas affected by their runoff;
6. Areas of concentrated air pollutant depositions or areas affected by their runoff;
7. Storm drains or ditches presently or historically receiving industrial or urban runoff;
or
8. Areas within three feet of any current structure, or the former location of any
structure, which is likely to have been painted with lead-based paint.
5
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Ambient Inorganic Chemicals
Element Number of Range Mean Standard
Samples (mg/kg) (mg/kg) Deviation
(mg/kg)
Aluminum 679 1290 - 38,100 10969 5462.9
Arsenic 539 0.059 - 55.5 8.9 7
Barium 756 6.14 - 1160 111.3 92.4
Beryllium 696 0.061 - 3.57 0.8 0.5
Cadmium 701 0.004 - 9.46 0.68 1.4
Chromium 771 2.83 - 168 20.5 13.9
Cobalt 649 0.29 - 67.6 11.9 8.1
Copper 729 0.49 - 636 18.9 39.7
Iron 697 222 - 86,900 22456 13269.7
Lead 808 0.03 - 284 30 31.3
Manganese 685 8.43 - 5100 1017 854.9
Mercury 459 0.007 - 0.721 0.06 0.1
Nickel 716 0.39 - 83.7 20.9 13.1
Selenium 714 0.001 - 3.93 0.94 0.7
Silver 697 0.006 - 5.2 0.42 0.6
Thallium 633 0.13 - 28
Vanadium 679 4.82 - 92.1 26.9 11.8
Zinc 721 6-470 55 46.3
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Table 2. Generic Statewide Ambient Background for Kentucky
Element Mean (mglkg) 95% VeL of 60Ln-percentile 95'" Percentile
Mean (mglkg) (mglkg) (mglkg)
Aluminum 10969 11314 10800 21000
Arsenic 8.9 9.4 8.3 21.2
Barium 111.3 116.9 100 241
Beryllium 0.8 0.83 0.75 1.8
Cadmium 0.68 0.78 0.27 3.9
Chromium 20.5 21.3 19.3 40
Cobalt 11.9 12.4 13.1 25.1
Copper 18.9 21.3 13.8 41.7
Iron 22456 23284 22000 47600
Lead 30 33 20.9 84.6
Manganese 1017 1071 948 2620
Mercury 0.06 0.07 0.059 0.14
Nickel 20.9 21.7 20.2 46.8
Selenium 0.94 0.99 1.38 2.1
Silver 0.42 0.45 0.257 1.2
Thallium 7.95
Vanadium 26.9 27.7 27.3 48.6
Zinc 55 57 48.6 115
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Kentucky Guidance for Groundwater Assessment Screening
January 15, 2004
Environmental and
Public Protection Cabinet
Introduction
This document provides guidance for evaluating contaminated sites to determine
whether superficial and shallow contamination in soils indicates an existing or potential
groundwater contamination problem, and whether a direct assessment of groundwater
conditions is necessary. This method is intended to provide the party or applicant a cost-
effective approach using soils data collected as part of the site characterization for
determining the need to assess groundwater quality.
Methodology
An assessment of the effect of a release of a hazardous substance or petroleum on
groundwater quality may not be necessary at all sites. This process is intended for sites
that lack adequate groundwater monitoring data and where the party or applicant
anticipates to leave in place contaminants of concern (COCs).
This approach to evaluating impacts and potential impacts of a release on
groundwater is based on the attenuation of contaminants moving through the soil profile
by means of biodegradation, hydrolysis, volatilization, adsorption, and dilution.
Contaminants may not attenuate similarly in all situations, and therefore conservative
Dilution Attenuation Factor (DAF) values are applied. However, conditions at some sites
may result in contaminant migration through the soil profile in a manner that bypasses
physical, chemical, and biological processes in the soils. Caution should be applied to
use of this methodology at sites where normal physical, chemical, and biological
processes in the soils are bypassed, including sites underlain by soils with large,
interconnected pores (macropores) that provide for the rapid transport of water and
contaminants through the soil profile, sites underlain by well-developed karst terrane,
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sites underlain by highly fractured media, or where contamination extends to the soil-
bedrock interface. These types of sites may not provide for the soil processes assumed to
be in effect in this method. In addition, this process is primarily intended for COCs that
are relatively insoluble and are expected, under normal conditions, to remain in the soil
profile and not to migrate to groundwater. Therefore, caution should be used in applying
this methodology at sites where soluble or mobile COCs such as volatile organic
compounds, nitrates, or dense non-aqueous phase liquids (DNAPL) are present; the
presence of such COCs in the soils may indicate that a groundwater assessment may be
necessary. The cabinet reserves the authority to require a direct assessment of
groundwater at sites where it deems such investigation is prudent to understanding the
extent of contamination and the risks associated with the release.
To determine whether a direct assessment of groundwater conditions is necessary,
analytical data from the soil profile may be evaluated by the methods outlined in this
document in combination with an evaluation of other soil conditions, and the geology and
hydrology of the site. These data can be used to determine whether groundwater was
likely to have been impacted, and whether these soils will serve as a future source of
groundwater contamination.
In order to use this method, the horizontal and vertical extent of soil
contamination must be known. An adequate number of soil borings with multiple,
discreet sampling intervals of sufficient length and spacing to characterize vertical
distribution of contamination are also necessary.
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If it can be demonstrated using one of the following options that a release has not
had and will not have an adverse effect on groundwater quality, a direct assessment of
groundwater impacts may not be necessary.
1. An assessment of groundwater for a release may not be necessary if the
applicable Soil Screening Levels, or SSL (DAF 1), in the U.S. EPA Region 9 Preliminary
Remediation Goals (October 1,2002) are not exceeded in the bottom two (2) sampling
intervals of each soil boring.
2. Rather than using the default SSLs (DAF 1), a modified SSL may be used. This
modified SSL takes into account the surface area of the site, the vertical separation
between the contamination in the soil profile and groundwater, and the underlying
bedrock conditions. The appropriate modified SSL is equivalent to the SSL (DAF 1)
referenced in the U.S. EPA Region 9 Preliminary Remediation Goals, (October 1,2002)
multiplied by the applicable value in Table 1, below. An assessment of groundwater for
a release may not be necessary if the applicable modified SSLs are not exceeded in
samples from the bottom two (2) sampling intervals.
Table 1.
Vertical Separation Between Surface Area of Site and other considerations
Contamination in the Soil Profile and the
Zone of Saturation < 0.5 acres 0.5-10 acres > 10 acres, or site
underlain by karst or
highly fractured media
0-5 ft 1 1 1
5-10 ft 5 2.5 1
10-15 ft 10 5 1
15-20 ft 15 7.5 2.5
Greater than 20 ft 20 10 5
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3. A site-specific SSL may be developed and applied based on site-specific
conditions, including soil types, characteristics of COCs, total organic carbon in the soil,
soil porosity, infiltration rate, and the vertical separation between the contamination in
the soil profile and groundwater. If the analytical results in the bottom two (2) sampling
intervals do not exceed the site-specific SSLs, a groundwater assessment may not be
necessary for that site.
4. A fate and transport evaluation may be developed to demonstrate that levels of
COCs in the soils will not result in groundwater contamination beyond the property
boundary. If a fate and transport evaluation adequately demonstrates that levels of COCs
in the soils will not result in groundwater contamination beyond the property boundary, a
groundwater assessment may not be necessary. However, a direct groundwater
assessment will be required to make such a determination in most situations.
5. An analysis of the results of current and historical groundwater monitoring may
be used to determine whether groundwater has been adequately characterized. Such an
analysis shall contain sufficient information to determine whether groundwater has been
affected by any releases at the site. The report of this analysis shall include:
a. The location of monitoring wells relative to the location of the soil
contamination at the site, and to groundwater flow direction at the property;
b. Monitoring well construction details, including diameter of the annulus,
diameter of the well casing, the depth and length of the screened interval, construction of
the sand pack, and the type and manner of sealing materials used;
c. The proximity ofwells to one another and to the property boundary; and
4
d. The results of all groundwater analyses conducted to date on samples collected
at the property, including sample dates, the parameters analyzed, and the methods of
collection and analysis.
A groundwater assessment is necessary and prudent in some circumstances. Any
direct evidence of groundwater contamination, including seeps, contaminated wells and
springs, or other similar information is compelling evidence to conduct a thorough
groundwater investigation. The cabinet may direct a person or applicant to conduct a
groundwater assessment in regards to a known or suspected release, regardless of the
results of the methods employed above.
5
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
2005 REGULAR SESSION
HOUSE BILL NO. 272
AS ENACTED
TUESDAY, MARCH 8,2005
14 SECTION 140. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 141 IS CREATED TO
15 READ AS FOLLOWS:
16 (1) As used in this section:
17 fa) "Quali(ving voluntary environmental remediation property" means real
18 property subject to the provisions o(KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405
19 for· which the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet
20 has made a determination that:
21 1. The responsible parties are financially unable to carry out the
22 obligations in KRS 224.01-400 and KRS 224.01-405; and
23 2. The property was acquired after the effective date ofthis Act bv a bona
24 fide prospective purchaser as defined in 42 U.S.C. sec. 9601(40);
25 (h) "Expenditures" means payment for work to characterize the extent of
26 contamination and to remediate the contamination at a qualifying
27 voluntary environmental remediation propertv; and
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1 (C) "Taxpayer" means an individual subject to tax' under KRS 141.020 or a
2 corporation subject to tax under KRS 141.040.
3 (2) There shall be allowed a nonrefundable credit against the tax imposed under
4 KRS 141.020 or 141.040 (or taxable years beginning after December 31.2004. (or
5 taxpayer expenditures made at a guaUtVing voluntary environmental remediation
6 propertY in order to meet the requirements ofan agreed order entered into by the
7 taxpayer under the provisions ofKRS 224.01-518. provided that the taxpayer has
8 obtained a covenant not to sue from the Natural Resources and Environmental
9 Protection Cabinet under KRS 224.01-526.
10 (3) The maximum total credit (or each taxpayer shall not exceed one hundred fifty
11 thousand dollars ($150.000). For purposes ofthis section. an affiliated group of
12 taxpayers required to file a consolidated return under KRS 141.200 shall be
13 "ea~dasonetaxpayer
14 (4) A taxpayer claiming a credit under this section shall submit receipts to the
15 Finance and Administration Cabinet in proof of the expenditures claimed. The
16 Finance and Administration Cabinet shall (orward the receipts to the Natural
17 Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet (or verification. After the
18 receipts are verified. the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall notitV the
19 taxpayer ofeligibility for the credit.
20 (5) The credit may be first claimed on the income tax return ofthe taxpayer filed in
21 the taxable year during which the credit was certified. The amount of the
22 allowable credit (or any taxable year shall be twenty-five percent (25%) of the
23 maximum credit approved. The credit may be carried (orward (or ten 00)
24 successive taxable years.
25 (61 Ifthe taxpayer is a general partnership. the credit shall pass through in the same
26 proportion as the distributive share ofincome or loss is passed through.
27 Section 141. KRS 224.01-400 is amended to read as follows:
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As used in this section:
(a) "Hazardous substance" means any substance·or combination of substances
including wastes of a solid, liquid, gaseous, or semi-solid form which, because
of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious
characteristics may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality
or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness, or
pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment. The substances may include but are not limited to those which
are, according to criteria established by the cabinet, toxic, corrosive, ignitable,
iiritants, strong sensitizers, or explosive, except that the term "hazardous
substance" shall not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction
thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous
substance under this section, and shall not include natural gas, natural gas
liquids, liquified natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel, or mixtures of
natural gas and synthetic gas;
(b) "Release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing hazardous
substances, pollutants, or contaminants into the environment, including the
abandonment or discarding ofbarrels, containers, and other closed receptacles
containing any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, but excludes
emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft,
vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine; the release of source, by-product,
or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, if the release is subject to requirements
with respect to financial protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission under Section 170 of the Act, or any release of source by-
product, or special nuclear material from any processing site designated under
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1 Sections l02(a)(1) or 302(a) of the Uranium Mill Tailing Radiation Control
2 Act of 1978; and the nonnal application of fertilizer;
3 (c) "Site" means any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe, or pipeline,
4 including any pipe into a sewer or publicly-owned treatment works, well, pit,
5 pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage containers, motor
6 vehicles, rolling stock, or aircraft, or any other place or area where a release or
7 threatened release has occurred. The tenn shall not include any consumer
8 product in consumer use;
9 (d) "Environmental emergency" means any release or threatened release of
10 materials into the environment in such quantities or concentrations as cause or
11 threaten to cause an imminent and substantial danger to human health or the
12 environment; the term includes, but is not limited to, discharges of oil and
13 hazardous substances prohibited by Section 311(b)(3) of the Federal Clean
14 Water Act - (public Law 92-500), as amended;
15 (e) "Threatened release" means a circumstance which presents a substantial threat
16 of a release;
17 (f) "Pollutant or contaminant" shall include, but not be limited to, any element,
18 substance, compound, or mixture, including disease-causing agents, which
19 after release into the environment and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or
20 assimilation into any organism, either directly from the environment or
21 indirectly by ingestion through food chains, will or may reasonably be
22 anticipated to cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic
23 mutation, physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction)
24 or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring; except that the
25 term "pollutant or contaminant" shall not include petroleum, including crude
26 oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or
27 designated as a hazardous substance under this section and shall not include
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1 natural gas, liquified natural gas, or synthetic gas of pipeline quality (or
2 mixtures ofnatural gas and such synthetic gas);
3 (g) "Environment" means the waters of the Commonwealth, land surface, surface,
4 and subsurface soils and strata, or ambient air within the Commonwealth or
5 under the jurisdiction ofthe Commonwealth;
6 (h) "Financial institution" means, for purposes of subsections (26) and (27) of this
7 section, the following:
8 1. A bank or trust ·company defined by KRS Chapter 287;
9 2. A savings and loan association defined by K.RS Chapter 289;
10 3. A credit union defined by KRS Chapter 290;
11 4. A mortgage loan company or loan broker defined by K.RS Chapter 294;
12 5. An insurer defined by K.RS Chapter 304; and
13 6. Any other financial institution engaged in the business of lending
14 money, the lending operations of which are subject to state or federal
15 regulation; and
16 . (i) "Fiduciary" means, for purposes of subsections (26) and (27) of this section, a
17 fiduciary as defined by K.RS Chapter 386.
18 (2) The cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with the
19 provisions of KRS Chapter 13A designating individual hazardous substances,
20 pollutants, or contaminants; establishing their respective reportable quantities; and
21 establishing their respective release notification requirements, which differ from
22 those designated or established in subsections (3) to (9) of this section, if necessary
23 to:
24 (a) Protect human health and the environment;
25 (b) Maintain consistency with valid scientific development; or
26 (c) Maintain consistency with newly adopted federal regulations.
27 (3) The hazardous substances for which release notification is required shall be those
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1 hazardous substances designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 302 under the Federal
2 Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
3 as amended; those extremely hazardous substances designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 355
4 under Title m of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986;
5 nerve arid blister agents designated under KRS 224.50-130(2); and any hazardous
6 substances designated by the cabinet in administrative regulations promulgated
7 pursuant to subsection (2) of this section.
8 (4) The reportable quantity for a release of a hazardous substance designated in 40
9 C.F.R. Part 302 under the Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response
10 Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended, shall be the quantity
11 designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 302. The reportable quantity for a release of an
12 extreme~y hazardous substance designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 355 under Title ill of
13 the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 shall be the quantity
14 designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 355. The reportable quantity for a release of a nerve or
15 blister agent designated under KRS 224.50-130(2) shall be any quantity. The
16 cabinet may establish reportab}e quantities for hazardous substances in
17 administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (2) of this section
18 which differ from those established in this subsection. The reportable quantity for
19 any hazardous substance designated by the cabinet in administrative regulations
20 promulgated pursuant to subsection (2) of this section shall be the reportable
21 quantity established by the cabinet.
22 (5) The release notification requirements for a release of a hazardous substance
23 designated in 40 C.F.R. Part 302 under the Federal Comprehensive Environmental
24 Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended, shall be the
25 notification requirements established in 40 C.F.R. Part 302. The release notification
26 requirements for a release of an extremely hazardous substance designated in 40
27 C.F.R. Part 355 under Title ill of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
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1 Act of 1986 shall be the notification requirements established in 40C.F.R. Part 355.
2 Whenever notification of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance is
3 required pursuant to this section, any person possessing or controlling the hazardous
4 substance shall mediately notify the cabinet's twenty-four (24) hour
5 environmental response line. The cabinet may establish release notification
6 requirements by administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to subsection (2) of
7 this section which differ from those established in this subsection. The release
8 notification requirements for any hazardous substance designated by the cabinet in
9 administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (2) of this section
10 shall be the release notification requirements established in the cabinet's
11 administrative regulations.
12 (6) Any person possessing or controlling a pollutant or contaminant for which a
13 reportable quantity has been established by administrative regulation promulgated
pursuant to subsection (2) of this section shall immediately notify the cabinet's
twenty-four (24) hour environmental response line, as soon as that person has
knowledge of any release or threatened release, other than a permitted release or
application of a pesticide in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions, of a
pollutant or contaminant to the environment in a quantity equal to or exceeding the
reportable quantity. In the notice to be made to the cabinet, the person shall state, at
a minimum, the location ofthe release or threatened release, the material released or
threatened to be released, and the approximate quantity and concentration of the
release or threatened release.
Any person possessing or controlling a pollutant or contaminant shall, as soon as
that person has knowledge of any release or threatened release of a pollutant or
contaminant from a site to the environment in a quantity which may present an
imminent or substantial danger to the public health or welfare, immediately notify
the cabinet's twenty-four (24) hour environmental response line. In the notice to be
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made to the cabinet, the person shall state, at a minimum, the location of the release
or threatened release, the material released or threatened to be released, and the
approximate quantity and concentration of the release or threatened release. If a
person possessing or controlling a pollutant or contaminant for which a reportable
quantity has not been established in administrative regulations promulgated
pursuant to subsection (2) of the section fails to report a release. or threatened
release because ofa good-faith belief that the release did not present an imminent or
substantial danger to the public health or welfare, that person shall not be liable for
a violation of the release notification requirements of this section. In determining
whether a person has acted in good f~th, the cabinet shall consider the
circumstances surrounding the release, including whether the release was a
permitted release or the application of a pesticide in accordance with the
manufacturer's instructions.
The cabinet may require the person subject to the release notification requirements
of subsections (5) to (9) of this section to provide a written report on the release or
threatened release. This report shall be submitted to the environmental response
section of the cabinet within seven (7) days of the cabinet's demand for the report.
The report shall identify the following:
(a) The precise location of the release or threatened release;
(b) The name, address, and phone number of the person possessing or controlling
the material at the time of the release or threatened release;
(c) The name, address, and phone number of persons having actual knowledge of
the facts surrounding the release or threatened release;
(d) The specific pollutant or contaminant or hazardous substance released or
threatened to be released;
(e) The concentration and quantity of the pollutant or contaminant or hazardous
substance in the release or threatened release;
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1 (f) The circumstances and cause of the release or threatened release;
2 (g) Efforts taken by the person to control or mitigate the release or threatened
3 release;
4 (h) To the extent known, the harmful effects of the release or threatened release;
5 (i) The transportation characteristics of the medium or matrix into which the
6 material was released or threatened to be released;
7 G) Any present or proposed remedial action by the person at the site of the
8 release or threatened release;
9 (k) The name, address, and phone number of the person who can be contacted for
10 additional information concerning the release or threatened release; and
11 (1) Any other information that may facilitate remediation of the site.
12 (9) A person possessing or controlling a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant
13 shall immediately notify the cabinet pursuant to subsection (5) ofthis section when
14 release notification, including notification of a continuous release reported under
15 the Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
16 Act of 1980, as amended, is provided to the United States Environmental Protection
17 Agency. Within seven (7) days of providing any written notification to the United
18 States Environmental Protection Agency, the person shall submit to the cabinet a
19 copy of the release notification submitted to the United States Environmental
20 Protection Agency. The cabinet shall not require additional information pursuant to
21 subsection (5) of this section if the release notification is in compliance with this
22 subsection, unless a written report is required under subsection (8) of this section or
23 the release or threatened release constitutes an environmental emergency.
24 (10) Any person in charge of a vessel or site from which oil is discharged in a hannful
25 quantity as defined by 40 C.F.R. Part 110 in contravention of Section 311 of the
26 Federal Clean Water Act shall immediately notify the cabinet's twenty-four (24)
27 hour environmental response line. In the notice to be made to the cabinet, the person
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shall state, at a minimum, the location of the discharge, the material discharged, and
the approximate quantity and concentration of the discharge.
Any person possessing or controlling petroleum or a petroleum product as defined
by KRS 224.60-115(15) shall, as soon as that person has knowledge of any release
or threatened release, other than a permitted release or application of a pesticide in
accordance with the manufacturer's instructions, in an amount of twenty-five (25)
gallons or more in a twenty-four (24) hour period, except for diesel fuel for which
the reportable quantity is seventy-five (75) gallons or more in a twenty-four (24)
hour period, or in c~ntraventionof Section 311 of the Federal Clean Water Act,
immediately notify the cabinet's twenty-four (24) hour environmental response line.
In the notice to be made to the cabinet, the person shall state, at a minimum, the
location of the release or threatened release, the material released or threatened to be
released, and the approximate quantity and concentration of the release or
14 threatened release.
15 (12) The cabinet may require the person subject to subsections (10) and (11) of this
16 section to provide a written report on the discharge or release. This report shall be
17 submitted to the environmental response section of the cabinet within seven (7)
18 days of the cabinet's demand for the report. The report shall identify the following:
19 (a) The precise location ofthe discharge or release;
20 (b) The name, address, and phone number of the person possessing or controlling
21 the material at the time of the discharge or release;
22 (c) The name, address, and phone number ofpersons having actual knowledge of
23 the facts surrounding the discharge or release;
24 (d) The concentration and quantity of the discharge or release;
25 (e) The circumstances and cause ofthe discharge or release;
26 (f) Efforts taken by the person to control or mitigate the discharge or release;
27 (g) To the extent known, the hannful effects of the discharge or release;
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(h) The transportation characteristics of the medium or matrix into which the
material was discharged or released;
(i) Any present or proposed remedial action by the person at the site of the
discharge or release;
G) The name, address, and phone number of the person who can be contacted for
additional information concerning the discharge or release; and
(k) Any other information that may facilitate an emergency spill response, or
remediation ofthe site.
Timely notification received under the release notification requirements of this
section or information obtained in a notification received under the release
notification requirements of this section may not be used against the person making
the notification in any criminal proceeding, except in a prosecution for submitting a
false or untimely notification to the cabinet. Notification received by the cabinet of
a threatened release or discharge shall not be deemed a separate incident.
The cabinet shall be the lead agency· for hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant emergency spill response and, after consultation with other affected
federal, state, and local agencies and private organizations, shall establish a
contingency plan for undertaking emergency actions in response to the release of a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant. The contingency plan shall:
(a) Provide for efficient, coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage to
the air, land, and waters of the Commonwealth caused by the release or
threatened release ofhazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants;
(b) fuclude containment, cleanup, and disposal procedures;
(c) Provide for remediation or restoration of the lands or waters affected
consistent with this section;
(d) Assign duties and responsibilities among state cabinets and agenCIes In
coordination with federal and local agencies;
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(e) Provide for the identification, procurement, maintenance, and storage of
necessary equipment and supplies;
(f) Provide for designation of persons trained, prepared, and available to provide
the necessary services to carry out the plan; and
(g) Establish procedures and techniques for identifying, containing, removing,
and disposing ofhazardous substances released or being released.
The cabinet shall have the authority, power, and duty to:
(a) Recover from persons liable therefor for the benefit of the hazardous waste
management fund, the cabinet's actual and necessary costs expended in
response to a threatened release, an environmental emergency, or a release of
a hazardous substance that is reportable under this section. Except as provided
in paragraph (b) of this subsection, this section is intended solely to recognize
the existence of a cause of action on behalf of the cabinet and is not intended
to expand or contract the bases of liability, the elements of proof, or the
amount of liability ofany person;
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection, recover its costs incurred in
the removal of oil or hazardous substances discharged in violation of Section
31l(b)(3) of the Federal Clean Water Act from any person liable therefor
under Section 311 of the Federal Clean Water Act subject to limitations of
liability and defenses provided in the section. The limitations of liability shall
apply to the total of state and federal expenses; and
(c) In every case where action required under this section is not being adequately
taken or the identity of the person responsible for the r~lease or threatened
release is unknown, the cabinet or its agent may contain, remove, or dispose
of the hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant or take any other action
consistent with this section, including, but not limited to, issuance of an
emergency order as provided in KRS 224.10-410 to the person possessing,
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controlling, or responsible for the release or threatened release as necessary
for the protection ofthe environment and public health, safety, or welfare.
Any duly authorized officer, employee, or agent of the cabinet may upon notice to
the owner or occupant enter any property, premises, or place at any time for the
purposes of this section, if the entry is necessary to prevent damage to the air, land,
or waters of the Commonwealth. Notice to the owner or occ,upant shall not be
required if the delay attendant upon providing it will result in imminent risk to
public health or safety.
The cabinet shall prepare and annually update an inventory of all sites in the
Commonwealth at which there is or has been an environmental emergency or a
release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, ,or contaminant. In. preparing the
inventory, the cabinet shall determine, based on infonnation available to the
cabinet, the impact of each site on public health and the environment and identify
the relative priority for restoration or remedial action. Upon determining that no
further restoration or remedial action is necessary, the cabinet shall so designate the
site on the inventory. A separate designation of sites where a remedial action
involving on-site containment or treatment has been perfonned and other sites
where restoration of the environment has not been achieved shall be maintained. A
review of environmental conditions at sites remediated by on-site containment or
treatment and other sites where restoration or remediation of the environment is not
achieved shall be conducted by the cabinet every five (5) years to detennine
whether additional action is necessary to protect human health or the environment.
Any person possessing or controlling a hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant which is released to the environment, or any person who caused a
release to the environment of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant,
shall characterize the extent of the release as necessary to detennine the effect of the
release on the environment, and shall take actions necessary to correct the effect of
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the release on the environment. Any person required to take action under this
subsection shall have the following options:
(a) Demonstrating that no action is necessary to protect human health, safety, and
the environment;
(b) Managing the release in a manner that controls and minimizes the harmful
effects of the release and protects human health, safety, and the environment,
provided that the management may include any existing or proposed
engineering or institutional controls and the maintenance of those controls;
(C) Restoring the environment through the removal of the hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant; or
(d) Any combination ofparagraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection.
Unless otherwise required by the cabinet, a person required to characterize the
extent of a release and correct the effect of the release on the environment under
subsection (18) of this section may take those actions without making the
demonstrations to the cabinet required by subsections (18) to (21) of this section, if:
(a) The release is less than the reportable quantity of a hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant;
(b) The release is of a pollutant or contaminant for which a reportable quantity
has not been established by administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to
subsection (2) of this section, if the release does not present an imminent or
substantial danger to the public health or welfare; or
(c) The release is authorized by a state or federal permit.
Ifa person required to take action under subsection (18) of this section demonstrates
to the cabinet that, pursuant to subsection (18)(a) of this section, no action is
necessary to protect human health, safety, and the environment or, pursuant to
subsection (18)(b) of this section, the release will be managed in a manner that
controls and minimizes the harmful effects of the release and protects human health,
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safety, and the environment, the cabinet shall not require restoration of the
environment through the removal of the hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant pursuant to subsection (18)(C) of this section.
A person required to take action under subsection (18) of this section who does not
restore the environment through removal of the hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant in accordance with subsection (18)(C) of this section shall demonstrate
to the cabinet that the remedy is protective of human health, safety, and the
environment, by considering the following factors:
(a) The characteristics of the substance, pollutant, or contaminant, including its
toxicity, persistence, environmental fate and transport dynamics,
bioaccumulation, biomagnification, and potential for synergistic interaction
and with specific reference to the environment into which the substance,
pollutant, or contaminant has been released;
(b) The hydrogeologic characteristics of the facility and the surrounding area;
(c) The proximity, quality, and current and future uses of surface water and
groundwater;
(d) The potential effects of residual contamination ofpotentially impacted surface
water and groundwater;
(e) The chronic and acute health effects and environmental consequences to
terrestrial and aquatic life of exposure to the hazardous substance, pollutant,
or contaminant through direct and indirect pathways;
(f) An exposure assessment; and
(g) All other available information.
A person who submits a proposal to the cabinet pursuant to subsection (18) of this
section may request in writing a final determination on the proposal no sooner than
thirty (30) days after its submission. When a final determination on the proposal is
requested, the cabinet shall make its final determination within sixty (60) working
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1 days from the date the request is received by the cabinet. After a fmal detennination
2 hasbeen made, the person requesting the final detennination may request a hearing
3 pursuant to the provisions of KRS 224.10-420. Nothing in this subsection shall
4 relieve any person of any obligations imposed by law during an environmental
5 emergency, nor shall it require the cabinet to approve a proposal which would
6 violate this chapter or the administrative regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
7 (23) (a) The cabinet shall have a lien against the real and personal property of a person
8 liable for the actual and necessary costs expended in response to a release or
9 threatened release or an environmental emergency. The lien shall be filed with
10 the county clerk of the county in which the property ofthe person is located.
11 (b) If a financial institution exempted from liability. by subsection (26) .of this
12 section conveys the site it has acquired, then the cabinet shall have a lien
13 against the site for the actual and necessary costs expended in response to a
14 release or threatened release or an environmental emergency. The lien shall be
filed with the county clerk ofthe county in which the site is located.
Nothing in this section shall replace the financial and technical assistance available
to the Commonwealth pursuant to Section 311 of the Federal Clean Water Act
(public Law 92-500) as amended, but shall be used to provide the Commonwealth
with a mechanism for additional response to releases and threatened releases of
hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants.
Defenses to liability, limitations to liability, and rights to contribution shall be
determined in accordance with Sections 10](35).10](40). 107(a) to (d). 107(q) and
107&). and 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act, as amended, and the Federal Clean Water Act, as amended.
In addition to the defenses and limitations provided in subsection (25) of this
section, a financial institution that acquired a site by foreclosure, by receiving an
assignment, by deed in lieu of foreclosure, or by otherwise becoming the owner as a
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1 result of the enforcement of a mortgage, lien, or other security interest held by the
2 financial institution, shall not be liable under this section with respect to the site, if:
3 (a) The fmancial institution served only in an administrative, custodial, financial,
40rsimilar capacity with respect to the site before its acquisition;
5 (b) The financial institution did not control or direct the handling of the material
6 causing the environmental emergency, or control or direct the handling of the
7 hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminants, at the site before its
8 acquisition;
9 (c) The financial institution did not participate in the day-to-day management of
10 the site before its acquisition;
11 (d) The financial institution, at the time it acquired the site, did not know and had
12 no reason to know that a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant was
13 disposed at the site. For purposes of this paragraph, the financial institution
14 shall have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiries into
15 the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
16 commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. What
17 actions constitute all appropriate inquiries shall be determined by taking into
18 account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the financial
19 . institution, the relationship of the market value of the site to the value of the
20 site if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable
21 infonnation about the site, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence
22 of contamination at the site, the ability to detect the contamination by
23 appropriate inspection, and any other relevant factor;
24 (e) The financial institution, when it undertakes actions to protect or preserve the
25 value of the site, undertakes those actions in accordance with this chapter and
26 the administrative regulations adopted pursuant thereto;
27 (f) The fmancial institution, its employees, agents, and contractors did not cause
HB027220.100-\089
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or contribute to an environmental emergency, or to a release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant; and
(g) The financial institution complies with the release notification requirements of
subsection (9) of this section.
In addition to the defenses and limitations provided in subsection (25) of this
section, a financial institution serving as a fiduciary with respect to an estate or
trust, the assets of which contain a site, shall not be liable under this section with
respect to the site if:
(a) The financial institution served only in an administrative, custodial, fmancial,
or similar capacity with respect to the site before it became a fiduciary;
(b) The financial institution did not control or direct the handling of the material
causing the environmental emergency, or control or direct the handling of the
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminants, at the site before it became a
fiduciary;
(c) The financial institution did not participate in the day-to-day management of
the site before it became a fiduciary;
(d) The financial institution, at the time it became a fiduciary, did not know and
had no reason to know that a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant
was disposed at the site. For pwposes of this paragraph, the financial
institution shall have undertaken, at the time it became a fiduciary, all
appropriate inquiries into the previous ownership and uses of the property
consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to
minimize liability. What actions constitute all appropriate inquiries shall be
detennined by taking into account any specialized knowledge or experience
on the part of the financial institution; the relationship of the market value of
the site to the value of the site if uncontaminated, commonly known or
reasonably ascertainable infonnation about the site, the obviousness of the
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1 presence or likely presence of contamination at the site, the ability to detect
2 the contamination by appropriate inspection, and any other relevant factor;
3 (e) The financial institution, when it undertakes actions to protect or preserve the
4 value of the site, undertakes those actions in accordance with this chapter and
5 the administrative regulations adopted pursuant thereto;
6 (f) The financial institution, its employees, agents, and contractors did not cause
7 or contribute to an environmental emergency, or to a release or threatened
8 release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant; and
9 (g) The financial institution complies with the release notification requirements of
10 subsection (9) of this section.
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provide false information because he was
married two times after his marriage to
Geraldine and would not wish to be viewed
as a bigamist. Third, Smith's statement
does not agree with agency records, which
indicate that the courthouse in Yuma, Ari-
zona was unable to locate a record of a
divorce between Geraldine and Smith. Fi-
nally, Geraldine's own testimony is incon-
sistent with Smith's statement as she al-
leged that Smith told her that he divorced
her in Mexico.
Geraldine also argues that the fact that
Smith remarried two additional times after
his marriage to her demonstrates that
Smith dissolved their marriage leaving her
free to enter into a common-law marriage
with Leach. This evidence, however, is
also unconvincing. In addition to the fac-
tors discussed above, Smith's first mar-
riage following his marriage to Geraldine
occurred on January 1, 1959. Thus, it is
possible that Smith could have divorced
Geraldine after January 1, 1957, thereby
precluding the commencement of a com-
mon-law marriage in the state of Michigan.
Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo
that Geraldine's evidence demonstrating
that her marriage to Smith was dissolved,
her marriage to Archie in 1963 is even
more problematic. While we would con-
cede that Geraldine's marriage to Archie
indicated her belief that her marriage to
Smith was dissolved, it also tends to dem-
onstrate that Geraldine did not believe
that she was married to Leach. Moreover,
Geraldine returned to Michigan and alleg-
edly resumed her common-law marriage to
Leach in 1964. By this time, however,
Michigan no longer recognized common-
law marriages. Geraldine claims, howev-
er, that Archie annulled their marriage at
some point in 1968 in Mexico. If Geral-
dine were correct in that her marriage to
Archie was annulled, then it would be pos-
sible for her to argue that there was no
interruption in her alleged common-law
marriage to Leach. Geraldine's only evi-
dence of such an annulment, however, is
her statement that a friend of Archie's told
her that Archie annulled their marriage.
Geraldine's continued use of Archie's
name, Le., Gainey, since 1963, however,
speaks louder than her after-the-fact ex-
planation.
III.
Because the Commissioner's decision is
supported by substantial evidence, in this
case a lack of convincing evidence that
Geraldine was free to enter into a com-
mon-law marriage with the deceased wage
earner Leach, we affirm.
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Landowners' advocacy organization
brought action against shellfish producer,
alleging Clean Water Act (CWA) violations
stemming from producer's mussel harvest-
F - 1
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ing facilities. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington' Franklin D. Burgess, J., granted
summary judgment in favor of producer.
Organization appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Gould, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
organization had ability to bring citizen's
suit, and (2) state agency was not neces-
sary party to action; but (3) materials re-
leased by mussels were not "pollutants,"
and (4) harvesting facilities were not "point
sources" of discharge.
Affirmed.
1. Environmental Law CS=>226, 659
Advocacy organization was entitled to
bring citizen's suit under Clean Water Act
(CWA) for unpermitted discharges by
shellfish producer, even though state agen-
cy charged with administering National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit program had determined
that producer did not require permit, since
organization satisfied explicit citizen's suit
notice requirements of CWA, and agency
did not possess exclusive authority under
CWA to decide whether producer's dis-
charges violated statute. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, § 101 et seq., as amended, 33
U.S.CA § 1251 et seq.
2. Federal Civil Procedure CS=>219
State agency that administered Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit program was not
necessary party to citizen's suit brought by
advocacy organization under Clean Water
Act (CWA) against shellfish producer,
even though agency had determined that
producer's discharge activities did not re-
quire permit, since presence of agency in
suit would not preclude relief to either
party, and agency did not claim interest
that would be impaired by litigation. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 19(a), 28 U.S.CA;
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, § 101 et seq., as
amended, 33 U.S.CA § 1251 et seq.
3. Statutes CS=>194
Under "ejusdem generis" doctrine,
when statute contains list of specific items
and general item, court usually deems gen-
eral item to be of same category or class
as more specifically enumerated items.
See publication Words and Phras-
es for other judicial constructions
and definitions.
4. Environmental Law CS=>175
Natural materials released by mussels
during commercial harvest were not "pol-
lutants" under Clean Water Act (CWA),
notwithstanding inclusion of "biological
materials" in list of pollutants covered by
statute, and thus discharge of such materi-
als did not contravene CWA; shells and
natural byproducts of living mussels were
result of natural biological processes, not
waste product of transforming human pro-
cess, and CWA specified that living shell-
fish were to be protected under statute.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, § 502(6), as amend-
ed, 33 U.S.CA § 1362(6).
5. Environmental Law cs=>201
Commercial mussel harvesting facility
was excluded from classification as concen-
trated aquatic animal production facility
(CAAPF) under Clean Water Act (CWA),
and thus was exempt from National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permitting requirements as
"point source" of discharges, since facility
did not add any feed to its harvesting rafts
or to surrounding water. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, § 502(14), as amended, 33 U.S.CA
§ 1362(14); 40 C.F.R. § 122.24(a); 40
C.F.R. Part 122, App. C(a).
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Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington; Franklin D. Burgess, District
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-99-
05433-FDB(EM).
Before: THOMAS, GRABER and
GOULD, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
GOULD, Circuit Judge.
This case poses the interesting question
whether the mussel shells, mussel feces
and other biological materials emitted
from mussels grown on harvesting rafts,
and thereby entering the beautiful waters
of Puget Sound, constitute the discharge of
pollutants from a point source without a
permit in violation of the Clean Water Act
("the Act"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376. Pre-
liminarily, we must also assess procedural
issues that affect whether we now can
decide this question.
The Association to Protect Hammersley,
Eld, and Totten Inlets ("APHETI"), a
non-profit organization composed of about
3,000 persons who reside along the south-
ern shores of Puget Sound, sued Taylor
Resources, Inc. ("Taylor"), a mussel-har-
vesting company, under the citizen suit
provisions of the Act. APHETI sought:
(1) a judgment declaring that Taylor dis-
charged pollutants from its mussel-har-
vesting facilities without a National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit; (2) an order enjoining
Taylor from discharging pollutants from
its facilities until it obtained such a per-
mit; and (3) an order imposing civil penal-
ties for Taylor's alleged violations of the
Act. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Taylor, holding that
Taylor's mussel-harvesting rafts did not
violate the Clean Water Act. APHETI ap-
peals. We reach the Clean Water Act
claim and review de novo the district
court's grant of summary judgment. See
Waste Action Project v. Dawn Mining
Corp., 137 F.3d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir.I998).
We affirm.
I
The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376, aims to restore and main-
tain the "chemical, physical and biological
integrity of [the] Nation's waters." 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a). To achieve these desir-
able goals, the Act "establishes a compre-
hensive statutory system for controlling
water pollution. To that end, it estab-
lishes the .. , NPDES permit system for
regulating discharges of pollutants into
waters of the United States." Nat'l Wild-
life Fed'n v. Consumers Pawer Co., 862
F.2d 580, 582 (6th Cir.1988).
A cornerstone of the Clean Water Act
is that the "discharge of any pollutant"
from a "point source" into navigable wa-
ters of the United States is unlawful un-
less the discharge is made according to
the terms of an NPDES permit obtained
from either the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") or
from an authorized state agency. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342; see also Comm.
to Save Mokelumne River v. E. Bay Mun.
Util. Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir.
1993). In Washington State, the Depart-
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ment of Ecology ("Ecology") is authorized
by the EPA to administer the Clean Wa-
ter Act's NPDES program. See 33
U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1) (suspending the avail-
ability of federal NPDES permits once a
state-permitting program has been sub-
mitted and approved by the EPA). With
these salient legal principles in mind, we
consider the dispute between APHETI
and Taylor.
II
Since the early 1990s, Taylor has run
two mussel-harvesting facilities in Puget
Sound's Totten Inlet, producing more than
20,000 pounds of mussels each year. With
these facilities, Taylor harvests gallo mus-
sels, a species of mussels present in Puget
Sound for about twenty-five years. l
Taylor attaches what are termed "mus-
sel brood stock" or mussel "seeds"-that
is, what we might consider to be "infant"
mussels if personified-to suspension
ropes that hang from floating rafts. Lead-
ing from Taylor's rafts, the suspension
ropes are immersed and then anchored to
the sea floor, surrounded by mesh netting
designed to protect the mussels from pre-
dators. Taylor does not add fish food or
chemicals to the water; the mussels are
I. Gallo mussels were first brought to Puget
Sound in the 1970s and 1980s by mussel
harvesters. However, amicus curiae Pacific
Coast Shellfish Growers Association suggests
that gallo mussels may have also indepen-
dently found their way to Puget Sound by (1)
hybridizing with sibling species of mussels or
(2) migrating northward along the Pacific
coast. Whatever their ticket to Puget Sound,
gallo mussels now reproduce naturally in
Puget Sound, albeit in limited numbers, and
have been observed in locations isolated from
any mussel-harvesting facilities.
2. Several Puget Sound area Native American
Tribes submitted letters as amicus curiae in
strong and unequivocal support of Taylor and
argued, among other things, that their own
historical shellfish-harvesting methods, which
are similar in design to Taylor's methods,
nurtured exclusively by the nutrients
found naturally in the waters of Puget
Sound, with nothing added. It is nature
and the vibrant waters of Puget Sound
that transform the mussel "seeds" into
edible mussels worthy of admiration and
human appetite.
But here's the rub, the environmental
issue, as APHETI sees it: The tiny mus-
sels have their commensurate physical and
chemical processes. And as a byproduct
of their metabolism, the mussels harvested
at Taylor's facilities produce and release,
as particulate matter, feces and pseudo-
feces, and they generate dissolved materi-
als in the form of ammonium and inorganic
phosphate (collectively, "mussel byprod-
uct"). Also, gallo mussel shells have ap-
peared on the beaches of Totten Inlet
since the mid-1990s. There is no doubt
that mussel byproduct and mussel shells
are released from Taylor's facilities and, in
this sense, they are adding something,
however small, to the Sound's abundant
waters. But it must also be recognized
that the mussels act as filters and are
considered by many to enhance water
quality by filtering excess nutrients or oth-
er matter in the water that can be destruc-
tive to marine environments.2
serve to enhance water quality. For example,
the Squaxin Island Tribe wrote that it relies
on a high standard of water quality for its
aquacultural activities and that "shellfish pop-
ulations are a regulating species, helping to
consume and control excess nutrients added
to the water from other sources." Similarly,
the Port Gamble S 'Klallam Tribe wrote that
"because of their formidable water filtration
capabilities, mussel rafts have actually been
proposed as a means to improve water quality
in embayments where poor circulation and
point source discharges threaten water quali-
ty." Although we cannot make factual find-
ings in our appellate review, we need not
close our eyes to the positions of these inde-
pendent Tribes, which have a deep historic
familiarity with Puget Sound waters, with
harvesting shellfish, and with concern for the
environment.
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Taylor's mussel-harvesting rafts, al-
though not welcomed by all who reside
along Puget Sound's southern shores, are
not a rogue operation. Since Taylor began
its operations, it has applied for and re-
ceived all required permits for compliance
with both the Washington State Environ-
mental Policy Act and the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act. To comply with the
Clean Water Act, Taylor sought to acquire
an NPDES permit. Ecology, however,
told Taylor that it would neither accept
nor process Taylor's application for an
NPDES permit. In Ecology's view, an
NPDES permit was not required for Tay-
lor's mussel-harvesting facilities.3
On August 18, 1997, the Director of
Ecology responded in a letter to an
APHETI member who had inquired
whether an NPDES permit was required
for mussel harvesting rafts. The Director
of Ecology wrote that mussel-harvesting
facilities do not violate the Clean Water
Act because "shellfish farmers do not need
to add fish food (nutrients) to the water to
promote shellfish growth." Not persuad-
ed, APHETI, on August 18, 1999, filed a
complaint under the citizen suit provision
of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365,
alleging that Taylor had violated the Act
by "discharging pollutants," such as mus-
sel feces, mussel shells, and ammonia from
3. Some amicus curiae oppose a requirement
that Ecology issue NPDES permits for shell-
fish-harvesting facilities. They argue that
such a requirement could divert the agency's
administrative and financial resources away
from regulating activities that significantly
impair water quality. For example, the
Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe writes that:
[t]he application [of] the NPDES permit to
mussel culture is a misuse of the Clean
Water Act. Our Tribe is very familiar with
the NPDES permit and other regulatory
tools emanating from this Act. We work
closely with both the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and the Washington
State Department of Ecology to insure that
the water quality upon which we rely is
its rafts into the Puget Sound without an
NPDES permit. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,
1342. APHETI claimed that particles and
chemicals emitted from the mussels were
"pollutants," that Taylor's harvesting rafts
were "point sources," and that Taylor
therefore needed an NPDES permit to
operate. APHETI sought civil penalties
and an order enjoining Taylor from dis-
charging pollutants from its facilities until
Taylor obtained an NPDES permit.
The district court granted summary
judgment to Taylor, holding that Taylor's
facilities did not "discharge a pollutant"
and that the mussels and mussel rafts
were not "point sources." In this appeal,
we must assess whether the district court's
conclusions on these novel interpretive is-
sues under the Clean Water Act were cor-
rect.
III
At the threshold, we are faced with Tay-
lor's contention that a private party cannot
bring a Clean Water Act citizen's suit for
unpermitted discharges when the state
agency charged with administering the
NPDES permit program has determined
that such a permit is not required. Tay-
lor's argument must be rejected because it
runs squarely against the plain words of
protected ... The Jamestown S'Klallam
Tribe will be directly and adversely affected
if these limited agency resources are de-
flected from pollution prevention and di-
rected toward attempting to apply the
NPDES permit to shellfish farming.
This view was echoed by the People for Puget
Sound, a non-profit conservation group with
about 12,000 members in Washington State.
That organization wrote that "Ecology acted
appropriately in determining that the Taylor
mussel rafts were not subject to the require-
ment for an NPDES permit. Unlike salmon
net pens and other confined animal farming
operations, we do not view this type of activi-
ty as meeting the EPA definition of 'point
source.' JI
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the statute and would frustrate the pur-
poses of the Clean Water Act's empower-
ment of citizen suit.
A
The Clean Water Act explicitly allows
private citizens to bring enforcement ac-
tions against any person alleged to be in
violation of federal pollution control re-
quirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1); see,
e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 174-75, 120
S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). This
right of private suit is subject. to express
procedural prerequisites: At least sixty
days before filing a suit, the prospective
citizen plaintiff must provide notice of the
alleged violation to the EPA, the State
where the alleged violation occurs, and the
alleged violator. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
If either the United States or the State
decides to bring an enforcement action
within sixty days, the private plaintiff can-
not bring an independent action, but may
only intervene in the government's suit.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). Here, APHETI gave
sixty days' notice to the EPA and Ecology
but neither agency brought an enforce-
ment action. APHETI decided to proceed
alone, and we must consider whether it has
the right to do so despite inaction by the
government and Taylor's arguments to the
contrary.
[1] APHETI has satisfied the Act's ex-
plicit citizen suit notice requirements.
Yet, Taylor contends that these protec-
tions are inadequate and that APHETI is
nonetheless barred from bringing this citi-
zen suit because Ecology has told the par-
ties that NPDES permits are not required
for mussel-harvesting facilities. In Tay-
4. We recognize that Clean Water Act citizen
suits are often brought against persons who
are violating the strictures of a NPDES per-
mit, see Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d at 566,
but nothing in the Act limits citizen suits to
only those claims where the alleged polluter
lor's view, APHETI should not be allowed
to sue Taylor for the unpermitted dis-
charge of pollutants when Ecology would
neither accept nor process an NPDES per-
mit application. We disagree.
Although the EPA or an authorized
state agency may be charged with enforce-
ment of the Clean Water Act, neither the
text of the Act nor its legislative history
expressly grants to the EPA or such a
state agency the exclusive authority to de-
cide whether the release of a substance
into the waters of the United States vio-
lates the Clean Water Act. See Sierra Club
v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 566--ti7
(5th Cir.1996) (holding courts may deter-
mine in citizen suits whether discharged
substance is pollutant even if EPA has not
issued NPDES permit). Here, if EPA and
Ecology decline enforcement, then they
have no statutory or common law right to
veto environmental review sought by a
citizen who otherwise has complied with
the Act. To the contrary, we must honor
the Act's express provisions authorizing
citizen suits in appropriate cases where
procedural requirements are met. Con-
gress thus empowered citizens to pursue
enforcement of the Clean Water Act when
all procedural requirements were satisfied.
Because those requirements are met here,
a citizen suit is authorized and the statuto-
ry issues whether Taylor "discharged pol-
lutants" from a "point source" are within
our jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. That Ecolo-
gy has decided that an NPDES permit is
not needed warrants consideration but
does not divest the federal courts of juris-
diction. The State may choose to sit on
the sidelines, but state inaction is not a
barrier to a citizen's otherwise proper fed-
eral suit to enforce the Clean Water Act.4
has obtained an NPDES permit and violated
its terms. Suit may also be brought where a
party proceeds to discharge pollutants from a
point source without a required permit. See
id.
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We have subject matter jurisdiction to
hear APHETI's citizen suit.
B
To support its argument that a citizen
suit alleging unpermitted discharges can-
not be asserted where an NPDES permit
is not obtainable, Taylor relies on Huglwy
v. JMS Development Corp., 78 F .3d 1523
(11th Cir.1996). In Huglwy, a property
owner filed a Clean Water Act citizen suit
seeking to enjoin a real estate developer
from discharging runoff from storm water
without an NPDES permit, even though
the delegated state agency would not issue
NPDES permits for such discharges. The
citizen plaintiff contended that the devel-
oper violated the "zero discharge" stan-
dard of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), which
makes it unlawful to discharge any pollu-
tant without an NPDES permit. The
Eleventh Circuit rejected the citizen plain-
tiffs argument and held that a citizen suit
cannot be maintained when: "(1) compli-
ance with [the zero discharge] standard is
factually impossible; (2) no NPDES per-
mit covering such discharge exists; (3) the
discharger was in good-faith compliance
with local pollution control requirements
that substantially mirrored the proposed
NPDES discharge standards; and (4) the
discharges were minimal." Huglwy, 78
F.3d at 1530.
We have never adopted nor rejected the
rule of Huglwy, and would apply it here
only if persuasive. However, because we
conclude that Huglwy by its terms would
not preclude suit here, we need not reach
the issue of its application in a case meet-
ing its requirements. To explain why Hu-
glwy, even if adopted, would not preclude
this suit, we must ponder only the first
5. Taylor's reliance on Hughey is further un-
dermined by the Eleventh Circuit's caution
that its holding be limited to cases "in which
the storm-water discharge is minimal." Hu-
ghey, 78 F.3d at 1530 (emphasis added). Be-
Hughey factor: whether compliance with a
pollution control requirement is impossi-
ble. In Huglwy, the Eleventh Circuit rea-
soned that relief could not be accorded to
the citizen plaintiff because it is was im-
possible for the developer to comply with
the Act's zero discharge standard. The
court reasoned that "rain water will run
downhill, and not even a law passed by the
Congress of the United States can stop
that." fd. But that is not the case here.
In this case, there is no reason why Taylor
cannot comply with the Act's zero dis-
charge standard, if the mussel byproduct
and shells are the discharge of pollutants
from a point source and prohibited without
a permit. Taylor, unlike the developer in
Huglwy, could simply cease operations to
comply with the Act.5 Because Taylor can
abate the discharge of alleged pollutants
by halting its operations, Huglwy is distin-
guishable and does not detract from
APHETI's statutory right of citizen suit.
C
Taylor further contends that Ecology is
a necessary party under the Clean Water
Act and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19(a). We have already reviewed the sub-
stantive provisions that govern permitting
and the citizen suit provisions of the Clean
Water Act. Rule 19(a) provides in relevant
part:
A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not de-
prive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in
the person's absence complete relief can-
not be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) the person claims an in-
cause we conclude that Taylor has failed to
satisfy the first factor set forth in Hughey, we
need not consider whether the other Hughey
factors are satisfied.
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terest relating to the subject of the ac-
tion and is so situated that the disposi-
tion of the action in the person's absence
may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede the person's ability to protect
that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a sub-
stantial risk of incurring double, multi-
ple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations
by reason of the claimed interest.
Taylor stresses that APHETI is attempt-
ing to overturn Ecology's decision that
Taylor's mussel-harvesting facilities do not
require an NPDES permit to operate.
And Taylor thus argues that Ecology will
need to be joined as a party in order to
accord relief or, alternatively, that any re-
lief accorded in Ecology's absence will im-
pair Ecology's interests in overseeing the
State's NPDES program.
[2] This case squarely presents an is-
sue not previously decided by us: whether
a state agency that administers the Clean
Water Act's NPDES program is a neces-
sary party to a citizen suit when that
agency has decided that an NPDES per-
mit is not required. We fully agree with
other federal circuits that, without excep-
tion, have held, as Taylor acknowledges as
a "general rule" in its supplemental brief-
ing, that federal and state agencies admin-
istering federal environmental laws are not
necessary parties in citizen suits to enforce
the federal environmental laws. See
Friends of Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165,
173 (2d Cir.1976) (EPA not a necessary
party in Clean Air Act citizen suit); Metro.
Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. Dist. of
Columbia, 511 F.2d 809, 814-15 (D.C.Cir.
1975) (per curiam) (same); see also Sierra
Club v. Young Life Campaign, Inc., 176
F.Supp.2d 1070, 1078-80 (D.Colo.2oo1)
(state not necessary party in Clean Water
Act citizen suit); Student Pub. Interest
Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Monsanto
6. In supplemental briefing, Ecology has ad-
Co., 600 F.Supp. 1479, 1484 (D.N.J.1985)
(state and EPA not necessary parties in
Clean Water Act citizen suit).
Although these cases addressed circum-
stances in which the citizen plaintiff was
seeking to enforce the terms of an existing
pollution abatement plan or NPDES per-
mit that had been approved by the rele-
vant agency, there is no sound reason to
distinguish between the cases cited above
and this case. The plain language of the
Clean Water Act has created opportunity
for citizen suit when government agencies
do not act. We adopt the views of the
Second Circuit and the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Clean Air Act cases where
they accepted citizen suits without requir-
ing joinder of a responsible government
agency. In those Clean Air Act cases, it
was the EPA that was not joined; in our
Clean Water Act case, it is the delegated
state agency that is not joined and that
previously had determined that an
NPDES permit is not required. The prin-
ciple is the same: Whether a citizen is
seeking to enforce the terms of an NPDES
permit or a pollution abatement plan or, as
here, the statutory requirements of the
Clean Water Act, it is the government
agency's alleged failure to act that "brings
the citizen suit into play." Carey, 535 F.2d
at 173.
Our conclusion that Ecology is not a
necessary party is supported by direct
analysis of the text of Rule 19(a). We fIrst
ask, under Rule 19(a)(1), whether Ecology
is a necessary party under the theory that
in its absence complete relief cannot be
accorded to the parties: APHETI and
Taylor. Here, the presence of Ecology
will not preclude relief to either party. If
APHETI were to win, Taylor could be
ordered to terminate operations unless it
obtains a permit, a form of relief that is
available irrespective of Ecology's partic-
ipation. Ecology might grant a permit
allowing further operations 6 but, if not,
vised us that. if we hold the mussel-raft opera-
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Taylor would have to pull in the ropes and
dock the rafts, and in either event, our
relief would be complete. Conversely, if
Taylor were to win, there would be no
need for Ecology to congratulate it or give
condolences to APHETI, and again our
relief would be complete. Ecology is not
needed at all for federal court relief that is
wholly adequate to resolve the dispute be-
tween APHETI and Taylor.
We next ask, under Rule 19(a)(2),
whether Ecology "claims an interest relat-
ing to the subject of the action" and is so
situated that our decision in Ecology's ab-
sence "may ... impair or impede [that]
person's ability to protect that interest" or
"leave [those] already parties subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multi-
ple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations
by reason of the claimed interest." This
portion of the Rule is wholly inapplicable
because Ecology does not claim an interest
that will be impaired by this litigation,7
and we see none. See United States v.
Bowen, 172 F.3d 682,688-89 (9th Cir.1999)
(a claim of interest is an essential prereq-
uisite to joinder under Rule 19(a)(2». And
Ecology's absence does not subject APHE-
TI or Taylor to any multiple or inconsis-
tent obligations.
Having determined that APHETI's citi-
zen suit is within our jurisdiction despite
Ecology's position that no permit is needed
and having held that Ecology is not a
necessary party under Rule 19(a),8 we turn
to the interpretive issues under the Clean
Water Act.
tions discharge pollutants from a point
source, then Ecology will grant a permit.
7. Ecology states in its supplemental briefing:
"This Court's resolution of this matter will not
impair or impede Ecology's ability to protect
its interest because Ecology recognizes that
its decisions are subject to judicial review and
IV
We recur to the fundamental law de-
scribed at the outset of our opinion: The
"discharge of any pollutant" from a "point
source" into navigable waters is unlawful
under the Clean Water Act unless made
per the terms of an NPDES permit ob-
tained from Ecology as the authorized
state agency. Because no permit was ob-
tained before commencing the raft opera-
tions in the navigable waters of Puget
Sound, we now address whether the mate-
rials naturally released by gallo mussels
are "pollutant[s]" under the Clean Water
Act.
The Act states:
The term "pollutant" means dredged
spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue,
sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, muni-
tions, chemical wastes, biological mate-
rials, radioactive materials, heat,
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock,
sand, cellar dirt and industrial, munici-
pal, and agricultural waste discharged
into water.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (emphasis added).
APHETI argues that the chemicals, fluids,
shells and other materials released by
Taylor's mussels meet the statutory defini-
tion of "pollutant" because these materials
are "biological materials" and thus "pollu-
tants" under the Act. A novel question is
presented, but we conclude that APHE-
TI's contention must be rejected to pre-
serve the integrity of the Clean Water Act.
"It is well settled that the starting point
for interpreting a statute is the language
of the statute itself." Gwaltney of Smith-
will issue an NPDES permit to Taylor if this
Court concludes a permit is necessary."
8. Because we hold that Ecology is not a nec-
essary party under Rule 19(a), we need not
decide whether it is feasible to join Ecology,
id., or whether Ecology is an indispensable
party under Rule 19(b).
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field, Ltd., v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98
L.Ed.2d 306 (1987) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). We begin
with the language of the Clean Water Act
and consider its illustrative pollutants.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The Act lists
diverse examples of a "pollutant," and in
this context the meaning of "biological ma-
terials" is not readily apparent.
[3, 4] The doctrine of ejusdem generis
suggests that the definition of "biological
materials" is not as broad as APHETI
argues. Under that doctrine, "[w]hen a
statute contains a list of specific items and
a general item, we usually deem the gener-
al item to be of the same category or class
as the more specifically enumerated
items." Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph
Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 834 (9th Cir.l999).
Here, the more specific items in the illus-
trative list of pollutants, such as "radioac-
tive materials," ''wrecked or discarded
equipment," "garbage," "sewage sludge,"
"solid waste," and "incinerator residue"
support an understanding of the more gen-
eral statutory term, "biological materials,"
as waste material of a human or industrial
process.
Viewed in this context, mussel shells,
mussel feces and other natural byproduct
of live mussels do not appear to be the
type of materials the drafters of the Act
would classify as "pollutants." But it must
also be acknowledged that the phrase "bio-
logical materials" could literally embrace
the emissions at issue. For this reason,
the statute is ambiguous on whether "bio-
logical materials" means all biological mat-
ter regardless of quantum and nature and
regardless of whether generated by living
creatures, or whether the term is limited
to biological materials that are a waste
product of some human process. In light
of this ambiguity, we consider the congres-
sional intent in passing the Clean Water
Act. See N.W Forest Res. Council v.
Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 834 (9th Cir.1996)
("Where a statute is ambiguous, we may
look to legislative history to ascertain [the
statute's] purpose.").
In 1972, Congress passed the Clean Wa-
ter Act amendments, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387, to respond to environmental degra-
dation of the nation's waters. In the text
of the Act, Congress plainly and explicitly
listed the "protection and propagation of
. .. shellfish" as one of the goals of re-
duced pollution and cleaner water. 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (emphasis added); see
also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312(a), 1314(a)(2). It
would be anomalous to conclude that the
living shellfish sought to be protected un-
der the Act are, at the same time, "pollu-
tants," the discharge of which may be pro-
scribed by the Act. Such a holding would
contravene clear congressional intent, give
unintended effect to the ambiguous lan-
guage of the Act and undermine the integ-
rity of its prohibitions.
This conclusion is strengthened by fur-
ther analysis. When faced with an ambig-
uous statutory term, we may apply other
tools of reason in assessing what Congress
proscribed. Interpreting the ambiguous
term, "biological materials," in its context,
we consider that the addition of this mate-
rial to the waters, so far as the record
shows, does not add any identifiable harm,
let alone appreciable or significant dam-
age, to the Puget Sound environment.
Moreover, there may be countervailing en-
vironmental benefits for encouraging shell-
fish farming in Puget Sound. We are
persuaded that Congress did not intend
that living shellfish and the natural chemi-
cals and particulate biological matter emit-
ted from them, or the occasional shells
that separate from them, be considered
pollutants.
By holding that mussel shells and mus-
sel byproduct are not pollutants, we do not
suggest that materials found naturally in
F - 10
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the water can never be "biological materi-
als" considered pollutants under the Act. A
facility that processes fIsh on land or sea
and that discards skin, scales, bones and
entrails into the waters might be discharg-
ing pollutants under the Act. Similarly, if
shellfIsh are processed and shells discard-
ed in the water, this might be the dis-
charge of pollutants, even though the bio-
logical materials had been in the water
before processing. Such materials, al-
though naturally occurring, are altered by
a human or industrial process and, as
waste material in signifIcant amounts,
might affect the biological composition of
the water. See, e.g., Ass'n of Pac. Fisher-
ies v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir.
1980) (pollutants are added where a sea-
food processor removes fish from a body of
water, processes them, and then places the
"heads, tails and internal residuals of the
processed fIsh" back in the water). In our
case, however, the shells and natural by-
product of living mussels released from
Taylor's facilities are the result of the nat-
ural biological processes of the mussels,
not the waste product of a transforming
human process.9 Accordingly, we do not
view Taylor's mussel shells and mussel
byproduct as pollutants under the Clean
Water Act.
That "biological materials" means the
waste product of a human or industrial
process is in accord with the views of
other courts that have examined what con-
stitutes "biological materials" under the
Act. See Concerned Area Residents for
Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 117
(2d Cir.1994) (liquid manure spread on
9. As a caveat, the record does not indicate
that the biological materials released by Tay-
lor's facilities were released in concentrations
significantly greater than would otherwise be
found in the waters of the Puget Sound. Ac-
cordingly, we need not decide whether the
addition of biological materials to the water
in concentrations significantly higher than
natural concentrations could support a con-
farm fIelds met defInition of pollutant as it
was "solid waste, ... sewage, ... biologi-
cal materials, ... and agricultural waste
discharged into water") (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); United
States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d
643, 645 (2d Cir.1993) (glass vials of hu-
man blood placed into river were "biologi-
cal materials"); National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Consumers Power Co.; 862 F.2d 580, 583
(6th Cir.1988) ("live fIsh, dead fish and fish
remains" discharged into Lake Michigan
after live fIsh were pulled through dam's
turbines "are pollutants within the mean-
ing of the CWA, since they are biological
materials"); United States v. Frezzo
Bros., 461 F.Supp. 266, 269-70 (E.D.Pa.
1978), affd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir.1979)
(runoff. from pile of "mushroom compost"
was discharge of "sewage" and "biological
materials"). These cases support that the
"biological materials" that are "pollutants"
under the Act are materials that are
transformed by human activity. We re-
ject a broader interpretation in this case.
Moreover, our conclusion that the statuto-
ry term "biological materials" means the
waste product of a human process is fur-
ther reinforced by the Act's use of the
term "pollution," which is defIned as the
"man-made or man-induced alteration of
the chemical, physical, biological, and radi-
ological integrity of water." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(19) (emphasis added).
We conclude that Taylor's mussel shells
and the byproduct from these living mus-
sels are not "biological materials" under
the Act because these materials come from
elusion that such biological materials are
"pollutant[s]" under the Act by virtue of their
high concentrations. In this case, feces and
chemicals exuded from live mussels have not
been shown in the record significantly to alter
the character of Puget Sound waters, and the
record suggests instead that the mussel-har-
vesting operations generally purify the waters.
F - 11
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the natural growth and development of the
mussels and not from a transformative
human process. We hold that the mussel
shells, mussel feces and other mussel by-
product released from Taylor's live mus-
sels thus do not fall within the statutory
definition and meaning of "pollutant." 10
V
[5] As an alternative and related basis
for decision, we next address ,whether Tay-
lor's mussel facility is a "point source," an
issue keenly disputed in this litigation and
the amicus briefing before us. The Clean
Water Act's definition of a "point source"
provides that a "point source" is
any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding oper-
ation, or vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or may be
discharged.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).
The EPA has determined that a fish farm
that harvests aquatic animals can be a
point source under the Clean Water Act.
40 C.F.R. § 122.24(a). Under EPA regu-
lations, a "concentrated aquatic animal
production facility," or "CAAPF," is a
point source and subject to the NPDES
permit requirements if it contains, grows
or holds, among other things, "[c]old water
fish species or other cold water aquatic
animals in ponds, raceways, or other simi-
lar structures which discharge at least 30
days per year." 40 C.F.R. Pt. 122, App.
C(a). Taylor's facilities meet these crite-
10. Because we hold that the mussels and
mussel byproduct in this case are not pollu-
tants, we need not consider whether the re-
lease of such materials from the rafts is a
"discharge" under the Act.
11. Even if an aquatic animal production facil-
ity does not meet the CAAPF production and
feed criteria, the EPA or authorized state
ria. However, the EPA excludes from
classification as a CAAPF: "(1) Facilities
which produce less than [approximately
20,000] pounds of aquatic animals per year;
and (2) Facilities which feed less than
[approximately 5,000 pounds] of food dur-
ing the calendar month of maximum feed-
ing." [d. (emphasis added),u Because
Taylor does not add any feed to its rafts or
to the surrounding water, its facilities fall
under the second exception to CAAPF
classification.
APHETI argues that, even if Taylor's
mussel harvesting facilities do not meet
the EPA's definition of a CAAPF, they
still fall under the general definition, "dis-
cernible, confined, and discrete convey-
ance," or under the more specific defini-
tion, ''vessel or other floating craft." By
this reasoning, APHETI argues that Tay-
lor's mussel rafts are "point source[s]" and
that their operation, if discharging pollu-
tants, requires an NPDES permit. But,
whatever merit this argument might have
in the absence of a regulatory definition of
when an aquatic animal feeding operation
is a point source, the argument has little
persuasive effect when faced with aquatic
animal farming that does not involve feed-
ing and that is not within the express and
described limits that invoke the Act under
the regulation.
We have previously held that " 'in the
construction of administrative regulations
. .. it is presumed that every phrase
serves a legitimate purpose and, therefore,
constructions which render regulatory pro-
visions superfluous are to be avoided.'''
agency has the discretion. on a case-by-case
basis, to "designate any ... cold water aquat-
ic animal production facility as a concentrat-
ed aquatic animal production facility upon
determining that it is a significant contributor
of pollution to waters of the United States."
If so designated. such a facility would require
an NPDES permit to operate. 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.24(c).
F - 12
CADILLAC FAIRVIEW/CALIFORNIA v. DOW CHEMICAL CO. 1019
Cite as 299 F.3d 1019 (9th Ctr. 2002)
Rainsong CO. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 151 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir.
1998) (quoting Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d
516, 519 (9th Cir.1976». In the context of
aquatic animal harvesting, the EPA's regu-
lations expressly exclude from the defini-
tion of "point source" facilities, like Tay-
lor's, that do not meet certain feeding
thresholds. To hold that these facilities
are nonetheless "point sources" under the
statutory defmition would render the
EPA's CAAPF criteria superfluous and
undermine the agency's interpretation of
the Clean Water Act. See Natural Res.
Dej. Counci4 Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369,
1382 (D.C.Cir.1977) (EPA was given the
power under the Act to define point
sources). Placing greatest weight on the
regulations that are most directly related
to the conduct under challenge, we hold
that Taylor's facilities are not "point
sources" under the Act.
VI
APHETI, on behalf of its members, has
a right of citizen suit to challenge Taylor's
operation under the Clean Water Act, re-
gardless of how Ecology views the rafts'
production of mussels. But when we con-
sider these mussel growing rafts and their
operations in Puget Sound in light of the
text and history of the Clean Water Act,
we conclude that mussel byproduct and
mussel shells that enter Puget Sound from
the living creatures suspended on ropes
attached to Taylor's rafts are not "pollu-
tants," Taylor's rafts are not "point
sources," and Taylor's mussel harvesting
on these rafts without a perrott does not
offend the Clean Water Act.
AFFIRMED.
CADILLAC FAIRVIEW/CALIFORNIA,
INC., Plaintiff,
v.
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY,
Defendant-third-party-
plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
United States of America, Defendant-
third-party-defendant-Appellant.
No. 99-56641.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 8, 2001.
Filed Aug. 6, 2002.
Land developer brought action
against manufacturer and United States
government, seeking damages to cover
expense of investigating soil pollution
stemming from wartime manufacture of
synthetic rubber. Manufacturer counter-
claimed for indemnity and contribution
under Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA). The United States District
Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia, Mariana R. Pfaelzer, J., granted
judgment allocating 100 percent of remed-
iation expense to government. Govern-
ment appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Kleinfeld, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
government's direct responsibility for site
warranted 100 percent allocation; (2) ben-
efit to manufacturer was properly disre-
garded as allocation factor; (3) factual
findings regarding government's knowl-
edge and control of site were proper; and
(4) indemnity agreement between govern-
ment and manufacturer was properly con-
sidered as allocation factor.
Affirmed.
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the remaining Defendants' Motions to Dis-
miss are denied. Additionally, Plaintiffs'
fraudulent concealment claim is not pled
with sufficient particularity. Plaintiffs fail
to allege Defendants' active concealment of
the cause of action, fail to explain why they
did not discover the cause of action earlier,
and fail to assert their due diligence in
attempting to discover the claim. On that
basis, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' fraud-
ulent concealment claim.
Additionally, Plaintiffs' claim against
LOL as successor in interest and majority
owner of Country Lake Foods and Dairy
Fresh must fail. No specific acts of either
Country Lake or Dairy Fresh were al-
leged. Further, any potential acts by ei-
ther company occurred more than four
years prior to the filing of Plaintiffs' claim
and are thus barred by the statute of
limitations. Therefore, all of Plaintiffs'
claims against LOL as successor in inter-
est or majority owner must be dismissed.
As Plaintiffs' Complaint is not being dis-
missed, it is appropriate for discovery to
go forward. Defendants must turn over
all relevant documents to Plaintiffs, with
the exception of those documents submit-
ted to the grand jury, as they are protect-
ed by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Plaintiffs have failed
to show a particularized need for the
grand jury documents, and thus their Mo-
tion to Compel discovery is denied with
respect to the grand jury documents, but
granted with respect to all other requests.
Lastly, the Court determines that it is
too early in the proceedings to determine
the issues of personal jurisdiction and
product and market definitions. First, the
Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is dismissed with leave to re-
new the motion at a later date. Second, a
decision on the relevant product and geo-
graphic market defInitions would be pre-
mature at this point. Therefore, the Court
declines to address these issues at this
point in time.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY OR·
DEREDTHAT:
1. Defendant K & P Company, Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss (Clerk Doc. No. 92) is
GRANTED;
2. Defendant Marigold Foods, Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss (Clerk Doc. No. 91) is
DENIED;
3. Defendant Meyer Bros. Dairy, Inc.'s
Motion to Dismiss (Clerk Doc. No. 88) is
DENIED;
4. Defendant Schroeder Milk Co.,
Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss (Clerk Doc. No.
97) is DENIED;
5. Defendant Land O'Lakes, Inc.'s Mo-
tion to Dismiss the Fraudulent Conceal-
ment Allegation (Clerk Doc. No. 89) is
GRANTED;
6. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants
alleging fraudulent concealment of the
combination or conspiracy, contained in
Count IX of the Second Amended Com-
plaint (Clerk Doc. No. 86), are DIS-
MISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
7. Defendants BolsWessanen Holdings,
Inc. and BolsWessanen U.S.A., Inc.'s Mo-
tion to Dismiss (Clerk Doc. No. 95) is
DENIED WITH LEAVE TO RENEW
the motion after further discovery; and
8. Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to Com-
pel (Clerk Doc. No. 140) is DENIED IN
PART AND GRANTED IN PART.
ASSOCIATED CONTRACT LOGGERS,
INC., et al.
v.
UNITED STATES FOREST
SERVICE et al.
No. 99-CV-1485(JMR/RLE).
United States District Court,
D. Minnesota.
Feb. 8, 2000.
Logging companies brought action
against United States Forest Service
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(USFS) and environmental groups to en-
join them from imposing set of religious
beliefs called "Deep Ecology." On defen-
dants' motion to dismiss, the District
Court, Rosenbaum, J., held that: (1)
groups were not so entangled in USFS
affairs that they could be considered to be
state actors; (2) groups were exempted
from any damages to lumber companies as
result of advocacy of their beliefs in admin-
istrative proceedings before USFS; and (3)
fact that USFS sometimes refused to per-
mit logging did not necessarily imply that
USFS's decisions violated Establishment
Clause due to input of environmental
groups.
Motion granted.
1. Constitutional Law e:=>84.5(1l)
Nonprofit environmental groups were
not so entangled in United States Forest
Service (USFS) affairs that they could be
considered to be state actors for purposes
of action alleging that groups violated Es-
tablishment Clause by attempting to su-
born or coerce USFS into imposing set of
beliefs based on purported religion of
"Deep Ecology," even if groups were ac-
tive administrative process participants
and litigants. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. I.
2. Constitutional Law e:=>84.1
In determining whether private par-
ty's acts may be deemed state action for
purposes of Establishment Clause, a court
must consider: (1) whether claimed consti-
tutional violation resulted from exercise of
right having its source in state authority,
and (2) whether private parties charged
with deprivation could be described in all
fairness as state actors. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. I.
3. Constitutional Law e:=>84.1
Private party does not become state
actor for purposes of Establishment
Clause by mere invocation of legal proce-
dures. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. I.
4. Civil Rights e:=>210
Constitutional Law e:=>91
Even if nonprofit environmental
groups were motivated in their dealings
with United States Forest Service (USFS)
by religious beliefs based on "Deep Ecolo-
gy," they were exempted under Noerr-
Pennington doctrine from any damages to
lumber companies as result of their advo-
cacy of their beliefs in administrative pro-
ceedings before USFS, absent evidence
that groups' actions were meritless.
U.S.C.A Const.Amend.I.
5. Health and Environment e:=>25.15(3.2)
Claim that environmental groups
sought to suborn or coerce United States
Forest Service (USFS) into imposing set
of religious beliefs called "Deep Ecology"
did not satisfy case or controversy require-
ment, absent existing logging dispute.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. I.
6. Constitutional Law e:=>84.1
In considering Establishment Clause
claim, court must consider: (1) whether
government action has secular legislative
purpose; (2) whether action's primary ef-
fect either to advances or inhibits religion;
and (3) whether action fosters excessive
government entanglement with religion.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.I.
7. Constitutional Law e:=>84.5(1l)
Woods and Forests e:=>8
Fact that United States Forest Ser-
vice (USFS) sometimes refused to permit
logging did not necessarily imply that
USFS's decisions violated Establishment
Clause due to input of environmental
groups that allegedly advocated religion of
"Deep Ecology," which purportedly disfa-
vored logging, absent evidence that
USFS's purpose in regulating forest use
was not secular, or that USFS's forest-use
actions primarily advanced or inhibited re-
ligion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. I.
8. Federal Civil Procedure e:=>2757
Court possesses inherent power to
sanction conduct that is inappropriate and
frivolous.
Stephen B. Young, Winthrop Consulting,
"Minneapolis, MN, for Associated Contract
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Loggers, Inc., Olson Logging, Inc., plain-
tiffs.
Mary Trippler, U.S. Attorney, Ernest
W. Grumbles, III, Bridget A. Sullivan,
James Alan Payne, Oppenheimer, Wolff &
Donnelly, Minneapolis, MN, Thomas C.
Buchele, Environmental Law, Chicago, IL,
Charles K. Dayton, Christopher M.
McGlincey, Noah D. Hall, Leonard Street
and Deinard, PA, Minneapolis, MN, for
United States Forest Service, Superior
Wilderness Action Network, Forest
Guardians, defendants.
ORDER
ROSENBAUM, District Judge.
Defendants move to dismiss this case,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ.
P."). Oral argument was heard on Janu-
ary 14, 2000.1 The defendants' motions
are granted, and the cause is dismissed
with prejudice. Further, because this
Court is concerned as to plaintiffs' and
their counsel's bona fides in initiating and
prosecuting this lawsuit, the Court issues
an Order to Show Cause why sanctions
ought not be imposed.
1. Background
Plaintiffs are Associated Contract Log-
gers, Inc., and Olson Logging, Inc. Each
claims to be involved in Northern Minne-
sota logging. Plaintiffs bring this action
against the United States Forest Service
("Forest Service" or "USFS") and two pri-
vate, nonprofit organizations: the Superior
Wilderness Action Network ("SWAN")
and Forest Guardians (collectively, "non-
profit defendants").
While plaintiffs' complaint is far from
crystal clear, it appears to claim defen-
dants, acting in concert, violated the Es-
tablishment Clause of the United States
Constitution. Specifically, plaintiffs claim
the nonprofit defendants have attempted
1. Defendants moved, pursuant to D.Minn.LR
n.l(b)(l)(B), to deny plaintiffs oral argument
as a sanction for plaintiffs' admitted failure to
comply with the District of Minnesota's brief-
ing schedules. Such neglect needlessly com-
to suborn or coerce the USFS into impos-
ing a set of religious beliefs called "Deep
Ecology."
Plaintiffs claim the nonprofit defendants
have influenced the Forest Service's deci-
sion-making in matters of forest manage-
ment. In plaintiffs' view, the nonprofit
defendants' efforts to influence the USFS
have converted them from private parties
into state actors for constitutional analytic
purposes. Plaintiffs further claim the
USFS has acquiesced in the nonprofit de-
fendants' actions. The complaint states,
and for purposes of this Rule 12 motion
the Court must assume, that the nonprofit
defendants' actions are actually motivated
by a form of nature worship.
II. A Rule 12 Motion
In considering these motions, the Court
is ever mindful of its obligation to assume
the facts set forth by plaintiffs as true, and
that a complaint "should not be dismissed
unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in sup-
port of his claim which would entitle him
to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Nonetheless, granting a motion to dismiss
is appropriate when a complaint, even tak-
en as true, and considered in light of appli-
cable law, shows an insuperable bar to
relief. See, e.g., Leggett v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 178 F.2d 436 (10th Cir.1949).
Throughout this Order, the Court does not
determine the accuracy of plaintiffs' factu-
al allegations, but instead focuses solely on
the legal import, or lack thereof, of those
facts. With that approach in mind, the
Court concludes plaintiffs' claims cannot
proceed.
III. The Nonprofit Defendants
Taking the plaintiffs' well-pleaded facts
as true, the Court easily finds all claims
against the nonprofit defendants must be
dismissed for two fundamental reasons.
plicates the work of both opposing counsel
and the Court. Notwithstanding this lapse,
the Court allowed plaintiffs to participate in
oral argument.
F - 17
1032 84 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES
First, notwithstanding plaintiffs' asser-
tions, the nonprofit defendants are not,
and cannot be under plaintiffs' pleadings,
state actors. Second, the nonprofit defen-
dants are immune frpm this kind of suit
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.2
A. State Action
The establishment clause of the United
States Constitution prohibits governmental
actions which support or establish religious
beliefs. See United States Constitution
Amend. I ("Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion
.... "); Montano v. Hedgepeth, 120 F.3d
844, 848 (8th Cir.1997); see also United
BM Of Carpenters & Joiners ofAmerica
v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 831, 103 S.Ct. 3352,
77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983).
[1] Plaintiffs' complaint recognizes that
SWAN and Forest Guardians are nonprof-
it entities, and neither is part of the state
or federal government. Nonetheless,
plaintiffs claim the nonprofit defendants
have so entangled themselves in the For-
est Service's affairs that they must be
considered state actors for purposes of this
lawsuit. Plaintiffs assert, "Defendant
USFS has allowed itself to be used as a
tool, agent, or instrument of Defendants
SWAN and Forest Guardians for religious
purposes." Complaint at 7. This some-
what bizarre assertion is neither supported
in law nor in the complaint's own factual
allegations.
Plaintiffs' brief opposing dismissal mis-
apprehends the concept of state action.
Plaintiffs cite cases irrelevant to the issue.
For example, plaintiffs cite the well-known
case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68
S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), where the
United States Supreme Court found a
state court's order enforcing a racially-
discriminatory private covenant which re-
stricted real estate sales to be a state
action. Plaintiffs do not seem to under-
stand that, however misguided, the private
2. The Court, in a later portion of this Opinion,
focusing directly on the United States Forest
Service, finds this matter is not currently jus-
parties' contract was not the state action
barred in Shelley. The state action was
the court's order enforcing the private par-
ties' racially-discriminatory covenants.
While Shelley is undoubtedly an important
case, it says nothing about whether a non-
profit private party, which advocates and
petitions a federal agency, becomes a state
actor. Neither Shelley, nor any case cited
by plaintiffs, supports a claim of state ac-
tion on the part of the nonprofit defen-
dants.
To the contrary, both the Congress and
the courts permit private parties, irrespec-
tive of their religious views, to participate
in the public's discourse over forest and
natural resource use. The Congress has
explicitly allowed public participation in
the administrative process before any ma-
jor use of federal lands and resources is
allowed. See, e.g., National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4332. This
participation is encouraged in order to give
meaning and flesh to the additional First
Amendment constitutional protection: the
right to petition for redress of grievances.
Similarly, the courts have remained open
to private parties seeking to protect-how-
ever that term is defined-natural re-
sources. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v.
Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 118 S.Ct. 1665,
140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998); Sierra Club v.
United States Forest Service, 93 F.3d 610
(9th Cir.1996).
[2] In order for a party's acts to be
deemed state action, a court must consid-
er: (1) whether the claimed constitutional
violation resulted from the exercise of a
right having its source in state authority,
and (2) whether the private parties (here,
SWAN and Forest Guardians) charged
with the deprivation could be described in
all fairness as state actors. See Edrrwn-
son v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,
620, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660
(1991). Plaintiffs have entirely failed to
plead facts which support either element.3
ticiable. This same determination is fully ap-
plicable to the nonprofit defendants.
3. Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to
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[3] A private party does not become a or endorsement by the government of the
state actor by the "mere invocation" of nonprofit defendants' activities.4
legal procedures. Such an act does not PIa' tiffi h 'mil I f":l d
satisfy the first element of the test See m save Sl ar y <We to allege
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. facts to support their claim that the non-
922, 939 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d p~ofit defendants coqld be. d~scribed in
482 (1982); see also Cobb v. Geargia Power frorne~s as state actors. Plamtiffs certain-
Co., 757 F.2d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir.1985). l~ claIm ~: non?rofit defendants are ac-
The mere use of legal procedures cannot bve ~?mmlstrative proc:ss participants
suffice; there must be an affirmative gov- and litigants, but they fail to assert any
ernmental action encouraging the private facts. to ~upport the co~clusion th~t they
action. Simple governmental permission are, m faIrness, appropnately descnbed as
to participate in a consultative process is s~te actors. The nonprofit defendants ac-
not sufficient. Here, the laws and admin- tively advocated f~r positions they espouse.
istrative practices which deal with forest They have prevailed and they have lost.
use allow private-party input; this is no See, e.g., compl~~ at 9-10. This simply
more than the "mere invocation" of proce- makes them partiCIpants, not state actors.
dures which is fully permitted and protect- Again, the nonprofit defendants' status
ed. Plaintiffs' complaint sets forth no fac- as litigation opponents of the USFS mili-
tual allegations which could conceivably tates against attributing their actions as
support any claim that the nonprofit defen- state action. See Polk County v. Dodson,
dants did anything other than invoke stat- 454 U.S. 312, 324, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70
utory rights. L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (public defenders, even
Plaintiffs correctly acknowledge the non- though paid by the state, are not state
profit defendants' frequent participation in ~ctors due to ~dversarial function). Plain-
adversarial proceedings against the USFS. tiffs d.o not claIm the nonprofit defendants'
See complaint at 10 ("The tactics used be lawswts are collusive, or that the USFS
[sic] Defendants SWAN and Forest and the nonprofit defendants are not genu-
Guardians have placed great administra- ine adversaries in those other matters.
tive burdens on Defendant USFS in Plaintiffs' complaint, in fact, makes clear
Minnesota so that sales of timber are post- that the nonprofit defendants have placed
poned, delayed or abandoned."); id. at 9- a burden on the USFS, and plaintiffs al-
10 (listing appeals and lawsuits brought by lege this burden has caused the USFS to
the nonprofit defendants challenging ~cale b~c~ logging activities-thus depriv-
USFS actions). The Court considers that mg plaIntiffs of as much logging as they
these allegations actually undermine any believe is appropriate. See complaint at 9-
claim of governmental encouragement. 10. These allegations are inimical to plain-
The cited instances are events when, rath- tiffs' assertion that the nonprofit defen-
er than working in concert with the USFS, dants' actions are those of the state.
the nonprofit defendan~ opposed and bur- Thus, neither the "state authority" nor
d.ened th~ Forest ServIce. The complaint the "in all fairness" state actor factors set
slmply fails to allege any encouragement forth in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
motions to dismiss at 14 suggests that defen-
dants' cited state-action cases were inapplica-
ble in an Establishment Clause context. This
suggestion was spurious. See Capitol Square
Review Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766-67,
115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) ("By
its terms [the Establishment] Clause applies
only to the words and acts of government.")
(emphasis in original).
4. As i~ Section II, above, the Court clearly
recogmzes that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not
the time to resolve factual disputes. But it is
a time to determine whether the challenged
party has pleaded any facts selting forth a
claim on which relief may be granted. Here,
~he Court is not resolving a factual dispute;
mdeed, it is taking the plaintiffs' assertions as
tru~. Plainti~fs' problem is that, even taking
theIr complamt as true, they have failed to
state a claim on which relief may be granted.
F - 19
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Co. have been alleged by plaintiffs in a
manner which states a claim upon which
relief can be granted, within the contem-
plation of Rule 12(b)(6). .As a result, no
colorable claim premised on the Establish-
ment Clause has been pled against the
nonprofit defendants. Accordingly, the
state action claims against the nonprofit
defendants must be dismissed.
B. Noerr-Pennington
Plaintiffs seem to completely misappre-
hend the Constitution's protection of a citi-
zen's right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. This protection in-
heres whether the petitioner is a single
person or a collective group commonly ad-
vocating for their views.5
In analyzing this portion of plaintiffs'
complaint, the Court does assume as true
plaintiffs' rather problematic assertion that
the nonprofit defendants are actually ad-
herents of the Deep Ecology religion. Af-
ter making this assumption, however,
plaintiffs urge the Court to accept, as an
actionable claim, the stunning proposition
that the Constitution protects only a reli-
gious group's rights to ineffective petition.
According to plaintiffs, once the religious
group's petition actually seeks to accom-
plish something-and to press its beliefs
into actions-the religious group moves
beyond the ambit of the First Amend-
ment's protection of the right to petition.
[4] Plaintiffs astound the Court when
they assert that the First Amendment
does not protect effective petitioning ac-
tivities, stating-without citation to any
authority whatsoever-that "[o]nce defen-
dants act on their beliefs-more impor-
tantly-once defendants seek to involve
the government in enforcing their beliefs,
5. It is irrelevant whether the nonprofit defen-
dants approach the USFS in administrative
proceedings or the courts singly or in a
group. The Constitution's First Amendment
protects the right of individuals to freely asso-
ciate with others of their choosing. See, e.g.,
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459, 78
S.Ct. 1163,2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958) ("Effective
advocacy of both public and private points of
they cross the line separating valued and
protected freedoms from unconstitutional
manipulation of the government's police
powers." Plaintiffs' memorandum in op-
position to motions to dismiss at 3 (em-
phasis in original).
This assertion is so clearly wrong as to
beggar conventional legal analysis. The
right to petition is absolutely fundamental
to the First Amendment. "To hold ...
that people cannot freely inform the gov-
ernment of their wishes would ... be par-
ticularly unjustified." Eastern R.R. Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5
L.Ed.2d 464 (1961); accord NAACP, 357
U.S. at 459, 78 S.Ct. 1163. The Constitu-
tion itself even makes it more clear: Citi-
zens have the right "to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances." It
is beyond conception that this cherished
right is so cabined that it is lost at the
very moment the petition might possibly
achieve success.
Even assuming the nonprofit defendants
are advocates of a religion's precepts, the
Court finds no support for the proposition
that the right to petition is restricted to
citizens whose motivation is only secular.
No such restriction is found in the words
of the Constitution. Plaintiffs have cited
no authority to support their argument to
the contrary, because none exists. Free-
dom of belief is not a passive right: citi-
zens are not limited to merely sitting idly
thinking about their political, moral, and
religious beliefs; democracy is founded
upon them acting upon those beliefs in
efforts to effect change. See generally
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct.
2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987); Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409,
25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970).6
view, particularly controversial ones, is unde-
niably enhanced by group association .... ").
6. The motion hearing transcript will reveal at
least one stunning moment. This occurred
when plaintiffs' counsel suggested that, when-
ever an arguably religious-based claim is as-
serted, the Court ought to make a threshold
determination and decide whether the claim
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Not surprisingly, with these flawed as- nonpublic defendants' efforts to influence
sumptions at their core, plaintiffs' argu- public policy have succeeded. See, e.g.,
ments with respect to the Noerr-Penning- complaint at 9 ("SWAN fIled a successful
ton doctrine fail. The Noerr-Pennington appeal which halted the Greenwood Tim-
doctrine implements the First Amend- ber Sale in Superior National Forest in
ment's protections by barring claims Minnesota."). Plaintiffs do not allege that
against litigants "for injuries allegedly any of the nonprofit defendants have ever
caused by activities and participation in been sanctioned under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 or
public processes with the intent of influ- otherwise for bringing frivolous actions, or
encing public policy dec~ions." Fisc!Wr that any of the nonprofit defendants' ac-
Sand and Aggregate v. Ctty. of LakemUe, tions have ever been described by the
874 F.Supp. 957, 959 (D.Minn.1994); see USFS or the courts as shams. This rec-
also Eastern Railroad ~residents Confer- ord of success simply vaporizes plaintiffs'
ence v. Noorr Motor Fretght, Inc., 365 U.S. claims that the nonprofit defendants' ac-
127, .81 S.Ct. 5~3, 5 L:Ed.~d 4~ (1961). tions were "objectively meritless," and that
On Its face, this doctrm~lffiffiUmz~S .th~ "no reasonable [person] could realistically
no~profit defen~a:n~ om . plamtiffs expect success" on them. The nonprofit
claImS, as the actiVIties complamed of are . .
. f:' te ted titi· ti't defendants not only realistically expectedpnma aCle pro c pe onmg ac VI y. th t tim h' d't A
.. success; ey a es, ac leve 1.
Th~re IS an e~ception to the .Noerr- successful claim is, as a matter of logic and
Penmngton doctrine. . The doctrine ex- of law, not meritless. See Professional
cepts those whose claImS were not fIled Real Estate Investors Inc. v. Columbia
with the true intent o~ influencing public Pictures Industries, I:W., 508 U.S. 49, 58,
policy, but whose tru~ mtent was a sham. 113 S.Ct. 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993).
In such a case, clmms can be allowed . . .
against a party whose legal actions were The pl~tiff~, therefore: have not. satis-
objectively and subjectively meritless. See fied the objective test which could mvoke
Fischer Sand, 874 F.Supp. at 959. But the sham exception to the Noerr-Penning-
plaintiffs' complaint makes no such asser- ton doctrine. They have, similarly, failed
tion. Their only reference to this Noerr- to deny that the nonprofit defendants were
Pennington exception is found in their re- attempting to influence governmental ac-
sponsive brief opposing dismissal. tions which could implicate the sham ex-
Plaintiffs' belated assertion of sham by ception's subjective element. Instead,
the nonprofit defendants falls far short of plaintiffs again focus on their allegation
the mark. In order to place the nonprofit that th~ .nonprofi~ defend~nts' ~otivation
defendants beyond the Noerr-Pennington was re~gI~us. This allegatio.n .fails to ~elp
doctrine plaintiffs must overcome a high the plamtiffs, because a religiOUS motiva-
hurdle. 'They must show that the nonprof- tion is not now, and has never been, any
it defendants' actions were "objectively bar to Noerr-Pennington protection. The
meritless in the sense that no reasonable Court finds that plaintiffs' claim of a sham
[person] could realistically expect success exception to the Noerr-Pennington doc-
on the merits"; they must also show that trine is entirely inapplicable. Plaintiffs'
the actions were undertaken in bad faith desperate efforts to smear the nonprofit
(the subjective element of the test). defendants with the sham brush is both
Fischer Sand, 874 F.Supp. at 960. The unseemly and unavailing.
plaintiffs have failed to meet this test. In short, the Court finds that the Con-
Plaintiffs' complaint shows the futility of stitution's Establishment Clause does not
their position. Rather than having made trump its right to petition and the right to
"objectively meritless" claims, they ac- free exercise of religion, including the
knowledge that on several occasions, the right to express those beliefs to govern-
is religiously based. If so, he urged the Court to deny the religious litigant access to relief.
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mental officials. As the Court noted at
oral argument, many of the parties in-
volved in social and political advocacy in
this country have been motivated and in-
spired, at least in part, by religious views.
The concept of a court's prescreening a
party's religious views, and requiring them
to prove that its claims are not religiously
based, is disturbing, and runs counter to
the protections set forth by the Constitu-
tion. It is a concept which this Court will
not endorse.
Accordingly, because plaintiffs have
failed to establish state action or any inap-
plicability of the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine respecting the nonprofit defendants,
their motions to dismiss are granted. Be-
cause these flaws in plaintiffs' lawsuit are
of constitutional dimension and cannot be
corrected by amending the complaint, this
dismissal is with prejudice.
IV. United States Forest Service
After review of the plaintiffs' claims, the
Court finds, in light of Rule 12(b), that
plaintiffs have failed to recognize and ac-
knowledge applicable law respecting the
Forest Service. Their claims against the
USFS fail because (a) this matter is not
justiciable under Article III of the Consti-
tution; (b) plaintiffs have abandoned any
claim for breach of statutory duty; and (c)
plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under
the Establishment Clause.
A. Justiciability
The Constitution, itself, makes clear that
a federal court may only exercise its pow-
ers when there exists a "case or controver-
sy" within the meaning of Article III. "A
justiciable controversy is . . . distinguished
from a difference or dispute of a hypotheti-
cal character; from one that is academic
or moot. The controversy must be defi-
nite or concrete, touching the legal rela-
tions of parties having adverse legal inter-
ests. It must be a real and substantial
controversy, admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character,
as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41, 57 S.Ct.
461,81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). No such dispute
exists here.
[5] Plaintiffs recite a series of past log-
ging disputes between the USFS and the
nonprofit defendants. After invoking this
history, they ask the Court to bring its
injunctive power to bear on future logging
disputes. But plaintiffs do not claim any
present logging dispute. The prior actions
are complete; all appeals and other legal
challenges have either been concluded or
waived. Under these circumstances, the
Court cannot-and indeed, is constitution-
ally prohibited from attempting to-specu-
late or opine concerning future disputes.
Plaintiffs' only response to this objection
is a statutory citation to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
and cases based upon it. This "reply" is
entirely unavailing. There is no doubt
that § 1331 touches subject matter juris-
diction. At the same time, it is axiomatic
that a statute cannot trump the Constitu-
tion, which is the supreme law of the land.
No statute obviates Article Ill's require-
ment of a case or controversy. Whether
or not the Court can, in fact, discern the
beliefs of Deep Ecology, and even if the
Court could anticipate future actions
(Heavens (or Deep Ecology) knows it
couldn't have anticipated this one), this
case is simply not ripe. Plaintiffs attempt
to reply by making the facile observation
that defendants "are all over the [I]nternet
and in the public press." Plaintiffs' memo-
randum in opposition to motions to dismiss
at 20. Even assuming this to be true, it in
no way creates a case or controversy
where none exists.
Plaintiffs' arguments, if they relate at all
to justiciability, misapprehend this Court's
power: a federal court cannot, and will
not, act absent a live and current dispute.
None is present here. The Court recog-
nizes that it might be able to hear a case
where there is a dispute which is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103
S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). But
plaintiffs have nowhere alleged that this is
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such a dispute. Even absent such an alle-
gation, the Court considers, as dicta, that
since each of the Forest Service's actions
are particular forest and site specific, this
slender exception would likely be unavail-
able here.
Absent any case or controversy, as is
mandated by the Constitution, each claim
against these defendants must be dis-
missed.
B. Statutory Claims
Plaintiffs have disavowed any claims
based on the statutes which control the
USFS's actions, including the Organic Act
of 1897 or the Multiple-Use Sustained
Yield Act of 1960. See plaintiffs' memo-
randum in opposition to motions to dismiss
at 17. Plaintiffs have apparently taken
this position to withdraw their claims enti-
tled "Breach of Duty by Defendant
USFS." Complaint at 4-6. In that portion
of their complaint, plaintiffs appeared to
assert the USFS had acted in breach of
numerous duties purportedly imposed by
statute. But now, in light of the plaintiffs'
late abandonment of any possible statutory
claims (and to whatever extent a private
cause of action might accrue therefrom-a
highly questionable proposition), any possi-
ble claim is dismissed.
C. Establishment Clause
[6] Finally, the Court determines that
plaintiffs have entirely failed to state a
claim under the Establishment Clause.
The United States Supreme Court has de-
lineated the test to be applied to Establish-
ment Clause claims. Under Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29
L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), a court must ask three
questions when considering such a claim:
(a) Does the government action have a
secular legislative purpose? (b) Is the ac-
tion's primary effect either to advance or
inhibit religion?, and (c) Does the action
foster excessive government entanglement
with religion? See id. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct.
2105. As plaintiffs have challenged the
Forest Service on Establishment Clause
grounds, the Lemon test must be applied
here.
[7] Plaintiffs' complaint sets forth no
facts which demonstrate that the USFS's
purpose in regulating forest use was any-
thing other than secular. Their conclusory
assertions that the Forest Service's actions
were taken to implement or impose the
teachings of Deep Ecology-without any
factual allegations in support---do not, and
could not, permit any finding upon which
relief could be granted. Even under the
liberal pleading standards of Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d
80 (1957), plaintiffs' bare assertions lack
the substance to satisfy this element.
Further, there is no fact alleged which
shows the USFS's forest-use actions pri-
marily advanced or inhibited religion. It
is a sophistry to say the nonprofit defen-
dants' religion disfavors logging; the For-
est Service sometimes does not allow log-
ging; and therefore, the Forest Service
had taken a position advancing religion.
This is as illogical as saying that if a tall
man advocates a position, and the govern-
ment takes a position in accord with the
tall man's wishes, it therefore follows that
the government has necessarily estab-
lished the views of tall men.
Beyond this wholly insubstantial argu-
ment, the Court takes judicial notice of
instances where the USFS enthusiastically
litigated against the nonprofit defen-
dants-and others alleged by plaintiffs to
also advocate Deep Ecology-in forest
management decisions, sometimes winning
and sometimes losing. The public record,
which can be considered in motions to
dismiss, see Porous Media Corp. v. PaU
Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.1999),
is clear that the USFS sometimes takes
positions which are congruent with, and
sometimes incongruent with, those taken
by the nonprofit defendants. Plaintiffs'
own complaint recognizes this. See com-
plaint at 9-10. A governmental decision
coinciding with the desires of a religious
group does not automatically constitute the
primary advancement of that religion.
Finally, the Court fmds no allegation in
the complaint to support a claim that the
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USFS's actions foster excessive entangle-
ment with religion. The Forest Service
acts, as it is required by law to do, as an
arbiter of forest management decisions.
Even if the nonprofit defendants were reli-
giously motivated, they are simply player-
participants in the forest management pro-
cess.7 If the Court were to rule that the
nonprofit defendants' religion barred them
from participating in the USFS's activities,
the Court would necessarily become exces-
sively entangled in deciding which reli-
gious believers could-and could not-ad-
vocate to influence governmental policy.
Because plaintiffs have failed to satisfy
any of Lemon's requirements, the USFS
motion to dismiss must also be granted.s
Again, because the flaws in plaintiffs'
claims are fundamental and irreparable
through amendment, this dismissal is also
with prejudice.
V. Sanctions
[8] A Court possesses inherent power
to sanction conduct that is inappropriate
and frivolous. See Chambers v. NASCa,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115
L.Ed.2d 27 (1991).• Despite plaintiffs' pro-
testations to the contrary, this lawsuit
seems to be designed to harass and delay
the defendants, in particular, the nonprofit
defendants, in the exercise of their consti-
tutionally-protected rights.9 It appears
probable that Plaintiffs have knowingly
drawn this Court into an unseemly and
baseless lawsuit, and has wasted the
Court's time and the defendants' valuable
time and money. It presently appears
that this case falls far below the minimal
7. The Court notes, parenthetically, that the
plaintiffs do not allege that they participated
in the administrative process in the forest
management matters of which they now com-
plain.
8. The USFS has also argued that plaintiffs'
failure to plead facts to overcome sovereign
immunity dooms their request for damages.
Because the Court's rulings herein are dispos-
standards of pleading and law which ought
to be expected in a federal court practi-
tioner.
With these preliminary observations in
mind, but not yet established as findings,
the Court invokes its inherent powers and
those granted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, and is-
sues an Order to Show Cause, directed to
plaintiffs' attorney, to show cause to this
Court why it ought not to impose sanctions
against him for his frivolous and, perhaps,
contumacious pleading. This response is
returnable within 15 days of the issuance
of this Order.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' motions to dismiss
[Docket Nos. 4, 8, & 10] are granted, and
the matter is dismissed with prejudice.
2. The attorney for plaintiffs is ordered
to show cause, within fifteen (15) days of
this Order, why sanctions should not be
imposed, pursuant to this Court's inherent
powers, and under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 for his
actions in bringing this lawsuit.
itive, it does not reach the sovereign immuni-
ty question.
9. Such lawsuits have become known as
SLAPP suits, where SLAPP stands for "Stra-
tegic Lawsuits Against Public Participation."
See Greenwich Citizens Comm. v. Counties of
Warren & Washington Industrial Development
Agency, 77 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir.1996).
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monwealth Edison Company, 61 ill.2d 494,
500-01, 336 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1975) ("an
agreement to indemnify against wilful mis-
conduct would, as a general rule, be contrary
to public policy and unenforceable ... "). See
also 15 S. Williston, Contracts § 1750A (3d
ed.1972); 6A A Corbin, Contracts § 1472
(1964).
[4] Because Mt. Bachelor made an unen-
forceable bargain in trying to escape liability
for gross negligence and willful misconduct,
the entire release provision in the season
pass application, including the limitation of
liability for ordina.rY negligence, is unenforce-
able. In contrast to other release clauses,
the language of the release provision in this
case does not manifest an intention by Mt.
Bachelor or by Fariila that the provision be
severable. See Gecnye 'V. School District No.
8R of UmatiUa County, 7 Or.App. 183, 188,
490 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1971) ("Whether a con-
tract is divisIble depends·on the intention of
the parties. Such intent is determined pri-
marily through construction or· interpretation
of the contract.") (citations omitted). In
one simple, broad sentence, Mt. Bachelor
sought to exculpate itself for any and all
claims that an injured skier might bring
against it. This attempt rendered Mt. Bach-
elor's entire release clause invalid. It is not
our role to enforce only part of the release
clause where it is not obvious from the lan-
guage of the clause that the parties intended
the clause to be severable.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is RE-
VERSED and the case is REMANDED for
trial.
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Operator of subsequently closed landfill
brought action alleging that Indian tribes'
management of site was violating Clean Wa-
ter Act (CWA) and Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA). The United
States District Court, Western District of
Washington, Carolyn R. Dimmick, Chief
Judge, dismissed, but denied tribes' request
for attorney fees. On cross-appeals, the
Court of Appeals, David R. Thompson, Cir-
cuit Judge, held that: (1) remedial investiga-
tion/feasibility study (RIIFS) is ''removal or
remedial action" within meaning of Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA) section
banning all challenges to ongoing remedial or
removal actions; (2) RCRA and CWA claims
were "challenge" to removal action within
meaning of that CERCLA section; (3) that
CERCLA section was not inconsistent with
CERCLA's savings provision; (4) district
court did not abuse discretion in refusing to
permit additional discovery; and (5) district
court did not abuse discretion in denying
tribes' request for attorney fees.
Affirmed.
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1. Health and Environment e::>25.15(3.2)
Remedial investigation/feasibility study
(RI/FS) is "removal or remedial action" with-
in meaning of CERCLA section banning all
challenges to. ongoing remedial or removal
actions. Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, § 113(h), 42 U.S.CA § 9613(h).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and defc
initions.
2. Health and Environment e::>25.15(3.2)
Plaintiffs asserting Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Clean
Water Act (CWA) claims were "challenging"
remedial investigationlfeasibility study (RII
FS) in violation of CERCLA section banning
all challenges to ongoing remedial or removal
actions; government established that RCRA
and CWA claims would affect ongoing RI/FS.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
§ 113(h), 42 U.S.CA § 9613(h); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, § 101 et seq., 33 U.S.CA § 1251 et
seq.; Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 1002 et
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C.A § 6901 et seq.
See .publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions.
3. Health and Environment e::>25.15<3.2)
Action constitutes "challenge," within
meaning of CERCLA section barring all
challenges to ongoing remedial or removal
actions, if action is related to goals of clean-
up. Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, § 113(h), 42 U.S.CA § 9613(h).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions.
4. Health and Environment e::>25.15<3.2)
CERCLA section banning all challenges
to ongoing remedial or removal actions, in-
cluding, in instant case, remedial investiga-
tionlfeastbility study (RI/FS), did not conflict
with CERCLA's savings provision, expressly
preserving Indiana tribes' obligations under
Clean Water Act (CWA) and Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA); tempo-
rary bar to citizen enforcement did not
change tribes' "obligations or liabilities" un-
der CWA or RCRA, so lU1 to violate savings
provision. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, §§ 113(h), 302(d), 42 U.S.CA
§§ 9613(h), 9652(d); .Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 101 et
seq., 33 U.S.CA § 1251 et seq.; Solid Waste
Disposal Act, § 1002 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.CA § 6901 et seq.
5. Federal Civil Procedure e::>1828
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to permit additional discov-
ery which could allegedly have demonstrated
that Indian tribes' compliance with Clean
Water Act (CWA) and Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) would not
have "challenged" CERCLA removal action
in violation ofCERCLA section banning
challenges to ongoing remedial or removal
actions; additional discovery would not have
affected jurisdictional analysis, particularly
as complaint on its face attempted to impose
requirements on handling of site, and plain-
tUfs admitted that they were attempting ei-
ther to require tribes to obtain permits or to
stop pollution discharges. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, § 113(h), 42 U.S.CA
§ 9613(h); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, § 101 et seq., 33
U.S.CA § 1251 et seq.; Solid Waste Dispos-
al Act, § 1002 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.CA § 6901 et seq.
6. Federal Civil Procedure e::>2737.10
District court may award attorney fees
to prevailing defendant in Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Clean
Water Act (CWA) suits upon finding that
plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation, even though not
brought in subjective bad faith. Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, § 101 et seq., 33 U.S.CA § 1251 et
seq.; Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 1002 et
seq., as amended, 42 U.S.CA § 6901 et seq.
7. Federal Civil Procedure e=>2737.3,
2737.10
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying defendant Indian tribes' re-
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quest for attorney fees following their suc-
cessful defense of Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Clean Water
Act (CWA) claims based on CERCLA sec-
tion banning all ehalIenges to ongoing reme-
dial or removal actions, as plaintiffs' jurisdic-
tional arguments were not frivolous or unrea-
sonable; whether remedial investigation/fea-
SIbility study (RIIFS) was ''remedial or·re-
moval action" was novel question, and court
had not previously considered whether
CERCLA's savings provision preserved right
of citizen suit enforcement under RCRA and
CWA Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, § 113(h), BOO(d), 42 U.S.C.A § 9613(h)'
9652(d); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, § 101 et seq., 33
U.S.C.A § 1251 et seq.; Solid Waste Dispos-
al Act,§ 1002 et seq., as amended, 42
U.S.C.A § 6901 et seq.
Roger Truitt, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore,
MD, for plaintiffs-appellants Razore and
Banchero.
Keith E. Moxon, Buck & Gordon, Seattle,
WA, and Joan M. Pepin, United States De-
partment of Justice, Washington, DC, for
defendants-appellees Tulalip Tribes, et al.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton.
Before -JOHN T. NOONAN, Jr.,
THOMPSON· and HAWKINS, Circuit
Judges.
DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge:
Section 113(h) of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h),
bans all challenges to ongoing remedial or
removal actions. The principal question in
this appeal is whether a remedial investiga-
tion/fe881bility study constitutes a removal or
remedial action.
• Judge David R. Thompson was drawn to replace
Judge Fams. He has read the briefs. reviewed
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1. FACTS
The plaintiffs operated a landfill on the
Tulalip Indian Reservation from 1965· to
1979. In 1979, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) direetedthe plaintiffs to halt
landfill disposal because pollution was con-
taminating the Snohomish River and Puget
Sound. The landfill was closed pursuant to a
consent decree entered into by the United
States, the plaintiffs and the Tulalip Tnbes.
The consent decree required the plaintiffs to
place a soil cover on the landfill.
The soil cover proved inadequate to stop
rainwater from percolating down through the
wastes and creating leaebate. In 1985, the
Tulalip Tribes sought to place a thicker soil
cover over the landfill. The plaintiffs allege
that the Tnbes capped the landfill with de-
bris such as concrete chunks, bricks and
ereosoted wood. In 1988, the EPA began
studying the landfill. Its study revealed that
groundwater and wetlands adjacent to the
landfill exceeded maximum contaminant lev-
els for several types of pollution. In 1989,
the EPA informed the Tribes that the landfill
might be listed as a superfund site. It rec-
ommended that additional capping efforts be
postponed. The Tribes complied with the
EPA's request. In 1991, the EPA proposed
that the site be included on the federal Na-
tional Priorities List. The site was eventual-
ly listed on May 25, 1995.
In 1993, the plaintiffs and other major
principally responsible parties signed an ad-
ministrative order for a remedial investiga-
tion/feasibility study (RI/FS). The parties
agreed to conduct a RI/FSas directed by an
EPA work plan. The objective of the RI/FS
is to make an informed choice among possi-
ble cleanup alternatives. 40 C.F.R.
§ 3OO.43O(a)(2). The RI/FS will be complet-
ed and cleanup. will begin later in 1995.
In March 1994, the plaintiffs filed this
complaint alleging that the Tnbes' manage-
ment of the site is violating the Clean Water
Act and. the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act. The Tribes and the EPA moved
to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. They assert that the suit ehal-
the record and listened to the tape of oral argu-
ment held on July 18. 1995.
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lenges an ongoing removal action under
CERCLA, and consequently section 113(h),
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), bars judicial review.
The district court granted the motion to dis-
miss, but denied the Tribes' request for at-
torney fees. The plaintiffs appeal, and the
Tribes cross-appeal the denial of fees.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction Barred by CERCLA
§ 113(h)
CERCLA is the federal government's stat-
utory framework for cleaning up hazardous
wastes. To ensure that the cleanup of con-
talmnated sites will not be slowed or halted
by litigation, Congress enacted section 113(h)
in its 1986 amendments to CERCLA1 Sec-
tion 113(h) provides in part:
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction
under Federal law ... to review any chal-
lenges to removal or remedial action se-
lected under section 9604 of this title, or to
review any order issued under section
9606(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
The statute lists five exceptions, but none
is appliCable here. Thus; the district court
had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claims
if (1) the EPA has not initiated a removal or
remedial action under section 9604, or (2) the
plaintiffs are not "challenging" such action.
[1] The plaintiffs' principal argument on
appeal is that a RJ/FS is not a remedial or
removal action. We reject this argument.
CERCLA defines a removal action to include
"such actions as may be necessary to moni-
tor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat
of release of hazardous substances ... " 42
U.S.C. § 9601(23). A RJIFS satisfies this
definition. See Boarhead Ceyrp. v. Erickson,
923 F.2d 1011 (ard Cir.1991) (holding that
section 113(h) bars claims under the Histori-
cal Preservation Act during the RJ/FS phase
of CERCLA cleanup); South MacomlJ Dis-
poso), A'ldh. v. EPA, 681 F.Supp. 1244, 1246
(E.D.Mich.1988) (stating that "[i]t is clear
. .. that a RJ/FS taken by the EPA is a
1. CERCLA was -amended in 1986 by the Super-
fund Amendtnents and Reauthorization Act of
'removal action' within the meaning of the
statute").
The plaintiffs argue that the EPA has not
selected a removal action under section 9604.
This argument finds no support in the rec-
ord. The Administrative Order of Consent
(RJ/FS consent order) was ''issued under the
authority vested in the President of the Unit-
ed States in sections 104 [section 9604J,
122(a) and 122(d)(3) of [CERCLAJ."
The plaintiffs argue that the EPA,· after
completing the RJ/FS, may adopt a no-fur-
ther-action alternative at the landfill. Their
argument implies that even though the EPA
is conducting studies, there may never be a
cleanup. Although the plaintiffs' scenario
may be theoretically possible, we cannot ig-
nore the clear mandate of section 113(h).
See McCleUan Ecotogical Seepage Situaticm
v. Ptmy (MESS), 47 F.3d 325, 328 (9tlt Cir.
1995), (stating the "[s]ection 113(h) is clear
and unequivocal" and "amounts to a blunt
withdrawal of federal jurisdiction" (quotation
omitted», petitionfor cert. filed, May 1, 1995.
Further, the EPA is obligated to consider
the no-action alternative. 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.430(e)(6). If the EPA elects not to
initiate a cleanup under CERCLA, the plain-
tiffs can then bring an appropriate citizen
suit.
[2, 3] The plaintiffs next argue they are
not "challenging" a removal action. Specifi-
cally, they contend the district court could
have fashioned RCRA and CWA remedies
that will not interfere with the RI/FS, and
ultimately the selected cleanup plan. We
reject this argument. An action constitutes
a challenge if it is related to the goals of the
cleanup. MESS at 330. The government
has persuasively demonstrated that the
plaintiffs' RCRA and CWA claims would af-
fect the ongoing RJIFS. According to the
Tulalip landfill site's remedial project manag-
er, "a judicial order requiring implementation
of a leachate collection system at this stage
in the RJ/FS would effectively terminate the
present RJ/FS." The district court found
that "[t]he plaintiffs attempt to dictate specif-
ic remedial actions and to alter the method
and order for cleanup during an RJ/FS and
1986, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675.
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prior to a determination of the ultimate re-
medial plan." The plaintiffs' own expert ad-
mits that the work could be halted for "days
or weeks." The RCRA and CWA claims are
sufficiently related to the goals of CERCLA
cleanup to trigger section 113(h). See MESS
at 330.
[4] The plaintiffs raise a third argument
about section 113(h). They argue that
CERCLA's "savings provision," section
302(d), expressly preserves the TrIbes' and
the EPA's obligations under theCWA and
RCRA. Section 302(d) provides in part:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect or
modify in any way the obligations or lia-
bilities of any person under Federal or
State law, including common law with re-
spect to releases of hazardous substances
or other pollutants or contaminants ....
(emphasis added).
42 U.S.C. § 9652(d). The plaintiffs argue
that without citizen suit enforcement, the
TrIbes' obligations are not only modified but
actually extinguished.
Sections 113(h) and 302(d) are not in con-
flict. The temporary bar to citizen enforce-
ment does not change the Tribes' "obli-
gations or liabilities" under the CWA or
RCRA. On the other hand, if section 302(d)
were to govern the interpretation of the stat-
ute, it ''would effectively write [section
113(h)] out of the Act" Westlands Water
Dist. v. Nailural Resources Defense Counci4
43 F.3d457, 462 (9th Cir.1994) (citation omit-
ted). " 'It is our duty to give effect, if possi-
ble, to every clause and word of a statute,
rather than to emasculate an entire sec-
tion.''' Ido, quoting Estate of Rey'lWlds v.
Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir.1993).
B. Refusing Additional Discoyery not
Abuse of Discretion
[5] The plaintiffs assert that the district
court abused its discretion by not permitting
additional discovery. They contend that ad-
ditional discovery could have demonstrated
that RCRA and CWA compliance would not
have "challenged" the CERCLA removal ac-
tion. We review a district court's decision to
grant or deny discovery on jurisdictional
facts for abuse of discretion. Cheng v. Boo-
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ing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir.), em
denied, 464 U.S. 1017, 104 S.Ct. 549, 78
L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).
The district court did not abuse its discre-
tion. A denial of discovery is proper ''when
it is clear that further discovery would not
demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a
basis for jurisdiction." America West Air-
lines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793,
801 (9th Cir.1989). The district court reject-
ed the plaintiffs' motion for discovery be-
cause their complaint "on its face" attempts
to impose requirements on the handling of
the site. The plaintiffs admit that they were
attempting either to require the TrIbes to
obtain permits or to stop the pollution dis-
charges. Additional discovery would not af-
fect the jurisdictional analysis.
C. Tribes' Cross-appeal for Attorney Fees
[6] The Tulalip Tribes contend the dis-
trict court abused its discretion by failing to
award attorney fees. We have not consid-
ered when attorney fees will be awarded to a
prevailing defendant under RCRA or CWA.
The Supreme Court has held that a district
court may "award attorney's fees to a pre-
vailing defendant in a TItle VII case upon a
finding that the plaintiffs action was frivo-
lous, unreasonable, or without foundation,
even though not brought in subjective bad
faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700,
54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). The Court has
adopted the same standard under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. Hughes v. Rawe, 449 U,S. 5, 14, 101
S.Ct. 173, 178, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per
curiam); see also Elks Nat'/, Found. v. Web-
er, 942 F.2d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1206, 112 S.Ct. 2995, 120
L.Ed.2d 872 (1992). We agree with the dis-
trict court that Christiansburg Garment Co.
is the proper standard for RCRA and CWA
suits.
[7] The plaintiffs' section 113(h) jurisdic-
tional arguments are not frivolous or unrea-
sonable. Whether a RIfFS constitutes a re-
medial or removal action was, before we
ruled, a novel question. Further, we have
not previously considered whether section
302(d) preserves the right of citizen suit en-
forcement under RCRA and CWA. The dis-
CHAUFFEURS, SALES DRIVERS,
WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS UN-
ION LOCAL 572, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
AFL-CIO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
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trict COurt did not abuse its discretion in I. Labor Relations ~7.1
denying the Tribes' request for attorney fees. When fewer than fifty full-time employ-
See Elks NaJ,'l Found. at 1485. ees suffer an employment loss, WARN Act
AFFIRMED. Each side shall bear its notice is not required. Worker Adjustment
own costs on appeal. and Retraining Notification Act, §§ 2 et seq.,
2(a)(2, 3), 3(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101 et seq.,
2101(a)(2, 3), 2102(a).
2. Labor Relations ~.I
The term "employer", for purposes of
WARN Act, embraces any defendant who
engages in a business enterprise, meaning at
time of plant closing or mass layoff, defen-
dant is responsible for operating business as
a going concern. Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, §§ 2(a), 3(a), 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 2101(a), 2102(a).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. .
v.
WESLOCK CORPORATION; West-
inghouse .Electric Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 94-55613.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Aug. 7, 1995.
Decided Sept. 20, 1995.
Union brought Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (WARN) action
against secured creditor of operators of man-
ufacturing plant. The United States District
Court for the Central District of California,
J. Spencer Letts, J., granted summary judg-
ment for creditor. Union appealed.. The
Court of Appeals, Trott, Circuit Judge, held
that: (1) WARN Act's obligations can apply
to a secured creditor, but only where creditor
operates debtor's asset as a business enter-
prise in the normal commercial sense, and (2)
secured creditor whose interaction with de-
linquent debtor primarily was limited to fi-
nancial controls was not an employer for
WARN Act purposes.
Affirmed.
/
3. Labor Relations ~7.1
WARN Act's obligations can apply to
secured creditor of employer, but only where
creditor operates debtor's asset as a business
enterprise in the normal commercial serise.
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notifica-
tion Act, §§ 2 et seq., 2(a), 3(a), 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2101 et seq., 2101(a), 2102(a).
4. Labor Relations *"'7.1
Where secured creditor does. no more
than exercise that degree of control over
debtor's eolliJ.teral necessary to protect secu-
rity interest, and acts only to preserve busi-
ness asset for liquidation or sale, notice re-
quirements of WARN Act will not apply
because debtor has not continued the busi-
ness in operation. Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, § 3(a), 29
U.S.C.A. § 2102(a).
5. Labor Relations e:>7.1
Determination that a defendant is an
employer under WARN Act creates no other
employment rights. Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act, §§ 2 et seq.,
2(a), 3(a), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101 et seq.,
2101(a), 2102(a); 29 C.F.R. § 639.6.
6. Labor· Relations e:>7.1
Secured creditor whose interaction with
delinquent debtor primarily was limited to
financial controls designed to preserve its
F - 30
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reconsider the constitutional assumptions
that underlie that case.
Justice SCALIA, concurring in the
judgment.
I do not share the apparent skepticism
of today's opinion concerning the judgment
of the Court (often curiously described as
merely the judgment of "the majority") in
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95
S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). I have
no doubt that the Framers of our Constitu-
tion, who were suspicious enough of gov-
ernmental power-including judicial pow-
er-that they insisted upon a citizen's
right to be judged by an independent jury
of private citizens, would not have found
acceptable the compulsory assignment of
counsel by the government to plead a crim-
inal defendant's case. While I might have
rested the decision upon the Due Process
Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment,
I believe it was correct.
That asserting the right of self-repre-
sentation may often, or even usually, work
to the defendant's disadvantage is no more
remarkable-and no more a basis for with-
drawing the right-than is the fact that
proceeding without counsel in custodial in-
terrogation, or confessing to the crime,
usually works to the defendant's disadvan-
tage. Our system of laws generally pre-
sumes that the criminal defendant, after
being fully informed, knows his own best
interests and does not need them dictated
by the State. Any other approach is un-
worthy of a free people. As Justice
Frankfurter eloquently put it for the Court
in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268
(1942), to require the acceptance of counsel
''is to imprison a man in his privileges and
call it the Constitution." Id., at 280, 63
S.Ct.236.
In any event, Faretta is relevant to the
question before us only to the limited ex-
tent that we must decide whether its hold-
ing applies to self-representation on ap-
peal. It seems to me that question is
readily answered by the fact that there is
no constitutional right to appeal. See
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-
688, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894).
Since a State could, a~far as the Feder-
al Constitution is concerned, subject its
trial-court determinations to no review
whatever, it could a fortiori subject them
to review which consists of a nonadver-
sarial reexamination of convictions by a
panel of government experts. Adversarial
review with counsel appointed by the State
is even less questionable than that.
For these reasons, I concur in the judg-
ment of the Court.
528 U.S. 167, 145 L.Ed.2d 610
...1J§7FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,
INCORPORATED, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
LAIDLAW ENVIRONMENTAL
SERVICES (TOC), INC.
No. 98-822.
Argued Oct. 12, 1999.
Decided Jan. 12, 2000.
Environmental groups brought action
pursuant to citizen suit provision of Clean
Water Act (CWA) against holder of Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit, alleging, inter
alia, violation of mercury discharge limits,
and seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief, civil penalties, costs, and attorney
fees. The United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina, Joseph F.
Anderson, Jr., J., 956 F.Supp. 588, found
numerous permit violations, imposed pen-
alty of $405,800, and denied request for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Appeal
was taken. The Court of Appeals for the
F - 31
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Fourth Circuit, 149 F.3d 303, vacated and
remanded with instructions to dismiss.
Certiorari was granted. The Supreme
Court, Justice Ginsburg, held that: (1)
groups had standing to bring citizen suit
seeking both injunctive relief and civil pen-
alties; (2) action was not rendered moot by
permit holder's compliance with permit
limits or its shut down of facility, absent
showing that violations could not reason-
ably be expected to recur; and (3) Supreme
Court would not address groups' request
for attorneys' fees.
Judgment of Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded.
Justice Stevens filed concurring opin-
ion.
Justice Kennedy filed concurring opin-
ion.
Justice Scalia filed dissenting opinion
in which Justice Thomas joined.
1. Health and Environment 0=>25.15(4.1)
Purpose of notice to the alleged viola-
tor, under Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision, is to give violator an opportunity
to bring itself into complete compliance
with the Act and thus render unnecessary
a citizen suit. Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, § 505(a), (b)(I)(A), (g), as
amended, 33 U.S.CA §§ 1365(a),
(b)(I)(A), (g).
2. Health and Environment 0=>25.15(4.1)
Citizens lack statutory standing under
Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision to
sue for violations that have ceased by the
time the complaint is filed. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, § 505(a), as amend-
ed, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a).
3. Federal Civil Procedure 0=>103.2, 103.3
To satisfy Article Ill's standing re-
quirements, a plaintiff must show: (1) it
has suffered an injury in fact that is con-
crete and particularized and is actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and (3)
it is likely, as opposed to merely specula-
tive, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3,
§ 2, cl. 1.
4. Associations 0=>20(1)
An association has standing to bring
suit on behalf of its members when its
members would otherwise have standing to
sue in their own right, the interests at
stake are germane to the organization's
purpose, and neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires the par-
ticipation of individual members in the law-
suit. U.S.CA Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
5. Health and Environment 0=>25.15(4.1)
Environmental groups alleged suffi-
cient injury in fact to establish standing to
seek injunctive relief in action against
holder of National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit for
alleged violation of mercury discharge lim-
its, pursuant to citizen suit provision of
Clean Water Act (CWA), even if there was
no resulting injury to the environment, as
group members alleged that, although they
would like to use affected river for recre-
ational purposes, they would not do so due
to permit holder's alleged discharges.
U.S.CA Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.; Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, § 505(a, g),
as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a, g).
6. Health and Environment 0=>25.15(3.3)
Environmental plaintiffs adequately
allege injury in fact, for standing purposes,
when they aver that they use the affected
area and are persons for whom the aesth-
etic and recreational values of the area will
be lessened by the challenged activity.
U.S.CA Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
7. Health and Environment 0=>25.15(4.5)
Environmental groups had standing
to seek civil penalties in action against
holder of National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit for
allegedly ongoing violation of mercury dis-
charge limits, pursuant to citizen suit pro-
vision of Clean Water Act (CWA), even
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though such penalties are paid to govern-
ment, not private plaintiffs, since penalties
would encourage permit holder to discon-
tinue current violations and deter it from
committing future ones. U.S.C.A. Const.
Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.; Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, § 505(a, g), as amended, 33
U.S.C.A. § 1365(a, g).
8. Federal Civil Procedure ¢::>103.2
A plaintiff must demonstrate standing
separately for each form of relief sought.
9. Federal Courts ¢::>13.25
Neither National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit hold-
er's substantial compliance with its permit
nor its subsequent shutdown of hazardous
waste incinerator facility from which it
discharged pollutants rendered moot envi-
ronmental groups' citizen suit, under Clean
Water Act, seeking civil penalty for viola-
tion of permit's mercury discharge limits,
absent clear showing that violations could
not reasonably be expected to recur, not-
withstanding groups' failure to appeal dis-
trict court's denial of injunctive relief.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
§ 505(a, g), as amended, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1365(a, g).
10. Federal Courts ¢::>12.1
A defendant's voluntary cessation of a
challenged practice does not deprive a fed-
eral court of its power to determine the
legality of the practice under the mootness
doctrine; if it did, the courts would be
compelled to leave the defendant free to
return to his old ways.
11. Federal Courts ¢::>12.1
A case might become moot based on a
defendant's voluntary conduct if subse-
quent events made it absolutely clear that
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur, but the
heavy burden of persuading the court that
the challenged conduct cannot reasonably
be expected to start up again lies with the
party asserting mootness.
12. Federal Civil Procedure ¢::>103.2
In a lawsuit brought to force compli-
ance, it is the plaintiffs burden to establish
standing by demonstrating that, if un-
checked by the litigation, the defendant's
allegedly wrongful behavior will likely oc-
cur or continue, and that the threatened
injury is certainly impending.
13. Federal Civil Procedure ¢::>103.2
Federal Courts ¢::>12.1
There are circumstances in which the
prospect that a defendant will engage in or
resume harmful conduct may be too specu-
lative to support standing, but not too
speculative to overcome mootness.
14. Federal Courts ¢::>13
When a mentally disabled patient files
a lawsuit challenging her confinement in a
segregated institution, her postcomplaint
transfer to a community-based program
will not moot the action, despite the fact
that she would have lacked initial standing
had she filed the complaint after the trans-
fer.
15. Federal Civil Procedure ¢::>103.2
If a plaintiff lacks standing at the time
the action commences, the fact that the
dispute is capable of repetition yet evading
review will not entitle the complainant to a
federal judicial forum.
16. Federal Courts ¢::>12.1
District courts cannot retain jurisdic-
tion over cases in which one or both of the
parties plainly lacks a continuing interest,
as when the parties have settled or a plain-
tiff pursuing a nonsurviving claim has died,
notwithstanding the sunk costs to the judi-
cial system.
17. Health and Environment ¢::>25.15(12)
Under Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision, the district court has discretion
to determine which form of relief is best
suited, in the particular case, to abate cur-
rent violations and deter future ones.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
§ 505(a), as amended, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1365(a).
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18. Injunction e=>1
A federal judge sitting as chancellor is
not mechanically obligated to grant an in-
junction for every violation of law.
19. Health and Environment e=>25.7(24)
Denial of injunctive relief in action
brought under Clean Water Act's citizen
suit provision does not necessarily mean
that the district court has concluded there
is no prospect of future violations for civil
penalties to deter. Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act, § 505(a, g), as amended,
33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a, g).
20. Federal Civil Procedure e=>2582
Federal courts should aim to ensure
the framing of relief no broader than re-
quired by the precise facts.
21. Health and Environment
e=>25.15(2.1)
A district court in a Clean Water Act
citizen suit properly may conclude that an
injunction would be an excessively intru-
sive remedy, because it could entail con-
tinuing superintendence of the permit
holder's activities by a federal court, which
is a process burdensome to court and per-
mit holder alike. Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, § 505(a), as amended, 33
U.S.C.A. § 1365(a).
22. Federal Courts e=>460.1
Supreme Court would not address
plaintiffs entitlement to attorneys' fees un-
der catalyst theory, on appeal from dis-
missal for mootness of citizen suit under
Clean Water Act, but would have district
court address request for fees in the first
instance, where district court had stayed
time for petition for attorneys' fees until
time for appeal had expired or, if either
party appealed, until appeal was resolved.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
§ 505(d), as amended, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1365(d).
*The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the
Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of
Syllabus *
Defendant-respondent Laidlaw Envi-
ronmental Services (TOC), Inc., bought a
facility in Roebuck, South Carolina, that
included a wastewater treatment plant.
Shortly thereafter, the South Carolina De-
partment of Health and Environmental
Control (DHEC), acting under the Clean
Water Act (Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1),
granted Laidlaw a National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) per-
mit. The permit authorized Laidlaw to
discharge treated water into the North
Tyger River, but limited, among other
things, the discharge of pollutants into the
waterway. Laidlaw began to discharge
various pollutants into the waterway;
these discharges, particularly of mercury,
an extremely toxic pollutant, repeatedly
exceeded the limits set by the permit.
On April 10, 1992, plaintiff-petitioners
Friends of the Earth and Citizens Local
Environmental Action Network, Inc. (re-
ferred to collectively here, along with later
joined plaintiff-petitioner Sierra Club, as
"FOE"), notified Laidlaw of their intention
to file a citizen suit against it under the
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), after the expira-
tion of the requisite 6o-day notice period.
DHEC acceded to Laidlaw's request to file
a lawsuit against the company. On the
last day before FOE's 6Q-day notice peri-
od expired, DHEC and Laidlaw reached a
settlement requiring Laidlaw to pay $100,-
000 in civil penalties and to make "every
effort" to comply with its permit obli-
gations.
On June 12, 1992, FOE filed this citi-
zen suit against Laidlaw, alleging noncom-
pliance with the NPDES permit and seek-
ing declaratory and injunctive relief and an
award of civil penalties. Laidlaw moved
for summary judgment on the ground that
FOE lacked Article III standing to bring
the lawsuit. After examining affidavits
and deposition testimony from members of
the plaintiff organizations;' the District
the reader. See United States v. Detroit Tim-
ber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct.
282, 50 L.Ed. 499.
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Court denied the motion, fmding that the
plaintiffs had standing. The District
Court also denied Laidlaw's motion to dis-
miss on the ground that the citizen suit
was barred under § 1365(b)(1)(B) by
DHEC's prior action against the company.
Mter FOE initiated this suit, but before
the District Court rendered judgment on
January 22, 1997, Laidlaw violated the
mercury discharge limitation in its permit
13 times and committed 13 monitoring and
10 reporting violations. In issuing its
judgment, th~District Court found that
Laidlaw had gained a total economic bene-
fit of $1,092,581 as a result of its extended
period of noncompliance with the permit's
mercury discharge limit; nevertheless, the
court concluded that a civil penalty of
$405,800 was appropriate. In particular,
the District Court found that the judg-
ment's "total deterrent effect" would be
adequate to forestall future violations, giv-
en that Laidlaw would have to reimburse
the plaintiffs for a significant amount of
legal fees and had itself incurred signifi-
cant legal expenses. The court declined to
order injunctive relief because Laidlaw, af-
ter the lawsuit began, had achieved sub-
stantial compliance with the terms of its
permit.
FOE appealed as to the amount of the
District Court's civil penalty judgment, but
did not appeal the denial of declaratory or
injunctive relief. The Fourth Circuit va-
cated the District Court's order and re-
manded with instructions to dismiss the
action. Assuming, arguendo, that FOE
initially had standing, the appellate court
held that the case had become moot once
Laidlaw complied with the terms of its
permit and the plaintiffs failed to appeal
the denial of equitable relief. Citing Steel
Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d
210, the court reasoned that the only rem~
edy currently available to FOE, civil penal-
ties payable to the Government, would not
redress any injury FOE had suffered.
The court added that FOE's failure to
obtain relief on the merits precluded re-
covery of attorneys' fees or costs because
such an award is available only to a "pre-
vailing or substantially prevailing party"
under § 1365(d). According to Laidlaw,
the entire Roebuck facility has since been
permanently closed, dismantled, and put
up for sale, and all discharges from the
facility have permanently ceased.
Held: The Fourth Circuit erred in
concluding that a citizen suitor's claim for
civil penalties must be dismissed as moot
when the defendant, after commencement
of the litigation, has come into compliance
with its NPDES permit. pp.703-712.
(a) The Constitution's case-or-contro-
versy limitation on federal judicial authori-
ty, Art. III, ~ 2, underpins both standing
and mootness doctrine, but the two inqui-
ries differ in crucial respects. Because the
Fourth Circuit was persuaded that the
case had become moot, it simply assumed
that FOE had initial standing. See Arizo-
nans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 66-67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d
170. But because this Court concludes
that the Court of Appeals erred as to
mootness, this Court has an obligation to
assure itself that FOE had Article III
standing at the outset of the litigation.
Pp. 703-704.
(b) FOE had Article III standing to
bring this action. This Court has held
that to satisfy Article Ill's standing re-
quirements, a plaintiff must show "injury
in fact," causation, and redressability. Lu-
jan v. D.!l!!.nders169 of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d
351. An association has standing to bring
suit on behalf of its members when its
meII).bers would have standing to sue in
their own right, the interests at stake are
germane to the organization's purpose, and
neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires individual members'
participation in the lawsuit. Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434,
53 L.Ed.2d 383. The relevant showing for
Article III standing is not injury to the
environment but injury to the plaintiff. To
F - 35
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insist on the former rather than the latter
is to raise the standing hurdle higher than
the necessary showing for success on the
merits in a citizen's NPDES permit en-
forcement suit. Here, injury in fact was
adequately documented by the affidavits
and testimony of FOE members asserting
that Laidlaw's pollutant discharges, and
the affiants' reasonable concerns about the
effects of those discharges, directly affect-
ed those affiants' recreational, aesthetic,
and economic interests. See, e.g., Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735, 92 S.Ct.
1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636. These submissions
present dispositively more than the mere
"general averments" and "conclusory alle-
gations" found inadequate in Lujan v. N a-
tional Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871,
888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695, or
the "'some day' intentions" to visit endan-
gered species haH\vay around the world
held insufficient in Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S., at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130. pp. 704-
706.
(c) Laidlaw argues that FOE lacked
standing to seek civil penalties payable to
the Government, because such penalties
offer no redress to citizen plaintiffs. For a
plaintiff who is injured or threatened with
injury due to illegal conduct ongoing at the
time of suit, a sanction that effectively
abates that conduct and prevents its recur-
rence provides a form of redress. Civil
penalties can fit that description. Insofar
as they encourage defendants to discontin-
ue current violations and deter future
ones, they afford redress to citizen plain-
tiffs injured or threatened with injury as a
result of ongoing unlawful conduct. The
Court need not explore the outer limits of
the principle that civil penalties provide
sufficient deterrence to support redressa-
bility, because the civil penalties sought
here carried a deterrent effect that made
it likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the penalties would redress FOE's
injuries-as the District Court reasonably
found when it assessed a penalty of $405,-
800. Steel Co. is not to the contrary.
That case held that private plaintiffs may
not sue to assess penalties for wholly past
violations, 523 U.S., at 106--107, 118 S.Ct.
1003, but did not address standing to seek
penalties for violations ongoing at the time
of the complaint that could continue into
the future if undeterred, see id., at 108,
118 S.Ct. 1003. Pp.706--708.
(d) FOE's civil penalties claim did not
automatically become moot once the com-
pany came into substantial compliance
with its permit. A defendant's voluntary
cessation of a challenged practice ordinari-
ly doe~onot deprive a federal court of its
power to determine the legality of the
practice. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct.
1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152. If it did, courts
would be compelled to leave the defendant
free to return to its old ways. Thus, the
standard for determining whether a case
has been mooted by the defendant's volun-
tary conduct is stringent: A case might
become moot if subsequent events make it
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrong-
ful behavior could not reasonably be ex-
pected to recur. United States v. Concen-
trated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S.
199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344.
The heavy burden of persuading the court
that the challenged conduct cannot reason-
ably be expected to recur lies with the
party asserting mootness. Ibid. The
Court of Appeals incorrectly conflated this
Court's case law on initial standing, see,
e.g., Steel Co., with its case law on moot-
ness, see, e.g., City of Mesquite. Such
confusion is understandable, given this
Court's repeated description of mootness
as "the doctrine of standing set in a time
frame: The requisite personal interest
that must exist at the commencement of
the litigation (standing) must continue
throughout its existence (mootness)."
E.g., Arizonans, 520 U.S., at 68, n. 22, 117
S.Ct. 1055. Careful reflection, however,
reveals that this description of mootness is
not comprehensive. For example, a defen-
dant claiming that its voluntary compliance
moots a case bears a formidable burden.
By contrast, it is the plaintiffs burden, in a
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lawsuit brought to force compliance, to
establish standing by demonstrating that,
if unchecked by the litigation, the defen-
dant's allegedly wrongful behavior will
likely occur or continue and that the
threatened injury is certainly impending.
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158,
110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135. The
plain lesson is that there are circumstances
in which the prospect that a defendant will
engage in (or resume) harmful conduct
may be too speculative to support stand-
ing, but not too speculative to overcome
mootness. Further, if mootness were sim-
ply "standing set in a time frame," the
exception to mootness for acts that are
"capable of repetition, yet evading review"
could not exist. See, e.g., Olmstead v.
L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 594, n. 6, 119 S.Ct.
2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540. Standing admits of
no similar exception; if a plaintiff lacks
standing at the time the action commences,
the fact that the dispute is capable of
repetition yet evading review will not enti-
tle the complainant to a federal judicial
forum. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S., at
109, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Standing doctrine
ensures, among other things, that the re-
sources of the federal courts are devoted
to disputes in which the parties have a
concrete stake. Yet by the time mootness
is an issue, abandonment of the case may
prove more wasteful than frugal. Courts
have no license to retain jurisdiction over
cases in which one or both of the parties
plainly lacks a continuing interest, see, e.g.,
Arizonans, 520 U.S., at 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055,
but the foregoing examples highlight an
important diff~cel7l between the two
doctrines, see generally Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 329-332, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98
L.Ed.2d 686 (REHNQUIST, C. J., concur-
ring).
Laidlaw's argument that FOE doomed
its awn civil penalty claim to mootness by
failing to appeal the denial of injunctive
relief misconceives the statutory scheme.
Under § 1365(a), the district court has dis-
cretion to determine which form of relief is
best suited to abate current violations and
deter future ones. See Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313, 102
S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91. Denial of in-
junctive relief does not necessarily mean
that the district court has concluded there
is no prospect of future violations to deter.
Indeed, it meant no such thing in this case;
the District Court denied injunctive relief,
but expressly based its award of civil pen-
alties on the need for deterrence. A dis-
trict court properly may conclude that an
injunction would be too intrusive, because
it could entail continuing and burdensome
superintendence of the permit holder's ac-
tivities by a federal court. See City of
Mesquite, 455 U.S., at 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070.
Both Laidlaw's permit compliance and the
facility closure might moot this case, but
only if one or the other event made it
absolutely clear that violations could not
reasonably be expected to recur. Concen-
trated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S.,
at 203, 89 S.Ct. 361. These are disputed
factual matters that have not been aired in
the lower courts; they remain open for
consideration on remand. Pp.708-711.
(e) This Court does not resolve FOE's
argument that it is entitled to attorneys'
fees on the theory that a plaintiff can be a
"prevailing party" under § 1365(d) if it
was the "catalyst" that triggered a favor-
able outcome. Although the Circuits have
divided as to the continuing validity of the
catalyst theory following Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d
494, it would be premature for this Court
to address the question here. The District
Court stayed the time for a petition for
attorneys' fees until the time for appeal
had expired or until any appeal was re-
solved. Thus, when the Fourth Circuit
addressed the availability of counsel fees,
no order was before it either denying or
awarding fees. It is for the District Court,
not this Court, to address in the first
instance any request for reimbursement of
costs, including fees. Pp. 711-712.
149 F.3d 303, reversed and remanded.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.
J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR,
F - 37
700 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 528 U.S. 171
KENNEDY, SOUTER, and BREYER,
JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., post, p. 712,
and KENNEDY, J., post, p. 713, filed
concurring opinions. SCALIA, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J.,
joined, post, p. 713.
..lwBruce J. Terris, Washington, DC, for
petitioners.
Jeffrey P. Minear, Washington, DC, for
United States as amicus curiae, by special
leave of the Court.
Donald A. Cockrill, Greenville, SC, for
respondent.
For U.S. Supreme Court briefs, see:
1999 WL 311764 (Pet.Brief)
1999 WL 513835 (Resp.Brief)
1999 WL 623917 (Reply.Brief)
...h1sJustice GINSBURG delivered the
opinion of the Court.
This case presents an important ques-
tion concerning the operation of the citi-
zen-suit provisions of the Clean Water Act.
Congress authorized the federal district
courts to entertain Clean Water Act suits
initiated by "a person or persons having an
interest which is or may be adversely af-
fected." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), (g). To
impel future compliance with the Act, a
district court may prescribe injunctive re-
lief in such a suit; additionally or alterna-
tively, the court may impose civil penalties
payable to the United States Treasury.
§ 1365(a). In the Clean Water Act citizen
suit now before us, the District Court de-
termined that injunctive relief was inap-
propriate because the defendant, after the
institution of the litigation, achieved sub-
stantial compliance with the terms of its
discharge permit. 956 F.Supp. 588, 611
(D.S.C.1997). The court did, however, as-
sess a civil penalty of $405,800. Id., at
610. The "total deterrent effect" of the
penalty would be adequate to forestall fu-
ture violations, the court reasoned, taking
into account that the defendant ''will be
required to reimburse plaintiffs for a sig-
nificant amount of legal fees and has, it-
self, incurred significant legal expenses."
Id. , at 610-611.
The Court of Appeals vacated the Dis-
trict Court's order. 149 F.3d 303 (C.AA
1998). The case became moot, the appel-
late court declared, once the defendant
fully complied with the terms of its permit
and the plaintiff failed to appeal the denial
of equitable relief. "[Clivil penalties pay-
able to the government," the Court of Ap-
peals stated, ''would not redress any injury
Plaintiffs have suffered." Id. , at 307. Nor
were attorneys' fees in order, the Court of
Appeals noted, because absent relief on
the merits, plaintiffs could not qualify as
prevailing parties. Id., at 307, n. 5.
We reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court erred in
concluding that a citizen suitor's claim for
civil penalties must be dismissed as moot
when the..,W4defendant, albeit after com-
mencement of the litigation, has come into
compliance. In directing dismissal of the
suit on grounds of mootness, the Court of
Appeals incorrectly conflated our case law
on initial standing to bring suit, see, e.g.,
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140
L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), with our case law on
postcommencement mootness, see, e.g.,
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.,
455 U.S. 283, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d
152 (1982). A defendant's voluntary cessa-
tion of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinari-
ly does not suffice to moot a case. The
Court of Appeals also misperceived the
remedial potential of civil penalties. Such
penalties may serve, as an alternative to
an injunction, to deter future violations
and thereby redress the injuries that
prompted a citizen suitor to commence
litigation.
I
A
In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean
Water Act (Act), also known as the Feder-
al Water Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat.
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816, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
Section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342,
provides for the issuance, by the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) or by authorized States, of
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permits. NPDES per-
mits impose limitations on the discharge of
pollutants, and establish related monitor-
ing and reporting requirements, in order
to improve the cleanliness and safety of
the Nation's waters. Noncompliance with
a permit constitutes a violation of the Act.
§ 1342(h).
[1,2] Under § 505(a) of the Act, a suit
to enforce any limitation in an NPDES
permit may be brought by any "citizen,"
defmed as "a person or persons having an
interest which is or may be adversely af-
fected." 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), (g). Sixty
days before initiating a citizen suit, howev-
er, the would-be plaintiff must give notice
of the alleged violation to the EPA, the
State in which the alleged violation
~rred'175 and the alleged violator.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A). "[T]he purpose of notice
to the alleged violator is to give it an
opportunity to bring itself into complete
compliance with the Act and thus ... ren-
der unnecessary a citizen suit." Gwaltney
of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60, 108
S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). Accord-
ingly, we have held that citizens lack statu-
tory standing under § 505(a) to sue for
violations that have ceased by the time the
complaint is filed. Id., at 56-63, 108 S.Ct.
376. The Act also bars a citizen from
suing if the EPA or the State has already
commenced, and is "diligently prosecut-
ing," an enforcement action. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(B).
The Act authorizes district courts in citi-
zen-suit proceedings to enter injunctions
and to assess civil penalties, which are
payable to the United States Treasury.
§ 1365(a). In determining the amount of
any civil penalty, the district court must
take into account "the seriousness of the
violation or violations, the economic benefit
(if any) resulting from the violation, any
history of such violations, any good-faith
efforts to comply with the applicable re-
quirements, the economic impact of the
penalty on the violator, and such other
matters as justice may require." § 1319(d).
In addition, the court "may award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees) to any prevailing
or substantially prevailing party, whenever
the court determines such award is appro-
priate." § 1365(d).
B
In 1986, defendant-respondent Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
bought a hazardous waste incinerator facil-
ity in Roebuck, South Carolina, that in-
cluded a wastewater treatment plant.
(The company has since changed its name
to Safety-Kleen (Roebuck), Inc., but for
simplicity we will refer to it as "Laidlaw"
throughout.) Shortly after Laidlaw ac-
quired the facility, the South Carolina De-
partmeni..J.u6of Health and Environmental
Control (DHEC), acting under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(1), granted Laidlaw an NPDES
permit authorizing the company to dis-
charge treated water into the North Tyger
River. The permit, which became effec-
tive on January 1, 1987, placed limits on
Laidlaw's discharge of several pollutants
into the river, including-of particular rel-
evance to this case-mercury, an extreme-
ly toxic pollutant. The permit also regu-
lated the flow, temperature, toxicity, and
pH of the effluent from the facility, and
imposed monitoring and reporting obli-
gations.
Once it received its permit, Laidlaw be-
gan to discharge various pollutants into
the waterway; repeatedly, Laidlaw's dis-
charges exceeded the limits set by the
permit. In particular, despite experiment-
ing with several technological fixes, Laid-
law consistently failed to meet the permit's
stringent 1.3 ppb (parts per billion) daily
average limit on mercury discharges. The
District Court later found that Laidlaw
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had violated the mercury limits on 489
occasions between 1987 and 1995. 956
F .Supp., at 613-621.
On April 10, 1992, plaintiff-petitioners
Friends of the Earth (FOE) and Citizens
Local Environmental Action Network, Inc.
(CLEAN) (referred to collectively in this
opinion, together with later joined plain-
tiff-petitioner Sierra Club, as "FOE") took
the preliminary step necessary to the insti-
tution of litigation. They sent a letter to
Laidlaw notifying the company of their
intention to file a citizen suit against it
under § 505(a) of the Act after the expira-
tion of the requisite 6O-day notice period,
i.e., on or after June 10, 1992. Laidlaw's
lawyer then contacted DREC to ask
whether DREC would consider filing a
lawsuit against Laidlaw. The District
Court later found that Laidlaw's reason for
requesting that DHEC file a lawsuit
against it was to bar FOE's proposed citi-
zen suit through the operation of 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(B). 890 F.Supp. 470, 478
(D.S.C.1995). DREC agreed to file a law-
suit against Laidlaw; the company's
la~r177 then drafted the complaint for
DREC and paid the filing fee. On June 9,
1992, the last day before FOE's 60-day
notice period expired, DREC and Laidlaw
reached a settlement requiring Laidlaw to
pay $100,000 in civil penalties and to make
" 'every effort' " to comply with its permit
obligations. Id., at 479-481.
On June 12, 1992, FOE filed this citizen
suit against Laidlaw under § 505(a) of the
Act, alleging noncompliance with the
NPDES permit and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief and an award of civil
penalties. Laidlaw moved for summary
judgment on the ground that FOE had
failed to present evidence demonstrating
injury in fact, and therefore lacked Article
III standing to bring the lawsuit. Record,
1. The District Court noted that "Laidlaw
drafted the state-court complaint and settle-
ment agreement, filed the lawsuit against it-
self, and paid the filing fee." 890 F.Supp., at
489. Further, "the settlement agreement be-
tween DHEC and Laidlaw was entered into
with unusual haste, without giving the Plain-
Doc. No. 43. In opposition to this motion,
FOE submitted affidavits and deposition
testimony from members of the plaintiff
organizations. Record, Doc. No. 71 (Exhs.
41-51). The record before the District
Court also included affidavits from the or-
ganizations' members submitted by FOE
in support of an earlier motion for prelimi-
nary injunctive relief. Record, Doc. No.
21 (Exhs. 5-10). After examining this evi-
dence, the District Court denied Laidlaw's
summary judgment motion, finding-albeit
"by the very slimmest of margins"-that
FOE had standing to bring the suit. App.
in No. 97-1246(C.A.4), pp. 207-208 (Tr. of
Rearing 39-40 (June 30, 1993)).
Laidlaw also moved to dismiss the action
on the ground that the citizen suit was
barred under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(I)(B) by
DREC's prior action against the company.
The United States, appearing as amicus
curiae, joined FOE in opposing the mo-
tion. Mter an extensive analysis of the
Laidlaw-DREC settlement and the cir-
cumstances under which it was reached,
the District Court held that DHEC's ac-
tion against Laidlaw had not been "dili-
gently prosecuted"; consequently, the
court allowed FOE's citizen suit to
p~ed'178 890 F.Supp., at 499.1 The rec-
ord indicates that after FOE initiated the
suit, but before the District Court ren-
dered judgment, Laidlaw violated the mer-
cury discharge limitation in its permit 13
times. 956 F .Supp., at 621. The District
Court also found that Laidlaw had commit-
ted 13 monitoring and 10 reporting viola-
tions during this period. Id., at 601. The
last recorded mercury discharge violation
occurred in January 1995, long after the
complaint was filed but about two years
before judgment was rendered. Id., at
621.
tiffs the opportunity to intervene." Ibid. The
court found "most persuasive" the fact that
"in imposing the civil penalty of $100,000
against Laidlaw, DHEC failed to recover, or
even to calculate, the economic benefit that
Laidlaw received by not complying with its
permit." Id., at 491.
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On January 22, 1997, the District Court
issued its judgment. 956 F.Supp. 588
(D.S.C.). It found that Laidlaw had
gained a total economic benefit of
$1,092,581 as a result of its extended peri-
od of noncompliance with the mercury dis-
charge limit in its permit. Id., at 603.
The court concluded, however, that a civil
penalty of $405,800 was adequate in light
of the guiding factors listed in 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d). 956 F.Supp., at 610. In partic-
ular, the District Court stated that the
lesser penalty was appropriate taking into
account the judgment's "total deterrent ef-
fect." In reaching this determination, the
court "considered that Laidlaw will be re-
quired to reimburse plaintiffs for a signifi-
cant amount of legal fees." Id., at 610-
611. The court declined to grant FOE's
request for injunctive relief, stating that
an injunction was inappropriate because
"Laidlaw has been in substantial compli-
ance with all parameters in its NPDES
permit since at least August 1992." Id., at
611.
...1wFOE appealed the District Court's
civil penalty judgment, arguing that the
penalty was inadequate, but did not appeal
the denial of declaratory or injunctive re-
lief. Laidlaw cross-appealed, arguing,
among other things, that FOE lacked
standing to bring the suit and that
DREC's action qualified as a diligent pros-
ecution precluding FOE's litigation. The
United States continued to participate as
amicus curiae in support of FOE.
On July 16, 1998, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit issued its judgment.
149 F.3d 303. The Court of Appeals as-
sumed without deciding that FOE initially
had standing to bring the action, id., at
306, n. 3, but went on to hold that the case
had become moot. The appellate court
stated, first, that the elements of Article
III standing-injury, causation, and re-
dressability-must persist at every stage
of review, or else the action becomes moot.
Id., at 306. Citing our decision in Steel
Co., the Court of Appeals reasoned that
the case had become moot because "the
only remedy currently available to
[FOE]-civil penalties payable to the gov-
ernment-would not redress any injury
[FOE has] suffered." 149 F.3d, at 306-
307. The court therefore vacated the Dis-
trict Court's order and remanded with in-
structions to dismiss the action. In a foot-
note, the Court of Appeals added that
FOE's "failure to obtain relief on the mer-
its of [its] claims precludes any recovery of
attorneys' fees or other litigation costs be-
cause such an award is available only to a
'prevailing or substantially prevailing par-
ty.''' Id., at 307, n. 5 (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(d)).
According to Laidlaw, after the Court of
Appeals issued its decision but before this
Court granted certiorari, the entire incin-
erator facility in Roebuck was permanently
closed, dismantled, and put up for sale,
and all discharges from the facility perma-
nently ceased. Respondent's Suggestion
of Mootness 3.
We granted certiorari, 525 U.S. 1176,
119 S.Ct. 1111, 143 L.Ed.2d 107 (1999), to
resolve the inconsistency between the
Fourth Circuit's decision in this~case
and the decisions of several other Courts
of Appeals, which have held that a defen-
dant's compliance with its permit after the
commencement of litigation does not moot
claims for civil penalties under the Act.
See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116
F.3d 814, 820 (C.A.7), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139 L.Ed.2d 379
(1997); Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Texaco Rfg. and Mktg., Inc., 2
F.3d 493, 503-504 (C.A.3 1993); Atlantic
States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Pan
American Tanning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017,
1020-1021 (C.A.2 1993); Atlantic States
Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1135-1136 (C.A.11
1990).
II
A
The Constitution's case-or-controversy
limitation on federal judicial authority, Art.
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III, § 2, underpins both our standing and
our mootness jurisprudence, but the two
inquiries differ in respects critical to the
proper resolution of this case, so we ad-
dress them separately. Because the Court
of Appeals was persuaded that the case
had become moot and so held, it simply
assumed without deciding that FOE had
initial standing. See Arizonans for Offi-
cial English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66-
67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997)
(court may assume without deciding that
standing exists in order to analyze moot-
ness). But because we hold that the Court
of Appeals erred in declaring the case
moot, we have an obligation to assure our-
selves that FOE had Article III standing
at the outset of the litigation. We there-
fore address the question of standing be-
fore turning to mootness.
[3, 4] In Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130,
119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), we held that, to
satisfy Article Ill's standing requirements,
a plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an
"injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant; and~1(3) it is
likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. An association has
standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members when its members would other-
wise have standing to sue in their own
right, the interests at stake are germane
to the organization's purpose, and neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit. Hunt v. Wash-
ington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53
L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).
[5] Laidlaw contends first that FOE
lacked standing from the outset even to
seek injunctive relief, because the plaintiff
organizations failed to show that any of
their members had sustained or faced the
threat of any "injury in fact" from Laid-
law's activities. In support of this conten-
tion Laidlaw points to the District Court's
finding, made in the course of setting the
penalty amount, that there had been "no
demonstrated proof of harm to the envi-
ronment" from Laidlaw's mercury dis-
charge violations. 956 F .Supp., at 602;
see also ibid. ("[T]he NPDES permit vio-
lations at issue in this citizen suit did not
result in any health risk or environmental
harm.").
The relevant showing for purposes of
Article III standing, however, is not injury
to the environment but injury to the plain-
tiff. To insist upon the former rather than
the latter as part of the standing inquiry
(as the dissent in essence does, post, at
713-714) is to raise the standing hurdle
higher than the necessary showing for suc-
cess on the merits in an action alleging
noncompliance with an NPDES permit.
Focusing properly on injury to the plain-
tiff, the District Court found that FOE had
demonstrated sufficient injury to establish
standing. App. in No. 97-1246(CA4), at
207-208 (Tr. of Hearing 39-40). For ex-
ample, FOE member Kenneth Lee Curtis
averred in affidavits that he lived a half-
mile from Laidlaw's facility; that he occa-
sionally drove over the North Tyger River,
and that it looked and smelled polluted;
and that he would like to fish, camp, swim,
and picnic in and ne~the river between
3 and 15 miles downstream from the facili-
ty, as he did when he was a teenager, but
would not do so because he was concerned
that the water was polluted by Laidlaw's
discharges. Record, Doc. No. 71 (Exhs.
41, 42). Curtis reaffirmed these state-
ments in extensive deposition testimony.
For example, he testified that he would
like to fish in the river at a specific spot he
used as a boy, but that he would not do so
now because of his concerns about Laid-
law's discharges. Ibid. (Exh. 43, at 52-53;
Exh. 44, at 33).
Other members presented evidence to
similar effect. CLEAN member Angela
Patterson attested that she lived two miles
from the facility; that before Laidlaw op-
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erated the facility, she picnicked, walked,
birdwatched, and waded in and along the
North Tyger River because of the natural
beauty of the area; that she no longer
engaged in these activities in or near the
river because she was concerned about
harmful effects from discharged pollu-
tants; and that she and her husband
would like to purchase a home near the
river but did not intend to do so, in part
because of Laidlaw's discharges. Record,
Doc. No. 21 (Exh. 10). CLEAN member
Judy Pruitt averred that she lived one-
quarter mile from Laidlaw's facility and
would like to fish, hike, and picnic along
the North Tyger River, but has refrained
from those activities because of the dis-
charges. Ibid. (Exh. 7). FOE member
Linda Moore attested that she lived 20
miles from Roebuck, and would use the
North Tyger River south of Roebuck and
the land surrounding it for recreational
purposes were she not concerned that the
water contained harmful pollutants. Rec-
ord, Doc. No. 71 (Exhs. 45, 46). In her
deposition, Moore testified at length that
she would hike, picnic, camp, swim, boat,
and drive near or in the river were it not
for her concerns about illegal discharges.
Ibid. (Exh. 48, at 29, 36-37, 62--63, 72).
CLEAN member Gail Lee attested that
her home, which is near Laidlaw's facility,
had a lower value than similar homes lo-
cated farther from the facility, and that
she believed the pollutant discharges ac-
counted~for some of the discrepancy.
Record, Doc. No. 21 (Exh. 9). Sierra Club
member Norman Sharp averred that he
had canoed approximately 40 miles down-
stream of the Laidlaw facility and would
like to canoe in the North Tyger River
closer to Laidlaw's discharge point, but did
not do so because he was concerned that
the water contained harmful pollutants.
Ibid. (Exh. 8).
[6] These sworn statements, as the
District Court determined, adequately doc-
umented injury in fact. We have held that
environmental plaintiffs adequately allege
injury in fact when they aver that they use
the affected area and are persons "for
whom the aesthetic and recreational values
of the area will be lessened" by the chal-
lenged activity. Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 735, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31
L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). See also Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S., at 562-563, 112 S.Ct.
2130 ("Of course, the desire to use or
observe an animal species, even for purely
esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cogniza-
ble interest for purposes of standing.").
Our decision in Lujan v. National Wild-
life Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct.
3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990), is not to the
contrary. In that case an environmental
organization assailed the Bureau of Land
Management's "land withdrawal review
program," a program covering millions of
acres, alleging that the program illegally
opened up public lands to mining activities.
The defendants moved for summary judg-
ment, challenging the plaintiff organiza-
tion's standing to initiate the action under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702. We held that the plaintiff
could not survive the summary judgment
motion merely by offering "averments
which state only that one of [the organiza-
tion's] members uses unspecified portions
of an immense tract of territory, on some
portions of which mining activity has oc-
curred or probably will occur by virtue of
the governmental action." 497 U.S., at
889, 110 S.Ct. 3177.
In contrast, the affidavits and testimony
presented by FOE in this case assert that
Laidlaw's discharges, and the affiant mem-
bers' reasonable concerns about the effects
of~those discharges, directly affected
those affiants' recreational, aesthetic, and
economic interests. These submissions
present dispositively more than the mere
"general averments" and "conclusory alle-
gations" found inadequate in National
Wildlife Federation. Id., at 888, 110 S.Ct.
3177. Nor can the affiants' conditional
statements-that they would use the near-
by North Tyger River for recreation if
Laidlaw were not discharging pollutants
into it-be equated with the speculative
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" 'some day' intentions" to visit endan-
gered species halfway around the world
that we held insufficient to show injury in
fact in Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S., at
564,112 S.Ct. 2130.
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103
S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), relied
on by the dissent, pos~ at 714, does not
weigh against standing in this case. In
Lyons, we held that a plaintiff lacked
standing to seek an injunction against the
enforcement of a police chokehold policy
because he could not credibly allege that
he faced a realistic threat from the policy.
461 U.S., at 107, n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1660. In
the footnote from Lyons cited by the dis-
sent, we noted that "[t]he reasonableness
of Lyons' fear is dependent upon the likeli-
hood of a recurrence of the allegedly un-
lawful conduct," and that his "subjective
apprehensions" that such a recurrence
would even take place were not enough to
support standing. Id., at 108, n. 8, 103
S.Ct. 1660. Here, in contrast, it is undis-
puted that Laidlaw's unlawful conduct--
discharging pollutants in excess of permit
limits-was occurring at the time the com-
plaint was filed. Under Lyons, then, the
only "subjective" issue here is "[t]he rea-
sonableness of [the] fear" that led the affi-
ants to respond to that concededly ongoing
conduct by refraining from use of the
North Tyger River and surrounding areas.
Unlike the dissent, pos~ at 714, we see
nothing "improbable" about the proposi-
tion that a company's continuous and per-
vasive illegal discharges of pollutants into
a river would cause nearby residents to
curtail their recreational use of that water-
way and would subject them to other eco-
nomic and aesthetic harms. The proposi-
tion is ~elYl85 reasonable, the District
Court found it was true in this case, and
that is enough for injury in fact.
[7] Laidlaw argues next that even if
FOE had standing to seek injunctive relief,
it lacked standing to seek civil penalties.
Here the asserted defect is not injury but
redressability. Civil penalties offer no re-
dress to private plaintiffs, Laidlaw argues,
because they are paid to the Government,
and therefore a citizen plaintiff can never
have standing to seek them.
[8] Laidlaw is right to insist that a
plaintiff must demonstrate standing sepa-
rately for each form of relief sought. See,
e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S., at 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660
(notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff had
standing to pursue damages, he lacked
standing to pursue injunctive relief); see
also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, n. 6,
116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996)
("[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross.").
But it is wrong to maintain that citizen
plaintiffs facing ongoing violations never
have standing to seek civil penalties.
We have recognized on numerous occa-
sions that "all civil penalties have some
deterrent effect." Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93, 102, 118 S.Ct. 488,139
L.Ed.2d 450 (1997); see also, e.g., Depart-
ment ofRevenue ofMont. v. Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. 767, 778, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128
L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). More specifically,
Congress has found that civil penalties in
Clean Water Act cases do more than pro-
mote immediate compliance by limiting the
defendant's economic incentive to delay its
attainment of permit limits; they also de-
ter future violations. This congressional
determination warrants judicial attention
and respect. "The legislative history of
the Act reveals that Congress wanted the
district court to consider the need for ret-
ribution and deterrence, in addition to res-
titution, when it imposed civil penalties.
. .. [The district court may] seek to deter
future violations by basing the penalty on
its economic impact." Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 422-423, 107 S.Ct.
1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987).
It can scarcely be doubted that, for a
plaintiff who is injured or faces the threat
of future injury due to illegal conduct on-
going at the time of suit, a sanction that
effectivellliaabates that conduct and pre-
vents its recurrence provides a form of
redress. Civil penalties can fit that de-
scription. To the extent that they encour-
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age defendants to discontinue current vio-
lations and deter them from committing
future ones, they afford redress to citizen
plaintiffs who are injured or threatened
with injury as a consequence of ongoing
unlawful conduct.
The dissent argues that it is the avail-
ability rather than the imposition of civil
penalties that deters any particular pollu-
ter from continuing to pollute. Pos~ at
718-719. This argument misses the mark
in two ways. First, it overlooks the inter-
dependence of the availability and the im-
position; a threat has no deterrent value
unless it is credible that it will be carried
out. Second, it is reasonable for Congress
to conclude that an actual award of civil
penalties does in fact bring with it a signif-
icant quantum of deterrence over and
above what is achieved by the mere pros-
pect of such penalties. A would-be pollu-
ter mayor may not be dissuaded by the
existence of a remedy on the books, but a
defendant once hit in its pocketbook will
surely think twice before polluting again.2
We recognize that there may be a point
at which the deterrent effect of a claim for
civil penalties becomes so insubstantial or
so remote that it cannot support citizen
standing. The fact that this vanishing
point is not easy to ascertain does not
detract from the deterrent power of such
penalties in the ordinary case. Justice
Frankfurter's observations for ...L6rthe
Court, made in a different context nearly
60 years ago, hold true here as well:
"How to effectuate policy-the adap-
tation of means to legitimately sought
ends-is one of the most intractable of
legislative problems. Whether pro-
2. The dissent suggests that there was little
deterrent work for civil penalties to do in this
case because the lawsuit brought against
Laidlaw by DHEC had already pushed the
level of deterrence to "near the top of the
graph." Post, at 718. This suggestion ig-
nores the District Court's specific finding that
the penalty agreed to by Laidlaw and DHEC
was far too low to remove Laidlaw's econom-
ic benefit from noncompliance, and thus was
inadequate to deter future violations. 890
scribed conduct is to be deterred by qui
tam action or triple damages or injunc-
tion, or by criminal prosecution, or
merely by defense to actions in contract,
or by some, or all, of these remedies in
combination, is a matter within the legis-
lature's range of choice. Judgment on
the deterrent effect of the various weap-
ons in the armory of the law can lay
little claim to scientific basis." Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148,60 S.Ct. 879, 84
L.Ed. 1124 (1940).3
In this case we need not explore the outer
limits of the principle that civil penalties
provide sufficient deterrence to support
redressability. Here, the civil penalties
sought by FOE carried with them a deter-
rent effect that made it likely, as opposed
to merely speculative, that the penalties
would redress FOE's injuries by abating
current violations and preventing future
ones-as the District Court reasonably
found when it assessed a penalty of $405,-
800. 956 F.Supp., at 610-611.
Laidlaw contends that the reasoning of
our decision in Steel Co. directs the conclu-
sion that citizen plaintiffs have no standing
to seek civil penalties under the Act. We
disagree. Steel Co. established that citizen
suitors lack standing to seek civil penalties
for violations that have abated by the time
of suit. 523 U.S., at 106-107, 118 S.Ct.
1003. We specifically noted in that case
that there was no allegation in the com-
plaint of any continuing or imminent viola-
tion, and that no basis for such an allega-
tion appeared to exist. I d., at 108, 118
S.Ct. 1003; see also Gwaltney, 484 U.S., at
59, 108 S.Ct. 376 ("the harm sought to be
addressed bllisthe citizen suit lies in the
F.Supp. 470, 491-494, 497-498 (D.S.C.1995).
And it begins to look especially farfetched
when one recalls that Laidlaw itself prompted
the DHEC lawsuit, paid the filing fee, and
drafted the complaint. See supra, at 702, n.
1.
3. In Tigner the Court rejected an equal protec-
tion challenge to a statutory provision ex-
empting agricultural producers from the
reach of the Texas antitrust laws.
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present or the future, not in the past"). In
short, Steel Co. held that private plaintiffs,
unlike the Federal Government, may not
sue to assess penalties for wholly past
violations, but our decision in that case did
not reach the issue of standing to seek
penalties for violations that are ongoing at
the time of the complaint and that could
continue into the future if undeterred.4
~B
Satisfied that FOE had standing under
Article III to bring this action, we turn to
the question of mootness.
[9-11] The only conceivable basis for a
finding of mootness in this case is Laid-
law's voluntary conduct-either its
achievement by August 1992 of substantial
compliance with its NPDES permit or its
more recent shutdown of the Roebuck fa-
cility. It is well settled that "a defendant's
voluntary cessation of a challenged prac-
tice does not deprive a federal court of its
power to determine the legality of the
practice." City of Mesquite, 455 U.S., at
289, 102 S.Ct. 1070. "[I]f it did, the courts
would be compelled to leave '[t]he defen-
4. In insisting that the redressability require-
ment is not met, the dissent relies heavily on
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 93
S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). That reli-
ance is sorely misplaced. In Linda R. S., the
mother of an out-of-wedlock child filed suit to
force a district attorney to bring a criminal
prosecution against the absentee father for
failure to pay child support. Id., at 616, 93
S.Ct. 1146. In finding that the mother lacked
standing to seek this extraordinary remedy,
the Court drew attention to "the special status
of criminal prosecutions in our system," id.,
at 619,93 S.Ct. 1146, and carefully limited its
holding to the "unique context of a challenge
to [the nonenforcement of] a criminal stat-
ute," id., at 617, 93 S.Ct. 1146. Furthermore,
as to redressabiIity, the relief sought in Linda
R. S.-a prosecution which, if successful,
would automatically land the delinquent fa-
ther in jail for a fixed term, id., at 618, 93
S.Ct. 1146, with predictably negative effects
on his earning power-would scarcely reme-
dy the plaintiff's lack of child support pay-
ments. In this regard, the Court contrasted
"the civil contempt model whereby the defen-
dant 'keeps the keys to the jail in his own
dant ... free to return to his old ways.' "
Id., at 289, n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 1070 (citing
United States v. W:T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303
(1953)). In accordance with this principle,
the standard we have announced for deter-
mining whether a case has been mooted by
the defendant's voluntary conduct is strin-
gent: "A case might become moot if subse-
quent events made it absolutely clear that
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur." United
States v. Concentrated PJwsphate Export
Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21
L.Ed.2d 344 (1968). The "heavy burden of
persua[ding]" the court that the challenged
conduct cannot reasonably be expected to
start up again lies with the party asserting
mootness. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals justified its moot-
ness disposition by reference to Steel Co.,
which held that citizen plaintiffs lack
standing to seek civil penalties for wholly
past violations. In relying on Steel Co.,
the Court of Appeals confused mootness
with standing. The confusion is under-
standable, given this Court's repeated
statements that the doctrine of mootness
pocket' and may be released whenever he
complies with his legal obligations." Ibid.
The dissent's contention, post, at 716, that
"precisely the same situation exists here" as
in Linda R. S. is, to say the least, extravagant.
Putting aside its mistaken reliance on Linda
R. S., the dissent's broader charge that citizen
suits for civil penalties under the Act carry
"grave implications for democratic gover-
nance," post, at 715, seems to us overdrawn.
Certainly the Federal Executive Branch does
not share the dissent's view that such suits
dissipate its authority to enforce the law. In
fact, the Department of Justice has endorsed
this citizen suit from the outset, submitting
amicus briefs in support of FOE in the Dis-
trict Court, the Court of Appeals, and this
Court. See supra, at 702, 703. As we have
already noted, supra, at 701, the Federal Gov-
ernment retains the power to foreclose a citi-
zen suit by undertaking its own action. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). And if the Executive
Branch opposes a particular citizen suit, the
statute allows the Administrator of the EPA to
"intervene as a matter of right" and bring the
Government's views to the attention of the
court. § 1365(c)(2).
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can be described as "the doctrine of stand-
ing set in a time frame: The requisite
personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation (standing)
must continue throughout its existence
(mootness)." Arizonans for Official En-
glish, 520 U.S., at 68, n. 22, 117 S.Ct. 1055
(quoting United States Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct.
1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), in turn
~quotingMonaghan, Constitutional Adju-
dication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J.
1363, 1384 (1973» (internal quotation
marks omitted).
[12, 13] Careful reflection on the long-
recognized exceptions to mootness, howev-
er, reveals that the description of moot-
ness as "standing set in a time frame" is
not comprehensive. As just noted, a de-
fendant claiming that its voluntary compli-
ance moots a case bears the formidable
burden of showing that it is absolutely
clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could
not reasonably be expected to recur. Con-
centrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393
U.S., at 203, 89 S.Ct. 361. By contrast, in
a lawsuit brought to force compliance, it is
the plaintiffs burden to establish standing
by demonstrating that, if unchecked by the
litigation, the defendant's allegedly wrong-
ful behavior will likely occur or continue,
and that the ''threatened injury [is] cer-
tainly impending." Whitmore v. Arkan-
sas, 495 U.S. 149, 158, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109
L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, in
Lyons, as already noted, we held that a
plaintiff lacked initial standing to seek an
injunction against the enforcement of a
police chokehold policy because he could
not credibly allege that he faced a realistic
threat arising from the policy. 461 U.S.,
at 105-110, 103 S.Ct. 1660. Elsewhere in
the opinion, however, we noted that a city-
wide moratorium on police chokeholds-an
action that surely diminished the already
slim likelihood that any particular individu-
al would be choked by police-would not
have mooted an otherwise valid claim for
injunctive relief, because the moratorium
by its terms was not permanent. Id., at
101, 103 S.Ct. 1660. The plain lesson of
these cases is that there are circumstances
in which the prospect that a defendant will
engage in (or resume) harmful conduct
may be too speculative to support stand-
ing, but not too speculative to overcome
mootness.
[14, 15] Furthermore, if mootness were
simply "standing set in a time frame," the
exception to mootness that arises when the
defendant's allegedly unlawful activity is
"capable of repetition, yet evading review,"
could not exist. When, for ex~e'191 a
mentally disabled patient fIles a lawsuit
challenging her confinement in a segregat-
ed institution, her postcomplaint transfer
to a community-based program will not
moot the action, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S.
581, 594, n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d
540 (1999), despite the fact that she would
have lacked initial standing had she filed
the complaint after the transfer. Standing
admits of no similar exception; if a plain-
tiff lacks standing at the time the action
commences, the fact that the dispute is
capable of repetition yet evading review
will not entitle the complainant to a federal
judicial forum. See Steel Co., 523 U.S., at
109, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (" 'the mootness excep-
tion for disputes capable of repetition yet
evading review ... will not revive a dis-
pute which became moot before the action
commenced''') (quoting Renne v. Geary,
501 U.S. 312, 320, 111 S.Ct. 2331, 115
L.Ed.2d 288 (1991».
We acknowledged the distinction be-
tween mootness and standing most recent-
ly in Steel Co.:
"The United States ... argues that
the injunctive relief does constitute
remediation because 'there is a pre-
sumption of [future] injury when the
defendant has voluntarily ceased its ille-
gal activity in response to litigation,'
even if that occurs before a complaint is
fIled. . .. This makes a sword out of a
shield. The 'presumption' the Govern-
ment refers to has been applied to re-
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fute the assertion of mootness by a de-
fendant who, when sued in a complaint
that alleges present or threatened inju-
ry, ceases the complained-of activity ....
It is an immense and unacceptable
stretch to call the presumption into ser-
vice as a substitute for the allegation of
present or threatened injury upon which
initial standing must be based." 523
U.S., at 109, 118 S.Ct. 1003.
[16] Standing doctrine functions to en-
sure, among other things, that the scarce
resources of the federal courts are devoted
to those disputes in which the parties have
a concrete stake. In contrast, by the time
mootness is an issue, the case has been
brought and litigated, often (as here) for
years. T~abandon the case at an ad-
vanced stage may prove more wasteful
than frugal. This argument from sunk
costs 5 does not license courts to retain
jurisdiction over cases in which one or
both of the parties plainly lack a continu-
ing interest, as when the parties have set-
tled or a plaintiff pursuing a nonsurviving
claim has died. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Ode-
gaard, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40
L.Ed.2d 164 (1974) (per curiam) (non-
class-action challenge to constitutionality
of law school admissions process mooted
when plaintiff, admitted pursuant to pre-
liminary injunction, neared graduation and
defendant law school conceded that, as a
matter of ordinary school policy, plaintiff
would be allowed to finish. his final term);
Arizonans, 520 U.S., at 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055
(non-class-action challenge to state consti-
tutional amendment declaring English the
official language of the State became moot
when plaintiff, a state employee who
sought to use her bilingual skills, left state
employment). But the argument surely
highlights an important difference between
the two doctrines. See generally Honig v.
Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 329--332, 108 S.Ct. 592,
S. Of course we mean sunk costs to the judicial
system, not to the litigants. Lewis v. Conti-
nental Bank Corp.• 494 U.S. 472. 110 S.Ct.
1249. 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) (cited by the
dissent, post. at 721), dealt with the latter.
98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) (REHNQUIST, C.
J., concurring).
[17-21] In its brief, Laidlaw appears to
argue that, regardless of the effect of
Laidlaw's compliance, FOE doomed its
own civil penalty claim to mootness by
failing to appeal the District Court's denial
of injunctive relief. Brief for Respondent
14-17. This argument misconceives the
statutory scheme. Under § 1365(a), the
district court has discretion to determine
which form of relief is best suited, in the
particular case, to abate current violations
and deter future ones. "[A] federal judge
sitting as chancellor is not mechanically
obligated to grant an injunction for every
violation of law."..wsWeinberger v. Rome-
ro-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313, 102 S.Ct.
1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). Denial of
injunctive relief does not necessarily mean
that the district court has concluded there
is no prospect of future violations for civil
penalties to deter. Indeed, it meant no
such thing in this case. The District Court
denied injunctive relief, but expressly
based its award of civil penalties on the
need for deterrence. See 956 F.Supp., at
610-611. As the dissent notes, pos~ at
717, federal courts should aim to ensure
"'the framing of relief no broader than
required by the precise facts.''' Schlesin-
ger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 222, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41
L.Ed.2d 706 (1974). In accordance with
this aim, a district court in a Clean Water
Act citizen suit properly may conclude that
an injunction would be an excessively in-
trusive remedy, because it could entail con-
tinuing superintendence of the permit
holder's activities by a federal court-a
process burdensome to court and permit
holder alike. See City of Mesquite, 455
U.S., at 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070 (although the
defendant's voluntary cessation of the chal-
lenged practice does not moot the case,
noting that courts should use caution to avoid
carrying forward a moot case solely to vindi-
cate a plaintiff's interest in recovering attor-
neys' fees.
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"[sluch abandonment is an important fac-
tor bearing on the question whether a
court should exercise its power to enjoin
the defendant from renewing the prac-
tice").
Laidlaw also asserts, in a supplemental
suggestion of mootness, that the closure of
its Roebuck facility, which took place after
the Court of Appeals issued its decision,
mooted the case. The facility closure, like
Laidlaw's earlier achievement of substan-
tial compliance with its permit require-
ments, might moot the case, but-we once
more reiterate-only if one or the other of
these events made it absolutely clear that
Laidlaw's permit violations could not rea-
sonably be expected to recur. Concentrat-
ed Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S., at
203, 89 S.Ct. 361. The effect of both Laid-
law's compliance and the facility closure on
the prospect of future violations is a dis-
puted factual matter. FOE points out, for
example-and Laidlaw does not appear to
contest-that Laidlaw retains its
~NPDES permit. These issues have not
been aired in the lower courts; they re-
main open for consideration on remand.6
C
[22l FOE argues that it is entitled to
attorneys' fees on the theory that a plain-
tiff can be a "prevailing party" for pur-
poses of 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) if it was the
"catalyst" that triggered a favorable out-
come. In the decision under review, the
Court of Appeals noted that its Circuit
precedent construed our decision in Far-
rar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566,
121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), to require rejec-
tion of that theory. 149 F.3d, at 307, n. 5
(citing S-l & S-2 v. State Bd. ofEd. of N.
C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (C.AA 1994) (en bane)).
Cf. Foreman v. Dallas County, 193 F.3d
314, 320 (C.A.5 1999) (stating, in dicta, that
6. We note that it is far from clear that vacatur
of the District Court's judgment would be the
appropriate response to a finding of mootness
on appeal brought about by the voluntary
conduct of the party that lost in the District
Court. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v.
Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 115
"[alfter Farrar ... the continuing validity
of the catalyst theory is in serious doubt").
Farrar acknowledged that a civil rights
plaintiff awarded nominal damages may be
a "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. 506 U.S., at 112, 113 S.Ct. 566.
The case involved no catalytic effect.
Recognizing that the issue was not pre-
sented for this Court's decision in Farrar,
several Courts of Appeals have expressly
concluded that Farrar did not repudiate
the catalyst theory. See Marbley v. Bane,
57 F.3d 224, 234 (C.A.2 1995); Baumgart-
ner v. Harrisburg Housing Authority, 21
F.3d 541, 546-550 (C.A.3 1994); Zinn v.
Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276 (C.A.7 1994);
Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County
Special Sch. Dist., # 1, 17 F.3d 260, 263, n.
2 (C.A.8 1994); Kilgour v. Pasadena, 53
F.3d 1007, 1010 (C.A.9 1995);,..WsBeard v.
Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-952 (C.A.lO 1994);
Morris v. West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d
1203, 1207 (C.A.11 1999). Other Courts of
Appeals have likewise continued to apply
the catalyst theory notwithstanding Far-
rar. Paris v. United States Dept. of
Housing and Urban Development, 988
F.2d 236, 238 (C.A.1 1993); Citizens
Against Tax Waste v. Westerville City
Schoo~ 985 F.2d 255, 257 (C.A.6 1993).
It would be premature, however, for us
to address the continuing validity of the
catalyst theory in the context of this case.
The District Court, in an order separate
from the one in which it imposed civil
penalties against Laidlaw, stayed the time
for a petition for attorneys' fees until the
time for appeal had expired or, if either
party appealed, until the appeal was re-
solved. See 149 F.3d, at 305 (describing
order staying time for attorneys' fees peti-
tion). In the opinion accompanying its
order on penalties, the District Court stat-
S.Ct. 386, 130 L.Ed.2d 233 (1994) (mootness
attributable to a voluntary act of a nonprevail-
ing party ordinarily does not justify vacatur of
a judgment under review); see also Walling v.
James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 64 S.Ct.
826,88 L.Ed. 1001 (1944).
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ed only that "this court has considered
that Laidlaw will be required to reimburse
plaintiffs for a significant amount of legal
fees," and referred to "potential fee
awards." 956 F.Supp., at 610-611. Thus,
when the Court of Appeals addressed the
availability of counsel fees in this case, no
order was before it either denying or
awarding fees. It is for the District Court,
not this Court, to address in the first
instance any request for reimbursement of
costs, including fees.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice STEVENS, concurring.
Although the Court has identified a suf-
ficient reason for rejecting the Court of
Appeals' mootness determination, it is im-
portant also to note that the case would
not be moo~even if it were absolutely
clear that respondent had gone out of busi-
ness and posed no threat of future permit
violations. The District Court entered a
valid judgment requiring respondent to
pay a civil penalty of $405,800 to the Unit-
ed States. No postjudgment conduct of
respondent could retroactively invalidate
that judgment. A record of voluntary
postjudgment compliance that would justi-
fy a decision that injunctive relief is unnec-
essary, or even a decision that any claim
for injunctive relief is now moot, would not
warrant vacation of the valid money judg-
ment.
* Comfort Lake Assn. v. Dresel Contracting, Inc.,
138 F.3d 351, 356 (C.A.8 1998); Atlantic
States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Stroh Die
Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 820(C.A.7), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 981, 118 S.Ct. 442, 139
L.Ed.2d 379 (1997); Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Texaco Refining & Mktg., Inc.,
2 F.3d 493, 502-503 (C.A.3 1993); Atlantic
States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Pan Am. Tan-
ning Corp., 993 F.2d 1017, 1020-1021 (C.A.2
1993); Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc.
Furthermore, petitioners' claim for civil
penalties would not be moot even if it were
absolutely clear that respondent's viola-
tions could not reasonably be expected to
recur because respondent achieved sub-
stantial compliance with its permit re-
quirements after petitioners flied their
complaint but before the District Court
entered judgment. As the Courts of Ap-
peals (other than the court below) have
uniformly concluded, a polluter's voluntary
postcomplaint cessation of an alleged viola-
tion will not moot a citizen-suit claim for
civil penalties even if it is sufficient to
moot a related claim for injunctive or de-
claratory relief.* This conclusion is con-
sistent with the structure of the Clean
Water Act, which attaches liability for civil
penalties at the time a permit violation
occurs. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) ("Any person
who violate~7[certain provisions of the
Act or certain permit conditions and limi-
tations] shall be subject to a civil penalty
... "). It is also consistent with the char-
acter of civil penalties, which, for purposes
of mootness analysis, should be equated
with punitive damages rather than with
injunctive or declaratory relief. See Tull
v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422-423,
107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987). No
one contends that a defendant's postcomp-
laint conduct could moot a claim for puni-
tive damages; civil penalties should be
treated the same way.
The cases cited by the Court in its dis-
cussion of the mootness issue all involved
requests for injunctive or declaratory re-
lief. In only one, Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675
(1983), did the plaintiff seek damages, and
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1134-
1137 (C.A.ll 1990); Chesapeake Bay Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 890
F.2d 690, 696-697 (C.AA 1989). Cf. Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, n. 8, 89 S.Ct.
1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) ("Where several
forms of relief are requested and one of these
requests subsequently becomes moot, the
Court has still considered the remaining re-
quests").
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Typically, an environmental plaintiff
claiming injury due to discharges in viola-
tion of the Clean Water Act argues that
the discharges harm the environment, and
that the harm to the environment injures
him. This route to injury is barred in the
present case, however, since the District
Court concluded after considering all the
evidence that there had been "no demon-
strated proof of harm to the environment,"
in that case the opinion makes it clear that
the inability to obtain injunctive relief
would have no impact on the damages
claim. Id., at 105, n. 6, 109, 103 S.Ct. 1660.
There is no precedent, either in our juris-
prudence, or in any other of which I am
aware, that provides any support for the
suggestion that postcomplaint factual de-
velopments that might moot a claim for
injunctive or declaratory relief could either
moot a claim for monetary relief or retro-
actively invalidate a valid money judgment.
Justice KENNEDY, concurring.
Difficult and fundamental questions are
raised when we ask whether exactions of
public fines by private litigants, and the
delegation of Executive power which might
be inferable from the authorization, are
permissible in view of the responsibilities
committed to the Executive by Article II
of the Constitution of the United States.
The questions presented in the petition for
certiorari did not identify these issues with
particularity; and neither the Court of Ap-
peals in deciding the case nor the parties
in their briefing before this Court devoted
specific attention to the subject. In my
view these matters are best reserved for a
later case. With this observation, I join
the opinion of the Court.
~Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice
THOMAS joins, dissenting.
Plaintiffs, as the parties invoking federal
jurisdiction, have the burden of proof and
persuasion as to the existence of standing.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351
(1992) (hereinafter Lujan); FW/PBS, Inc.
v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596,
107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). The plaintiffs in
this case fell far short of carrying their
burden of demonstrating injury in fact.
The Court cites affiants' testimony assert-
ing that their enjoyment of the North Tyg-
er River has been diminished due to "con-
cern" that the water was polluted, and that
they "believed" that Laidlaw's mercury ex-
ceedances had reduced the value of their
homes. Ante, at 704-705. These aver-
ments alone cannot carry the plaintiffs'
burden of demonstrating that they have
suffered a "concrete and particularized"
injury, Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560, 112 S.Ct.
2130. General allegations of injury may
suffice at the pleading stage, but at sum-
mary judgment plaintiffs must set forth
"specific facts" to support their claims.
Id., at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. And where, as
here, the case has proceeded to judgment,
those specific facts must be "'supported
adequately by the evidence adduced at tri-
aI,'" ibid. (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v.
Village ofBellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115, n. 31,
99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)). In
The Court begins its analysis by finding this case, the affidavits themselves are
injury in fact on the basis of vague affida- ~woefully short on "specific facts," and
vits that are undermined by the District the vague allegations of injury they do
Court's express finding that Laidlaw's dis- make are undermined by the evidence ad-
charges caused no demonstrable harm to duced at trial.
the environment. It then proceeds to
marry private wrong with public remedy
in a union that violates traditional princi-
ples of federal standing-thereby permit-
ting law enforcement to be placed in the
hands of private individuals. Finally, the
Court suggests that to avoid mootness one
needs even less of a stake in the outcome
than the Court's watered-down require-
ments for initial standing. I dissent from
all of this.
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956 F.Supp. 588, 602 (D.S.C.1997), that the
"permit violations at issue in this citizen
suit did not result in any health risk or
environmental harm," ibid., that "[a]ll
available data ... fail to show that Laid-
law's actual discharges have resulted in
harm to the North Tyger River," id., at
602-603, and that "the overall quality of
the river exceeds levels necessary to sup-
port ... recreation in and on the water,"
id., at 600.
The Court fmds these conclusions un-
problematic for standing, because "[t]he
relevant showing for purposes of Article
III standing ... is not injury to the envi-
ronment but injury to the plaintiff." Ante,
at 704. This statement is correct, as far as
it goes. We have certainly held that a
demonstration of harm to the environment
is not enough to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement unless the plaintiff can dem-
onstrate how he personally was harmed.
E.g., Lujan, supra, at 563, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
In the normal course, however, a lack of
demonstrable harm to the environment
will translate, as it plainly does here, into a
lack of demonstrable harm to citizen plain-
tiffs. While it is perhaps possible that a
plaintiff could be harmed even though the
environment was not, such a plaintiff
would have the burden of articulating and
demonstrating the nature of that injury.
Ongoing "concerns" about the environment
are not enough, for "[i]t is the reality of
the threat of repeated injury that is rele-
vant to the standing inquiry, not the plain-
tiffs subjective apprehensions," Los Ange-
les v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107, n. 8, 103
S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). At the
very least, in~the present case, one
would expect to see evidence supporting
the affidavits' bald assertions regarding
decreasing recreational usage and declin-
ing home values, as well as evidence for
the improbable proposition that Laidlaw's
violations, even though harmless to the
environment, are somehqw responsible for
these effects. Cf. Gladstone, supra, at
115, 99 S.Ct. 1601 (noting that standing
could be established by "convincing evi-
dence" that a decline in real estate values
was attributable to the defendant's con-
duct). Plaintiffs here have made no at-
tempt at such a showing, but rely entirely
upon unsupported and unexplained affida-
vit allegations of "concern."
Indeed, every one of the affiants de-
posed by Laidlaw cast into doubt the (in
any event inadequate) proposition that
subjective "concerns" actually affected
their conduct. Linda Moore, for example,
said in her affidavit that she would use the
affected waterways for recreation if it
were not for her concern about pollution.
Record, Doc. No. 71 (Exhs. 45, 46). Yet
she testified in her deposition that she had
been to the river only twice, once in 1980
(when she visited someone who lived by
the river) and once after this suit was filed.
Record, Doc. No. 62 (Moore Deposition
23-24). Similarly, Kenneth Lee Curtis,
who claimed he was injured by being de-
prived of recreational activity at the river,
admitted that he had not been to the river
since he was "a kid," ibid. (Curtis Deposi-
tion, pt. 2, p. 38), and when asked whether
the reason he stopped visiting the river
was because of pollution, answered "no,"
id., at 39. As to Curtis's claim that the
river "looke[d] and smell[ed] polluted," this
condition, if present, was surely not caused
by Laidlaw's discharges, which according
to the District Court "did not result in any
health risk or environmental harm." 956
F.Supp., at 602. The other affiants cited
by the Court were not deposed, but their
affidavits state either that they would use
the river if it were not polluted or harmful
(as the court subsequently found it is not),
Record, Doc. No. 21 (Exhs. 7.l.bn8, and 9),
or said that the river looks polluted (which
is also incompatible with the court's fmd-
ings), ibid. (Exh. 10). These affiants
have established nothing but "subjective
apprehensions."
The Court is correct that the District
Court explicitly found standing-albeit "by
the very slimmest of margins," and as "an
awfully close call." App. in No. 97-1246
(C.AA), pp. 207-208 (Tr. of Hearing 39-40
(June 30, 1993)). That cautious finding,
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however, was made in 1993, long before
the court's 1997 conclusion that Laidlaw's
discharges did not harm the environment.
Ai> we have previously recognized, an ini-
tial conclusion that plaintiffs have standing
is subject to reexamination, particularly if
later evidence proves inconsistent with
that conclusion. Gladstone, 441 U.S., at
115, and n. 31, 99 S.Ct. 1601; Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 446, 112 S.Ct.
789, 117 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). Laidlaw chal-
lenged the existence of injury in fact on
appeal to the Fourth Circuit, but that
court did not reach the question. Thus no
lower court has reviewed the injury-in-fact
issue in light of the extensive studies that
led the District Court to conclude that the
environment was not harmed by Laidlaw's
discharges.
Inexplicably, the Court is untroubled by
this, but proceeds to find injury in fact in
the most casual fashion, as though it is
merely confirming a careful analysis made
below. Although we have previously re-
fused to fmd standing based on the "con-
clusory allegations of an affidavit," Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S.
871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695
(1990), the Court is content to do just that
today. By accepting plaintiffs' vague, con-
tradictory, and unsubstantiated allegations
of "concern" about the environment as ad-
equate to prove injury in fact, and accept-
ing them even in the face of a finding that
the environment was not demonstrably
harmed, the Court makes the injury-in-fact
requirement a sham. If there are permit
violations, and a member of a plaintiff
environmental organization lives near the
offending plant, it would be difficult not to
satisfy today's lenient standard.
..,b2II
The Court's treatment of the redressa-
bility requirement-which would have
been unnecessary if it resolved the injury-
in-fact question correctly-is equally cava-
lier. Ai> discussed above, petitioners al-
lege ongoing injury consisting of diminish-
ed enjoyment of the affected waterways
and decreased property values. They al-
lege that these injuries are caused by
Laidlaw's continuing permit violations.
But the remedy petitioners seek is neither
recompense for their injuries nor an in-
junction against future violations. In-
stead, the remedy is a statutorily specified
"penalty" for past violations, payable en-
tirely to the United States Treasury.
Only last Term, we held that such penal-
ties do not redress any injury a citizen
plaintiff has suffered from past violations.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment, 523 U.S. 83, 106-107, 118 S.Ct. 1003,
140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). The Court none-
theless fmds the redressability require-
ment satisfied here, distinguishing Steel
Co. on the ground that in this case peti-
tioners allege ongoing violations; payment
of the penalties, it says, will remedy peti-
tioners' injury by deterring future viola-
tions by Laidlaw. Ante, at 706-707. It
holds that a penalty payable to the public
''remedies'' a threatened private harm, and
suffices to sustain a private suit.
That holding has no precedent in our
jurisprudence, and takes this Court be-
yond the "cases and controversies" that
Article III of the Constitution has entrust-
ed to its resolution. Even if it were appro-
priate, moreover, to allow Article Ill's
remediation requirement to be satisfied by
the indirect private consequences of a pub-
lic penalty, those consequences are entire-
ly too speculative in the present case. The
new standing law that the Court makes-
like all expansions of standing beyond the
traditional constitutional limits-has grave
implications for democratic governance. I
shall discuss these three points in turn.
...baA
In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973),
the plaintiff, mother of an illegitimate
child, sought, on behalf of herself, her
child, and all others similarly situated, an
injunction against discriminatory applica-
tion of Art. 602 of the Texas Penal Code.
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Although that provision made it a misde-
meanor for "any parent" to refuse to sup-
port his or her minor children under 18
years of age, it was enforced only against
married parents. That refusal, the plain-
tiff contended, deprived her and her child
of the equal protection of the law by deny-
ing them the deterrent effect of the statute
upon the father's failure to fulfill his sup-
port obligation. The Court held that there
was no Article III standing. There was no
" 'direct' relationship," it said, "between
the alleged injury and the claim sought to
be adjudicated," since "[t]he prospect that
prosecution will, at least in the future,
result in payment of support can, at best,
be termed only speculative." Id., at 618,
93 S.Ct. 1146. "[Our cases] demonstrate
that, in American jurisprudence at least, a
private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecu-
tion of another." Id., at 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146.
Although the Court in Linda R.S. recit-
ed the "logical nexus" analysis of Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20
L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), which has since fallen
into desuetude, "it is clear that standing
was denied . .. because of the unlikelihood
that the relief requested would redress
appellant's claimed injury." Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79, n. 24, 98 S.Ct.
2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). There was
no "logical nexus" between nonenforce-
ment of the statute and Linda R. S.'s
failure to receive support payments be-
cause "[t]he prospect that prosecution will
. .. result in payment of support" was
"speculative," Linda R. S., supra, at 618,
93 S.Ct. 1146-that is to say, it was uncer-
tain whether the relief would prevent the
injury.1 O~course precisely the same
situation exists here. The principle that
"in American jurisprudence ... a private
1. The decision in Linda R.S. did not turn, as
today's opinion imaginatively suggests, on the
father's short-term inability to pay support if
imprisoned. Ante, at 708, n. 4. The Court's
only comment upon the imprisonment was
that, unlike imprisonment for civil contempt,
it would not condition the father's release
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest
in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another" applies no less to prosecution for
civil penalties payable to the State than to
prosecution for criminal penalties owing to
the State.
The Court's opinion reads as though the
only purpose and effect of the redressabili-
ty requirement is to assure that the plain-
tiff receive some of the benefit of the relief
that a court orders. That is not so. If it
were, a federal tort plaintiff fearing repeti-
tion of the injury could ask for tort dam-
ages to be paid not only to himself but to
other victims as well, on the theory that
those damages would have at least some
deterrent effect beneficial to him. Such a
suit is preposterous because the "remedia-
tion" that is the traditional business of
Anglo-American courts is relief specifically
tailored to the plaintiff's injury, and not
any sort of relief that has some incidental
benefit to the plaintiff. Just as a "general-
ized grievance" that affects the entire citi-
zenry cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact re-
quirement even though it aggrieves the
plaintiff along with everyone else, see Lu-
jan, 504 U.S., at 573-574, 112 S.Ct. 2130,
so also a generalized remedy that deters
all future unlawful activity against all per-
sons cannot satisfy the remediation re-
quirement, even though it deters (among
other things) repetition of this particular
unlawful activity against these particular
plaintiffs.
Thus, relief against prospective harm is
traditionally afforded by way of an injunc-
tion, the scope of which is limited by the
scope of the threatened injury. Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357-360, 116 S.Ct.
2174, 135L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); Lyons, 461
U.S., at 105-107, and n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1660.
In seeking to overturn that tradition by
upon payment. The Court then continued:
"The prospect that prosecution will, at least
in the future"-i.e., upon completion of the
imprisonment-"result in payment of support
can, at best, be termed only speculative."
Linda R. 5., 410 U.S., at 618, 93 S.Ct. 1146.
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giving an in2l:idual205 plaintiff the power
to invoke a public remedy, Congress has
done precisely what we have said it cannot
do: convert an "undifferentiated public in-
terest" into an "individual right" vindicable
in the courts. Lujan, supra, at 577, 112
S.Ct. 2130; Steel Co., 523 U.S., at 106, 118
S.Ct. 1003. The sort of scattershot re-
dress approved today makes nonsense of
our statement in Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222,
94 S.Ct. 2925 (1974), that the requirement
of injury in fact "insures the framing of
relief no broader than required by the
precise facts." A claim of particularized
future injury has today been made the
vehicle for pursuing generalized penalties
for past violations, and a threshold show-
ing of injury in fact has become a lever
that will move the world.
B
As I have just discussed, it is my view
that a plaintiff's desire to benefit from the
deterrent effect of a public penalty for past
conduct can never suffice to establish a
case or controversy of the sort known to
our law. Such deterrent effect is, so to
speak, "speculative as a matter of law."
Even if that were not so, however, the
deterrent effect in the present case would
surely be speculative as a matter of fact.
The Court recognizes, of course, that to
satisfy Article III, it must be "likely," as
opposed to "merely speculative," that a
favorable decision will redress plaintiffs'
injury, Lujan, supra, at 561, 112 S.Ct.
2130. See ante, at 704. Further, the Court
recognizes that not all deterrent effects of
all civil penalties will meet this standard-
though it declines to "explore the outer
limits" of adequate deterrence, ante, at
707. It concludes, however, that in the
present case "the civil penalties sought by
FOE carried with them a deterrent effect"
that satisfied the "likely [rather than]
speculative" standard. Ibid. There is little
in the Court's opinion to explain why it
believes this is so.
The Court cites the District Court's con-
clusion that the penalties imposed, along
with anticipated fee awards, p~ded206
"adequate deterrence." Ante, at 703, 707;
956 F.Supp., at 611. There is absolutely
no reason to believe, however, that this
meant "deterrence adequate to prevent an
injury to these plaintiffs that would other-
wise occur." The statute does not even
mention deterrence in general (much less
deterrence of future harm to the particular
plaintiff) as one of the elements that the
court should consider in fixing the amount
of the penalty. (That element can come in,
if at all, under the last, residual category
of "such other matters as justice may re-
quire." 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).) The statute
does require the court to consider "the
seriousness of the violation or violations,
the economic benefit (if any) resulting
from the violation, any history of such
violations, any good-faith efforts to comply
with the applicable requirements, [and] the
economic impact of the penalty on the
violator .... " Ibid., see 956 F.Supp., at
601. The District Court meticulously dis-
cussed, in subsections (a) through (e) of
the portion of its opinion entitled "Civil
Penalty," each one of those specified fac-
tors, and then-under subsection (f) enti-
tled "Other Matters As Justice May Re-
quire," it discussed "1. Laidlaw's Failure to
Avail Itself of the Reopener Clause," "2.
Recent Compliance History," and "3. The
Ever-Changing Mercury Limit." There is
no mention whatever-in this portion of
the opinion or anywhere else-of the de-
gree of deterrence necessary to prevent
future harm to these particular plaintiffs.
Indeed, neither the District Court's final
opinion (which contains the "adequate de-
terrence" statement) nor its earlier opinion
dealing with the preliminary question
whether South Carolina's previous lawsuit
against Laidlaw constituted "diligent pros-
ecution" that would bar citizen suit, see 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B), displayed any
awareness that deterrence of future inju-
ry to the plaintif.fs was necessary to sup-
port standing.
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The District Court's earlier opinion did,
however, quote with approval the passage
from a District Court case which began:
"'Civil penalties seek to deter pollution
by discour~g207 future violations. To
serve this function, the amount of the civil
penalty must be high enough to insure
that polluters cannot simply absorb the
penalty as a cost of doing business.'''
App. 122, quoting PIRG v. Powell Dul-
fryn Terminals, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 1158,
1166 (D.N.J. 1989). When the District
Court concluded the "Civil Penalty" sec-
tion of its opinion with the statement that
"[t]aken together, this court believes the
above penalty, potential fee awards, and
Laidlaw's own direct and indirect litiga-
tion expenses provide adequate deter-
rence under the circumstances of this
case," 956 F.Supp., at 611, it was obvious-
ly harking back to this general statement
of what the statutorily prescribed factors
(and the "as justice may require" factors,
which in this case did not include particu-
larized or even generalized deterrence)
were designed to achieve. It meant no
more than that the court believed the civil
penalty it had prescribed met the statuto-
ry standards.
The Court points out that we have previ-
ously said "'all civil penalties have some
deterrent effect,'" ante, at 706 (quoting
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102,
118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997».
That is unquestionably true: As a general
matter, polluters as a class are deterred
from violating discharge limits by the
availability of civil penalties. However,
none of the cases the Court cites focused
on the deterrent effect of a single imposi-
tion of penalties on a particular lawbreak-
er. Even less did they focus on the ques-
tion whether that particularized deterrent
effect (if any) was enough to redress the
injury of a citizen plaintiff in the sense
required by Article III. They all involved
penalties pursued by the government, not
by citizens. See id., at 96, 118 S.Ct. 488;
Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 773, 114 S.Ct. 1937,
128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994); Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 414, 107 S.Ct. 1831,
95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987).
If the Court had undertaken the neces-
sary inquiry into whether significant deter-
rence of the plaintiffs' feared injury was
"likely," it would have had to reason some-
thing like this: Strictly speaking, no pollu-
ter is deterred by a penalty foz:.wspast
pollution; he is deterred by the fear of a
penalty for future pollution. That fear will
be virtually nonexistent if the prospective
polluter knows that all emissions violators
are given a free pass; it will be substantial
under an emissions program such as the
federal scheme here, which is regularly
and notoriously enforced; it will be even
higher when a prospective polluter subject
to such a regularly enforced program has,
as here, been the object of public charges
of pollution and a suit for injunction; and
it will surely be near the top of the graph
when, as here, the prospective polluter has
already been subjected to state penalties
for the past pollution. The deterrence on
which the plaintiffs must rely for standing
in the present case is the marginal in-
crease in Laidlaw's fear of future penalties
that will be achieved by adding federal
penalties for Laidlaw's past conduct.
I cannot say for certain that this mar-
ginal increase is zero; but I can say for
certain that it is entirely speculative
whether it will make the difference be-
tween these plaintiffs' suffering injury in
the future and these plaintiffs' going un-
harmed. In fact, the assertion that it will
"likely" do so is entirely farfetched. The
speculativeness of that result is much
greater than the speculativeness we found
excessive in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 43, 96
S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), where
we held that denying § 501(c)(3) charita-
ble-deduction tax status to hospitals that
refused to treat indigents was not suffi-
ciently likely to assure future treatment of
the indigent plaintiffs to support standing.
And it is much greater than the specula-
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tiveness we found excessive in Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., discussed supra, at 715-716,
where we said that "[t]he prospect that
prosecution [for nonsupport] will '" re-
sult in payment of support can, at best, be
termed only speculative," 410 U.S., at 618,
93 S.Ct. 1146.
In sum, if this case is, as the Court
suggests, within the central core of "deter-
rence" standing, it is impossible to imagine
what the "outer limits" could possibly be.
The Court's expressed reluctance to define
those "outer limits~servesonly to dis-
guise the fact that it has promulgated a
revolutionary new doctrine of standing
that will permit the entire body of public
civil penalties to be handed over to en-
forcement by private interests.
C
Article II of the Constitution commits it
to the President to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3,
and provides specific methods by which all
persons exercising significant executive
power are to be appointed, Art. II, § 2. As
Justice KENNEDY'S concurrence correct-
ly observes, the question of the conformity
of this legislation with Article II has not
been argued-and I, like the Court, do not
address it. But Article III, no less than
Article II, has consequences for the struc-
ture of our government, see Schlesinger,
418 U.S., at 222, 94 S.Ct. 2925, and it is
worth noting the changes in that structure
which today's decision allows.
By permitting citizens to pursue civil
penalties payable to the Federal Treasury,
2. The Court points out that the Government is
allowed to intervene in a citizen suit, see ante,
at 708, n. 4; 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2), but this
power to "bring the Government's views to
the attention of the court," ante, at 708, n. 4,
is meager substitute for the power to decide
whether prosecution will occur. Indeed, ac-
cording the Chief Executive of the United
States the ability to intervene does no more
than place him on a par with John Q. Public,
who can intervene-whether the Government
likes it or not-when the United States files
suit. § 1365(b)(l)(B).
the Act does not provide a mechanism for
individual relief in any traditional sense,
but turns over to private citizens the func-
tion of enforcing the law. A Clean Water
Act plaintiff pursuing civil penalties acts
as a self-appointed mini-EPA Where, as
is often the case, the plaintiff is a national
association, it has significant discretion in
choosing enforcement targets. Once the
association .is aware of a reported viola-
tion, it need not look long for an injured
member, at least under the theory of inju-
ry the Court applies today. See supra, at
700-702. And once the target is chosen,
the suit goes forward without meaningful
public contro1.2 The availability of civil
penalties vastly ~oportionate210 to the
individual injury gives citizen plaintiffs
massive bargaining power-which is often
used to achieve settlements requiring the
defendant to support environmental pro-
jects of the plaintiffs' choosing. See
Greve, The Private Enforcement of Envi-
ronmental Law, 65 Tulane L.Rev. 339,
355-359 (1990). Thus is a public fine di-
verted to a private interest.
To be sure, the EPA may foreclose the
citizen suit by itself bringing suit. 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). This allows public
authorities to avoid private enforcement
only by accepting private direction as to
when enforcement should be undertaken-
which is no less constitutionally bizarre.
Elected officials are entirely deprived of
their discretion to decide that a given vio-
lation should not be the object of suit at
all, or that the enforcement decision should
be postponed.s See § 1365(b)(1)(A) (pro-
viding that citizen plaintiff need only wait
3. The Court observes that "the Federal Execu-
tive Branch does not share the dissent's view
that such suits dissipate its authority to en-
force the law," since it has "endorsed this
citizen suit from the outset." Ante, at 708, n.
4. Of course, in doubtful cases a long and
uninterrupted history of Presidential acquies-
cence and approval can shed light upon the
constitutional understanding. What we have
here-acquiescence and approval by a single
administration---does not deserve passing
mention.
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60 days after giving notice of the violation
to the government before proceeding with
action). This is the predictable and inevit-
able consequence of the Court's allowing
the use of public remedies for private
wrongs.
voluntary compliance with the permit, and
leaving this fact-intensive question open
for consideration on remand, as the Court
does, ante, at 711, seems sensible.4 In
reaching this disposition, however, the
Court engages in a troubling discussion of
the purported distinctions between the
III doctrines of standing and mootness. I am
Finally, I offer a few comments regard- frankly puzzled as to why this discussion
ing the Court's discussion of whether appears at all. Laidlaw's claimed compli-
FOE's claims became moot by reason of ance is squarely within the bounds of our
Laidlaw's substantial compliance with the ''voluntary cessation" doctrine, which is the
permit limits. I do not disagree with the basis for the remand. Ante, at 710.5
conclusion that the Court reaches. As- ~There is no reason to engage in an
suming that the plaintiffs had standing to interesting academic excursus upon the
pursue civil penalties in the fIrst instance differences between mootness and stand-
(which they did not), their claim-Ullmight ing in order to invoke this obviously appli-
well not have been mooted by Laidlaw's cable rule.6
4. In addition to the compliance and plant-
closure issues, there also remains open on
remand the question whether the current suit
was foreclosed because the earlier suit by the
State was "diligently prosecuted." See 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). Nothing in the
Court's opinion disposes of the issue. The
opinion notes the District Court's finding that
Laidlaw itself played a significant role in fa-
cilitating the State's action. Ante, at 702, n.
1, 707, n. 2. But there is no incompatibility
whatever between a defendant's facilitation of
suit and the State's diligent prosecution-as
prosecutions of felons who confess their
crimes and turn themselves in regularly dem-
onstrate. Laidlaw was entirely within its
rights to prefer state suit to this private en-
forcement action; and if it had such a prefer-
ence it would have been prudent-given that
a State must act within 60 days of receiving
notice of a citizen suit, see § 1365(b)(1)(A),
and given the number of cases state agencies
handle-for Laidlaw to make sure its case did
not fall through the cracks. South Carolina's
interest in the action was not a feigned last
minute contrivance. It had worked with
Laidlaw in resolving the problem for many
years, and had previously undertaken an ad-
ministrative enforcement action resulting in a
consent order. 890 F.Supp. 470, 476 (D.S.C.
1995). South Carolina has filed an amicus
brief arguing that allowing citizen suits to
proceed despite ongoing state enforcement ef-
forts "will provide citizens and federal judges
the opportunity to relitigate and second-guess
the enforcement and permitting actions of
South Carolina and other States." Brief for
South Carolina as Amicus Curiae 6.
5. Unlike Justice STEVENS' concurrence, the
opinion for the Court appears to recognize
that a claim for civil penalties is moot when it
is clear that no future injury to the plaintiff at
the hands of the defendant can occur. The
concurrence suggests that civil penalties, like
traditional damages remedies, cannot be
mooted by absence of threatened injury. The
analogy is inapt. Traditional money damages
are payable to compensate for the harm of
past conduct, which subsists whether future
harm is threatened or not; civil penalties are
privately assessable (according to the Court)
to deter threatened future harm to the plain-
tiff. Where there is no threat to the plaintiff,
he has no claim to deterrence. The proposi-
tion that impossibility of future violation does
not moot the case holds true, of course, for
civil-penalty suits by the government, which
do not rest upon the theory that some particu-
lar future harm is being prevented.
6. The Court attempts to frame its exposition
as a corrective to the Fourth Circuit, which it
claims "confused mootness with standing."
Ante, at 708. The Fourth Circuit's conclusion
of nonjusticiability rested upon the belief (en-
tirely correct, in my view) that the only reme-
dy being pursued on appeal, civil penalties,
would not redress FOE's claimed injury. 149
F.3d 303, 306 (1998). While this might be
characterized as a conclusion that FOE had
no standing to pursue civil penalties from the
outset, it can also be characterized, as it was
by the Fourth Circuit, as a conclusion that,
when FOE declined to appeal denial of the
declaratory judgment and injunction, and ap-
pealed only the inadequacy of the civil penal-
ties (which it had no standing to pursue) the
case as a whole became moot. Given the
Court's erroneous conclusion that civil penal-
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Because the discussion is not essential-
indeed, not even relevant-to the Court's
decision, it is of limited significance.
Nonetheless, I am troubled by the Court's
too-hasty retreat from our characterization
of mootness as "the doctrine of standing
set in a time frame." Arizonans for Offi-
cial English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68, n.
22, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997).
We have repeatedly recognized that what
is required for litigation to continue is
essentially identical to what is required for
litigation to begin: There must be a justi-
ciable case or controversy as required by
Article III. "Simply stated, a case is moot
when the issues presented are no longer
'live' or the parties lack a legally cogniza-
ble interest in the outcome." PoweU v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct.
1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). A court may
n0!.Wsproceed to hear an action if, subse-
quent to its initiation, the dispute loses "its
character as a present, live controversy of
the kind that must exist if [the court is] to
avoid advisory opinions on abstract propo-
sitions oflaw." HaU v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45,
48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969) (per
curiam). See also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422
U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d
272 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 459, n. 10, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d
505 (1974). Because the requirement of a
continuing case or controversy derives
from the Constitution, Liner v. Jafco, Inc.,
375 U.S. 301, 306, n. 3, 84 S.Ct. 391, 11
L.Ed.2d 347 (1964), it may not be ignored
when inconvenient, United States v. Alas-
ka S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116, 40 S.Ct. 448,
64 L.Ed. 808 (1920) (moot question cannot
be decided, "[h]owever convenient it might
be"), or, as the Court suggests, to save
"sunk costs," compare ante, at 710, with
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S.
472, 480, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400
(1990) ("[R]easonable caution is needed to
be sure that mooted litigation is not
pressed forward ... solely in order to
obtain reimbursement of sunk costs").
ties can redress private injury, it of course
rejects both formulations-but neither of
them necessitates the Court's academic dis-
It is true that mootness has some added
wrinkles that standing lacks. One is the
''voluntary cessation" doctrine to which the
Court refers. Ante, at 708. But it is
inaccurate to regard this as a reduction of
the basic requirement for standing that
obtained at the beginning of the suit. A
genuine controversy must exist at both
stages. And just as the initial suit could
be brought (by way of suit for declaratory
judgment) before the defendant actually
violated the plaintiff's alleged rights, so
also the initial suit can be continued even
though the defendant has stopped violating
the plaintiff's alleged rights. The ''volun-
tary cessation" doctrine is nothing more
than an evidentiary presumption that the
controversy reflected by the violation of
alleged rights continues to exist. Steel
Co., 523 U.S., at 109, 118 S.Ct. 1003. Simi-
larly, the fact that we do not fmd cases
moot when the challenged conduct is "ca-
pable of repetition, yet evading review"
does not demonstrate that the require-
ments for mootness and for standing dif-
fer. ''Where the conduct has ceased for
the time bein&:,.W4but there is a demon-
strated probability that it will recur, a
real-life controversy between parties with
a personal stake in the outcome continues
to exist." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 341,
108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) (SCA-
LIA, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
Part of the confusion in the Court's dis-
cussion is engendered by the fact that it
compares standing, on the one hand, with
mootness based on voluntary cessation, on
the other hand. Ante, at 709. The re-
quired showing that it is "absolutely clear"
that the conduct "could not reasonably be
expected to recur" is not the threshold
showing required for mootness, but the
heightened showing required in a particu-
lar category of cases where we have sensi-
bly concluded that there is reason to be
skeptical that cessation of violation means
course comparing the mootness and standing
doctrines.
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cessation of live controversy. For claims
of mootness based on changes in circum-
stances other than voluntary cessation, the
showing we have required is less taxing,
and the inquiry is indeed properly charac-
terized as one of "'standing set in a time
frame.''' See Arizonans, supra, at 67, 68,
n. 22, 117 S.Ct. 1055 (case mooted where
plaintiff's change in jobs deprived case of
"still vital claim for prospective relief');
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct.
978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (case mooted by
petitioner's completion of his sentence,
since "throughout the litigation, the plain-
tiff must have suffered, or be threatened
with, an actual injury traceable to the de-
fendant and likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision" (internal quota-
tion marks omitted»; Lewis, supra, at
478-480, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (case against State
mooted by change in federal law that elim-
inated parties' "personal stake" in the out-
come).
In sum, while the Court may be cor-
rect that the parallel between standing
and mootness is imperfect due to realistic
evidentiary presumptions that are by
their nature applicable only in the moot-
ness context, this does not change the
underlying principle that" '[t]he requisite
personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation ... must
continue throughout its existence .... '"
Arizonans, supra,..wsat 68, n. 22, 117
S.Ct. 1055 (quoting United States Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397,
100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980».
* * *
By uncritically accepting vague claims of
injury, the Court has turned the Article
III requirement of injury in fact into a
"mere pleading requirement," Lujan, 504
U.S., at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; and by ap-
proving the novel theory that public penal-
ties can redress anticipated private
wrongs, it has come close to "mak[ing] the
redressability requirement vanish," Steel
Co., supra, at 107, 118 S.Ct. 1003. The
undesirable and unconstitutional conse-
quence of today's decision is to place the
immense power of suing to enforce the
public laws in private hands. I respectful-
ly dissent.
528 U.S. 216, 145 L.Ed.2d 650
..wtrADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC.,
v.
Rodney SLATER, Secretary of
Transportation, et al.
No. 99-295.
Jan. 12, 2000.
Subcontractor which was not awarded
portion of federal highway project brought
action against Department of Transporta-
tion officials challenging constitutionality
of federal program designed to provide
highway contracts to disadvantaged busi-
ness enterprises (DBE). The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado,
Jim R. Carrigan, J., 790 F.Supp. 240
granted summary judgment for officials,
and subcontractor appealed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, 16 F.3d 1537, affirmed, and certio-
rari was granted. The Supreme Court,
Justice O'Connor, 515 U.S. 200, 115 S.Ct.
2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158, vacated and re-
manded. On remand, the District Court,
John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge,
965 F.Supp. 1556, granted summary judg-
ment for subcontractor. Government ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Lucero, Cir-
cuit Judge, 169 F.3d 1292, vacated and
remanded with directions. Upon granting
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that
state's certification of subcontractor as
DBE pursuant to its new procedures
which it adopted in response to subcon-
tractor's suit did not moot subcontractor's
cause of action.
Reversed and remanded.
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Congress adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (the "Act") in an effort to restore investor confidence in light of public scandals such as
Enron, Tyco, and Worldcom. Though only applicable to publicly-traded companies, the Act sets
forth a new standard of conduct concerning disclosure of liabilities that may ripple down to
privately-held for-profit and non-profit companies.
Lawyers have been highly suspicious of the Act since its enactment in 2002. A survey by
LexisNexis and the International Bar Association in 2003 found that 90% of lawyers surveyed
worry their clients will be "less open" with them, and 71% worry that the Act will be
"detrimental to justice." Lawyers are also concerned about the effect of the Act on the attorney-
client privilege, particularly because 80% of lawyers surveyed believe that the general public
does not understand the reasons behind the attorney-client privilege and ethics rules protecting
client confidentiality. The issue of how the Act affects the attorney-privilege is even the subject
matter being discussed by a new task force of the American Bar Association.
The Act has various implications for the environmental lawyer in particular. First, the
Act sets forth new standards for reporting liabilities, including environmental liabilities. Second,
the Act sets imposes obligations on attorneys to report potential violations of law by
representatives of the client "up the ladder," a significant intrusion on the attorney-client
privilege. Last, potential liabilities implicit in the Act create a need to ensure that all publicly-
available information is completely accurate in order to stave off any claims that a company is
concealing potential liabilities. Though treated in the popular press as a new securities law, the
Act has far-reaching effects that all environmental lawyers need to consider.
G'l
I. Overview of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
A. Applicability
The Act is applicable to companies currently registered under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 or who apply to register securities under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
B. Basic Requirements of the Act
The Act includes provisions on three broad topics-(l) auditors; (2) internal corporate
governance; and (3) corporate attorneys. Though this outline will focus on the third
topic, it includes the basic provisions of the Act concerning auditors and corporate
governance.
1. Auditors
The Act created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (ltPCAOB It).
The PCAOB was created to regulate accounting industry standards applicable to
outside audits of public companies' books. See Section 101 ofthe Act.
All accounting firms preparing or issuing audit reports for public companies must
be registered with the PCAOB. See Section 102 ofthe Act.
Registered firms performing audits for a client may not provide some non-
auditing services to those clients, including bookkeeping, appraisal and valuation
services, and actuarial services. See Section 201 of the Act. These provisions are
intended to preserve auditor independence in reviewing the books of a public
company.
Registered firms must comply with rules enacted by the PCAOB in order to
maintain their certification, including rules concerning document retention and
destruction. See Section 103 of the Act.
The PCAOB has the power to periodically audit registered firms to ensure
compliance. Firms auditing more than 100 public companies are subject to an
annual compliance audit; firms auditing less than 100 public companies are
subject to a compliance audit every three years. See Sections 104-105 of the Act.
The PCAOB has the power to levy civil penalties of up to $750,000 against an
individual and $15,000,000 against corporate-type entities, in conjunction with
the SEC.
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2. Corporate Governance
The Act sets forth several requirements to ensure that public companies, in
making disclosures in publicly-available securities filings, do not mislead
investors about the financial condition of the company. These requirements
include (1) enhanced certification requirements; (2) requirements applicable to
public companies' audit committees; and (3) restrictions on executive
compensation. The Act also includes civil and criminal penalties for violation of
the corporate governance provisions.
a. Certification Requirements
The Act required the SEC to adopt rules (now codified as Exchange Act
Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) requiring the CEO and CFO of all public
companies to certify the accuracy of all annual and quarterly reports filed
with the SEC. The certification must include the following: (1) They have
read the report; (2) The report, to their knowledge, does not contain any
material misstatements; and (3) The report fairly presents the financial
situation of the company. See SeCtion 302 of the Act; Exchange Act Rules
13a-14 and 15d-14.
Every periodic report containing financial statements must be
accompanied by a written statement from the CEO and CFO certifying
that statements comply with securities laws and fairly present the financial
condition of the company. This requirement overlaps with the
requirements in Section 302, but it imposes criminal penalties of up to
$5,000,000 in fines and 20 years in prison. See Section 906 of the Act.
Public companies must maintain controls on procedures for making
disclosures, and do an evaluation of their internal disclosure controls
within 90 days before filing quarterly reports. See Exchange Act Rules
13a-15 and 15d-15.
b. Requirements Applicable to Audit Committees
The Act includes a requirement that all members of the audit committee be
"independent," i.e., that the committees members must not be internal to
the public company such as a member of management or receive
compensation from the public company other than director or committee
fees. See Section 301 of the Act.
The Act allows the SEC to adopt rules requiring the stock exchanges and
the NASDAQ to deny the listing of securities of any issuer not in
compliance with the audit committee provisions. See Section 301 of the
Act; Securities Act Release 33-8220.
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The Act requires the audit committee to contract for outside auditing
services on behalf of the public company instead of management. See
Section 301 ofthe Act.
The audit committee must establish a system to allow employees of the
public company to make confidential reports concerning questionable
practices. See Section 301 of the Act. Failure to properly respond to these
confidential reports can give rise to damages. One company in Virginia
has already been required to rehire a "whistleblower" it fired after the
employee made allegations of financial irregularities. The company may
also be required to pay damages to the employee. This case is still at the
administrative level, and commentators expect to eventually see an appeal
at least to the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See Welch
v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., 2003-S0X-15
The Act requires audit committees to disclose whether any of its members
is a "financial expert," and if so, whether' that expert is "independent" of
management. See Section 407 of the Act; Securities Act Release 33-8177.
c. Requirements Applicable to Executive Compensation
If a public company is required to restate its public financial reports as a
result of "misconduct," the Act requires the CEO and CFO to disgorge any
bonuses or profits from sale of company stock gained in the 12 months
after filing the inaccurate financial report. See Section 304 of the Act.
Corporate executives cannot trade company stock during blackout periods
imposed on the company's employee stock plan. Any profits obtained on
such trades must be returned to the company. See Section 306 of the Act.
Directors and officers must disclose any transactions they make in their
company's stock ("insider" transactions) within two business days after
completion of the transaction. See Section 403 of the Act.
Public companies may no longer make personal loans to directors and
officers. See Section 402 of the Act.
d. Penalties
The Act lengthens the statute of limitations for civil securItIes fraud
actions from one year to two years from discovery of the violations, with
an overall bar against civil actions after five years from the occurrence of
the violation. See Section 804 of the Act.
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The Act amends the Bankruptcy Code to prevent discharge of
indebtedness due to judgements or settlements of securities violations.
See Section 803 of the Act.
The Act lowers the standard required for the SEC to bar an officer or
director of a public company from serving in either of those positions in
another public company from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness." The
SEC may also now bar an officer or director in an administrative cease
and desist proceeding. See Sections 305 and 1105 of the Act.
The Act also creates a number of new crimes, including a new securities
fraud crime substantially the same as existing criminal liability under Rule
10b-5. Maximum jail time is increased from five to 20 years, and
maximum fines are increased from $1,000,000 to $5,000,000 for
individuals, and from $2,500,000 to $25,000,000 for corporate-type
entities. See Sections 802, 807, 903, 1102, 1106, and 1107 of the Act.
3. Attorneys
The Act requires the SEC to enact rules to govern the conduct of attorneys
"practicing before the Commission," including rules requiring attorneys to report
potential violations of securities or other laws "up the ladder" to senior
management in order to ensure that those managers are fully aware of all potential
liabilities to report in securities filings. See Section 307 of the Act. The SEC
enacted those rules in January 2003. See Securities Act Release 33-8185.
An attorney's requirement to report potential violations of securities laws "up the
ladder" can be discharged by reporting to a Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee ("QLCC"). The Act gives covered companies the option to establish a
QLCC, which must be comprised of at least one member of the audit committee
and two or more independent board members. The QLCC then has the
responsibility to investigate alleged violations of securities laws and must request
the company to take remedial actions in response to the QLCC's conclusions. If
the company does not undertake the remedial actions requested by the QLCC, the
members of the QLCC, the chieflegal officer, and the CEO must report that to the
SEC and disavow any filings tainted by the violation.
The SEC, as part of the rules it plans to enact to carry out Section 307 of the Act,
has proposed a rule to require attorneys who have knowledge that,
notwithstanding any up the ladder reporting, the company filed any materially
false or misleading information with the SEC, to effect a "noisy withdrawal" from
that representation. The "noisy withdrawal" requirement was not imposed on
attorneys reporting to a QLCC. The SEC has put implementation of the proposed
"noisy withdrawal" rule to individual attorneys on hold pending further comment,
but maintained the requirement for QLCCs in the final rule.
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II. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Environmental Reporting
The provisions of the Act (and accompanying regulations) affecting certification of a company's
financial condition do not specify any mechanism for determining whether an environmental
liability is "material." Material effects of compliance with environmental laws and material
pending or threatened litigation proceedings are required to be reported pursuant to Items 101,
103 and 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229, and are subject to generally-accepted standards
developed in light of that regulation. Those rules have not changed in the wake of the Act.
However, some groups are concerned that the increased emphasis on corporate disclosures will
increase the scrutiny on environmental liabilities and whether they are indeed material.
A. Standard for Materiality
There is no hard and fast rule for determining whether a potential liability is material.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "material" as anything that would influence
a reasonable investor's decision to invest in a company.
Item 101 of Regulation S-K requires public companies to disclosure the material effects
of compliance with environmental laws.
Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires a description of all pending material legal
proceedings. Item 103 normally requires any non-routine liability to be disclosed, as well
as any damage claims that exceed 10 percent of the net worth of a company OR probable
liability that is equal to or greater than $100,000, though the SEC claims that $100,000 is
not a bright-line test. Item 103 is the most violated requirement.
Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires a public company to disclose any known trends or
uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material impact on operations.
B. Alternative Proposals for Determining Materiality
1. ASTM
Some groups have petitioned the SEC to formally enact as regulations under the
Act the American Society of Testing and Materials ("ASTM") Standard Guide for
Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities (ASTM E2137-01) established in March
2002 for estimating and disclosing environmental liabilities. According to the
rulemaking petition, adoption of the ASTM standards would provide a uniform
and comprehensive approach to estimating environmental liabilities and
expanding the scope of conditions requiring disclosure. Should the SEC decide to
enact regulations enshrining the ASTM standards, companies may be faced with
expanded disclosure obligations if they do not currently adhere to the ASTM
standards.
ASTM E2137-01 gives a public company mechanism by which to estimate the
amount ofpotential liabilities, particularly when there are uncertainties inherent in
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the potential liabilities. ASTM E2137-01 sets forth four methods for calculating
liabilities-(l) expected costs; (2) most likely value; (3) range of value; and (4)
known minimum value. The method to be used depends on the amount of
information available and the degree of uncertainty.
2. ISO 14000
ISO 14000 standards are a set of internationally-recognized standards for
environmental process management developed by the International Organization
for Standardization. The Act provides that public companies must maintain
controls on procedures for making disclosures, and do an evaluation of their
internal disclosure controls within 90 days before filing quarterly reports. See
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15. ISO 14000 processes and ISO
certification under ISO 14001 give public companies a mechanism to monitor
their environmental management systems to ensure that they can give proper
assurances under Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15. Unlike ASTM E2137-
01, there has not been a push to codify ISO 14000 standards into regulations as a
method to achieve prima facie compliance.
3. Other Standards
Other standards which attempt to give meaning to the materiality requirement
include: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Statement of Position
96-1, Environmental Remediation Liabilities; Financial Accounting Standards
Board Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.5, Accounting for
Contingencies; and Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 14,
Reasonable Estimation of the Amount of a Loss.
III. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Attorney-Client Privilege
Section 307 of the Act authorizes the SEC to enact rules "setting forth minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys practicing before the Commission." The SEC has taken steps
to exercise its authority under Section 307 of the Act by enacting a rule requiring attorneys for
public corporations to report potential violations of law "up the ladder" to senior management
and by proposing a rule requiring a "noisy withdrawal" by an attorney for a public company if
senior management does not appropriately react to the up the ladder reporting of potential
violations. Both the current up the ladder reporting rule and the proposed noisy withdrawal rule
have implications for the attorney-client privilege.
A. Threshold Issues
1. "Practicing Before the Commission"
Section 307 of the Act limits the SEC's authority to those attorneys "practicing
before the Commission." The SEC has claimed jurisdiction over all lawyers
preparing and issuing securities, representing a public company in any way before
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the SEC, making or preparing disclosures to the SEC, or otherwise providing
advice on documents to be filed with the SEC. See 17 CFR § 205.2(a); SEC Rule
of Practice 102(f). The last two provisions pull in attorneys preparing disclosures
of any type to the SEC, including disclosures of environmental liabilities. Thus,
even though most environmental attorneys do not consider themselves to be
securities lawyers, if those lawyers aid in preparing environmental disclosures
they are "practicing before the Commission" for the purposes of Section 307 of
the Act and all rules enacted under that Section. There are no cases at this time
challenging the SEC's interpretation of the extent of its power under Section 307
of the Act.
The SEC has the authority to "censure a person or deny, temporarily or
permanently, the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way ..."
upon finding of a violation of the rules applicable to attorneys under the Act, in
much the same manner that state bar associations have authority to sanction
attorney conduct. See SEC Rule of Practice 102(e). Disbarment by the SEC
would extend both to administrative hearings practice before the SEC as well as
the privilege to file documents with the SEC. The SEC has indicated that it will
not hesitate to impose sanctions on offending attorneys if state bar associations
fail to do so.
2. Who is the client?
The issuer, i.e., the company, is the client-not individual members of the board,
officers, or employees.
3. Who has the authority to enforce the rules?
Only the SEC has the authority to enforce the Act or the attorney conduct rules.
They do not create a private cause of action on behalf of shareholders of the
company.
B. Up the Ladder Reporting Rules
The Up the Ladder Reporting Rule requires attorneys aware of evidence of a material
violation of law to report that evidence to the CEO or chief legal officer of the public
company. This rule is of particular importance to environmental attorneys, who normally
deal with environmental managers and not persons at the senior management level. This
rule does not directly affect the attorney-client privilege (though it does interfere in the
attorney-client relationship) because it does not directly require a breach of the privilege.
However, other parts of the Rule are of concern.
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1. What must be reported up?
The final Up the Ladder Reporting Rule requires an attorney to report to the CEO
or chief legal officer upon receipt of evidence of a material violation. Evidence of
a material violation is defined as:
Credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the
circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it
is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is
about to occur.
This definition takes in both violations in the past, the present, and those about to
occur.
This definition also puts the attorney in the position of being required to judge the
conduct of the company as opposed to simply responding to client requests for
legal services. Clients - and client representatives - expect absolute loyalty from
their attorneys. However, if your client contact is a midlevel environmental
manager, you may be placed in the position of reporting your client contact to the
chief legal officer, CEO or QLCC if you believe any actions taken by your client
contact are a material violation of law.
There are also issues concerning what constitutes an appropriate response by the
company to a report by an attorney under the Rule. An "appropriate response" by
the company is either to enact remedial measures based on the report, or obtain an
opinion from another attorney that there is a colorable defense to the alleged
material violation.
2. How does the Rule affect ethical rules concerning disclosure of client
confidences?
The Rule permits, but does not require, attorneys to reveal client confidences to
the SEC without the client's consent if the attorney believes that a material
violation of law will occur. See 17 CFR § 203.5(d)(2). Any attorney who
chooses to breach the confidence and reveal client confidences in such a manner
would in most states be guilty of a violation of ethics rules on confidentiality of
client information (as distinct from the evidentiary privilege). The SEC takes the
position that its rules preempt all other conflicting law, and that this preemption
gives any attorney cover from an ethics complaint. See 17 CFR § 205.1; 17 CFR
§ 205.6(c). However, it is not clear that state ethics rules would recognize any
federal preemption since this rule is not mandatory. See, e.g., SCR 3.130(1.6),
Commentary 20-22 (setting forth the principle that disclosure of client
confidences based on other law is only appropriate in Kentucky when compelled
and that there is a presumption against interpreting other law to compel
disclosure). In other words, in most states an attorney risks an ethics violation if
he or she attempts to rely on the SEC for authority to breach client confidences.
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As noted above, the SEC has given itself the power to sanction attorneys who do
not comply with the Up the Ladder Reporting Rule. See SEC Rule of Practice
102(e). While this provision could only be invoked if the SEC determines that a
public company committed a material violation of law, the SEC could use this
provision to force attorneys to defend their own actions, and, in tum, reveal client
confidences to the SEC in their own defense.
C. Proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rules
The proposed Noisy Withdrawal Rule would require attorneys who reasonably believe
that a material violation of law is ongoing or about to occur and that the material
violation of law is likely to result in substantial injury to the public company or its
investors must (1) withdraw from the representation; (2) provide written notice to the
SEC that the attorney had withdrawn from the representation for "professional
considerations"; and (3) disaffirm to the SEC any filing which contains any material
misrepresentations. The last provision applies to in-house attorneys, but in-house
attorneys are not required to quit their jobs.
This proposed Rule is designed to give notice to the SEC of potential violations of law,
which implicitly reveals a client confidence. The SEC has contended that the proposed
Rule is consistent with ABA Model Rules 1.16(a)(I) and 4.1, Comment 3, which allow
an attorney to withdraw from a representation if the attorney's services are or will be used
in commission ofa fraud or crime. See also SCR 3.130(1.16) and 3.130(4.1) (equivalent
Kentucky ethics rules). However, some commentators have opined that the
circumstances permitting withdrawal in Model Rules 1.16(a)(I) and 4.21 are sufficiently
broad to protect client confidences, whereas a withdrawal under the SEC proposed Rule
will give the SEC much more information concerning the conduct of the client.
Given the outcry over the proposed Noisy Withdrawal rule, the SEC has tabled the Rule
for now and is offering for comment an alternate proposal which would allow the
attorney to withdraw upon notice to the public company. The public company would
then have the burden to notify the SEC of the withdrawal. This proposal has also been
criticized on the same grounds as the original proposal, i.e., that the SEC notice
provisions reveal client confidences no matter who is compelled to make the disclosure.
Note that the "Noisy Withdrawal" rule still applies to a QLCC. If the majority of the
members of a QLCC believe that a company has not taken proper remedial measures
after a report of a material breach of law, the QLCC, chief legal officer, and CEO must
report that to the SEC and disavow any tainted filings.
D. Investigation of Whistleblower Complaints
Attorneys - both outside counsel and in-house counsel - are increasingly being called
upon to assist audit committees in investigating whistleblower complaints. This raises
several issues, including whether attorneys should be involved in the initial complaint
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"hotline" process, and how attorneys should proceed to investigate whistleblower
complaints.
1. Should attorneys answer the whistleblower hotline?
Many third-party vendors are advertising "hotline" services to public companies
to discharge audit committee responsibilities to create mechanisms for employees
to report alleged wrongdoing. Using a third-party vendor can be a bad idea. It is
preferable to use in-house legal staff for such "hotline" services. The use of in-
house legal staff gives the public company an argument that the reports are
cloaked with the attorney-client privilege, and in-house legal staff are in a better
position to determine if the "whistleblower" is legitimate or is simply a
disgruntled employee.
2. How should an internal investigation of whistleblower complaints be
conducted?
Attorneys should be involved in every step of the investigation of a whistleblower
complaint, for obvious reasons of privilege. However, it may be prudent to use
primarily outside counsel for such investigations because there are normally fewer
challenges that can be made to the application of the privilege to outside counsel
than for in-house counsel.
The choice of outside counsel is also important. If the public company and its
officers and directors have a longstanding relationship with one firm, it may not
be prudent to use that firm for the investigation. A private law firm with
substantial ties to existing management may be viewed as beholden to that current
management and may not be viewed as impartial. It often makes sense to use a
law firm with few or no existing ties to the public company, and that law firm
should answer only to the audit committee.
A whistleblower investigation may also tum into a dual investigation--one of the
initial company, and another of any alleged retaliation against the whistleblower.
Attorneys directing a whistleblower investigation must be careful to fully
investigate both sides of the equation while keeping the issues separate.
IV. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Public Information
In addition to the direct implications of the Act, U.S. EPA's roll-out of the ECHO Database,
along with other publicly-available data from U.S. EPA and equivalent state agencies, may have
implications for the reporting of environmental liabilities in securities filings.
A. Publicly-Available Information
The ECHO Database (Enforcement and Compliance History Online) provides the public
easy access to facility enforcement and compliance information for approximately
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800,000 facilities for the past two years. Facilities regulated under the Clean Air Act
Stationary Source Program, Clean Water Act, National Pollutant Elimination Discharge
System, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act are included in the ECHO
Database. Information on the ECHO Database is available on the U.S. EPA website at
http://www.epa.gov/echo/.
The ECHO Database is updated once a month, but some commentators have noticed a
longer lag time between posting of a proposed penalty assessment and correction to a
final, negotiated penalty assessment, which could be much lower. An EPA spokesperson
has admitted that "there may be a small percentage of cases where EPA shows the
proposed penalty where the company has settled for a lesser amount." See "Sarbanes-
Oxley Act Forces Corporations to Focus on Environmental Disclosure Rules," 34
ENVIRONMENT REpORTER 36 at 2048-2049 (September 12,2003).
Other regulatory agencies commonly post enforcement records on their websites, and any
member of the public can easily obtain enforcement information about public companies
from regulatory agencies through the Freedom of Information Act and its state
equivalents.
B. Interaction of Publicly-Available Information and the Materiality
Requirement
Item 103 of Regulation S-K of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires a public
company to disclose any non-routine liability, as well as any damage claims that exceed
10 percent of the net worth of a company OR probable liability that is equal to or greater
than $100,000. See Section II.A, supra. The ECHO Database will include information
on proposed penalty assessments, and that information will be available to the public and
the SEC. If a proposed penalty is listed in excess of $100,000, the SEC and stockholders
will be able to find that information to use as a double-check against disclosures. If that
proposed penalty is not disclosed pursuant to Item 103, the SEC or stockholders may be
under the impression that the public company failed to properly disclose liabilities, even
if the ultimate liability ended up being less than $100,000. This danger heightens the
need for public companies to periodically review the accuracy of information in the
ECHO Database and similar databases to make sure accurate penalty information is
posted.
The SEC has made a recent push to upgrade its publicly-available databases so that
investors have more current information about public companies, and has attempted to
work toward better coordination with EPA on information-sharing. Neither the SEC nor
EPA have made any specific commitments, with EPA being particularly non-committal,
but such information linkage will likely come in the future.
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ETHICS PROBLEMS
1. You are outside counsel representing a large mining company, Mineco, Inc. Mineco has
issued securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. During a visit to a mine
you inquire as to the status of the mining permits for the current mining. The mining engineer, a
mid-level employee, tells you that Mineco applied for the permits but has not yet received them.
Mining without a permit is a violation of state and federal law.
a. What are your duties under the Up the Ladder Reporting provisions of the Act? Is
the violation material?
b. If you report the potential violation of law to upper management, are your duties
discharged?
c. You meet with the CEO of Mineco, and he informs you that he was already aware
of the problem and authorized mining activity prior to receipt of a permit. What
are your duties at this point?
d. Mineco has a QLCC. What do you need to do?
e. No regulatory authorities have found out about the violation at this time. You get
a request from Mineco's audit committee for a list of all environmental liabilities
that should be disclosed under the Act and Regulation S-K. Do you disclose the
unpermitted mining? What if the client objects?
f. Assume that you disclose the unpermitted mining to the SEC against the wishes
of the client. The client files a bar complaint against you. What do you do?
g. Do any of your answers change if you are an in-house attorney at Mineco?
1
h. The mmmg engineer reported the violation to the audit committee. After
reporting the violation to the audit committee, the mining engineer is demoted and
files a whistleblower complaint. The audit committee comes to you for advice on
investigating his allegations. The initial investigation into the mining engineer's
complaint is not complete. How should the investigation be structured?
2. You are an associate in a mid-sized law firm. You are the primary client contact for a
landfill owned by a company which has issued securities registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, We-Dump-It, Inc., but a senior partner has ultimate responsibility for the
We-Dump-It. An employee of the landfill calls you one day and tells you that the on-site
man8:ger has authorized disposal ofwastes in the landfill not allowed under the landfill's permit.
a. You call the on-site manager of the landfill and ask him if what the employee
claims is true. The manager denies the allegations and claims the employee is
"just trying to make trouble because he didn't get a promotion." What do you do?
b. You decide you believe the employee. Do you immediately call the General
Counsel of We-Dump-It or consult the partner in charge ofthe case?
c. You consulted the partner in charge, and she did not believe you and sides with
the on-site manager. Is that the end ofthe matter?
d. The partner believed you, and she informed the General Counsel. The General
Counsel takes no action to even investigate the matter. Do you have any further
responsibilities?
e. You decided to call the General Counsel of We-Dump-It without consulting the
partner in charge. The General Counsel sides with the on-site manager. What are
your responsibilities at that point?
f. You call the General Counsel, and he does not dispute the allegations. The
General Counsel informs you that the on-site manager was working pursuant to a
general directive at the corporate level and asks you to call the on-site manager to
let him know that you have been informed of the new corporate policy. What do
you do?
g. Assume that when you called the General Counsel without the partner in charge's
permission, the General Counsel believed you and fired the on-site manager.
Later, the on-site manager sues for wrongful termination, and in the lawsuit it
comes out that the employee was lying. The General Counsel files a malpractice
action against your law firm. How do you defend?
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401 KAR 63:021.
401 KAR 63:024.
Overview - State Air Toxies Regulations
401 KAR 63:020, Potentially hazardous matter or toxic substances (existing)
Effective: June 6, 1979
Approved to Kentucky SIP: December 24, 1980 (45 FR 84999)
• On a case-by-case basis the cabinet has used this regulation to require risk assessments.
• The regulation:
=> Was promulgated under the mandate of KRS 224 to protect the public health and
environment.
=> Calls for case-by-case determination for any material that could be "harmful to the health
and welfare of humans, animals, and plants."
=> Applies to any "affected facility which emits or may emit potentially hazardous matter or
toxic substances."
Existing sources emitting toxic air pollutants (amended)
Repeal of 401 KAR 63:022, New or modified sources emitting toxic air
pollutants
Effective: November 11, 1986
Amended/Repealed: January 19, 1999
• The 1999 revision to the state air toxics program repealed 401 KAR 63 :022 regarding new or
modified sources emitting toxic air pollutants. The revision also amended 401 KAR 63:021
to provide that any condition of a permit issued under these regulations must remain in place
unless the source can demonstrate that compliance with the condition is no longer necessary
to protect human health or the environment (no back-sliding provision).
• All sources of toxic air pollutants that were subject to 401 KAR 63:021 or 401 KAR 63:022
became subject to 401 KAR 63:020.
• The amendment to 401 KAR 63:021 and the repeal of 401 KAR 63:022 allowed sources to
be excused from the obligation under the Title V program to re-demonstrate compliance with
Kentucky air toxics regulations (i.e., all state origin requirements). Such sources are not
required to re-demonstrate compliance with Kentucky's air toxic regulations when they
receive their Title V permit, but they are not allowed to alter or remove controls or
procedures that were used to achieve compliance with these administrative regulations.
• Reasons for the revisions to the air toxics regulations included:
=> The air toxics program was ineffective and inefficient. In the twelve years that the
regulations existed, fewer than ten sources were impacted.
=> Excessive amounts of agency and industry time and resources were expended in
preparing and reviewing applications and modeling results only to determine that nothing
was required to be done to meet the provisions of the regulations.
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=> The preparation and review of air toxics permits under these regulations was very costly
and time consuming, and human health and the environment would be better served if the
Division and industry resources were redirected to other air quality issues.
=> The citizens of the Commonwealth would be better served if the resources being
expended on the air toxics program were redirected to more positively impact human
health and the environment.
• The Division applies 401 KAR 63:020 on a case-by-case basis as necessary.
=> Catalog emissions and identify Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs)
=> Identify HAPS that may pose risk to public health and the environment
=> Conduct screening modeling to predict maximum concentrations in ambient air
=> Compare maximum concentrations to acceptable limits (IRIS, Region 9 PROs, OEHHA,
et al)
=> If necessary, conduct more precise screening
=> If exceedence still exists, work with source to resolve
• Sources that subject to 401 KAR 63:021 or 401 KAR 63:022 prior to the 1999 revisions are
not allowed to alter or remove controls or procedures that were used to achieve compliance
with these regulations.
=> The "no back-sliding" provision of 401 KAR 63:021 applies to all permit conditions.
This includes technological controls as well as throughput limits and operating hour
limitations.
=> The permit conditions must remain in force absent a demonstration by a source that a
condition will no longer be necessary to protect the human health or the environment.
• The 1999 state air toxics revision was somewhat controversial:
=> In general, industry supported the Division's position, while the environmental
community feared that the action would ultimately have a negative impact on human
health and the environment.
=> EQC's approval of the revision was contingent upon the Cabinet establishing an air
toxics task force to review the air toxics regulations and make recommendations on how
to address the concerns of the environmental and regulated communities.
• Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) establishes a two-stage regulatory process to address
emissions of HAPs from stationary sources.
=> In the first stage, after EPA has identified categories of sources emitting one or more of
the HAP listed in the CAA, Section 112(d) requires EPA to promulgate national
technology-based emission standards for sources within those categories that emit or
have the potential to emit any single HAP at a rate of 10 tons or more per year or any
combination of HAP at a rate of 25 tons per year (known as "major sources"), as well as
for certain "area sources" emitting less than those amounts. These technology-based
standards are commonly referred to as maximum achievable control technology (MACT)
standards.
=> The second stage in standard-setting is described in section 112(f) of the CAA. The
provision requires, first, that EPA prepare a Report to Congress discussing risk posed by
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sources after implementation of the MACT standards. This report ("Residual Risk
Report to Congress") was prepared and submitted in March 1999. Since Congress did
not act on this report EPA was then required to begin the standard-setting process, the
residual risk phase. This requires EPA to look at each source category and determine
whether the MACT standards protect public health with an ample margin of safety. Ifthe
MACT standards for HAP "classified as a known, probable or possible human
carcinogen do not reduce lifetime excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to
emissions from a source in the category or subcategory to less than one in one million,"
EOPA must promulgate residual risk standards. The terms "individual most exposed and
"ample margin of safety" are not defined in the CAA but are found in EPA's 1989
rulemaking on benzene emissions, better known as the Benzene NESHAP.
• Given that EPA is behind in the process described above for determination that MACT
standards have or have not provided an "ample margin safety", the Environmental and Public
Protection Cabinet has embarked on an effort to establish an air toxics program that goes
beyond the generic application of401 KAR 63:020 and formalizes in Kentucky regulations, a
process for making this determination. This effort is not yet complete; however, a
workgroup of individuals who have special knowledge and experience in the fields of
toxicology, environmental protection and risk assessment have been assembled to assist in
the formulation of the regulatory program.
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I. STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO REGULATE TOXIC AIR POLLUTANTS
Congress and state legislatures establish the extent to which the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("U.S. EPA), state agencies, and/or local regulatory
authorities must or may regulate toxic air pollutants. It is axiomatic that an agency's
promulgation of administrative regulations must be consistent with its statutory authorizations.
NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 ("[T]he
regulations at issue must be fully consistent with [the statute]."); Flying J Travel Plaza v.
Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet, Dep't of Highways, 928 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Ky. 1996) (stating
that regulations are valid only "as subordinate rules when found to be within the framework of
the policy defined by the legislation" because an agency's authority is "limited to a direct
implementation of the functions assigned to the agency by statute."). As to air pollutants that
may present a risk to human health, Congress has often authorized U.S. EPA to protect human
health with "an ample margin of safety."
Under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), for example, U.S. EPA is to establish and periodically
review primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for any
pollutant the "emissions of which ... cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. §7408(a)(l)(A). U.S. EPA is to
set primary NAAQS at levels "the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the
Administrator, ... allow[s] an adequate margin of safety, [and] are requisite to protect the public
health." Id. §7409(b)(l) (emphasis added). Moreover, U.S. EPA may, on the basis of all the
information it has accessible, promulgate regulations to "control or prohibit the manufacture,
introduction into commerce, offering for sale, or sale of any fuel or fuel additive for use in a
motor vehicle [or] motor vehicle engine ... if ... any emission product of such fuel or fuel
additive causes, or contributes, to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
the public health or welfare." 42 U.S.c.A. § 7545(c)(1).
Pursuant to Section 112(b) of the CAA, U.S. EPA is also authorized to regulate
hazardous air pollutants ("HAPs"), which are specific listed in the statute. 42 U.S.c.
§7412(b)(1). However, U.S. EPA must periodically review and revise this list by "adding
pollutants which present, or may present, through inhalation or other routes of exposure, a threat
of adverse human health effects ...." Id. § 7412(b)(2). Following promulgation of technology-
based emission standards for source categories of HAPs, U.S. EPA is to determine whether, for
each source category, the technology-based standards protect public health ''with an ample
margin of safety." Id. § 7412(t)(2)(A).
State statutes do not necessarily contain as specific an authorization as the CAA for
regulating potentially harmful air pollutants. For example, KRS Chapter 224 provides the
Kentucky Division for Air Quality with the following authorities to promulgate regulations to
control the emission ofair pollutants from point sources:
224.20-100 Finding as to necessity for act
The Kentucky General Assembly hereby finds that it is necessary
to the health and welfare of the citizens of Kentucky that there be
maintained at all times both now and in the future a reasonable
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degree of purity of the air resources of this Commonwealth
consistent with maximum employment and full industrial
development necessary for the protection of the public health, the
general welfare, and the property and people in this
Commonwealth; and foster the comfort and convenience of its
inhabitants and facilitate the enjoyment of the natural attractions of
the state.
224.20-120 Considerations in fixing standards
In exercising the power conferred upon it by this chapter the
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet shall
give due recognition to the policy as heretofore expressed in KRS
224.20-100. The cabinet, in fixing standards, shall require the use
of all available, practical, and reasonable methods to prevent and
control air pollution in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It shall
give due recognition to the quantity of characteristics of air
contaminants or the duration of their presence in the atmosphere.
It shall take into consideration in this connection such factors,
among others, found by it to be proper andjust, existing physical
conditions, public benefit, that the degree of conformance
therewith that may be proper as to an essentially residential area of
the state may not be proper as to a highly industrial area of the
state, and, further, the relationship between the intensity and
composition of air pollution and the health of the public and
damage to or interference with enjoyment of property. It shall give
reasonable consideration to the interests of all parties concerned.
KRS 224.20-100 (emphasis added); KRS 224.20-120 (emphasis added).
The Louisville Metro Air Pollution Control District ("District") derives it rulemaking
authority from KRS Chapter 77. These statutory provisions provide as follows:
77.060 General powers of district
(1) The district shall have power to ... make rules and regulations
and do all other things necessary to carry out the provisions of this
chapter....
77.155 Prohibited emission of air contaminants
(2) ... The board shall have power, by regulation, to fix reasonable
limits, by weight or otherwise, for particular air contaminants or
other material which in the opinion of said board may cause or
have tendency to cause injury, detriment, nuisance, or annoyance
to any considerable number of persons or to the public ...
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77.190 Authority to enact orders, rules and regulations for
reduction of air pollution
Whenever the air pollution control board finds that the air in the air
pollution control district is so polluted as to cause any discomfort
or property damage at intervals to a substantial number of
inhabitants of the district, the air pollution control board may make
and enforce such orders, rules, and regulations as will reduce the
amount ofair contaminants released within the district.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has interpreted KRS Chapter 77 as authorizing the District to
"make regulations which are necessary in order to carry out the statute's provisions and
purposes, to establish reasonable limits for particular air contaminants, and to regulate the
amounts of air contaminants released within the districts." Frederick v. Air Pollution Control
Dist. ofJefferson County, 783 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Ky. 1990).
Unless the relevant legislative body has specified that a certain pollutant or group of
pollutants poses an unacceptable risk and shall be the subject of regulation, as an initial
threshold, the regulatory agency must first determine whether an unacceptable risk of injury or
impact on human health exists under the authorizing statute before it may promulgate health-
based regulations for the pollutant. The courts have generally afforded considerable deference to
regulatory agencies in making this determination. In essence, the courts have generally found
this to be a "policy" type decision, especially where the statutes are written to prevent emissions
of pollutants that "may" cause injury or that will "endanger" public health. As explained by the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit regarding the "will endanger public health"
threshold for regulating fuel additives:
[W]e conclude that the 'will endanger' standard is precautionary in
nature and does not require proof of actual harm before regulation
is appropriate.... Danger, the Administrator recognized, is not set
by a fixed probability of harm, but rather is composed of reciprocal
elements of risk and harm, or probability and severity. That is to
say, the public health may properly be found endangered both by a
lesser risk of a greater harm and by a greater risk of a lesser harm.
Danger depends upon the relation between the risk and harm
presented by each case, and cannot legitimately be pegged to
'probable' harm, regardless of whether that harm may be great or
small.
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to
come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the public
health, and the decision that of an expert Administrator, we will
not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect. Such
proof may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of
the statute is to be served. Of course, we are not suggesting that
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the Administrator has the power to act on hunches or wild guesses.
. . . his conclusions must be rationally justified.
Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 17-18,28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
With respect to regulation of HAPs under Section 112 of the CAA, "[U.S.] EPA, not the
court[s], has the technical expertise to decide what inferences must be drawn from the
characteristics of . . . substances and to formulate policy with respect to what risks are
acceptable." Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir.
1987). Congress "recognized in Section 112 that the determination of what is 'safe' will always
be marked by scientific uncertainty and thus exhorted the Administrator to set emission
standards that will provide an 'ample margin' of safety. This language permits the Administrator
to take into account scientific uncertainty and to use expert discretion to determine what action
should be taken in light of that uncertainty." Id. at 1165.
II. POLICY AND SCIENCE ISSUES IN PROMULGATING RULES FOR TOXIC AIR
POLLUTANTS
A. Policy Issues
As set forth above, where a statute authorizes a regulatory agency to promulgate
regulations to control air pollutants that may endanger human health, the agency will generally
have discretion in determining the level of "risk" to human health that is acceptable due to
exposure. Under U.S. EPA's residual risk program for HAPs, U.S. EPA has indicated its overall
objective:
In protecting public health with an ample margin of safety, we
strive to provide maximum feasible protection against risk to
health from hazardous air pollutants by (l) protecting the greatest
number of persons possible to an individual lifetime risk level no
higher than approximately 1 in 1 million; and (2) limiting to no
higher than 1 in 10,000 [i.e., 100 in a million] the estimated risk
that a person living near a facility would have if he or she were
exposed to the maximum pollutant concentrations for 70 years.
69 Fed. Reg. 48340 (August 9, 2004) (proposed coke oven batteries residual risk rule).
It seems important to put health risks from exposure to toxic air pollutants in perspective
when promulgating regulations so the public can appreciate the true nature of the potential risks
and the potential costs of reduction to achieve the selected or proposed risk standards. For
example, the risk of being killed by accidents associated with many routine aspects of life are
frequently far lower than one in a million. See Attachment 1. The lifetime risks of dying from
an accident in the home or from a motor vehicle accident are both greater than one in one
thousand. The risk of being struck and killed by lightening in a lifetime is also calculated as
being far less than 1 in 100,000. This demonstrates that standards or controls to reduce lifetime
risks from exposure to below 1 in 100,000 are very protective when compared to other risks
associated with modem life.
H - 12
When promulgating regulations, several other "policy" factors also help to determine the
necessary control stringency that will reduce the health exposure risk from toxic air pollutants.
For example, if a lifetime cancer risk goal ofone in a million is established, the following factors
will impact the stringency ofcontrols necessary to achieve that standard:
• Where is the risk to be determined or measured?
• The fence line of the industrial facility;
• The nearest residential area; or
• Any location to which the public may have access (e.g., on waterways or
highways)?
• What is the standard for lifetime exposure?
• 70 years;
• The average residence time in anyone location; or
• 24 hours per day versus average hours per day in a single location?
• Which sources of the toxic air pollutant at issue will be regulated in order to
achieve the risk standard?
• Only industrial point sources;
• Area sources;
• Mobile sources; or
• All sources?
One or more of these "policy" issues may be addressed in the statute authorizing the
agency to promulgate regulations to control toxic air pollutants. If a statute does not specifically
address such issues, and provides for "reasonable" regulation of point source emissions or
otherwise qualifies or restricts the authority of the agency to promulgate such regulations, a
question may arise as to whether policy choices with respect to regulating risks are reasonable.
For example, one may argue that a program designed to regulate risks based upon a 100 year
lifespan would be unreasonable. Similarly, a program designed to regulate emissions based upon
a resident's lifetime exposure to ambient air inside the fence line ofan industrial facility or in the
middle of a river would appear to be overly stringent. Indeed, based upon the risks associated
with many aspects of modem life (see Attachment 1), one could argue that setting a strict 1 in a
million lifetime standard for control of emissions from point sources is not "reasonable" within
the meaning ofKRS 224.20-100 or KRS 77.155.
B. Science Used to Establish Risk Associated with Levels ofEmissions
Once the regulatory agency makes its policy decisions that define the acceptable risk, it
then must determine the amount of emissions of a given toxic air pollutant that will not exceed
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the established risk level in ambient air. This is very difficult determination because it involves
highly technical and scientific issues. Such issues generally involve complicated emission
computer modeling, as well as reliance on toxicological studies to determine the ambient
concentrations at which a toxic air pollutant is expected to cause acute or chronic health concerns
to one person in the populations to be protected (e.g., 1 in 1,000,000) over the period at issue. At
the federal level, U.S. EPA has the technical resources to conduct such analyses. Even then,
however, U.S. EPA's risk evaluations are commonly subject to legal challenge. Moreover, the
science is constantly evolving.
When a state or local air pollution control agency undertakes the regulation of toxic air
pollutants through development of its own program, it may not have the in-house technical
resources or expertise to independently develop such standards. In such cases, a state or local
agency may look to established databases prepared by U.S. EPA or others for use as key
components of the local program. This may also create concerns if the database or program to be
relied upon:
• Is outdated or was not designed or intended to be used in the manner that the
agency is proposing; or
• Was designed based upon a different statutory authority with standards that vary
from the standards established in the state or local agency's authorizing statute
(e.g., "reasonable controls" versus "protect with amble margin of safety").
An example of such concerns arise from the use of U.S. EPA's Integrated Risk
Information System ("IRIS") database. U.S. EPA's IRIS database contains "chemical specific
summaries of qualitative and quantitative health information in support of the first two steps of
the risk assessment process, i.e., hazard identification and dose-response evaluation. Combined
with specific situational exposure assessment information, the information in IRIS may be used
as a source in evaluating potential public health risks from environmental contaminants." 69
Fed. Reg. 5971 (February 9, 2004). Mandatory reliance on an IRIS database to determine
acceptable levels of emissions of toxic air pollutants may grossly over-estimate or under-estimate
the risk associated with emissions of a particular toxic air pollutant where the IRIS value is out
of date or was not subjected to peer review. In fact, U.S. EPA has emphasized that the IRIS
database should not be used as the exclusive means of determining the potential health risks from
exposure to a toxic air pollutant:
EPA recognizes that IRIS is not a comprehensive toxicological
database. There may be more recent relevant information available
than is contained in IRIS. IRIS values are not rules adopted after
notice and comment rulemaking, although recent IRIS assessments
are posted on the Internet and public comments are solicited. IRIS
values are not legally binding and are not entitled to conclusive
weight in any rulemaking. In addition, EPA or any State agency
that uses IRIS should not rely exclusively on IRIS values but
should consider all credible and relevant information that is
submitted in any particular rulemaking. If an outside party
questions IRIS values during the course of an EPA rulemaking, ...
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EPA considers all credible and relevant information before it in
that proceeding.
66 Fed. Reg. 46929 (Sept. 7, 2001). Accordingly, when state or local agencies attempt to
develop toxic air pollutant regulations based upon databases, program elements, and [mdings
taken in isolation from other regulatory programs, the resulting regulations may not be
scientifically defensible or could be based upon policy considerations that are inconsistent with
the promulgating agency's statutory authority.
Other factors may also influence the over or under estimation of risk associated with an
industrial facility's emissions. For example: Are exposure assessments conducted based upon a
facility's maximum hourly emissions or annual average emissions? Are synergistic effects of
toxic air pollutants considered? How are background ambient concentrations taken into account?
Moreover, if a regulatory authority assumes several conservative factors in its risk evaluation,
this inevitably will have a compounding effect. In such an instance, even though the standard or
goal may be stated as a 1 in a million lifetime cancer risk, the program may actually be
regulating sources to a much more stringent standard. Conversely, use of overly liberal
assumptions could under-estimate risks from emissions.
C. Legal Challenges to an Agency's Scientific Determinations ofRisk
At the federal level, the courts generally apply the familiar arbitrary and capricious
standard when reviewing challenges to U.S. EPA's findings of fact-especially with respect to
the highly technical risk issues associated with exposure to air pollutants. Of course, the courts
also examine whether the agency considered the appropriate factors delineated in the authorizing
statute. With respect to scientific based challenges, the courts generally afford a high degree of
deference to the regulatory authority where such determinations are within the agency's area of
expertise. Nevertheless, the courts will closely scrutinize scientific determinations to ensure that
they have a rational basis. One of the most extensive discussions of this review is set forth in
Ethyl Com. v. EPA, 541 F.2d. 1 (D.C. Cir., 1976).
There is no inconsistency between the deferential standard of
review and the requirement that the reviewing court involve itself
in even the most complex evidentiary matters; rather, the two
indicia of arbitrary and capricious review stand in careful balance.
The close scrutiny of the evidence is intended to educate the court.
It must understand enough about the problem confronting the
agency to comprehend the meaning of the evidence relied upon
and the evidence discarded; the questions addressed by the agency
and those bypassed; the choices open to the agency and those
made. The more technical the case, the more intensive must be the
court's effort to understand the evidence, for without an
appropriate understanding of the case before it the court cannot
properly perform its appellate function. But that function must be
performed with conscientious awareness of its limited nature. The
enforced education into the intricacies of the problem before the
agency is not designed to enable the court to become a
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superagency that can supplant the agency's expert decision-maker.
To the contrary, the court must give due deference to the agency's
ability to rely on its own developed expertise. The immersion in
the evidence is designed solely to enable the court to determine
whether the agency decision was rational and based on
consideration of the relevant factors. It is settled that we must
affirm decisions with which we disagree so long as this test is met.
Thus, after our careful study of the record, we must take a step
back from the agency decision. We must look at the decision not
as the chemist, bio logist or statistician that we are qualified neither
by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court
exercising our narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain
minimal standards of rationality. Although (our) inquiry into the
facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review
is a narrow one. We must affirm unless the agency decision is
arbitrary or capricious.
Id. at 36-37 (footnotes and citations omitted). As stated in Motor Vehicle Mfr's Ass'n v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citations omitted).
[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made." In
reviewing that explanation, we must "consider whether the
decision was based upon a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Normally, an
agency rule will be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied
upon factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Where U.S. EPA's technical rulemaking judgments are being challenged, the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review also requires the court to determine whether "the agency has
provided notice and an opportunity to comment, and has fairly considered all significant data and
comments...." Kennecott v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 780 F.2d. 445,
449 (4th Cir., 1985).
Under Kentucky law, agency action in promulgating a regulation will be deemed
arbitrary where: (1) the agency exceeded its statutory powers; (2) the agency's procedures
deprived any person of due process; or (3) the agency's decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. Transp. Cabinet v. Cornell, 796 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990). As stated in
Motor Vehicle Comm'n v. Hertz Corp., 767 S.W.2d 1,2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989):
[A] legislature, or a body acting under legislative authority, may
not, "under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere
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with private business or prohibit lawful occupation or impose
unreasonable or unnecessary restrictions on them. The regulation
of a lawful business is dependent upon some reasonable necessity
for the protection of health, safety, morality or other phase of the
general welfare.
See also Kentucky Milk Marketing v. Kroger Co., 691 S.W.2d 893, 899 (Ky. 1985) ("The
question of reasonableness is one ofdegree and must be based on the facts of a particular case.");
McGuffey v. Hall 557 S.W.2d 401, 413 (Ky. 1975) (finding that a state's police power is not
without limitation: "it may not operate unreasonably beyond the occasion or necessity of the
case").
III. CONCLUSION
The extent to which a state or local agency may regulate toxic air pollutant emissions
from industry to protect public health is largely dependent on the agency's statutory rulemaking
authority. Depending upon the nature of statutory restrictions on agency power, the agency may
not be free to regulate industry to an unreasonably low risk level, especially if other non-
regulated sources contribute significantly to the perceived problem.
Methodologies used to predict the risk posed by certain levels of emissions are highly
technical, complicated, and often rely on science that is evolving. If a regulation is based upon
flawed science or is not rational, especially given the agency's statutory charge, the rules may
also be susceptible to challenge.
In sum, although state/local agency determinations receive deference, a state or local
agency does not have unfettered discretion when regulating toxic air emissions. The agency
must comply with its statutory authority, ensure that it relies on substantial evidence, and
promulgate regulations that are reasonable.
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ATTACHMENT 1
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RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH MODERN LIFE
ANNUAL RISK OF DYING FROM, 1 IN...
Accident (all kinds) 3,014
Motor vehicle accidents 6,745
Alcohol (direct plus liver disease) 6,210
Homicide 15,440
Food poisoning 56,424
Drowning 64,031
Fire 82,977
Bicycle accident 376,165
Lightning 4,478,159
Bioterrorism (anthrax) 56,424,800
u.s. pop. Divided by number ofannual deaths for 2000 except for bioterrorism. Source: CDC
as reported on website for Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, ltww.hcra.harvardedu
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Louisville Metro Air Pollution Control District
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This is Draft 2 of the set of STAR program regulations. For each regulation, the PDF
document linked in the right column identifies with a double underline the changes
between Draft 1 (September 16,2004) and Draft 2 (January 10,2005). If there is not a
link to the regulation, the District did not make a change to that regulation between
Draft 1 and Draft 2.
On 1/13/2005, the Committee of the Whole of the Air Pollution Control Board
approved beginning the formal public review process for the proposed regulations.
All of the regulations are provided as Adobe PDF tiles.
No. Regulation Title Changes
from
Draft 1
1.02 Definitions 1.02
1.06 Stationary Source Self Monitoring, Emissions Inventory Development, 1.06
and Reporting
1.07 Excess Emissions During Startups, Shutdowns, and Malfunctions 1.07
1.20 Malfunction Prevention Programs 1.20
1.21 Enhanced Leak Detection and Repair Programs 1.21
2.08 Emissions Fees, Permit Fees, Permit Renewal Procedures, and 2.08
Additional Program Fees
3.01 Ambient Air Quality Standards 3.01
3.02 Applicability of Ambient Air Quality Standards -
3.03 Definitions -
3.04 Ambient Air Quality Standards -
3.05 Methods of Measurement -
5.01 General Provisions 5.01
5.03 Potential Hazardous Emissions -
5.11 Standards of Performance for Existing Processes and Process 5.11
Equipment Emitting Toxic Air Pollutants
5.12 Standards ofPerformance for New or Modified Processes or Process 5.12
Equipment Emitting Toxic Air Pollutants
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5.20 Methodology for Determining Benchmark Ambient Concentration of a 5.20
Toxic Air Contaminant
5.21 Environmental Acceptability for Toxic Air Contaminants 5.21
5.22 Procedures for Determining the Maximum Ambient Concentration of 5.22
a Toxic Air Contaminant
5.23 Categories of Toxic Air Contaminants 5.23
5.30 Report and Plan ofAction for Identified Source Sectors (Added in 5.30
second draft)
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"When You Wish Upon A STAR"
Politics, Policy And Air Toxics
In Metro Louisville, Kentucky
Tom FitzGerald, Director
Kentucky Resources Council, Inc.·
P.O. Box 1070
Frankfort, Kentucky 40602
www.kyrc.org
1. Political Realignment and Changing Expectations
* Shift from heavy industrial to service economy
* Evolution OfAir Pollution Control Agency
2. History ofState Activities Towards Controlling Air Toxics
A. 1986 state air toxics regulations.
Developed pursuant to Reagan Administration initiative to encourage state lead in
development ofair toxics regulations. Identified lists ofchemicals and compounds, and
required demonstration that emissions fell below threshold or imposition ofcontrols to
achieve that emission limit.
Underprotective ofpublic health due to certain assumptions in the standards and
calculation ofallowable emissions.
i. Allowance for stack height.
ii. Use of l/42M fraction ofTLVs. Developed by ACGrn for occupational exposure, and
never intended to be used to establish ambient concentrations for general public.
iii. Scope ofcoverage included 92 chemicals contrasted with the 736 chemicals listed in
the new source regulation as being toxics ofconcern..
B. 1994 Air Toxics Program Issues Paper
Recognized failure of 1986 regulations. Invited public comment on state methodology
for addressing the requirements ofthe Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 regulating
189 "hazardous air pollutants" from 174 categories ofsources, and how this new
requirement would be meshed with the existing state air pollution regulations governing
the air toxics emissions.
C. Kentucky Air Toxic Pollutants Workgroup
"EPPC is ofthe opinion that the public interest would be served by the development ofa
state regulatory program that identifies ambient levels oftoxic air pollutants that are
consistent with protection ofhealth-related values and establishes clear-cut
implementation procedures."
D. Evolution of Local Toxics Control Efforts
1. West County Community Task Force - West Louisville Air Toxics Study
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2. Legal Authority
a. Clean Air Act and "floor preemption"
42 U.S.C. 7416, CAAA Sec. 116, explicitly preserves state and local government
authority, noting that
... nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right ofany
State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (l) any
standard or limitation respecting emissions ofair pollutants or (2)
any requirement respecting control or abatement ofair pollution;
except that the standards cannot be less stringent than those required under the Act and
included in a state implementation plan. Likewise, KRS 224.20-130 requires that a local
district's regulations and standards be no less stringent than those adopted by the cabinet.
b. KRS Chapter 77 provides explicit authorization for a county to establish a local air
pollution control program. It designates each county~ an air pollution control district,
and provides the mechanism by which the district's program becomes activated.
General rulemaking authority in KRS 77.060(1) to make rules and regulations
"necessary to carry out the provisions ofthis chapter."
Specific authorization in KRS 77.155(2) to "fix reasonable limits" by weight or
otherwise,
for particular air contaminants or other material·which in the opinion of
said board may cause or have tendency to cause injury, detriment,
nuisance, or annoyance to any considerable number ofpersons or to the
public.
c. Preemption and "concurrent authority"
"Gap filling" on residual risk. Status ofEPA Actions on MACT and residual risk.
Eight years after EPA publishes a final technology-based NESHAP for a source category,
they are required to determine ifthe residual risk from air toxics emissions for that source
category are protective ofhuman health and the environment with an ample margin of
safety. They are also required to review the technology-based standards every eight years
after publication.
EPA acknowledged in January 2005 that it had missed the 8-year statutory deadline and
that "we are focusing our resources on the 8 projects where we have missed our deadline
and Earth Justice has filed suit and we are under schedule negotiations. 20 residual risk
and MATC review standards development projects are underway, first proposal is for
coke ovens.
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Issues associated with regulation:
a. Point of Compliance for measuring risk and defining "ambient air."
KRC has questioned the use of"public access" as a qualifier for defining "ambient air."
While air within a structure that is used for commercial or manufacturing is typically
subject to OSHA standards, occupational exposure ofworkers in the workplace outside
ofthe workplace to emissions from the facility vents and stacks appears to fall in a void if
the ambient standards are not measured until the "Property line." The use ofthe
"property line" as the point at which compliance is determined with respect to ambient
standards, has two unintended consequences that make it underprotective of public health
- first, it would appear to allow acquisition of land in order to create a buffer rather than
management of the emissions; and second, it would allow exposure to workers outside of
the workplace without accountability, even where those workers might be the maximally
exposed individuals due to the exposure in the workplace as well as potential exposure as
neighborhood residents and individual in transit from home to work.
b. Control ofEmissions From Malfunctions And Upsets
Emissions ofproducts ofcombustion and of incomplete combustion from thermal
treatment units can be orders ofmagnitude higher than during normal operating
conditions, and accountability in the area ofstartups, shutdowns, malfunctions and
releases has been lacking.
Question ofwho should develop malfunction prevention program.
2. Principles
a The goal of the state program should be that ofassuring air quality that protects public
health and welfare, with an adequate margin ofsaftty (to account for tremendous
uncertainties in toxicology and cumulative risk science). Endpoint should not be
identification of"tolerance" level ofexposure but cessation of the use ofthe public air for
disposal ofwastes to which exposure is nontherapeutic and which are toxic, persistent or
bioaccumulative. Imposition ofany degree of involuntary risk on an unknowing
population, many ofwhom are legally incapable ofconsent, in order to accommodate the
short-term economic interests of the discharger, is morally and legally repugnant.
In determining the "acceptable" level ofris~KRC believes that the formulation of
"acceptability" ofrisks posited by the National Commission on Product Safety is
instructive:
Risks of bodily harm to users are not unreasonable when consumers
understand that risk exists, can appraise their probability and severity, know
how to cope with them, and voluntarily accept them to get benefits that could
not be obtained in less risky ways. When there is a risk of this character,
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consumers have reasonable opportunity to protect themselves; and public
authorities should hesitate to substitute their value judgments about the
desirability of the risk for those ofthe consumers who choose to incur it.
But preventable risk is not reasonable (a) when consumers do not know that it
exists; (b) when, though aware of it, consumers are unable to estimate its fre-
quency and severity, or (c) when consumers do not know how to cope with
it, and hence are likely to incur harm unnecessarily; or (d) when risk is unnece-
ssary in ... that it could be reduced or eliminated at a cost in money or in
the performance ofthe product that consumers would willingly incur if they
knew the facts and were given the choice.
Thus framed, the regulatory endpoint must be the protection ofpublic health and
environmental quality by eliminating the use ofthe "commons" for disposal ofairborne
wastes and by more fully internalizing the cost ofavoidance, reduction, management and
disposal ofwaste byproducts ofmanufacturing.
b. Utilizing the precautionary principle, the burden must be shifted to the soUrces to
demonstrate lack ofharm in the use ofthe public's air for waste disposal rather than on
the agency to justify imposition ofcontrols to limit the use ofpublic resources to dispose
ofwastes as airborne pollutants. Each facility should bear responsibility
for demonstrating that its emissions at the rate, quantities and duration proposed do not
result in an increase in morbidity or mortality, or failing that, to commit to a meaningful,
measurable program ofcontinuous reductions that will achieve that standard in a
reasonable time certain.
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AIR TOXICS
- SUPPLEMENTAL HANDOUT-
LOUISVILLE METRO AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT
STAR PROGRAM
Strategic Toxic Air Reduction
DRAFT REGULATIONS
January 10,2005

Version #11, Draft #2 - Proposed January 10, 2005
[Ifadopted, this would amend the December 19,2001, version ofRegulation 1.02J
[Approved by the Committee ofthe Whole on January 13, 2005, for Public ReviewJ
REGULATION 1.02 Definitions
Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
Jefferson County, Kentucky
Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes the Air Pollution Control Board to adopt and
enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of KRS
Chapter 77. This regulation contains certain definitions used throughout District regulations.
SECTION IDefinitions
As used in these regulations, the following terms shall have the meaning given to them in this section
except as otherwise specified in these regulations. All terms not defined in these regulations shall
have the meaning given to them in KRS 77.005, the Act, or by commonly accepted usage.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
1.1
1.2
1.32-
1.43-
1.54
1.65
1.76
1.87
1.87.1
1.87.2
1.~
"Act" means the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§7401 et seq.) which consists of the Clean Air
Act of 1963 and all of the amendments made by subsequent enactments, the most recent
major amendment being the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (p.L. 101-549).
"Acute noncancer effect" means a biochemical change, functional impairment, or
pathological lesion that affects the performance of the whole organism, or reduces an
organism's ability to respond to an additional environmental challenge that is produced
within a short period of time following an exposure.
"Affected facili ty" means a process or process equipment to which a regulation is applicable.
"Air contaminant" or "air pollutant" means smoke, charred paper, dust, soot, grime, carbon,
noxious acids, fumes, gases, odors, or particulate matter, or any combination of these, that
is emitted into or otherwise enters the outside air. These terms also include any precursors
to the formation of an air contaminant or air pollutant.
"Air pollution control equipment" means equipment that may be required by law or
regulation for tile control ofair pollution but is not vital to production ofthe normal product
of the process or process equipment or to its normal operation.
"Alternative method" means any method of sampling and analyzing for an air pollutant that
is not a reference method or an equivalent method but that has been demonstrated to the
satisfaction of the EPA and the District to produce, in specific cases, results adequate for
determining compliance.
"Ambient air" means that portion of the atmosphere, external to buildings, to which the
general public has access. For the purpose of determining the concentration of an air
contaminant that is or may be emitted by a stationary source, ambient air also includes the
atmosphere, external to buildings, that is beyond the property line of that stationary source,
regardless of whether the general public has access.
"Ambient air quality standard" means a numerical expression of the level of an air
contaminant required to be achieved and maintained through the application ofappropriate
preventive or control measures. An "ambient air quality standard" consists of two parts:
A specified concentration for a particular air contaminant and
A time-averaging interval over which that concentration is measured.
"Annual mean" means an average determined on the basis of any consecutive 12-month
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35 interval.
36 1.109 "Asbestos" means the asbestiform vaneties of serpentInIte (chrysoti1e), riebeckite
37 (crocidolite), cummingtonite-grunerite, amosite, anthophylite, and actinolote-tremolite.
38 1.116 "Asbestos mill" means any process or process equipment engaged in converting, or in any
39 intermediate step in converting, asbestos ore into commercial asbestos. Outside storage of
40 asbestos materials is not considered a part of the asbestos mill.
41 1.12+"Asbestos material" means asbestos or any material containing asbestos.
42 1.13z "Asbestos tailings" means any solid waste that contains asbestos and is a product ofasbestos
43 mining or milling operations.
44 1.143- "Best available control technology" (BACT) means an emission limitation, including a
45 visible emission standard, based on the maximum degree of reduction for each pollutant
46 subject to regulation that would be emitted from any proposed new or modified process or
47 process equipment that the District, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy,
48 environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for that new
49 or modified process or process equipment through the application ofproduction processes
50 or available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment,
51 innovative fuel combustion techniques, and pollution preventionapproaches, for elimination,
52 reduction, or control of that pollutant. In no event shall the application of best available
53 control technology result in emissions of any pollutant that would exceed the emissions
54 allowed by any applicable standard under Regulation 5,6, or 7. If the District determines
55 that technological or economic limitations on the application ofmeasurement methodology
56 to a particular process or process equipment would make the imposition of an emissions
57 standard infeasible, a design, equipment, work practice, or operational standard, or
58 combination of those approaches, may be prescribed instead.
59 1.154 "Board" means the Air Pollution Control Board ofJefferson County as provided for in KRS
60 Chapter 77.
61 1.16 "Bypass" means the intentional diversion of air contaminants from air pollution control
62 equipment or process equipment that nonnallyreduces the emission ofthe air contaminants.
63 1.175 "Cabinet" means the Namal Resources and Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet
64 of the Commonwealth of Kentucky as provided for in KRS Chapter 224.
65 1.18 "Cancer" means a disease of heritable, somatic mutations affecting cell growth and
66 differentiation, characterized by an abnonnal, uncontrolled growth of cells.
67 1.19 "Carcinogen" means an agent capable of inducing cancer.
68 1.20 "Chronic noncancer effect" means a biochemical change, functional impairment, or
69 pathological lesion that affects the performance of the whole organism, or reduces an
70 organism's ability to respond to an additional environmental challenge that occurs as a result
71 of repeated or long tenn exposures.
72 1.21+6 "Commence" means that an owner or operator has obtained all necessary preconstruction
73 approvals or permits and has either:
74 1.21+6.1 Begun, or caused to begin, a continuous program of actual on-site construction or
75 modification, to be completed within a reasonable time, or
76 1.21+6.2 Entered into a binding agreement or a contractual obligation, that cannot be canceled or
77 modified without substantial loss to the owner or operator, to undertake a continuous
78 program of actual on-site construction or modification, to be completed within a
79 reasonable time.
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80 1.22+9- "Commercial asbestos" means any asbestos that is extracted from asbestos ore.
81 1.23+8 "Compliance plan and schedule" means a list ofremedial measures including an enforceable
82 sequence and timing of actions or operations leading to compliance with a limitation or
83 standard by a specific date.
84 1.24+9 "Construction" means fabrication, erection, modification, or installation of an affected
85 facility or any portion of an affected facility.
86 1.25e "Demolition" means the wrecking or taking out ofany load-supporting structural member
87 ofa structure together with any related handling operations.
88 1.26+ "District" means the Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County as provided for in
89 KRS Chapter 77.
90 1.27:Z "Division" means the Division for Air Qualityofthe Nannal Resources and Environmental
91 and Public Protection Cabinet of the Commonwealth of Kentucky as provided for in KRS
92 Chapter 224.
93 1.28:3- "Emission standard" means a requirement that is contained in a federal, state, or local law
94 or regulation, District permit, or Board Order, or is otherwise legally enforceable reqnirement
95 that limits the quantity, rate, or-concentration, or opacity of the emission~ of an air
96 contaminants into the ambient air on a continuous basis, including any requirement related
97 to the operation or maintenance of a process or process equipment to assure continuous
98 emission reduction, and any required design, equipment, work practice, or operational
99 standard.
100 1.294 "Equivalent method" means any method of sampling and analyzing for an air pollutant that
101 has been demonstrated to the satisfaction ofthe EPA to have a consistent and quantitatively-
102 known relationship to the reference method under specified conditions.
103 1.30 "Excess emissions" means emissions that exceed an applicable emission standard. An
104 applicable emissions standard would include a surrogate emission standard, such as volatile
105 organic compounds that would include a toxic air contaminant, for which environmental
106 acceptabilityhas been demonstrated pursuant to Regulation 5.21. Ifthere is not an applicable
107 emission standard for a toxic air contaminant established pursuant to Regulation 5.21
108 Environmental Acceptability for Toxic Air Contaminants, then, for the purpose of the
109 notification and reporting requirements of Regulation 1.07 Excess Emissions During
110 Startups, Shutdowns, and Malfunctions, excess emissions shall also mean emissions that
111 exceed 125% ofthe reported actual maximum hourly emission rate ofa toxic air contaminant
112 that results from a startup, shutdown, or malfunction.
113 1.31Z5 "Existing affected facility", except as otherwise specified under applicable regulations,
114 means any affected facility that is in existence or has commenced construction before the
115 effective date of the applicable emission standard and that has not been subsequently
116 modified or reconstructed.
117 1.322'6 "Federally Enforceable District Origin Operating Permit" (FEDOOP) means a non-Title V
118 operatingpermit issued by the District that contains a federally-enforceable permit condition,
119 limit, or provision.
120 1.33ZT "Fixed capital cost" means the capital needed to provide all ofthe depreciable components.
121 1.342-8 "Fuel" means natural gas, petroleum, coal, wood, and any other form of solid, liquid, or
122 gaseous matter consumed for the purpose ofcreating useful heat.
123 1.35Z9 "Fugitive emissions" means those emissions that could not reasonably pass through a stack,
124 chimney, vent, or other functionally equivalent opening.
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125 1.366 "Hazardous air pollutant" (HAP) means anyairpollutant listed in Regulation 5.14Hazardous
126 Air Pollutants and Source Categories Section 2 pursuant to the Act §112(b).
127 1.37+ "Incineration" means the process ofigniting and burning solid, semi-solid, liquid, or gaseous
128 combustible or partially combustible wastes.
129 1.382- "Incinerator" means any furnace used in the process of burning waste for the purpose of
130 reducing the volume of waste by removing combustible matter.
131 1.393 "Lowest achievable emission rate" (LAER) means, for any affected facility, that rate of
132 emissions based on the more stringent ofthe following:
133 1.393.1 The most stringent emission limitation that is contained in the implementation plan of
134 any State for that class or categoryofaffected facility, unless the owner or operator ofthe
135 proposed affected facility demonstrates that this limitation is not achievable, or
136 1.39:3'.2 The most stringent emission limitation that is achieved in practice by that class or
137 category of affected facility taking into consideration the pollutant that must be
138 controlled. In no event shall the application oflowest achievable emission rate permit
139 a proposed affected facility to emit anypollutant in excess ofthe amount allowable under
140 applicable new source standards pursuant to Regulations 5, 6, or 7 or 40 CFR
141 parts 60, 61, or 63.
142 1.4034 "Major source", except as specified in another regulation for use in that regulation, means
143 any stationary source that emits, or has the potential to emit, 100 tons per year or more ofany
144 air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act, 10 tons or more ofan individual hazardous
145 air pollutant (HAP), or 25 tons per year or more of a combination ofHAPs.
146 1.41:3-5 "Malfunction" means the any 5ttdden, tmrorMeen, and tlnavoidable failure of air pollution
147 control equipment or process equipment or of a process to operate in a normal or usual
148 manner that causes, or is likely to cause, emissions that exceed an applicable emission
149 standard, bttt not inelttding failm e5 that ar e catt5ed entirely or in part by poor Illaintenance,
150 carele55 operation, or any other preventable ttp5et condition or eqtlipment breakdot'\itl.
151 1.42% "Maximum achievable control technology" (MACT) means the maximum achievable control
152 technology defined in the Act §112 (d)(3).
153 1.4337 "Modification", except as specified in another regulation foruse in that regulation, means any
154 physical change in, or change in the method ofoperation of, an affected facility that increases
155 the amount of any air pollutant (to which an emission standard applies) emitted by that
156 affected facility or that results in the emission of any air pollutant (to which an emission
157 standard applies) not previously emitted, except that:
158 1.4337.1 Routine maintenance, repair, and replacement shall not be considered a physical change,
159 and
160 1.4337.2 A change in the method of operation, unless previously limited by permit conditions,
161 shall not include:
162 1.4337.2.1 An increase in the production rate, if the increase does not exceed the operating
163 design capacity of the affected facility or of the air pollution control equipment
164 installed on the affected facility,
165 1.4337.2.2 An increase in the hours ofoperation when the increase does not result in a violation
166 ofany applicable emission standards,
167 1.4337.2.3 Use ofan alternative fuel orraw material if, prior to the date any standard under this
168 regulation becomes applicable to that affected facility, the affected facility is
169 designed to accommodate the alternative use,
1.02-4
Version #11, Draft #2 - Proposed January 10,2005
[Ifadopted, this would amend the December 19,2001, version ofRegulation 1.02J
[Approved by the Committee ofthe Whole on January 13, 2005, for Public ReviewJ
170 1.4337-.2.4 Use of an alternative fuel or raw material by reason ofan order, rule, or natural gas
171 curtailment plan as approved by the District, or
172 1.4337-.2.5 Change in ownership of the stationary source.
173 1.443-8 "New affected facility" means any affected facility the construction, modification, or
174 reconstruction of which is commenced on or after the effective date of an any-applicable
175 emission standardIegnlation.
176 1.4539 "Nitrogen oxides" means all oxides of nitrogen, except nitrous oxide, as measured by test
177 methods specified by the District.
178 1.466 "Odor" means the property ofan air contaminant that can be detected by the sense ofsmell.
179 1.47+ "Opacity" means the degree to which emissions reduce the transmission oflight and obscure
180 the view ofan object in the background.
181 1.48z. "Open burning" means the burning of any matter in such a manner that the products of
182 combustion resulting from the burning are emitted directly into the outside air without
183 passing through a stack, chimney, vent, or other functionally equivalent opening.
184 1.49~ "Organic compound" or "organic material" means a chemical compound ofcarbon that has
185 the same meaning as "volatile organic compound."
186 1.50# "Outside air" or "open air" means the air outside ofbuildings and structures.
187 1.5145 "Owner or Operator" means any person who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises
188 one or more affected facilities.
189 1.5246 "Particulate asbestos material" means finely divided particles of asbestos material.
190 1.5347 "Particulate matter" means any material, except uncombined water, that exists in a finely
191 divided form as a liquid or a solid.
192 1.5448 "PMIO" means particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to a
193 nominal 10 micrometers as measured by a reference method based on 40 CFR Part 50
194 Appendix J and designated in accordance with 40 CFR Part 53, or by an equivalent method
195 designated in accordance with 40 CFR Part 53.
196 1.5549 "PM2.5" means particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to a
197 nominal 2.5 micrometers as measured by a reference method based on 40 CFR Part 50
198 Appendix L and designated in accordance with 40 CFR Part 53, or by an equivalent method
199 designated in accordance with 40 CFR Part 53.
200 1.566 "Person" means any individual, firm, copartnership,joint venture, association, corporation,
201 social club, fraternal organization, estate, trust, receiver, syndicate, county, city, municipality,
202 district (for air pollution control or other purpose), or other political subdivision, or any
203 group or combination acting as a unit, and the plural as well as the singular unit.
204 1.57+ "Pollution prevention" (P2) means the use ofmaterials, processes, or practices that reduce
205 or eliminate the creation of pollutants or wastes by the process. Pollution prevention
206 includes practices that reduce the use of hazardous and nonhazardous materials, energy,
207 water, or other resources as well as practices that protect natural resources through
208 conservation or more efficient use.
209 1.58z. "Potential hazardous emissions" means an air pollutant, exclusive of pollutants regulated
210 under the Act Section 112(b), to which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and that,
211 in the judgment of the District, may cause, or contribute to, an increase in mortality or an
212 increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness.
213 1.5~ "Potential to emit" (PTE) means the maximum capacity ofa stationary source or an affected
214 facility to emit a pollutant under its physical and operational design. Any physical or
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215 operationallimitation on the capacity of the stationary source or affected facility to emit a
216 pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and restrictions on the hours ofoperation
217 or on the type or amount ofmaterial combusted, stored, or processed, shall be treated as part
218 ofits design ifthe limitation orthe effect it would have on emissions is federally enforceable.
219 Secondary emissions do not count in determining the potential to emit ofa stationary source
220 or affected facility.
221 1.6054 "Process" means an action or operation, or a series ofactions or operations, from which the
222 emission ofan air contaminant may originate. Examples of a "process" include any of the
223 following:
224 1.6054.1 The physical change ofa material,
225 1.6054.2 The chemical change ofa material,
226 1.6054.3 The combustion of a fuel, refuse, or waste material,
227 1.6054.4 The storage ofa material, and
228 1.6054.5 The handling of a material,: and
229 1.60.6 The use of a material.
230 1.6155 "Process equipment" means all equipment, devices, and auxiliary components, including
231 control equipment and stacks, used in a process.
232 1.6256 "Reactor" means a vat orvessel, that maybejacketed to permit temperature control, designed
233 to contain chemical reactions.
234 1.63s-:t "Reasonably available control technology" (RACT) means devices, systems, process
235 modifications, or other apparatus or techniques, including pollution prevention approaches,
236 that are reasonably available taking into account the necessity of imposing those controls
237 in order to attain and maintain a national ambient air quality standard and the social,
238 environmental, and economic impact of those controls.
239 1.6458 "Reconstruction" means the replacement ofprocess equipmentJor an affected facility to the
240 extent that the fixed capital cost of the new components exceeds 50% of the fixed capital
241 cost of a comparable entirely new affected facility.
242 1.6559 "Reference Method" means any method of sampling and analyzing for an air pollutant as
243 prescribed in the following EPA regulations: Standards ofPerformance for New Stationary
244 Sources (40 CFR part 60), National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
245 (40 CFR part 61), National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source
246 Categories (40 CFRpart 63, National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards
247 (40 CFR part 50), and Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of
248 Implementation Plans (40 CFR part 51).
249 1.666 "Regulation" means a rule or order adopted bythe Board pursuant to KRS Chapter 77 for the
250 control or abatement of air contaminants within its jurisdiction or for the administration of
251 the District.
252 1.67+ "Run" means the net period of time during which an emission sample is collected. Unless
253 otherwise specified, a run may be either intermittent or continuous within the limits ofgood
254 engineering practice.
255 1.682: "Sludge" means solid or semi-solid material produced by a treatment plant that processes
256 municipal or industrial waste waters.
257 1.693 "Sludge dryer" means a device used to reduce the moisture content ofa sludge by heating to
258 temperatures above 65°C directly with combustion gases.
259 1.7064 "Stack or chimney" means a flue, conduit, or duct arranged to conduct a gas stream to the
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260 outside air.
261 1.7165 "Standard conditions" means:
262 1.7165.1 For source measurements, 20°C and a pressure of760 mm Hg, and
263 1.7165.2 For the purpose ofair quality determinations, 25°C and a reference pressure of760 mm
264 Hg.
265 1.7266 "Stationary source" means all of the air pollutant-emitting activities that are located on 1 or
266 more contiguous or adjacent properties and are under the control of the same person or
267 persons under common control. A property shall be considered contiguous if separated by
268 only a public thoroughfare, stream, or other right ofway. Ifa transmission and fuel delivery
269 rights-of-way or a strip ofland that serves no other principal purpose than as a transportation
270 or materials handling link connects 2 or more otherwise separate stationary sources, then the
271 connected stationary sources shall be considered as separate stationary sources.
272 1.7369- "Startup" means the setting in operation of an affected facility for any purpose.
273 1.74 "Toxic air contaminant" (also "TAC") means any air contaminant for which there is no
274 national ambient air quality standard and that is, or may become, harmful to public health or
275 the environment when present in sufficient quantities and duration in the ambient air. As
276 used in these regulations, toxic air contaminant does not include the substances listed in
277 Regulation 5.23 Categories of Toxic Air Contaminants Section 5 Exemptions from the
278 Definition ofToxic Air Contaminant.
279 1.7568 "Toxic air pollutant" (TAP) means a substance listed in either 401 KAR 63:021 (11-11-86)
280 or 401 KAR 63:022 (11-11-86).
281 1.7669 "Uncombined water" means water that is either in a gaseous, liquid, or solid state and that
282 is not bound to a compound by internal molecular forces.
283 1.776 "Volatile organic compound" (VOC) means any compound of carbon, excluding carbon
284 monoxide, carbon dioxide, carbonic acid, metallic carbides or carbonates, and ammonium
285 carbonate, that participates in atmospheric photochemical reactions. The following organic
286 compounds have been determined by the EPA to have negligible photochemical reactivity
287 and are also excluded:
288 1.776.1 Methane,
289 1.776.2 Ethane,
290 1.776.3 Methylene chloride (dichloromethane),
291 1.776.4 1,1,1-trichloroethane (methyl chloroform),
292 1.776.5 1,1,2-trichloro-1,2,2-trifluoroethane (CFC-l13),
293 1.776.6 Trichlorofluoromethane (CFC-11),
294 1.776.7 Dichlorodifluoromethane (CFC-12),
295 1.776.8 Chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22),
296 1.776.9 Trifluoromethane (HFC-23),
297 1.776.10 1,2-dichloro-1,1,2,2-tetrafluoroethane (CFC-114),
298 1.776.11 Chloropentafluoroethane (CFC-115),
299 1.776.12 1,1,1-trifluoro-2,2-dichloroethane (HCFC-123),
300 1.776.13 1,1,1,2-tetrafluoroethane (HFC-134a),
301 1.776.14 1,1-dichloro-1-fluoroethane (HCFC-141b),
302 1.776.15 1-chloro-1,1-difluoroethane (HCFC-142b),
303 1.776.16 2-chloro-1, 1,1 ,2-tetrafluoroethane (HCFC-124),
304 1.776.17 Pentafluoroethane (HFC-125),
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305 1.776.18 1,1,2,2-tetrafluoroethane (HFC-134),
306 1.776.19 1,1, I-trifluoroethane (HFC-143a),
307 1.776.20 1,I-difluoroethane (HFC-152a),
308 1.776.21 Parachlorobenzotrifluoride (PCBTF),
309 1.776.22 Cyclic, branched, or linear completely methylated siloxanes,
310 1.776.23 Acetone,;
311 1.776.24 Perchloroethylene (tetrachloroethylene),
312 1.776.25 3,3-dichloro-l,I,I,2,2-pentafluoropropane (HCFC-225ca),
313 1.776.26 1,3-dichloro-l,1,2,2,3-pentafluoropropane (HCFC-225cb),
314 1.776.27 1,1,1,2,3,4,4,5,5,5-decafluoropentane (HFC-43-lOmee),
315 1.776.28 Difluoromethane (HFC-32),
316 1.776.29 Ethylfluoride (HFC-161),
317 1.776.30 1,1,1,3,3,3-hexafluoropropane (HFC-236fa),
318 1.776.31 1,1 ,2,2,3-pentafluoropropane (HFC-245ca),
319 1.776.32 1,1 ,2,3,3-pentafluoropropane (HFC-245ea),
320 1.776.33 1,1,1,2,3-pentafluoropropane (HFC-245eb),
321 1.776.34 1,1,1,3,3-pentafluoropropane (HFC-245fa),
322 1.776.35 1,1,1,2,3,3-hexafluoropropane (HFC-236ea),
323 1.776.36 1,1,1 ,3,3-pentafluorobutane (HFC-365mfc),
324 1.776.37 Chlorofluoromethane (HCFC-31),
325 1.776.38 l-chloro-l-fluoroethane (HCFC-151a),
326 1.776.39 1,2-dichloro-l,I,2-trifluoroethane (HCFC-123a),
327 1.776.40 1,1,1,2,2,3,3,4,4-nonafluoro-4-methoxy-butane (C4F90CH3)'
328 1.776.41 2-(difluoromethoxymethyl)-I,I,I,2,3,3,3-heptafluoropropane [(CF3)2CFCF20CH3],
329 1.776.42 l-ethoxy-l,I,2,2,3,3,4,4,4-nonafluorobutane (C4F90C2Hs),
330 1.776.43 2-(ethoxyditluoromethyl)-I, 1,1 ,2,3,3,3-heptafluoropropane [(CF3)2CFCF20C2Hs],
331 1.776.44 Perfluorocarbon compounds that fall into the following classes:
332 1.776.44.1 Cyclic, branched, or linear, completely fluorinated alkanes,
333 1.776.44.2 Cyclic, branched, or linear, completely fluorinated ethers with no unsaturations,
334 1.776.44.3 Cyclic, branched, or linear, completely fluorinated tertiary amines with no
335 unsaturations, and
336 1.776.44.4 Sulfur-containingperfluorocarbons with nounsaturations and with sulfurbonds only
337 to carbon and fluorine,-and
338 1.176.45 Methyl acetate,:-
339 1.77.46 1,1,1,2,2,3,3-heptafluoro-3-methoxy-propane (HFE-7000),
340 1.77.47 3-ethoxy-l,1 ,1,2,3,4,4,5,5,6,6,6-dodecafluoro-2-(tritluoromethyl) hexane (HFE-7500),
341 1.77.48 1,1,1,2,3,3,3-heptafluoropropane (HFC 227ea),
342 1.77.49 Methyl formate, and
343 1.77.50 t-butyl acetate, for purposes ofVOC emissions limitations or VOC content requirements,
344 but is not excluded for purposes ofall recordkeeping, emissions reporting, photochemical
345 dispersion modeling, and inventory requirements that apply to VOC and shall be
346 uniquely identified in emission reports.
347 1.78 "Welfare" means the effects on welfare, including, but not limited to, the effects on soils,
348 water, crops, vegetation, man-made materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and
349 climate, damage to and deterioration of property, hazards to transportation, and effects on
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350 economic values and on personal comfort and well-being, whether caused bytransformation,
351 conversion, or combination with other air pollutants.
352 1.79+ "Year" means a calendar year.
353 Adopted vl/4-19-72; effective4-19-72; amended v2/6-13-79, v3/11-16-83, v4/4-20-88, v5/5-15-91,
354 v6/3-17-93, v7/6-16-93, v8/9-25-96, v9/11-19-97, vlO/12-19-01.
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1 REGULATION 1.06 Stationary Source Self-Monitoring, Emissions Inventory Development,
2 and Reporting
3 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
4 Jefferson County, Kentucky
5 Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
6 Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
7 Necessity And Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes provide5 that the Air Pollution Control Board to
8 adopt rmt)i make and enforce all needful orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to
9 accomplish the purposes of KRS Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the conditions for
10 stationary source selfmonitoring, emissions inventory development, and reporting.
11 SECTION 1 In-Stack Self-Monitoring and Reporting
12 The District may require the owner or operator of a any-process or process equipment affected
13 faeility to install, operate, and maintain stack gas measuring, mtdfor emission monitoring, and
14 parametric monitoring equipment in accordance ~ith 5tlch reqtlirement5 a5 5pecified in the5e
15 regmation5. For cause, including, but not limited to, In 5electcd in5tancc5, primarily involving the
16 incineration ofhazardous or infectious waste orantl-repeated or on-going violations, the Districtmteh
17 rcqniremcntmay also require includc data storage and transmission equipment and lines. The owner
18 or operator of a process or process equipment that is required to install, operate, and maintain this
19 measuring or monitoring equipment shall maintain records of monitoring data and make periodic
20 reports of these meh-data in a meh-form, unit~ of measure, and at the meh-time intervals required
21 by which the District may prc5cribe. Requirements for specific affected facilities are contained in
22 the applicable regulations. The District, for cause, may require additional or more stringent specific
23 requirements for an individual affected facility than those required in the regulations otherwise
24 applicable to that affected meh-facility.
25 SECTION 2 Ambient Air Monitoring
26 The District may require the owner or operator of a process or process equipment any affected
27 facility to install, operate, and maintain ambient air monitoring equipment in accordance with
28 methods prescribed by the District, and in the mteh-number and frequency as prescribed by the
29 District, and to make periodic ambient air monitoring reports at intervals as prescribed by the
30 District.
31 SECTION 3 Provisions for Section 4 and Section 5 Emissions Data
32 The following provisions apply to the emissions data requirements in Section 4 and Section 5:
33 3.1 When reporting actual emissions, the owner or operator shall include any increased
34 emissions that result from startups, shutdowns, and malfunctions along with the routine
35 emissions of a process or process equipment.
36 3.2+:t For purposes of complying with the provisions of Section 4 and Section 5tilis section, all
37 emissions shall mmt-be calculated using emission factors from EPA AP-42, other methods
38 defined in the EPA-approved District regulations, stack test or CEMS data, or other
39 procedures proposed defined by the owner or operator and ~hich have been approved in
40 writingby the District. Ifthese otherDistrict-approved procedures areused, the District shall
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41 provide all documentation on the emissions calculationprocedures to the EPA, upon request.
42 3.3H The emissions data required by Section 4 and Section 5 statementshall include the process-
43 or process equipment-specific facility-by-faeility calculations used to detennine emissions.
44 The raw data used to calculate the emissions shall be retained bythe owner or operator ofthe
45 stationary source for a period ofnot less than 5 two-years and shall be made available to the
46 District upon request. Representative Selected portions ofthe raw data used to calculate the
47 emissions shall be supplied to the District in support ofthe emissions statement in a format
48 provided by the District.
49 3.4 Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 4.2 to 4.4, if a stationary source is subject to
50 Regulation 2.16 Title V Operating Permits, then the owner or operator of the stationary
51 source shall comply with the provisions of section 4.1 and not the otherwise applicable
52 provisions of sections 4.2 to 4.4.
53 3.5 For the purpose of reporting emissions pursuant to Section 4, the owner or operator may
54 exclude emissions that are defined in Regulation 5.01 General Provisions sections 1.6.1 and
55 1.6.2 as "de minimis."
56 3.6 For the purpose of reporting emissions pursuant to Section 5, the owner or operator may
57 exclude emissions that are defined in Regulation 5.01 section 1.6 as "de minimis."
58 3.7 If the owner or operator of a stationary source is required to submit an emissions statement
59 pursuant to section 4.1 but no hazardous air pollutant is emitted during the applicable year,
60 then the owner or operator shall submit a negative declaration in place of the emissions
61 statement.
62 3.8 Ifthe owner or operator ofa stationary source is required to submit an enhanced emissions
63 statement pursuant to section 5.2 but no toxic air contaminant is emitted during the
64 applicable year, then the owner or operator shall submit a negative declaration in place ofthe
65 enhanced emissions statement.
66 3.2 Sotuces sttbjectto section 3.1 me.
67 3.2.1 Airy stationary somcethat emits 25 tpy 01 mOle ofany ofthe fbllowing pollntants. snlfm
68 dioxide, particnlates, volatile oIganic componnds, OI ninogen oxides, and
69 3.2.2 AIry stationary sonlee that emits 10 tpy or mOle, OI a lesseI qnantity as plomnlgated by
70 EPA ifl 40 CFR Part 61, of aftY Hl\P listed ifl the Aet Seetiofl 112(8), Of 25 trJy offlflY
71 eombination of the listed HAPs.
72 3.3 Stationaly somees snbjeet to sections 3.2.1 OI 3.2.2 shall snbmit t11en fiISt emissions
73 statement by Apli115, 1993 and shall Ieport actnal emissions nom all facilities within the
74 somce dming ealendaI yem 1992. A sonlce shall snbmit emission statements anntlally
75 theleafteI, mlless it is no 10ngeI sttbject to section 3.2.
76 3.5 Failme to Ietmn the Ieqtlisite data and felms by the date IeqtliIed in section 3.1 shall be
77 pI ima facie evidence of a violation of this Iegnlation.
78 SECTION 43' Emissions and Related Data for Criteria Pollutants, HAPs, and
79 AmmoniaRepol ting
80 43.1 The owner or operator of a any-stationary source described in section 3.2 shall submit an
81 ammal emissions statemen~ofactual emissions ofparticulate matter, sulfur dioxide, carbon
82 monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone precursor emissions ofvolatile organic compounds and
83 oxides of nitrogen, lead, ammonia, and all hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) listed in
84 Regulation 5.14 Hazardous Air Pollutants and Source Categories to the District as
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85 follows:cn m be£ore Aprill5th cfeaeh ,ear £Or the pre viCU5 ealendar ,ear cfcperaticn.
86 4.1.1 Each year, on orbefore April15th ofthe year, for the previous calendar year ofoperation,
87 for a stationary source subject to Regulation 2.16 Title V Operating Permits (Group 1
88 stationary source),
89 4.1.2 Each year, on orbefore April15th ofthe year, for the previous calendar year ofoperation,
90 for either of the following (Group 2 stationary source):
91 4.1.2.1 A stationary source that has applied for an operating permit pursuant to Regulation
92 2.17 Federally Enforceable District Origin Operating Permits, or
93 4.1.2.2 A stationary source that is subject to the permit requirements of Regulation 2.03
94 section 1.1 or 1.2 but is not included in section 4.1.1,4.1.2.1, 4.2, 4.3, or 4.4 of this
95 regulation, ifthe actual emissions from the stationary source are 25 or more tons per
96 year individually of sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, volatile organic compounds,
97 or oxides of nitrogen, and
98 4.1.3 Beginning August 15,2006, and every third year thereafter, on or before August 15th of
99 the year, for the previous calendar year ofoperation, for a stationary source that is subject
100 to the permit requirements of Regulation 2.03 section 1.1 or 1.2 but is not included in
101 section 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.2, 4.3, or 4.4 ofthis regulation, unless the District has notified the
102 owner or operator of the stationary source in writing that an emissions statement is
103 required every year.
104 4.2 Beginning April15, 2006, the owner or operator ofa gasoline dispensing facility subject to
105 Regulation 6.40 Standards ofPerformancefor Gasoline Transfer to Motor Vehicles (Stage
106 II Vapor Recovery and Control), which does not include the initial transfer ofgasoline into
107 the fuel tanks ofnew motor vehicles at an automobile or truck assembly plant, shall submit
108 to the District, on or before April 15th of each year, the gasoline throughput, by grade, by
109 month, for the previous calendar year of operation. In addition, beginning April 15, 2006,
110 and every third year thereafter, the owner or operator shall submit to the District, on or before
111 April 15th of the year, the amount, by type, in gallons per year, ofcold cleaner material used
112 for the previous calendar year.
113 4.3 Beginning July 15,2006, and every thirdyear thereafter, the owner or operator ofa stationary
114 source that is subject to Regulation 6.44 Standards ofPerformance For Existing Commercial
115 Motor Vehicle AndMobile Equipment Refinishing Operations or Regulation 7.79 Standards
116 ofPerformance For New Commercial Motor Vehicle And Mobile Equipment Refinishing
117 Operations and is not a stationary source described in either section 4.1.1 or 4.1.2 shall
118 submit to the District, on or before July 15th of the year, the amount, in gallons, of coating
119 and solvent, by type, used each month for the previous calendar year.
120 4.4 Beginning April 15, 2006, and every third year thereafter, the owner or operator of a
121 stationary source that is subject to Regulation 5.02 Adoption ofNational Emission Standards
122 for Hazardous Air Pollutants section 3.12 National Perchloroethylene Air Emission
123 Standards for Dry Cleaning Facilities and is not a stationary source described in either
124 section 4.1.1 or 4.1.2 shall submit to the District, on or before April 15th of the year, the
125 perchloroethylene usage in gallons, by month, for the previous calendar year.
126 43.54 The District may require the owner or operator 0 f any stationary source nct 5ubjeet tc 5eeticn
127 3:2-1:0 submit additional information regarding processes, process equipment, and repmt-the
128 actual or potential emissions related to any process or process equipment at trfthe stationary
129 source tc the Di5triet on forms supplied by the District. The forms shall be eertified pur5uant
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130 to 5cction 3.1.3 and Ieturned to the District by the deadline date stated in the letter of
131 transmittal with the forms or stated in the forms themselves.
132 SECTION 5 Enhanced Emissions Data for Toxic Air Contaminants
133 5.1 As used in Section 5:
134 5.1.1 "Category 1 TAC" means a toxic air contaminant (TAC) listed in Regulation 5.23
135 Categories ofToxic Air Contaminants Section 1,
136 5.1.2 "Category2 TAC" means a toxic air contaminant listed in Regulation 5.23 Section 2, and
137 5.1.3 "Uncontrolled emissions" means the maximum amount ofan air contaminant that could
138 be emitted from a process or process equipment under its physical and operational
139 design, regardless ofany enforceable limitation on the potential to emit ofthe process or
140 process equipment and the effect ofany air pollution control equipment or other process
141 equipment that reduces emissions and that is vital to production of the normal product
142 or to the normal operation ofthe process or process equipment. Physical and operational
143 design factors that would limit the uncontrolled emissions from a process or process
144 equipment include, but are not limited to, raw material specifications, maximum
145 production capability, product configuration, and process constraints.
146 5.2 The owner or operator ofa stationary source shall submit an enhanced emissions statement
147 for listed toxic air contaminants (TACs) to the District as follows:
148 5.2.1 For a stationary source subject to Regulation 2.16 (Group 1 stationary source), the
149 following:
150 5.2.1.1 The information listed in section 5.2.3 for the actual and uncontrolled emissions by
151 process or process equipment as follows:
152 5.2.1.1.1 Category 1 TACs Calendar Year 2004 Due 7-15-05, and
153 5.2.1.1.2 Categories 1 and 2 TACs Calendar Year 2006 Due 6-30-07, and each
154 year thereafter, and
155 5.2.1.2 The related stack and fugitive emission release parameters listed in section 5.3 as
156 follows:
157 5.2.1.2.1 Category 1 TACs Due 7-15-05, and
158 5.2.1.2.2 Category 2 TACs Due 12-31-06, and
159 5.2.2 For a stationary source that has applied for an operating permit pursuant to
160 Regulation 2.17 or a stationary source that is described in section 4.1.2.2 (Group 2
161 stationary source), the following:
162 5.2.2.1 The information listed in section 5.2.3 for the actual emissions byprocess or process
163 equipment as follows:
164 5.2.2.1.1 Categories 1 and 2 TACs Calendar Year 2006 Due 9-30-07, and each
165 year thereafter, and
166 5.2.2.2 The related stack and fugitive emission release parameters listed in section 5.3 as
167 follows:
168 5.2.2.2.1 Categories 1 and 2 TACs Due 12-31-06.
169 5.2.3 For each process, all ofthe following:
170 5.2.3.1 The operating schedule in hours per day, days per week, and weeks per year,
171 5.2.3.2 The chemical name for each listed TAC emitted,
172 5.2.3.3 The actual (and, if required, for the first year's emissions inventory submittal, the
173 uncontrolled) annual, average hourly and daily, and maximum hourly and daily
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174 emission rates for each listed TAC, and
175 5.2.3.4 For the process emissions:
176 5.2.3.4.1 Whether the emission is a stack, fugitive, or area/pit emission,
177 5.2.3.4.2 The percentage of the overall process emissions that are stack, fugitive, or area
178 or pit, and
179 5.2.3.4.3 The amolUlt of emissions for each point of emission for each listed TAC,
180 5.2.4 For cause, the District may extend the compliance date of section 5.2.1.1.1 by up to 6
181 months. To be eligible for this extension, the owner or operator shall submit all of the
182 information that is available by the compliance date and a written request to the District
183 explaining why the extension is necessary and the actions that were taken to minimize
184 the needed extension.
185 5.3 The related stack and fugitive emission release parameters are as follows:
186 5.3.1 Plot plan, drawn to scale, showing all of the following:
187 5.3.1.1 Property line,
188 5.3.1.2 Fences,
189 5.3.1.3 Scale,
190 5.3.1.4 North arrow,
191 5.3.1.5 Buildings and other structures,
192 5.3.1.6 Height of buildings and other structures (ifbuildings have tiers, profile of building
193 tiers),
194 5.3.1.7 Location of processes and process equipment,
195 5.3.1.8 Location of points of emission, and
196 5.3.1.9 UTM coordinates for comers ofproperty, fences, buildings, and points ofemission,
197 5.3.2 For each stack, all ofthe following:
198 5.3.2.1 Stack height,
199 5.3.2.2 Stack diameter (or dimensions if the stack is not round),
200 5.3.2.3 Exhaust gas temperature at stack exit point,
201 5.3.2.4 Exhaust gas exit velocity,
202 5.3.2.5 Exhaust gas flow rate in ACFM, and
203 5.3.2.6 A diagram of the stack discharge point if the exhaust gas is not discharged
204 unobstructed vertically upwards,
205 5.3.3 For fugitive and area or pit emissions, all of the following:
206 5.3.3.1 Dimensions of the point of release, and
207 5.3.3.2 Height of the point of release, and
208 5.3.4 For flares, all of the following:
209 5.3.4.1 Flare tip height,
210 5.3.4.2 Maximum and average flare input gas stream volumetric flow rate, temperature, and
211 net heat input,
212 5.3.4.3 Identification of each component of the flare input gas stream,
213 5.3.4.4 Volumetric fraction for each component of the flare input gas stream, and
214 5.3.4.5 Flare stack diameter.
215 5.4 The uncontrolled emission rate for each listed toxic air contaminant, ifrequired pursuant to
216 section 5.2.1, the maximum hourly and daily emission rates, and the related stack and
217 fugitive emission release parameters required to be submitted pursuant to section 5.2 are
218 required to be submitted only once unless there is an appreciable increase in the uncontrolled
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or maximum hourly or daily emission rates or an appreciable change in the information that
has been submitted that would increase the maximum ambient concentration of a toxic air
contaminant. The current actual annual and average hourly and daily emission rates ofeach
listed toxic air contaminant are required to be submitted eachyear according to the schedule
in section 5.2.
Ifthe District determines that the concentration ofa toxic air contaminant in the ambient air,
resulting from the emission by a stationary source that is not required to submit the related
stack and fugitive emission release parameters listed in section 5.3, may be greater than the
level that would be considered environmentally acceptable pursuant to Regulation 5.21
Environmental Acceptability for Toxic Air Contaminants section 2.5.2 or 2.5.3, then the
District may require the owner or operator to submit the applicable stack and fugitive
emission release parameter information. In this case, the District shall provide written notice
to the owner or operator, specifying the information required to be submitted and the
applicable deadline.
Ifthe District determines that the concentration ofa toxic air contaminant in the ambient air
is, or may be, greater than the level that would be considered environmentally acceptable
pursuant to Regulation 5.21 section 2.8.1 or 2.8.2 and a potentially responsible entity for the
emissions of the toxic air contaminant is identified, then the District may require the owner
or operator of an identified stationary source to submit the information identified in
sections 5.2 and 5.3 ofthis regulation. Ifthe stationary source is already scheduled to submit
the information identified in section 5.2 and 5.3, then the District may require the
information to be submitted on an accelerated schedule. In either case, the District shall
provide written notice to the owner or operator, specifying the required information to be
submitted and the applicable deadline.
243 SECTION 63;i;;3 Certification by a Responsible Official
244 The information submitted to the District pursuant to this regulation shall contain a formal
245 certification by a responsible official, as defined in Regulation 2.16 section 1.35 (excluding
246 section 1.35.1.1), of the truth, accuracy, and completeness of the information. The certification
247 required is as follows:
248 "Based on information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, I certify that the
249 statements and information in this document are true, accurate, and complete."
250 SECTION 7 Confidentiality and Open Records Requirements
251 3.1.4 Nothing in this I'leeti~n ~fthe regulation is intended to preempt the confidentiality and open
252 records provisions poliey of Regulation 1.08 Administrative Procedures.
253 Adopted vl/4-l9-72; effective 4-19-72; amended v2/9-l-76, v3/6-l3-79, v4/l2-l7-86, v5/ll-l8-92,
254 v6/l2-l5-93.
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1 REGULATION 1.07 Excess Emissions During Startups, Shutdowns, and Malfunctions
2 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
3 Jefferson County, Kentucky
4 Relates to: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
5 Pursuant to: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
6 Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes pro vide~ that the Air Pollution Control Board to
7 adopt may make and enforce all needfnl orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to
8 accomplish the purposes of KRS Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the notification, and
9 reporting, and operational requirements for the owner or operator ofa stationary source when excess
10 emissions occur as a result of a dtning startup~, shutdown~, or malfunctioll5, and emeIgencie~.
11 SECTION 1 Definitions
12 Terms used in this regulation that are not defined in this regulation heIein shall have the meaning
13 given to them in Regulation 1.02 Definitions.
14 1.1 "EmeIgeney" mean~ a ~itnation aIising nom a ~ndden and Iea~onably nnfOIeseeable event
15 beyond the contI01 ofthe ~otlIce, inelnding acts ofGod, whichIeqniIes imnlediate eonective
16 action to Ie~tole nOlmal opeIation, and that catt~~ the ~onIce to exceed a technology-ba~ed
17 emission limitation in the pelmit, dne to nnavoidable incleases in emissions atttibntable to
18 the emeIgency. An emeIgency ~hall not inelnde noncompliance cansed by impIopetly
19 designed eqnipment, lack of pIeventive maintenance, careles~ 01 implopeI opeIation, 01
20 opelatoI enol.
21 SECTION 2 Excess Emissions
22 2.1 The owner or operator of a process or process equipment has a general duty to ensure that
23 the emissions from the process or process equipment are in compliance with all emission
24 standards at all times. This includes starting up and shutting down the process or process
25 equipment in a manner that the emissions are in compliance with all applicable emission
26 standards and, consistent with safe operating procedures, stopping input feed to the process
27 or process equipment and shutting down the process or process equipment if excess
28 emissions would likely result from a malfunction.
29 2.2+ Excess emissions from a process or process equipment due to startup, shutdown, or
30 malfunction, 01 emeIgeney, that tempolatily exceed the standards set forth by the DistIict,
31 shall be deemed in violation ofthe applicable emission ~standard~. nnle~~, ba5ed npon
32 a showing by the 0 WlleI OJ opelatoI of the somce and an amImati ve detel mination by the
33 Di5tIict, the applicable leqnilement5 ofthi5 Iegnlation ate 5ati~fied.
34 2.32 Notwithstanding the pIOvi5ions ofsection 2.1, if a fedeIal Iegnlation IeqniIe5 compliance
35 with emis5ion 5tandards dming staItnp, shntdown, malftmction, 01 emeIgency, excess
36 emi55ion5 Ie~nlting fiom any ofthe5e e vent5 5hall be deemed in violation of th05e 5tandatd5
37 even thongh, based npon a 5howing by the owneI 01 opelatoI ofthe somce and an affinnative
38 deteImination by the Di5tIict, the applicable IeqniIements identified in section 2.1 ate
39 5ati5fied. HowevCl, in the ea~e of teehnology-ba5ed fedeIal emi55ion 5tandatd5, an
40 emergency 5hall con5titttte an affiImati ve defen5e to an enfoIcement action bIonght fol
41 noncompliance t'Vith the5e emi55ion 5tandaId5 if, ba~ed npon a 5hot'Ving by the ot'Vnel or
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5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
5.2
5.3
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.4
2.3.5
2.3.6
2.3.7
2.3.8
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opelMoI of the 50tnee and an affilmative detelmination by the Di5t1iet, the reqnitement5 of
Seetion 5 me met. In the e~e of the5e teehnology-ba5ed federal emi55ion 5tandard5, the
Di5tliet 5hall ine1ude a Plovi5ion in the applieable pelmit that thi5 affilmative defen5e i5
provided.
The affilmative defen5e of an emelgeney 5hall be demon5trated tinough plopetly 5igned,
eontemprnaneou5 operating log5, 01 othet le1evant evidenee that.
An emelgeney occmred and that the pelmittee can identify the came ofthe emetgency,
The pelmitted facility Wa5 at the time being plopetly opelated,
Dming the pel iod ofthe emelgency, the pennittee expeditiously took all Iea50nable 5teps
con5istent with 5afe operating plactice5 to minimi:ze leve15 ofemi55ion5 that exceeded
the emi55ion standaIds 01 othel lequitements in the pelmit, aIId
The pennittee st:tbmitted notice of the emelgency to the DistIict pnISttant to this
legulation of the time when emi55ion litnitation5 'Wele exceedcd dtte to the
emCIgency. Thi5 notice mU5t fulfill the lequitements of this section, aIId mU5t
contain a de5clipticm of the emelgeney, 5tep5 taken to mitigate emi55ion5, and
COIl ecti ve action5 taken.
In an enfOleement ploceeding, the pelmittee seeking to c5tabli5h the occttnencc of an
emelgeney hM the burden of ploof.
Thi5 Plovi5ion i5 in addition to aIry emelgency 01 t:tp5et Plovi5ion contained in an
applieable legttlation.
In determining the appropriate enforcement action for excess emissions, the District may
consider the following factors:
The duration and frequency of excess emissions during startups, shutdowns,
malfunctions,
Whether the excess emissions could have been prevented through careful planning and
design,
Whether the excess emissions are part of a recurring pattern indicative of inadequate
design, operation, or maintenance,
Whether the process or process equipment was, at all times, operated in a manner
consistent with good practices for minimizing emissions,
For a malfunction, whether the owner or operator, consistent with safe operating
procedures, stopped input feed to the process or process equipment and shut down the
process or process equipment as soon as possible,
For excess emissions during a startup or shutdown, the extent to which the owner or
operator complied with section 3.6,
For excess emissions during a malfunction, the extent to which the owner or operator
complied with section 4.4,
For a malfunction, whether the excess emissions were the result of an unavoidable
malfunction. To be deemed an unavoidable malfunction, the owner or operator of the
process or process equipment shall demonstrate, through properly signed,
contemporaneous operating logs or other relevant evidence, all of the following:
The excess emissions were the result of an identified sudden and reasonably
unforeseeable event beyond the control ofthe owner or operator, including forces of
nature,
Corrective action to restore normal operation of the process or process equipment
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was required,
The excess emissions were not caused by improperly designed equipment, lack of
preventive maintenance, careless or improper operation, or operator error, and
The process or process equipment was, at the time ofthe malfunction, being properly
operated, and
Whether the excess emissions exceeded a concentration in the ambient air that could
reasonably have caused an acute noncancer effect.
Nothing in this regulation shall be construed to restrict the District's discretion to take, at any
time, appropriate enforcement action under KRS Chapter 77 if, upon information supplied
to the District pursuant to this regulation or otherwise available to the District, the District
determines that this mteh-action is necessary to protect public health or welfare.
The owner or operator of a process or process equipment for which there are excess
emissions shall comply with the following requirements, as applicableThese applieable
requirements me as foUo ws:
For startups and shutdowns, a:re-in-Section 3, and
For malfunctions, a:re-in-Section 4,6, and 7, and
Emergeneies are in Section 5, 6, and 7.
If a notification or report to the District is required pursuant to this regulation to be in
writing, then compliance with the deadline shall be established as follows:
If the notification or report is sent via mail, then the date and time postmarked by the
U.S. Postal Service,
If the notification or report is sent via facsimile, then the date and time received by the
District as indicated on the printed copy received by the District,
If the notification or report is sent via electronic mail, then the date and time identified
as sent by the electronic mail received by the District, and
If the notification or report is hand-delivered to the District's office, then the date and
time received by the District as stamped by the District.
The owner or operator of a process or process equipment that is subject to a notification or
reporting requirement pursuant to this regulation may request, and the District may, for
cause, approve an extension of the deadline for submitting one or more elements of the
notification or report. The owner or operator may make this request by telephone, facsimile
or electronic mail. If the request is made by telephone, then the owner or operator shall
submit, by the end of that day, a confrrmation written request by facsimile, electronic mail,
or mail.
Notwithstanding a requirement in these regulations for certification of a submitted report,
the notifications required by sections 3.1, 3.2,3.3,4.1,4.3, and 4.6 are not required to be
certified by a "responsible official" as defined in Regulation 2.16 Title V Operating Permits
section 1.35. The reports required by sections 3.7, 3.8, 4.5, and 4.7 are required to be
certified by a "responsible official."
126 SECTION 3 Startup or Shutdown
127 3.1 If When excess emissions during any planned startup or shutdown are expected to
128 occUIexceed the stmldmds, then the owner or operator of the process or process equipment
129 affected facility shall notify the District in writing no later than 3 three-days before the
130 planned startup or shutdown. IIo-wcvcr,
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131 3.2 Ifan unplanned the-startup or shutdown during which excess emissions are expected to occur
132 is necessitated by events, other than a malfunction, that \'\Jhieh the owner or operator could
133 not reasonably have foreseen 3 three-days before the startup or shutdown, then the mteh
134 notification shall be given to the District by telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail within
135 1hour after the decision to start up or shut down the process or process equipment was made,
136 and, ifthe notification is given by telephone, in writing as promptly as possible, but no later
137 than 24 hours after that fo11o\'\Jing the decision detenninmion to soot dO\'\Jn was madeor
138 startnp and in no e veItt ImeI thaI! one day £0110 \'\J ing the deteI minmion to staI tttp 01 sOOtdo \'\J n.
139 3.3 Ifan unplanned startup or shutdown pursuant to section 3.2 begins outside of the District's
140 regular business hours (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Monday to Friday, not including holidays)
141 and the initial written notification pursuant to section 3.2 was not available to the District
142 during regular business hours, then, in addition to that written notification, the owner or
143 operator of the process or process equipment shall leave a message on the District's main
144 telephone line [(502) 574-6000] containing the information required by sections 3.5.1, 3.5.3,
145 3.5.4, and 3.5.6, and the name and telephone number of a contact person at the stationary
146 source.
147 3.4 An unplanned startup or shutdown during which excess emissions are expected to occur that
148 is necessitated by a malfunction shall be treated as part of the malfunction pursuant to
149 Section 4.
150 3.53- The written planned or unplanned startup or shutdown initial notification notiees pursuant
151 to section 3.1 or 3.2 shall include the following information:
152 3.5.1 The name and location of the stationary source,
153 3.5.2 The name, address, telephone number, and electronic mail address of the person
154 responsible for providing the information required by section 3.5,
155 3.5.3 The process or process equipment involved in the startup or shutdown,
156 3.53-.43- The scheduled date and time for the beginning of the startup or shutdown process, the
157 expected duration offur-the startup or shutdown process, and the expected time period
158 during which excess emissions are expected to occur,
159 3.5.5 The physical and chemical composition and estimated quantity and concentration of
160 excess emissions, or equivalent information that relates to compliance with the emissions
161 standard, such as emissions monitoring data or results ofan EPA-approved test method,
162 for each air contaminant,action, and
163 3.53-.6+ The reason for and necessity dmation of the startup or shutdown,
164 3.5.7 The reason the startup or shutdown could not be accomplished without causing excess
165 emissions, and
166 3.5.8 An explanation as to how the provisions of section 3.6 will be met.
167 3.3.2 The natme of the aetion to be taken dming startnp 01 shtttdo\'\Jn,
168 3.3.4 The basis fin detenmnation that such stmtnp 01 shutdo\'\Jn is necessary.
169 3.6 If excess emissions during a startup or shutdown of a process or process equipment are
170 expected to occur, then the owner or operator of the process or process equipment shall
171 comply with all of the following:
172 3.6.1 Reasonable, available, and practicable emission reduction measures, including process
173 equipment design, operating procedures, and pollution prevention measures, shall be
174 used to prevent or minimize excess emissions,
175 3.6.2 The frequency of operation of the process or process equipment in the startup or
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shutdown mode shall be minimized to the maximum extent practicable,
A bypass of any related control equipment shall not occur unless necessary to prevent
loss of life, personal injury, or severe property damage, and the extent and duration of
any bypass shall be reduced as much as necessary to minimize excess emissions, and
All emission and parametric monitoring systems for the process or process equipment
shall be operated unless technically infeasible.
Ifa person has notified the District pursuant to section 3.1, 3.2, or 3.3 but no excess emission
occurred as the result of the startup or shutdown, then the owner or operator of the process
or process equipment shall send a written report to the District that includes the name and
telephone number ofa contact person at the stationary source and the information required
by sections 3.8.1,3.8.3, and 3.8.4, except indicating that no excess emission occurred. The
written report may be sent by mail, facsimile, or electronic mail, and shall be sent no later
than 5 working days following the completion of the startup or shutdown.
If the emissions exceed the standard fu! a period in excess of fum homs, No later than 5
working days following the completion of a startup or shutdown during which excess
emissions occurred, whether or not initial notification of the startup or shutdown pursuant
to section 3.1,3.2, or 3.3 was made to the District, the owner or operator of the process or
process equipment affected facility shall send a written report notice to the District that
includes the following information:no latc! than thc end of the next ll\io!king day following
the fourth hou! ofexccss emissions.
The name and location of the stationary source,
The name, address, telephone number, and electronic mail address of the person
responsible for providing the information required by section 3.8,
The process or process equipment involved in the startup or shutdown,
The actual date and time of the beginning ofthe startup or shutdown process, the actual
duration of the startup or shutdown process, and the actual time period during which
excess emissions occurred,
The physical and chemical composition and calculated quantity and concentration of
excess emissions, or equivalent information that relates to compliance with the emissions
standard, such as emissions monitoring data or results ofan EPA-approved test method,
for each air contaminant, including a description of the method used for calculating
excess emissions and an identification of the applicable emission standard that was
exceeded,
An explanation as to how each provision of section 3.6 was met, and
The frequency of excess emissions during startups or shutdowns during the previous 2
years.
The District may require the owner or operator ofa process or process equipment for which
startups or shutdowns have resulted in repeated excess emissions to develop and submit a
program to eliminate or minimize excess emissions. Ifthe District determines that a program
is appropriate, then the District shall notify the owner or operator in writing, specify the
information that is required in the program, and establish a deadline for submittal of the
program. Upon District approval, the owner or operator shall implement the approved
program and the approved program shall be an enforceable requirement of the applicable
District permit for the process and process equipment included in the program.
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4.3
4.2
4.4
4.4.1
..
SECTION 4 Malfunction~
46.1 If When excess emissions from a process or process equipment resulting from cine t~ a
malfunction, tor from to-an unplanned nnforeseen startup or shutdown necessitated by a
aS5~eiated ~ithmalfunctions) ~r at'!: emergeney, occur are-or are likely to occmmay be in
exeess ~fthe 5tandm'ds, the owner or operator of the process or process equipment affeeted
faeility shall, as promptly as possible, but no and in n~ event later than 1 tme'"hour following
the start of the malfunction ~r emergeney, or, if a call to the 911 system was made, then no
later than 2 hours following the start of the malfunction, notify the District by telephone,
facsimile, or electronic mail. A eall placed t~ the emergeney nnmber 911 e~nstitntes
n~tifieati~n t~ the Distriet.
The initial notification ofthe malfunction pursuant to section 4.1 shall include the following
information:
The name and location of the stationary source,
The name, address, telephone number, and electronic mail address of the person
responsible for providing the information required by section 4.2,
The process or process equipment involved in the malfunction,
The date and time of the beginning of the malfunction, the estimated time before,
consistent with safe operating procedures, input feed to the process or process equipment
will be stopped and the process orprocess equipment shut down or the process or process
equipment is returned to normal operation, whichever is earlier (the excess emissions
end), and the estimated time period during which excess emissions are likely to occur,
To the extent that it can reasonably be determined within the context of the
circumstances, the physical and chemical composition and estimated quantity and
concentration ofexcess emissions, or equivalent information that relates to compliance
with the emissions standard, such as emissions monitoring data or results of an EPA-
approved test method, for each air contaminant,
If known or suspected, the likely cause of the malfunction, and
Ifapplicable and known, the reason the processes or process equipment will not be shut
down immediately, consistent with safe operating procedures.
If the initial notification pursuant to section 4.1 is required to be made at a time outside of
the District's regular business hours (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Monday to Friday, not
counting holidays), then, in addition to that initial notification, the owner or operator ofthe
process or process equipment shall leave a message on the District's main telephone line
[(502) 574-6000] containing the information required by sections 4.2.1, 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.2.6,
and 4.2.7, and the name and telephone number ofa contact person at the stationary source.
If excess emissions during a malfunction of a process or process equipment occur or are
likely to occur, then the owner or operator of the process or process equipment shall comply
with all of the following:
Reasonable, available, and practicable emission reduction measures, including process
equipment design, operating procedures, pollution prevention measures, use ofoff-shift
labor and overtime, and, consistent with safe operating procedures, immediatelystopping
input feed to the process or process equipment and shutting down the process or process
equipment, shall be used to prevent or minimize excess emissions,
The frequency ofoperation of the process or process equipment in a malfunction mode
shall be minimized to the maximum extent practicable and the duration of operation of
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3
4.2.4
4.2.5
4.2.6
4.2.7
4.4.2
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4.4.4
4.1
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4.1.3
4.1.4
4.5
4.6
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4.6.2
4.6.3
4.6.4
4.6.5
4.7
6.2
the process or process equipment in a malfunction mode shall be reduced as much as
necessary to minimize excess emissions,
A bypass of any related control equipment shall not occur unless necessary to prevent
loss of life, personal injury, or severe property damage, and the extent and duration of
any bypass shall be reduced as much as necessary to minimize excess emissions, and
All emission and parametric monitoring systems for the process or process equipment
shall be operated unless technically infeasible.
In oldel fel exee55 emi55ion5 Ie5ulting from a malfunetion to not be deemed a violation, the
5howing and detelmination identified in 5eetion 2.1 5hall eonfilm that all of the following
have oeeuned.
The oeeunenee in qne5tion did not le5nlt from the failule ofthe ownel 01 opelatol ofthe
50m ee to oper ate and maintain the equipment pI oper ry ,
All Iea50nable 5tep5 weIe taken to eoneet, a5 expeditiou5ly a5 pIaetieable, the eondition5
ean5ing the emi55ion5 to exeeed the 5tandalds, including the use of off-5hift labol and
overtime ifneee5SaIy,
All Iea50nable 5teps weIe taken to minimi2:e the emission5 Iesulting ft om the oeennenee,
and-
The exeess emission5 ale not pm ofa leemTing patteln indieati ye ofinadeqnate design,
opelation, 01 maintenanee.
If a person has notified the District pursuant to section 4.1 or 4.3 but no excess emission
occurred as the result ofthe malfunction, then the owner or operator ofthe process or process
equipment shall send a written report to the District that includes the name and telephone
number of a contact person at the stationary source, the information required by sections
4.6.1, 4.6.3, and 4.6.4, and the statement that no excess emission occurred. The written
report may be sent by mail, facsimile, or electronic mail, and shall be sent no later than 5
working days after the input feed to the process or process equipment is stopped and the
process or process equipment is shut down or the process or process equipment is returned
to normal operation after the occurrence of a malfunction, whichever is earlier.
As soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 2 hours after the excess emissions ended,
the owner or operator of the process or process equipment shall notify the District by
telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail. lfthis notification is made by telephone, the owner
or operator shall provide written notification by facsimile or electronic mail no later than 4
hours after the excess emissions ended. The written notification of the end of the
malfunction shall include the following information:
The name and location of the stationary source,
The name, address, telephone number, and electronic mail address of the person
responsible for providing the information required by section 4.6,
The process or process equipment involved in the malfunction,
The date and time that the excess emissions ended, and
lfthe initial notification to the District pursuant to section 4.6 was made by telephone,
then the time that the telephone notification was made.
No later than 15 calendar days after the excess emissions ended, the owner or operator ofthe
process or process equipment shall send a written report to the District that includes the
following information:
If the time neeessary to eoneet unlawful emissions will exceed £Cm honl5, the ownel 01
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310 operator mU5t notify the Di5t1iet of the malftmetion or emergeney by telephone at the time
311 of thi5 detennination, and in \'V riting no later than tow 0 \'V orking day5 after the 5ta:rt of the
312 emergeney or malfunetion. Notifieation ofeompletion ofthe eoneeti ~ e action5 rntl5t be made
313 by telephone to the Di5t1iet.
314 6.3 Malftmetion and emergeney report5 and notiee5 mn5t include the rono\'Ving infonnation.
315 46.73-.1 The name and location of the stationary sourcea:ir eontaminant 50mee and affeeted
316 faeility,
317 6.3.2 It51oeation,
318 46.73-.23- The name, address, and-telephone number, and electronic mail address of the person
319 responsible per50n for providing the information required by section 4.7the affeeted
320 faeility,
321 4.7.3 The process or process equipment involved in the malfunction,
322 46.73-.4 Confirmation of the actual date and time that the excess emissions endedof-the
323 oeeunenee,
324 46.73-.5 The physical and chemical composition;-ntte; and calculated quantity and concentration
325 of excess the-emissions, or equivalent information that relates to compliance with the
326 emissions standard, such as emissions monitoring data or results ofan EPA-approved test
327 method, for each air contaminant, including a description of the method used for
328 calculating excess emissions and an identification of the applicable emission standard
329 that was exceededdnting the malfunetion, or dming the emergeney,-a:nd
330 46.73-.6 An explanation as to how each provision of section 4.4 was mefFhe mea5ure5 adopted
331 to minimize the dmation and extent of the emi55ion5 dming 5hntdOM1, 5tarttlp,
332 malftmetion; ('}I emergency.
333 6.4 Malfmletion and emergeney report5 5han a150 inemde.
334 6.4.1 The time the exee55 emi55ion5 began and ended,
335 6.4.2 The time of the beginning and end of the brea:kdo\'Vn, malfunetion or emergeney that i5
336 a55erted to be the eause ofthe exee55 emis5ion5,
337 6.4.3 An explanation and, \'Vhere appropriate, an engineering analysi5 of the eanse of the
338 malftmetion, breakdo\'Vn or emergeney,
339 6.5 The Di5t1iet, ror ean5e, may \'Vai~e therepOlt5 or extend the time period fOl filing the report5
340 required by thi5 5eetion.
341 4.2 In ea5e5 \'Vhere malftmetion5 are ofarepetitiou5 nature, 01 \'Vhen more than 12 failme5 ofthe
342 5ame or 5imilar pieee5 ofeqnipment oeem in a 12-month period, the Di5t1iet 5haH reqnite the
343 o\'Vner or operMOI to 5ubmit a \'Vritten program outlining a time 5ehednle and eoneeti~e
344 aetion5 \'Vhieh \'Villre5ult in a permanent solntion to the problem5. The Di5triet reser ~e5 the
345 right to eontilltlany e~aluate and reqrtire coneetiOI15 ofmalftmetions.
346 46.74.74 An analysis ofthe cause ofthe malfunction and the steps that will be taken to prevent or
347 minimize similar occurrences in the future,-a:nd
348 4.7.8 The frequency of excess emissions resulting from malfunctions during the previous 2
349 years ofthe same or similar process or process equipment or that occurred because ofthe
350 same or similar cause, and
351 46.74.95 Any additional information requested by a5""the District may reqnile.
352 4.8 Upon written request from the owner or operator ofa process or process equipment required
353 to submit a report pursuant to section 4.7 for an extension of the due date to submit the
354 information required by section 4.7.7, the District may extend the due date by up to 45 days
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355 from the original due date.
356 SECTION 5 Emer gencies
357 SECTION 6 Initial Notification and Repor ting Requir ements for Malfunctions and
358 Emergencies
359 SECTION 57 Extended Malfunctions and Erner gerrcies
360 7.1 ht the event ofa malfbnetion or emergency fOl ~hich thc time necessary to eoneettmla~fttl
361 cmissions ~ill execed fom hOMs, the Air Polltttion Control Offieer may anthorize contintted
362 operation and impose eonditions fOl eontinttcd operation.
363 57-.12 If correcting the time necessary to eonect the ttnla~fttl excess emissions from a process or
364 process equipment resulting from a malfunction is anticipated to exceed 30 days and the
365 owner or operator does not shut down the process or process equipment, then the owner or
366 operator shall, as soon as known, but no later than 7 days after the beginning of the excess
367 emissions, request, in writing, that the District initiate the process for the adoption ofa Board
368 Order to allow continued operation with excess emissions. The request by the owner or
369 operator ofthe process orprocess equipment shall include a writtenprogram outlininga time
370 schedule and corrective actions to abate the excess emissions. The time schedule may
371 include a period for engineering review and analysis ofthe cause ofthe excess emissions and
372 design of modifications to effect compliance with the emission standards. The owner or
373 operator shall, in a timely manner, submit all information requested by the District.
374 5.2 Any resulting Board Order shall include a time schedule and required actions to complywith
375 the emission standards.
376 Adopted v1/4-19-72; effective 4-19-72; amended v2/9-1-76, v3/6-13-79, v4/11-16-83, v5/12-15-93,
377 v6/6-21-95, v7/1-17-96.
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1 REGULATION 1.20 Malfunction Prevention Programs
2 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
3 Jefferson County, Kentucky
4 Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
5 Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
6 Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes the Air Pollution Control Board to adopt and
7 enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of KRS
8 Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the requirement for the owner or operator of certain
9 permitted processes or process equipment to develop and implement a malfunction prevention
10 program.
11 SECTION 1 Definitions
12 Terms used in this regulation that are not defined in this regulation shall have the meaning given to
13 them in Regulation 1.02 Definitions.
14 1.1 "Affected facility" means any process or process equipment that meets one ofthe following:
15 1.1.1 A malfunction involving the process or process equipment was reported pursuant to
16 Regulation 1.07 Excess Emissions During Startups, Shutdowns, and Malfunctions and
17 the District determines that the development and implementation of a malfunction
18 prevention program is appropriate,
19 1.1.2 The District determines that a malfunction involving the process or process equipment
20 may have occurred and that the development and implementation of a malfunction
21 prevention program is appropriate, or
22 1.1.3 The District determines that the development and implementation of a malfunction
23 prevention program is appropriate to minimize the likelihood of the occurrence of a
24 malfunction that may become harmful to public health or welfare.
25 SECTION 2 Applicability
26 This regulation applies to any affected facility.
27 SECTION 3 Malfunction Prevention Program Requirements
28 3.1 The owner or operator ofan affected facility shall develop a malfunction prevention program
29 to prevent, detect, and correct malfunctions, equipment failures, or abnormal process or
30 process equipment operating parameters that may cause an excess emission. The program
31 shall be in writing and reviewed and updatedas the owner or operator or the District
32 determines necessary to keep the program current, relevant, and effective. The program
33 shall, at a minimum, include all of the following:
34 3.1.1 Identification of the processes, process equipment, and air pollution control equipment
35 included in the program, including monitoring equipment and other instrumentation used
36 to determine proper operation of the process and equipment,
37 3.1.2 Identification of the individual or position responsible for inspecting, maintaining, and
38 repairing the affected process equipment and air pollution control equipment,
39 3.1.3 The maximum intervals for inspection and routine maintenance ofthe affected process
40 equipment and air pollution control equipment. The maximum interval for routine
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inspection and maintenance shall not exceed that recommended by the manufacturer
unless specifically identified in the program and justified,
A description of the items or conditions that will be inspected,
A listing ofmaterials and spare parts that will be maintained in inventory,
A description of the corrective procedures that will be taken in the event of a
malfunction,
The calibration schedule for any device that monitors emissions or process, process
equipment, or airpollution control equipment operational parameters. The time between
calibrations shall not exceed 1 year or as specified in the program, whichever is shorter,
A description ofany additional air pollution control equipment, monitoring equipment,
or other instrumentation that will be installed, the installation and operation ofwhich is
necessary to minimize the likelihood of the occurrence of a malfunction,
A description of any operational changes that will be instituted that are necessary to
minimize the likelihood of the occurrence of a malfunction,
If full implementation of a component of the malfunction prevention program will not
occur upon approval by the District, then a schedule for implementation of that
component,
The recommended length of time for the malfunction prevention program to remain in
effect, and
Any other information that the District deems appropriate.
The owner or operator ofan affected facility shall submit a malfunction prevention program
to the District within 120 days of receipt of written notification from the District that a
program is required. If the District determines that a revision to the program is necessary,
the owner or operator shall, within 60 days ofreceipt ofwritten notification from the District
of a deficiency, submit a revision to the program addressing the deficiency.
After providing an opportunity for public review and comment on an initial malfunction
prevention program, the District may approve the program. Upon receipt of written
notification from the District that a submitted malfunction prevention program is approved,
the owner or operator of the affected facility shall implement the approved program. The
approved program shall be an enforceable requirement ofthe applicable District permit for
the process and process equipment included in the program.
In addition to any required revision ofa malfunction prevention program pursuant to section
3.1 or 3.2, the owner or operator ofan affected facility may periodically revise the program
as necessary to satisfy the requirements ofthis regulation or to reflect changes in equipment
or procedures for the affected facility. Any revised program shall be submitted to the
District. After providing an opportunity for public review and comment on a revision to a
program determined by the District to be substantive, the District may approve the revised
program. Upon receipt ofwritten notification from the District that the revised program is
approved, the owner or operator ofthe affected facility shall implement the approved revised
program. The approved revised program shall be the enforceable requirement of the
applicable District permit.
The owner or operator may reference, in whole or in part, in a malfunction prevention
program the affected facility's standard operating procedure manual, an Occupational Safety
and Health plan, or other program to meet some or all ofthe requirements ofthis regulation.
The owner or operator of the affected facility shall keep adequate records to document
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3.7
implementation of the components of the malfunction prevention program. These records
shall be maintained for a minimum of 5 years and made available to the District upon
request.
The District, after providing an opportunity for public review and comment, maydiscontinue
the requirement for an owner or operator to implement a malfunction prevention program.
Ifthe District determines that discontinuation ofthis requirement is appropriate, based upon
a supporting history that the program has been successful in minimizing malfunctions, then
the District shall notify the owner or operator in writing and the program shall no longer be
an enforceable requirement of the applicable District permit.
95 Adopted vl/ ; effective _
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1 REGULATION 1.21 Enhanced Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) Program
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Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
Jefferson County, Kentucky
Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes the Air Pollution Control Board to adopt and
enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of KRS
Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the requirement for the owner or operator ofcertain process
units to develop and implement an enhanced leak detection and repair program.
SECTION 1 Definitions
Terms used in this regulation that are not defined in this regulation shall have the meaning given to
them in Regulation 1.02 Definitions.
1.1 "Affected facility" means either of the following:
1.1.1 A process unit that is subject to requirements ofa program for the detection and repair of
equipment leaks in 40 CFR Part 60, 61, or 63 except for 40 CFR Part 63 Subpart M
National Perchloroethylene Air Emission Standards for Dry Cleaning Facilities, or
1.1.2 A process unit for which the District determines the implementation ofa leak detection
and repair (LDAR) program is appropriate to minimize the likelihood of the occurrence
of increased emissions that may become harmful to public health or welfare.
1.2 "Connector" means a flanged, screwed, or otherjoined fitting used to connect two pipe lines
or a pipe line and a piece of equipment. A common connector is a flange. A joined fitting
welded completely around the circumference of the interface is not considered a connector
for the purpose of this regulation.
1.3 "Independent third party" means an entity in which the owner or operator (including any
subsidiary, parent company, sister company, or joint venture) of the affected facility has no
ownership or other financial interest. If the routine monitoring at an affected facility is done
by a contractor rather than by in-house personnel, then the independent third party shall not
be the contractor that did the routine monitoring nor have ownership or other financial interest
in that contractor.
1.4 "Leak" means:
1.4.1 For a valve or flange, a screening concentration greater than 100 parts per million by
volume,
1.4.2 For a pump, a screening concentration greater than 250 parts per million by volume,
1.4.3 For an agitator or compressor, a screening concentration greater than 2,500 parts per
million by volume, and
1.4.4 For any other component, a screening concentration greater than 500 parts per million by
volume.
1.4.5 All concentrations specified in this definition are as methane, above background.
1.5 "Process unit" means the equipment assembled and connected by pipes or ducts to process
raw materials and to manufacture an intendedproduct, including ancillary equipment such as, .
but not limited to, pumps, compressors, agitators, pressure reliefdevices, sampling connection
systems, open-ended valves or lines, valves, connectors, instrumentation systems, and control
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1.6
devices or systems. A process unit may consist ofmore than 1unit operation. A process unit
does not include utilities, such as steam, uncontaminated water, or compressed air.
"Water seal control" means a seal pot, p-leg trap, or other type oftrap filled with water (e.g.,
flooded sewers that maintain water levels adequate to prevent air flow through the system)
that creates a water barrier between the water level ofthe seal and the atmosphere. The water
level of the seal shall be maintained in the vertical leg of a drain in order to be considered a
water seal.
50 SECTION 2 Applicability
51 This regulation applies to any affected facility except that an affected facility that is subject to
52 Section 14 shall comply with the provisions of Section 14.
53 SECTION 3 General Monitoring and Inspection Requirements
54 The owner or operator of an affected facility shall monitor the process unit equipment for organic
55 compound leaks according to the requirements of40 CFR 63 Subpart H National Emission Standards
56 for Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants for Equipment Leaks, except that the following additional
57 requirements shall apply:
58 3.1 The organic compound emissions from the following components shall be monitored with a
59 hydrocarbon gas analyzer each calendar quarter: blind flange, cap, or plug at the end ofa pipe
60 or line containing an organic compound; heat exchanger head; sight glass; meter; gauge;
61 sampling connection; bolted manway; hatch; connector; agitator; sump cover; junction box
62 vent; cover and seal on an organic compound-water separator; and process drain.
63 3.2 As an alternative to the requirements ofsection 3.1 for blind flanges, caps, or plugs at the end
64 of pipes or lines containing an organic compound; sight glasses; meters; gauges; sampling
65 connections; bolted manways; connectors; heat exchanger heads; hatches; and sump covers
66 (the section 3.2 components), the owner or operator may elect to monitor all of these
67 components of a process unit and then conduct subsequent monitoring at the following
68 frequencies:
69 3.2.1 Once per year (i.e., 12-month period), ifthe percent ofleaking section 3.2 components of
70 the process unit was 0.5% or greater, but less than 2.0%, during the last required annual
71 or biennial monitoring period,
72 3.2.2 Once every 2 years, if the percent ofleaking section 3.2 components of the process unit
73 was less than 0.5% during the last required monitoring period. An owner or operator may
74 complywith section 3.2.2 by monitoringat least 40% ofthese components in the first year
75 and the remainder of the components in the second year. The percent ofleaking section
76 3.2 components shall be calculated for the total of all monitoring performed during the
77 2-year period,
78 3.2.3 Ifthe owner or operator ofthe process unit in a biennial leak detection and repair program
79 calculates less than 0.5% ofleaking section 3.2 components from the 2-year monitoring
80 period, the owner or operator may monitor the components one time every 4 years. An
81 owner or operator may comply with the requirements of section 3.2.3 by monitoring at
82 least 20% of the components each year until all section 3.2 components have been
83 monitored within 4 years,
84 3.2.4 If the process unit complying with the requirements of section 3.2.3 using a 4-year
85 monitoring interval program has greater than or equal to 0.5% but less than 1.0% leaking
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86 section 3.2 components, the owner or operator shall increase the monitoring frequency to
87 one time every 2 years. An owner or operator may comply with the requirements of
88 section 3.2.4 by monitoring at least 40% of the components in the first year and the
89 remainder of the components in the second year. The owner or operator may again elect
90 to use the provisions ofsection 3.2.3 when the percent leaking components decreases to
91 less than 0.5%,
92 3.2.5 Ifthe process unit complying with requirements ofsection 3.2.3 using a 4-yearmonitoring
93 interval program has greater than or equal to 1.0% but less than 2.0% leaking section 3.2
94 components, the owner or operator shall increase the monitoring frequency to one time
95 per year. The owner or operator may again elect to use the provisions of section 3.2.3
96 when the percent leaking components decreases to less than 0.5%, and
97 3.2.6 Ifa process unit complying with requirements ofsection 3.2.3 using a 4-yearmonitoring
98 interval program has 2.0% or greater leaking section 3.2 components, the owner or
99 operator shall increase the monitoring frequency to quarterly. The owner or operator may
100 again elect to use the provisions of section 3.2.3 when the percent leaking components
101 decreases to less than 0.5%.
102 3.3 A process drain equipped with a water seal control shall be inspected weekly to ensure that
103 the water seal control is effective in preventing ventilation, except that daily inspections are
104 required for a seal that has failed 3 or more inspections in any 12-month period. Upon request
105 by the District, the owner or operator shall demonstrate (e.g., by visual inspection or smoke
106 test) that the water seal control is properly designed and restricts ventilation.
107 3.4 A process drain not equipped with a water seal control shall be inspected monthly to ensure
108 that each gasket, cap, and plug is in place and that there is no gap, crack, or other hole in the
109 gasket, cap, or plug. In addition, each cap and plug shall be inspected monthly to ensure that
110 it is tightly-fitting.
111 3.5 A pressure reliefvalve in gaseous service that is not vented to a closed-vent system shall be
112 monitored with a hydrocarbon gas analyzer each calendar quarter.
113 3.6 Monitored screening concentrations shall be recorded for each component in gaseous or light
114 liquid service. Notations such as "pegged," "offscale," "leaking," "not leaking," or "below
115 leak definition" shall not be substituted for numerical hydrocarbon gas analyzer results. For
116 readings that are higher than the upper end of the scale (i.e., pegged) even when using the
117 highest scale setting or a dilution probe, a default pegged value of 100,000 parts per million
118 by volume shall be recorded.
119 3.7 Ifthere are 25,000 or more components at an affected facility required to be monitored by this
120 regulation, then the monitoring data shall be recorded simultaneously when the component
121 is monitored in an electronic format using a datalogger or other similar device and the
122 information shall be kept electronically in a computer database. However, if the electronic
123 recording device fails, then the monitoring data may temporarily be recorded in a non-
124 electronic format and later entered into the electronic database.
125 3.8 Notwithstanding the monitoring frequency provisions ofsections 3.1 to 3.5, the District may,
126 for cause, require monitoring to be done on a more frequent schedule. If the District
127 determines that more frequent monitoring is appropriate, the District shall notify the owner
128 or operator ofthe affected facility in writing of the required revised monitoring schedule and
129 the reason for requiring more frequent monitoring.
130 3.9 The owner or operator may propose to the District for approval a leak monitoring program
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131 that uses continuous monitoring ofleaks with an alarm system that may be used to replace the
132 monitoring requirement of sections 3.1 to 3.7. This program shall include a record keeping
133 plan.
134 SECTION 4 Leak Repair
135 4.1 Forleaks detected over 10,000 parts permillion by volume (ppmv), a first attempt at repairing
136 the leaking component shall be made no later than 1process unit operating day after the leak
137 is detected, and the component shall be repaired no later than 7 calendar days after the leak
138 is detected.
139 4.2 For all other components subject to this regulation found to have leaks as defined in
140 section 1.4, the components shall be repaired as specified in 40 CFR 63 Subpart H.
141 4.3 For a valve that is not a pressure reliefvalve or automatic control valve, repair maybe delayed
142 beyond the period designated in section 4.1 only under one of the following conditions:
143 4.3.1 Repair or replacement ofthe valve will occur at the next scheduled process unit shutdown
144 and the owner or operator has undertaken "extraordinary efforts" to repair the leaking
145 valve. For purposes ofsection 4.3, "extraordinary efforts" is defined as nonroutine repair
146 methods (e.g., sealant injection) or use ofa closed-vent system to capture and control the
147 leak by at least 90%. For a leak detected at a level greater than 10,000 ppmv,
148 extraordinary efforts shall be undertaken within 7 days of the valve being placed on the
149 shutdown list; however, the owner or operator may keep the leaking valve on the
150 shutdown list only after 2 unsuccessful attempts to repair a leaking valve through
151 extraordinaryefforts, provided that the second extraordinaryeffort attempt is made within
152 15 days ofthe first extraordinary effort attempt. For any other leak, extraordinary efforts
153 shall be undertaken within 15 days of the valve being placed on the shutdown list, and a
154 second extraordinary effort attempt is not required,
155 4.3.2 The owner or operator maintains, and makes available to the District upon request,
156 documentation that demonstrates that there is a safety, mechanical, or major
157 environmental concern posed by repairing the leak by using "extraordinary efforts", or
158 4.3.3 The valve is isolated from the process unit and does not remain in organic compound
159 service.
160 4.4 A supervisory level person shall sign-offprior to putting a component on a "delay ofrepair"
161 list.
162 SECTION 5 Equipment Requirements
163 The following equipment standards shall apply in addition to any equipment standards in 40 CFR 63
164 Subpart H.
165 5.1 A pressure relief valve in organic compound service that vents to atmosphere and that is
166 installed in series with a rupture disk, pin, second relief valve, or other similar leak-tight
167 pressure reliefcomponent shall be equipped with a pressure-sensing device or an equivalent
168 device or system between the pressure reliefvalve and the other pressure reliefcomponent to
169 monitor for leakage past the first pressure reliefcomponent. When leakage is detected past
170 the first pressure reliefcomponent, the pressure reliefcomponent shall be repaired or replaced
171 as soon as practicable, but no later than 30 calendar days after the failure is detected.
172 5.2 A pump, compressor, or agitator installed on or after July 1,2006, shall be equipped with a
173 shaft sealing system that prevents or detects the emission of organic compounds from the
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174 seal.
175 5.2.1 An acceptable shaft sealing system includes:
176 5.2.1.1 A seal equipped with piping capable of transporting any leakage from the seal back
177 to the process unit,
178 5.2.1.2 A seal with a closed-vent system capable of transporting to a control device any
179 leakage from the seal,
180 5.2.1.3 A dual seal system with a heavy liquid or non-organic compound barrier fluid or gas
181 at a higher pressure than the process pressure, and
182 5.2.1.4 A seal with an automatic seal failure detection and alarm system.
183 5.2.2 The District may approve a shaft sealing system different from those specified in
184 section 5.2.1, provided that the District considers, on a case-by-case basis, the
185 technological circumstances of the individual pump, compressor, or agitator, and
186 determines that the alternative shaft sealing system will result in the lowest emissions
187 level that the pump, compressor, or agitator is capable ofmeeting.
188 5.3 The following equipment standards shall apply to a process drain:
189 5.3.1 Ifa water seal control is used the only acceptable alternative to water as the sealing liquid
190 is ethylene glycol, propylene glycol, or a similar low vaporpressure antifreeze, which may
191 be used only during the period ofNovember through February,
192 5.3.2 As an alternative to the weekly water seal inspections ofsection 3.3, the owner or operator
193 may choose to equip the process drain with one of the following:
194 5.3.2.1 An alarm that alerts the operator if the water level in the vertical leg ofthe drain falls
195 below 50% of the maximum level and a device that continuously records the status
196 of the water level alarm, including the time period for which the alarm is activated,
197 or
198 5.3.2.2 A flow-monitoring device indicating either positive flow from a main to a branch
199 water line supplying a trap or water being continuously dripped into the trap, and a
200 device that continuously records the st'!tus of water flow into the trap, and
201 5.3.3 For a process drain not equipped with a water seal control, the process drain shall be
202 equipped with one of the following:
203 5.3.3.1 A gasketed seal, or
204 5.3.3.2 A tightly-fitting cap or plug.
205 5.4 Construction ofa new or reworked piping, valve, pump, or compressor system shall conform
206 to the applicable American National Standards Institute, American Petroleum Institute,
207 American Society ofMechanical Engineers, or equivalent codes.
208 5.5 A new or reworked underground process unit pipeline shall not contain a buried valve that
209 would render monitoring for fugitive emissions impractical.
210 5.6 To the extent that good engineering practice will permit, a new or reworked component shall
211 be located so as to be reasonably accessible for leak checking during the operation of the
212 process unit. A component elevated more than 2 meters above a support surface may be
213 considered nonaccessible and may be included on a list of nonaccessible components and
214 made available to the District upon request.
215 5.7 A new or reworked piping connection shall be either welded or flanged or consist ofpressed
216 and permanently formed metal-to-meta1 seals. A screwed connection is permissible only on
217 new piping smaller than 2 inches in diameter. A new connection shall be checked for leaks
218 using one of the following methods:
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219 5.7.1 Within 10 days of being placed in organic compound service, by monitoring with a
220 hydrocarbon gas analyzer for a component in light liquid and gas service and by using
221 visual, audio, or olfactory means for a component in heavy liquid service, or
222 5.7.2 Before placing the system in organic compound service, bypressure testing at a pressure
223 that is equal to or greater than the maximum operating pressure for that component.
224 5.8 For a pressure reliefvalve installed in series with a rupture disk, pin, second reliefvalve, or
225 other similar leak-tight pressure relief component, a pressure gauge or an equivalent device
226 or system shall be installed between the first pressure relief component and the second
227 pressure relief component to monitor for leakage past the first pressure relief component.
228 When leakage is detected past the first pressure relief component, that component shall be
229 repaired or replaced at the earliest opportunity, but no later than the next process unit
230 shutdown.
231 SECTION 6 Personnel Requirements
232 6.1 The owner or operator of an affected facility shall act as, or assign a person to be, the leak
233 detection and repair (LDAR) coordinator. The position of LDAR coordinator shall be
234 authorized to implement appropriate changes regarding LDAR activities.
235 6.2 The owner or operator of an affected facility shall provide LDAR program training for:
236 6.2.1 Each new LDAR technician employee prior to performing LDARprogram duties without
237 supervIsIOn,
238 6.2.2 Each existing LDAR technician employee, at least once every 2 ye~, and
239 6.2.3 Each operations and maintenance employee who deals with the affected facility's
240 potentially leaking components, at least once every 2 years.
241 6.3 If the owner or operator ofan affected facility uses the services ofcontractors to do LDAR-
242 related work, then the owner or operator shall determine and assure that the contracted
243 employees have sufficient training to meet the requirements of this section.
244 SECTION 7 Recordkeeping Requirements
245 7.1 If the owner or operator of an affected facility is securing a bypass line valve in the closed
246 position to comply with 40 CFR 63.1720)(2), the owner or operator shall:
247 7.1.1 Maintain a record of the dates that the monthly visual inspection of the seal or closure
248 mechanism has been performed,
249 7.1.2 Record the date and time of all periods when:
250 7.1.2.1 The seal mechanism is broken,
251 7.1.2.2 The bypass line valve position has changed, or
252 7.1.2.3 The key for a lock-and-key type lock has been checked out, and
253 7.1.3 Maintain a record ofeach time the bypass line valve was opened, including:
254 7.1.3.1 The date and time the valve was opened,
255 7.1.3.2 The date and time the valve was closed,
256 7.1.3.3 The reason the valve was opened,
257 7.1.3.4 The flow through the valve, and
258 7.1.3.5 The resulting speciated emissions, including the basis for the emissions estimate.
259 7.2 Records ofall components subject to Section 4 for which repair was delayed shall be prepared
260 and maintained as specified in 40 CFR 63 Subpart H.
261 7.3 The owner or operator shall maintain all records required bythis regulation for at least 5 years
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262 and make them available to the District for review upon request, including records identifying
263 and justifying each exemption claimed under Section 8.
264 SECTION 8 Exemptions
265 8.1 The following are exempt from the shaft sealing system requirements of section 5.2 of this
266 regulation:
267 8.1.1 Submerged pumps or sealless pumps (e.g., diaphragm, canned, or magnetic-driven
268 pumps), and
269 8.1.2 Pumps, compressors, and agitators installed before July 1, 2006.
270 8.2 The following components are exempt from the requirements of this regulation:
271 8.2.1 Components in continuous vacuum service,
272 8.2.2 Valves that are not externally regulated (such as in-line check valves),
273 8.2.3 Components that are insulated or buried underground, making them inaccessible to
274 monitoring with a hydrocarbon gas analyzer,
275 8.2.4 Sampling connection systems, as defined in 40 CFR §63.161, that are in compliance
276 with 40 CFR §63.166(a) and (b), and
277 8.2.5 Instrumentation systems, as defined in 40 CFR §63.161, that are in compliance
278 with 40 CFR §63.169.
279 SECTION 9 Test Methods
280 9.1 The monitoring and testing requirements of this regulation shall be satisfied by using the
281 methods specified in 40 CFR 63 Subpart H.
282 9.2 As authorized by 40 CFR §63.180(b)(2)(ii), a calibration gas other than methane may beused,
283 provided that the owner or operator demonstrates, to the District's satisfaction, equivalency
284 to the leak definition concentration based upon the different calibration gas.
285 SECTION 10 Alternative Requirements
286 The owner or operator ofan affected facility may submit a request for the use ofan alternate method
287 ofdemonstrating and documenting continuous compliance with the applicable control requirements
288 or exemption criteria in this regulation. The District may approve the request ifemission reductions
289 are demonstrated to be substantially equivalent.
290 SECTION 11 Data Review Plan
291 The owner or operator ofan affected facility shall prepare, submit to the District for approval, and
292 implement a data review plan. The plan shall include, but not be limited, to the following items:
293 11.1 The number ofcomponents monitored per technician,
294 11.2 Times between monitoring events, and
295 11.3 The presence ofabnormal data patterns.
296 SECTION 12 Audit Requirements
297 12.1 At least once every 2 calendar years, the owner or operator ofan affected facility shall retain
298 the services ofan independent third party to conduct an audit ofeach process unit subject to
299 this regulation, including:
300 12.1.1 All components that:
301 12.1.1.1 Were not identified, and if leaking, tagged, but that should have been identified, and,
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302 if appropriate, tagged, or
303 12.1.1.2 Were not included in the list ofcomponents to be monitored with a hydrocarbon gas
304 analyzer or visually inspected, but that should have been included on that list.
305 12.1.2 The leak/no-leak status and measured organiccompound concentration for all components
306 for which monitoring (with a hydrocarbon gas analyzer) or visual inspection is required
307 that monitoring period, as follows:
308 12.1.2.1 The monitoring/inspection audit shall begin when the owner's or operator's contracted
309 orusual monitoring service begins monitoring components for that monitoring period,
310 12.1.2.2 The number of components required to be monitored in the audit out of the total
311 number of components that have the potential to emit organic compounds in each
312 affected facility shall be determined as follows:
313 12.1.2.2.1 If 400 or fewer components, then at least 50% shall be monitored,
314 12.1.2.2.2 Ifbetween 401 and 700 components, then at least 40% shall be monitored,
315 12.1.2.2.3 Ifbetween 701 and 1000 components, then at least 30% shall be monitored,
316 12.1.2.2.4 Ifbetween 1001 and 1500 components, then at least 25% shall be monitored, and
317 12.1.2.2.5 Ifmore than 1500 components, at least 400 components shall be monitored.
318 12.1.2.3 The audit shall not include components that were included in the most recent audit if
319 there are 1000 or fewer components at the affected facility and shall not include
320 components that were included in either of the 2 most recent audits ifthere are more
321 than 1000 components at the affected facility, unless monitoring these components is
322 unavoidable due to the shutdown ofprocess units not included in the specified audits,
323 or for other reasons agreed upon in advance by the District, and
324 12.1.3 All data generated by monitoring technicians in the previous quarter. This shall include:
325 12.1.3.1 A review of the number ofcomponents monitored per technician,
326 12.1.3.2 A review of the time between monitoring events,
327 12.1.3.3 Identification of abnormal data patterns, and
328 12.1.3.4 Identification of any discrepancies between the data in the electronic data system
329 required by Section 3.7 and the data in the datalogger or field notes required by
330 Section 3 or 40 CFR 63 Subpart H, respectively.
331 12.2 The owner or operator shall submit notification to the District as follows:
332 12.2.1 Written notification of the date that the independent third party is scheduled to begin the
333 audit at least 30 days prior to this date, and
334 12.2.2 Written notification within 15 days after the audit is completed.
335 12.3 The owner or operator shall submit to the District a copy ofthe results ofeach audit authored
336 by the independent third party within 30 days of receipt of the audit results, but no later
337 than 60 days after completion of the audit, including:
338 12.3.1 The number of components that were not tagged, but that should have been tagged,
339 12.3.2 The number of components that were not included in the list of components to be
340 monitored (with a hydrocarbon gas analyzer) or visually inspected, but that should have
341 been included on that list,
342 12.3.3 The number of components monitored, the number of leaking components, and the
343 percentage of leaking components identified by the independent third party and by the
344 owner's or operator's contracted or usual monitoring service in each of the following
345 categories:
346 12.3.3.1 Valves (excluding pressure relief valves),
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347 12.3.3.2 Pressure relief valves,
348 12.3.3.3 Pumps,
349 12.3.3.4 Compressors, and
350 12.3.3.5 Connectors, and
351 12.3.4 A summary of the independent third party's review of all data generated by monitoring
352 technicians in the previous quarter by the owner's or operator's contracted or usual
353 monitoring service for each of the following categories:
354 12.3.4.1 The number of components monitored per technician,
355 12.3.4.2 The time between monitoring events, including identification ofspecific instances in
356 which a monitoring technician recorded data faster than was physically possible due
357 to the hydrocarbon gas analyzer response time or the time required for the technician
358 to move to the next component, and
359 12.3.4.3 Identification of abnormal data pattems.
360 12.4 The District may conduct an audit of the owner's or operator's leak detection and repair
361 program.
362 12.5 In lieu of complying with sections 12.1 to 12.3, an owner or operator may request approval
363 from the District ofan alternative method that demonstrates equivalencywith the independent
364 third party audit, provided that the request:
365 12.5.1 Includes a detailed explanation of how the equivalency will be demonstrated, including
366 the appropriate recordkeeping and reporting requirements that will be implemented that
367 are sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the alternative method and
368 12.5.2 Demonstrates that it is a replicable procedure and details how the equivalency will be
369 demonstrated.
370 12.6 The District may approve the third-party audits required bythis Section to be performed once
371 every 3 years after 2 consecutIve audits show a high level of compliance with the
372 requirements of this regulation.
373 SECTION 13 Leak Detection and Repair Plan
374 13.1 The owner or operator ofan affected facility shall prepare, submit to the District for approval,
375 and implement the District-approved leak detection and repair plan. The plan shall include,
376 but is not limited to, the following items:
377 13.1.1 The components of the training program and the frequency of training,
378 13.1.2 A procedure and schedule for identifying equipment included in the plan, including both
379 equipment that is subject to an existing LDAR program, ifapplicable, and equipment that
380 is part of the new LDAR program pursuant to this regulation,
381 13.1.3 If the affected facility is not subject to an existing LDAR program, then the schedule to
382 begin monitoring,
383 13.1.4 If the affected facility is subject to an existing LDAR program but is required to monitor
384 additional components pursuant to this regulation, then the schedule to begin monitoring
385 the additional components,
386 13.1.5 Procedures for identifying leaking equipment,
387 13.1.6 Procedures for identifying added equipment,
388 13.1.7 A process to identify and promote the installation ofequipment technology to minimize
389 leaks,
390 13.1.8 A data review plan, and
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391 13.1.9 A schedule for implementation ofany other component ofthe LDAR plan for which full
392 implementation will not occur upon approval by the District
393 13.2 The owner or operator of an affected facility pursuant to section 1.1.1 shall submit the leak
394 detection and repair plan to the District by [insert the date 120 days after the effective date of
395 this regulation]. The owner or operator ofan affected facility pursuant to section 1.1.2 shall
396 submit the leak detection and repair plan to the District within 120 days ofwritten notification
397 from the District that a plan is required. Ifthe District determines that a revision to the plan
398 is necessary, the owner or operator shall, within 60 days of written notification from the
399 District of a deficiency, submit a revision to the plan addressing the deficiency.
400 13.3 A leak detection and repair plan approved by the District shall be an enforceable requirement
401 of the applicable District permit for the process unit included in the plan.
402 SECTION 14 Inorganic Compound Leak Detection and Repair
403 14.1 The owner or operator of an affected facility that has components that have the potential to
404 leak an inorganic toxic air contaminant shall prepare, submit to the District for approval, and
405 implement an inorganic toxic compound leak detection and repair plan. The plan shall
406 include, but is not limited to, the following:
407 14.1.1 The screening and sampling methods,
408 14.1.2 The frequency ofmonitoring,
409 14.1.3 The repair procedures,
410 14.1.4 The data recording and maintenance plan and the data review plan,
411 14.1.5 The components of the training program and the frequency of training,
412 14.1.6 The procedure and schedule for identifying equipment included in the plan,
413 14.1.7 The schedule to begin monitoring,
414 14.1.8 The schedule for implementation ofanyothercomponent ofthe LDARplan for which full
415 implementation will not occur upon approval by the District.
416 14.2 The leak detection and repair plan shall be submitted within 120 days ofwritten notification
417 from the District that a plan is required. If the District determines that a revision to the plan
418 is necessary, the owner or operator shall, within 60 days of written notification from the
419 District of a deficiency, submit a revision to the plan addressing the deficiency.
420 14.3 A leak detection and repair plan approved bythe District shall be an enforceable requirement
421 of the applicable District permit for the process unit included in the plan.
422 Adopted vl/ ; effective _
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REGULATION 2.08 Emissions Fees, Permit Fees, Permit Renewal Procedures, and
Additional Program Fees
Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
Jefferson County, Kentucky
Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control and
KRS Chapter 224 Environmental Protection
Necessity And Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes the Air Pollution Control Board to adopt and
enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of KRS
Chapter 77. The Act Title V requires the assessment ofoperating permit emissions fees necessary
to operate the Act Title V-required activities of the District. This regulation establishes emissions
fees, permit fees, the procedures for permit renewal, and additional program fees.
1 SECTION 1 Title V Emissions Fees
2 1.1 Emissions fees are required from all major sources defined in Regulation 2.16 Title V
3 Operating Permits that are subject to the operating permit requirements ofRegulation 2.16
4 and all stationary sources for which an administratively complete operating permit
5 application pursuant to Regulation 2.16 has been submitted to the District.
6 1.2 Beginning with Fiscal Year 1997 (July 1, 1996, through June 30, 1997) and for each fiscal
7 year thereafter, and for the purpose of the July 1st interim billing for that fiscal year,
8 emissions fees shall be calculated by multiplying the total of all the single pollutant actual
9 emissions in tpy, as affected by the limitations of section 1.3, by the EPA-published Annual
10 Emissions Fee Amount Consumer Price Index for the year in which the emissions occurred.
11 The Board may, by resolution, adjust the emissions fee rate applicable to a fiscal year based
12 upon the review required by section 4.1 and after the public review process specified in
13 section 4.3. If the Board adjusts the emissions fee rate applicable to a fiscal year, the new
14 emissions fee rate shall be retroactive to July 1st ofthat year and the supplemental emissions
15 fees specified in the supplemental billing shall be calculated by multiplying the difference
16 in emissions fee rates by the same single pollutant total as used for the interim billing.
17 1.3 The total ofall the single pollutant actual emissions in tpy shall be modified by the following
18 limitations:
19 1.3.1 The total annual emissions fee shall be the sum of the single pollutant fees except that
20 no pollutant shall be counted in more than one single pollutant category,
21 1.3.2 No more than 4,000 tpy of the actual emissions of a single pollutant shall be counted
22 toward the total emissions of a stationary source, and
23 1.3.3 Carbon monoxide emissions shall not be counted toward the total emissions.
24 1.4 Emissions fees shall be calculatedbasedupon the actual emissions from the stationary source
25 for the calendar year preceding the start ofthe fiscal year in which the fee is due. Emissions
26 statements are required to be submitted in accordance with Regulation 1.06 Source Self-
27 Monitoring andReporting. Ifdata for the preceding year are not submitted, then the District
28 shall determine the fees based upon potential to emit.
29 1.5 Emissions fees are due annually beginning July 1, 1994. Payment of emission fees is due
30 within 30 days of the billing date or July 31, whichever is later. In certain situations, the
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32
33
34
35
36
37
1.6
District may approve an installment schedule ofpayments not more frequently than quarterly.
Failure to pay emissions fees when due is a violation ofDistrict regulations. This failure is
subject to penalties and an increase in the fee of an additional 5% per month up to a
maximum of 25% of the original amount due. In addition, failure to pay emissions fees
within 60 days ofthe due date shall automatically suspend the stationary source's permits to
operate until the fees are paid or a schedule for payment acceptable to the District has been
established.
38 SECTION 2 Permit Fees
39 2.1 The permit fees listed in Section 2 shall apply to Fiscal Year 2001 (July 1, 2000, to
40 June 30, 2001) to the extent that the date of the applicable event identified in section 2.3 is
41 on or after July 1, 2000. Ifthe date ofthe applicable event identified in section 2.3 is before
42 July 1, 2000, then the permit fee listed in the June 16, 1999, version of this regulation shall
43 apply.
44 2.2 Beginning with Fiscal Year 2002 (July 1,2001, to June 30, 2002) and for each fiscal year
45 thereafter, all permit fees shall be calculated by multiplying the applicable permit fee for the
46 previous fiscal year by the sum of 1plus the fractional change in the Consumer Price Index
47 as is used in section 1.2 for calculating the Title V emissions fee rate, rounded to the nearest
48 dollar. The District shall make available, at the beginning of each fiscal year, a document
49 that lists the calculated permit fees applicable to that fiscal year.
50 2.3 The fiscal year used for determining the applicable permit fee is as follows:
51 2.3.1 For construction permits, permit transfers, and asbestos demolition/renovation permits,
52 the fiscal year in which the permit is issued,
53 2.3.2 For construction permit renewals, the fiscal year in which the construction permit
54 expires,
55 2.3.3 For first-issue operating permits, the fiscal year in which the construction permit expires
56 and is not renewed pursuant to section 2.5.3,
57 2.3.4 For first-issue FEDOOP permits, the fiscal year in which the FEDOOP permit is issued,
58 and
59 2.3.5 For renewal operating permits and FEDOOP permits, the fiscal year in which the
60 previous operating permit or FEDOOP permit expires.
61 2.4 Fees for permits except permit transfers and asbestos demolition/renovation permits
62 reviewed or issued pursuant to this regulation shall be based upon the pollutant that has the
63 largest potential to emit and are on a per permit basis. Construction permits are based on
64 potential to emit for the total project and operating permits are based on the potential to emit
65 for the entire stationary source.
66 2.5 Construction Permit Fees
67 2.5.1 Construction permits shall be valid for a period of 1 year. The permit fee shall be
68 determined by the following criteria for each permit:
69 2.5.1.1 Subject to Federal PSDINSR (includes "net-outs," "offsets," other
70 exemptions, or subject to NSPS or NESHAPs) $ 5,638
71 2.5.1.2 100 tpyor more, the basic fee is $3,759
72 2.5.1.2.1 Subject to NSPS, add to the basic fee $ 1,342
73 2.5.1.2.2 Subject to NESHAPs, add to the basic fee $ 1,342
74 2.5.1.3 Less than 100 tpy, but greater than or equal to 50 tpy,
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75 the basic fee is $ 2,282
76 2.5.1.3.1 Subject to NSPS, add to the basic fee $ 1,007
77 2.5.1.3.2 Subject to NESHAPs, add to the basic fee $ 1,007
78 2.5.1.4 Less than 50 tpy, but greater than or equal to 10 tpy, the basic fee is $ 872
79 2.5.1.4.1 Subject to NSPS, add to the basic fee $ 671
80 2.5.1.4.2 Subject to NESHAPs, add to the basic fee $ 671
81 2.5.1.5 New Stage IT Gasoline Dispensing Facilities $ 1,950
82 2.5.1.6 Modified Stage II Gasoline Dispensing Facilities for which testing
83 or retesting is necessary $780
84 2.5.1.7 Less than 10 tpy, but greater than or equal to 5 tpy, or
85 Stage I Gasoline Dispensing Facilities ofgreater than 1000 gallon capacity,
86 the basic fee is $ 671
87 2.5.1.7.1 Subject to NESHAPs or NSPS, add to the basic fee $ 335
88 2.5.1.8 Stage I Gasoline Dispensing Facilities ofgreater than 250 gallon
89 capacity but less than or equal to 1000 gallon capacity $ 168
90 2.5.1.9 Less than 5 tpyand TAP greater than the adjtlsted significant level or
91 subject to NSPS or NESHAPs (except asbestos demolition/renovation
92 projects subject to section 2.8), the basic fee is $ 470
93 2.5.1.10 Less than 5 tpy; and not subject to NSPS or NESHAPs, and no TAP greater
94 than the adjtlsted signifieant Ievel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 250
95 2.5.1.11 Permit transfers at non-Title V stationary sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 67
96 2.5.2 On applications for construction permits where there are 2 or more identical pieces of
97 equipment at the same location, the fee shall be the same as that specified for 1 piece of
98 equipment.
99 2.5.3 Construction permits may be renewed until the project is completed and the affected
100 facility is in operation unless 1 ofthe provisions in Regulation 2.03 Permit Requirements
101 - Non-Title V Construction and Operating Permits and Demolition/Renovation Permits
102 section 5.4 is met. The construction permit renewal fee shall be $604 or the applicable
103 construction permit fee, whichever is less.
104 2.6 Non-Title V Operating Permit Fees
105 2.6.1 Non-Title V operating permits are for stationary sources that are not subject to the
106 emissions fees of Section 1.
107 2.6.2 Non-Title V operating permits are valid for up to 5 years except as noted in Section 3 if
108 no changes are made to the process operation equipment, the air pollution control
109 equipment, or the raw materials; or ifthere is no increase in the pollutant emission rate.
110 Ifchanges are proposed, the owner or operator shall apply for the appropriate permits and
111 any resulting permits shall be issued at full fee.
112 2.6.3 Expiration dates ofnon-Title V operating permits for a stationary source shall be adjusted
113 to a common date and fees shall not be prorated.
114 2.6.4 Non-Title V operating permits are issued on an equipment basis and the District may
115 require multiple permits.
116 2.6.5 The pennit fee shall be determined by the following criteria for each permit:
117 2.6.5.1 Reissuance of a permit for which the sole change is the name or
118 address of the stationary source (this does not include change
119 of owner or operator or relocation) $ 40
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120 2.6.5.2 Greater than or equal to 100 tpy but not subject to the Title V program $1,040
121 2.6.5.3 Less than 100 tpy, but greater than or equal to 50 tpy, the basic fee is $ 416
122 2.6.5.4 Less than 50 tpy, but greater than or equal to 10 tpy, the basic fee is $ 312
123 2.6.5.5 Less than 10 tpy, but greater than or equal to 5 tpy, or
124 Stage I Gasoline Dispensing Facilities, the basic fee is $ 208
125 2.6.5.6 Less than 5 tpy, the basic fee is $ 156
126 2.6.5.7 Gasoline Dispensing Facilities - Stage IT, add to the Stage I fee per
127 fueling position $ 166
128 2.6.5.8 Subject to NSPS, add to the applicable basic fee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 52
129 2.6.5.9 Subject to NESHAPs, add to the applicable basic fee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 52
130 2.6.5.10 TAP greater than the adjusted ~ign:ifieant level, add to
131 the applieable ba~ie fee ..........................................--$--£
132 2.6.5.1 Of Greater than 5 tpy ofa single HAP or greater than 10 tpy ofall HAPs
133 combined, add to the applicable basic fee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 52
134 2.6.5.1 H Banking Permit (issuance or reissuance with modification,
135 no renewal required.) $ 403
136 2.6.5.12:3- Permit transfers $ 67
137 2.7 Federally Enforceable District Origin Operating Permit (FEDOOP) Fees
138 2.7.1 Permit fees under section 2.7 are for stationary sources that applied for, and were issued,
139 a FEDOOP permit pursuant to Regulation 2.17 Federally Enforceable District Origin
140 Operating Permits.
141 2.7.2 FEDOOP permits are valid for 5 years unless voided at the request of the applicant or
142 revoked pursuant to Regulation 2.17 section 6.5.
143 2.7.3 The FEDOOP permit fee shall be the sum of the following:
144· 2.7.3.1 Special processing fee (including cost ofpublic notification) of$4l6 and
145 2.7.3.2 The sum ofthe permit fees for all ofthe emissions units at the stationary source that
146 normally would be assessed pursuant to section 2.6 if the stationary source had not
147 applied for a FEDOOP permit.
148 2.7.4 The permit fee for initial issuance ofa FEDOOP permit pursuant to section 2.7.3.2 shall
149 be adjusted on a proratedbasis to account for the unexpired term ofanypreviously issued
150 operating permits pursuant to section 2.6.
151 2.7.5 The permit fee for revision ofa FEDOOP permit shall be the amount that, in the absence
152 of section 2.7, would have been required by section 2.5 or section 2.6.
153 2.7.6 The permit fee for the initial FEDOOP permit and subsequent renewal FEDOOP permits
154 shall be divided by the number ofyears for which that FEDOOP permit is issued and the
155 District shall issue a statement of fees annually for the calculated quotient.
156 2.8 The permit fee or notification fee for asbestos demolition/renovation projects shall be
157 determined by the following criteria:
158 2.8.1 NESHAPs asbestos demolition/renovation projects:
159 2.8.1.1 The basic permit fee including the first 1500 linear or square feet $ 537
160 2.8.1.2 Add to the basic permit fee for each additional full or partial increment of
161 1500 linear or square feet $ 537
162 2.8.2 NESHAPs asbestos demolition/renovation projects using glovebags:
163 2.8.2.1 The basic permit fee including the first 1500 linear or square feet $ 336
164 2.8.2.2 Add to the basic permit fee for each additional full or partial increment of
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2.8.3
2.8.3.1
2.8.3.2
2.8.4
2.8.5
2.8.6
2.9
2.10
2.11
1500 linear or square feet $ 336
Non-NESHAPs asbestos demolition/renovation projects:
The basic permit fee including the fIrst 3,000 linear or square feet $ 201
Add to the basic permit fee for each additional full or partial increment of
3000 linear or square feet $ 201
NotifIcation fee for all asbestos demolition/renovation projects for which
the quantity involved is less than 260 linear feet on pipes and 160 square
feet on other facility components (sections 2.1 to 2.3 apply) $ 25
Each address on a multiple-dwelling project shall be assessed a fee based upon the
criteria in sections 2.8.1 to 2.8.4.
A single permit may be issued with any number ofcombinations of projects described
in sections 2.8.1 to 2.8.4.
Permit fees are payable by cash, check, or money order to the District and due 30 days after
the issuance of a statement of fees by the District. Failure to timely pay for permits may
cause the issuance of a notice ofviolation.
Failure to timely pay for permits issued pursuant to section 2.8 may also cause the
requirement that permits be paid for only bycash, money order, or cashier's check and at the
time of issuance.
Failure to pay permit fees for permits issued pursuant to sections 2.5.1.1 to 2.5.1.10, 2.6, or
2.7 within 60 days ofthe due date may also cause the suspension ofthe unpaid permits until
the fees are paid or a schedule for payment acceptable to the District has been established.
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SECTION 3 Permit Renewal And Transfer
3.1 All stationary sources shall renew operating permits every 5 years.
3.2 The District, at its discretion, may adjust individual permit time periods up to 1 year to
conform with its inspection schedules of stationary sources.
3.3 Instead of the expiration date and fee provisions of section 2.6.3, section 2.7.2,
section 2.7.3.2, section 3.1, or section 3.2, the District, at its discretion, may, at permit
renewal or at anytime during the term ofa permit, adjust an individual non-Title V operating
permit time period by an amount greater than 1 year. If, at the time of operating permit
renewal, the District adjusts the time period for the permit by more than 1 year, then the
permit fee, other than the special processing fee pursuant to section 2.7.3.1, shall be adjusted
on a prorated basis to account for the shortened length oftime for which the renewed permit
is valid. If, during the term of an operating permit, the District adjusts the time period for
the permit by more than 1 year, then the permit fee, other than the special processing fee
pursuantto section 2.7.3.1, for the subsequentpermit renewal shall be adjusted on a prorated
basis to account for the shortened length of time for which the permit is valid.
3.4 Except for construction permits and operating permits at Title V stationary sources, permits
issued under this regulation may be reissued to a new owner or operator (transferred)
provided that all ofthe following provisions are met:
3.4.1 A written agreement containing a specifIc date for transfer of permit responsibility,
coverage, and liability between the current and new permittee has been submitted to the
District,
3.4.2 The District determines that no other changes in the permit are necessary, and
3.4.3 The permit contains an additional permit condition that allows the District to revise the
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3.5
3.6
permit to increase monitoring, record keeping, and reporting requirements.
The transfer of construction permits and operating permits at Title V stationary sources is
subject to the requirements of Regulation 2.16 sections 1.3.4 and 5.4.
Banking permits are not subject to periodic renewal. However, a modified banking permit,
subject to the permit fee provisions of section 2.6.6.12, shall be issued after each banking
transaction, either ERCs deposited or removed.
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SECTION 4 Review Of Emissions And Permit Fees
4.1 Emissions, construction, and operating fees shall be reviewed each year by the Board.
4.2 The annual emissions fee review shall be presented to EPA to document the adequacy ofthe
fees collected to satisfy the requirements of the Act.
4.3 The Title V emissions fee rate adjustment public review process pursuant to section 1.2 shall
consist ofthe following steps:
4.3.1 Information on the actual expenses incurred during the previous fiscal year, the projected
expenses for the current fiscal year, the total for all the affected stationary sources ofall
the single pollutant actual emissions, as affected by the limitations of section 1.2.1, for
the previous year, and the resulting adjusted emissions fee rate shall be presented to the
Title V Permit Fee Advisory Panel (Advisory Panel). Ifa quorum ofthe Advisory Panel
is not present at a meeting scheduled by the District for this purpose, then this step shall
be met by the District mailing this information to the Advisory Panel members,
4.3.2 The Advisory Panel shall have an opportunity to review the information identified in
section 4.3.1 and make a recommendation to the Board,
4.3.3 The public shall be provided with at least 30 days' notice prior to the public hearing, and
the opportunity for public comment, on a proposed Board action to adjust the Title V
emissions fee rate. Legal notice shall be made in accordance with KRS Chapter 424
Legal Notices, and
4.3.4 The Board shall hold a public hearing on the proposed Board action to adjust the Title V
emissions fee rate.
SECTION 5 Transition Period
5.1 In addition to the billing of Title V fees as required by Section 1, the District shall continue
to issue, as appropriate, non-Title V operating permits to a Title V source whose operating
permits expire before issuance of a Title V permit. The permit fee for each non-Title V
operating permit renewal at a Title V source whose non-Title V operating permit expires on
or after December 15, 1993, and before July 1, 1994, shall be $450. A non-Title V operating
permit renewal for a Title V source whose non-Title V operating permit expires on or after
July 1, 1994, shall be issued at no charge to the owner or operator ifthe stationary source is
considered by the District to be a Title V source at the time that the non-Title V operating
permit expires. Non-Title V operating permits issued in the interim for a Title V source shall
expire when the Title V permit is issued.
5.2 A stationary source is considered by the District to be a Title V source ifit meets 1 of the
following:
5.2.1 The District has issued a Title V operating permit to the stationary source,
5.2.2 The District has determined that the stationary source has submitted an administratively
complete Title V permit application, or
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252 5.2.3 The District had, for Fiscal Years 1995, 1996, or 1997, included the emissions from the
253 stationary source in the emissions inventory list ofTitle V companies that was used for
254 determining the fmal Title V emission fee rate for that fiscal year.
255 5.3 A Title V emissions fee credit for the unexpended portion of the non-Title V operating
256 permit fees at a Title V source shall be made as follows:
C = (0.51 P) (T - M) (N)
T
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
where:
C
0.51
P
T
M
N
Title V emissions fees credit, in dollars.
The fraction ofthe operating permit fee that does not represent the initial cost
of inspection and reissuance.
The non-Title V operating permit fee, pursuant to section 2.6, in dollars.
Term of the issued non-Title V operating permit, in months.
Number of months from effective date of non-Title V operating permit
. renewals to July 1st of the fiscal year in which the stationary source was
considered a Title V source, in months.
Number ofcurrent non-Title V operating permits.
267 SECTION 6 Additional Program Fees
268 6.1 Starting in Fiscal Year 1999, annual Risk Management Plan (RMP) program fees are
269 required from all stationary sources that are subject to the requirements ofRegulation 5.15
270 Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions except for those stationary sources that are also
271 subject to Title V emissions fees pursuant to Section 1.
272 6.2 The RMP program fee is as follows:
273 6.2.1 For Fiscal Year 1999, $110,
274 6.2.2 For Fiscal Year 2000, $480, and
275 6.2.3 Starting in Fiscal Year 2001, the RMP program fee shall be calculated bymultiplying the
276 fee for the previous fiscal year by the sum of 1 plus the fractional change in the
277 Consumer Price Index as is used in section 1.2 for calculating the Title V emissions fee
278 rate, rounded to the nearest dollar. The District shall make available, at the beginning
279 ofeach fiscal year, a document that lists the calculated fee applicable to that fiscal year.
280 6.3 For Fiscal Year 2005, Toxic Air Contaminant (TAC) program fees are required from each
281 stationary source that, as of July 1,2004, was subject to Regulation 2.16 Title V Operating
282 Permits (Title V source); each stationary source that, as of July 1, 2004, had applied for an
283 operating permit pursuant to Regulation 2.17 Federally Enforceable District Origin
284 Operating Permits (FEDOOP source); and each stationary source that is neither a Title V
285 source nor a FEDOOP source but, for calendar year 2002, had actual emissions of25 or more
286 tons per year individually ofsulfur dioxide, particulate matter, volatile organic compounds,
287 or oxides ofnitrogen (25 ton source). The TAC program fees are as follows:
288 6.3.1 For a Title V source, the sum of the following:
289 6.3.1.1 $2,529, and
290 6.3.1.2 The proportional amount of$108,750 based upon the Title V sources's percentage
291 of the total hazardous air pollutant (HAP) and ammonia emissions reported to the
292 District for 2002. The District will make available a list of the Title V sources, the
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293 HAP and ammonia emissions reported by each Title V source, and the percentage of
294 the total for each Title V source, and
295 6.3.2 . For a FEDOOP source and a 25 ton source, $335.
296 6.43- Program fees are payable by cash, check, or money order to the District and due 30 days after
297 the issuance ofa statement of fees by the District. Failure to timely pay program fees may
298 cause the issuance ofa notice ofviolation. In addition, failure to pay program fees pursuant
299 to section 6.3 within 60 days ofthe due date shall automatically cause the stationary source's
300 construction and operating permits to be suspended until the fees are paid or a schedule for
301 payment acceptable to the District has been established.
302 Adopted v1l6-13-79, effective 6-13-79; amended v2/4-21-82, v3/11-16-83, v4/12-17-86, v5/6-20-90,
303 v6/7-15-92, v7/5-19-93, v8/12-15-93, v9/5-25-94, vlO/6-21-95, vl119-20-95, v12/7-17-96,
304 v13/3-19-97, v14/4-16-97, v15/9-16-98, v16/6-16-99, v17/5-17-00, v18/12-20-00, v19/9-19-01.
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PART Regulation 3
Ambient Air Quality Standards
3 REGULATION 3.01 PUI pose of Ambient Air Quality Standards and Expl ession of
4 Non-Begl adation Intention
5 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
6 Jefferson County, Kentucky
7 Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
8 Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
9 Necessity And Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes ptovide!! that the Air Pollution Control Board to
10 adopt Inay make and enforce all needfttl orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to
11 accomplish the purposes of KRS Chapter 77. This regulation establishes !!mt:e!! the ptttpo!!e of
12 Di!!ttiet ambient air quality standards, the methods for measuring air contaminants, and the an
13 expte!!~ion of non degtadation intention of the Ait Polltttion Conttol Board to prohibit further
14 significant and avoidable deterioration ofair quality.
15 SECTION 1 Definitions
16 Terms used in this regulation that are not defined in this regulation shall have the meaning given
17 them in Regulation 1.02 Definitions
18 SECTION 2t Purpose
19 The purpose of an ambient air quality standards is to establish a concentration, including a time-
20 averaging interval over which that concentration i~measured, for a particular air contaminant mean
21 tho5e level5 orait quality that ~hich the Board determines isjudge!! ate necessary, with an adequate
22 margin of safety, to protect the-public health and welfare from any known or anticipated adverse
23 effects of that air contaminantpollntion. Such !!tandmd!! me !!ttbject to tevi5ion, and additional
24 !!tandatd!! may be ptomtllgated a!! the Dmud deeIn!! ncce!!!!ary to ptoteet the publiehealth and ~dfate.
25 SECTION 3i Non-degradation Intention
26 In establishing an ambient air quality the e~tabli!!hmentofthMe standards, it is the intention of the
27 Board to prohibit further significant and avoidable deterioration ofair quality in ~reas where the air
28 quality is presently exi!!t!! ~hich i!! numerically equal to or is-better than the standard!! expte~!!ed
29 herein.
30 SECTION 43 General Prohibition
31 A No-person shall not cause or allow the emission of an air contaminant that would violate, or
32 interfere with the attainment or maintenance of, an ambient air quality standard5 a!! !!pecified in tm!!
33 tegulation.
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34 SECTION 5 Ambient Air Quality Standards
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
~ SecondaryAir Contaminant Primary Standards Averaging Times Standards
5.1 Carbon Monoxide
5.1.1 9 ppm (10 mg/m3) 8-hour l None
5.1.2 35 ppm (40 mg/m3) I-hourI None
5.2 Lead 1.5 Ilg/m3 Quarterly Average Same as Primary
5.3 Nitrogen Dioxide 0.053 ppm (100 Ilg/m3) Annual Same as Primary
(Arithmetic Mean)
5.4 Particulate Matter
5.4.1 (PMIO) 50 Ilg/m3 Annua12 Same as Primary
(Arithmetic Mean)
5.4.2 150 Ilg/m3 24-hour l
5.5 Particulate Matter
5.5.1 (PM2.5) 15 Ilg/m3 Annuae Same as Primary
(Arithmetic Mean)
5.5.2 65 Ilg/m3 24-hour4
5.6 Ozone
5.6.1 0.08 ppm 8-ho~ Same as Primary
5.6.2 0.12 ppm I-hour6 Same as Primary
5.7 Sulfur Oxides
5.7.1 0.03 ppm Annual
(Arithmetic Mean)
5.7.2 0.14 ppm 24-hourl
5.7.3 3-hourl 0.5 ppm
(1300 llg/m3)
53 1 Not to be exceeded more than once per year.
54 2 To attain this standard, the expected annual arithmetic mean PM IO concentration at each monitor
55 within an area must not exceed 50 Ilg/m3.
56 3 To attain this standard, the 3-year average of the annual arithmetic mean PM2.5 concentrations
57 from single or multiple community-oriented monitors must not exceed 15 Ilg/m3.
58 4 To attain this standard, the 3-yearaverage ofthe 98th percentile of24-hour concentrations at each
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59 population-oriented monitor within an area must not exceed 65 j.Lg/m3•
60 5 To attain this standard, the 3-year average of the fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average
61 ozone concentrations measured at each monitor within an area over each year must not
62 exceed 0.08 ppm.
63 6 The standard is attained when the expected number of days per calendar year with maximum
64 hourly average concentrations above 0.12 ppm is ::;; I, as determined by40 CFR Part 50 Appendix
65 H. The I-hour ozone standard shall be in effect until June 15,2005.
66 SECTION 6 Applicability of Ambient Air Quality Standards
67 The ambient air quality standards shall apply, be achieved, and maintained in Jefferson County,
68 Kentucky.
69 SECTION 7 Methods of Measurement
70 The air contaminants listed in sections 5.1 to 5.7 shall be measured by the reference or equivalent
71 methods and at the frequency specified in EPA regulations on Ambient Air Quality Surveillance
72 (40 CFR Parts 50, 53, and 58).
73 SECTION 8Savings Clause
74 Any emission standard established pursuant to Regulation 3.04 Ambient Air Quality Standards
75 section 1.7,2.7,2.8, or 2.9 that is reflected in a permit condition as of [insert the effective date of
76 Version 4 of this regulation] shall remain in effect until replaced with an emission standard
77 established pursuant to Regulation 5.21.
78 Adopted v1/4-19-72; effective 4-19-72; amended v2/9-1-76, v3/6-13-79.
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REGULATION 3.02 Applicability of Ambient Air Quality Standards
REPEALED - Superceded by Regulation 3.01
Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
Jefferson County, Kentucky
Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Necessity And Function: KRS 77.180 provides that the Air Pollution Control Board may make and
enforce all needful orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of
KRS Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the applicability of District air quality standards.
The ambient air quality standards in Regulation 3.04 shall apply, be aehie ved, and maintained at any
single point in the Dish iet.
Adopted vl/4-19-72; effective 4-19-72; amended v2/9-1-76, v3/6-13-79.
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REGULATION 3.03 Definitions
REPEALED - Superceded by Regulation 3.01
Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
Jefferson County, Kentucky
Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Necessity And Function: KRS 77.180 provides that the Air Pollution Control Board maymake and
enforce all needful orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of
KRS Chapter 77. This regulation contains certain definitions used in all ambient air quality
standards regulations.
SECTION 1
TeIms nsed in Regn1ation 3 not defined heIein shall have the meaning given them in
Regn1ation 1.02.
1.1 "CalendaI quartet aveIage" means an aveIage deteImined on the basis of a
eonsecotive 3=morrth intena1 eoinciding ~ith one of the fOtlI quarteIs ofa calendaI yem.
1.2 "Maximom" means an ambient ail quality standmd ~hich sha:l1 not be exceeded mOle than
onee pel yem pIO viding that the aveIages exceeding the standard do not contain any common
hoody data points.
1.3 "Thtee hOOI aveIage" means an aveIage detennined on the basis ofany eonseentive 3=honr
intetva:l.
Adopted v1/4-19-72; effective 4-19-72; amended v2/9-1-76, v3/6-13-79.
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REGULATION 3.04 Ambient Air Quality Standards
REPEALED - Superceded by Regulation 3.01
Note: Any emission standard that had been established pursuant to section 1.7,2.7,2.8, or
2.9 and is reflected in a permit condition as of [insert the effective date of the repeal of this
regulation] shall remain in effect until replaced with an emission standard established
pursuant to Regulation 5.21.
Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
Jefferson County, Kentucky
Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Necessity And Function: KRS 77.180 provides that the Air Pollution Control Board may make
and enforce all needful orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the
purposes ofKRS Chapter 77. This regulation establishes ambient air quality standards for
Jefferson County.
50 micrograms per enbie meter mrrttlal mithmetie mean as determined in accordance
8ECTION 1 Primftry 8tftlldftrds
The primary ambient air quality standards for sulfur oxides, pmticulate matter, carbon monoxide,
total nonmethane hydroembons, lead, nitrogen dioxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrogen
fluoride, and odors meastlIed by reference methods specified by the Domd, or by equivalent
methods, me.
1.1 Sulfur Oxides (stllfttr dioxide).
1.1.1 80 micrograms per enbie meter (.03 ppm) - annnal mithmetie mean.
1.1.2 365 micrograms per etlbie meter (0.14 ppm) - maximnm 24-hom average not to be
exceeded mor e than once per yem.
Particulate Matter PM IO :1.2
1.2.1
1.2.2
'With 40 CFR Part 50 Appendix K.
150 micrograms per etlbie meter - maximnm 24-hom average not to be exceeded
1.3
more than once per yem as determined in accordance with 40 CFR Part 50
AppendixK.
Cmbon Monoxide.
1.3.1 10 milligrams per enbie meter (9 ppm) - maximtlm 8-hom average not to be exceeded
1.3.2
more thml once per yem.
40 milligra111s per enbie meter (35 ppm) - maximtlm I-hom average not to be
1.4
exceeded more than once per year.
PhotocheH'lical Oxidants (measured as ~ and correoted for interferenoes due to nitrogen
1.4.1
oxides and stllfttr dioxide).
235 micrograms per ctlbic meter (0.12 ppm) - The standmd is attained 'When the
expected ntlIllbcr of days per calendm yem with maxinmm hom1)' average
concentrations above 0.12 ppm (235 tlg/m3) is equal to or less than 1, and determined
b)' 40 CFR Part 50 Appendix II.
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1.5 Hydtocatbons (meastlted as total hydtocatbons and conecred fot methanc, to bc used as a
gnide in devising plans to achicve photochemieal oxidant standmds):
1.5.1 160 mictogtams pet eubic metet (0.24 ppm) = maxinmnl3-hOtlt avetage (6.00 a.m.
to 9.00 a.m.) not to be exceeded mote thml once pet year.
1.6 Nitrogen Dioxide.
1.6.1 100 mictogtams pet ettbic mctet (0.05 ppm) - annttal atithmetic mean.
1.7 Gaseous Fluorides (expressed as HF).
1.7.1 400 mictogtams pet cubic metet (0.05 ppm) - an1mal mith111etic mean.
1.8 Lead.
1.8.1 Not to exceed 1.5 mictogtanlS pet eubic metet, calendat qnarter a vetage.
1.9 Odots.
Any ambient an satnple of at least 50 1111 whidl, undilttted, is established by a
cmcumented investigation Ot measmement to be offensive, foul, unpleasant, Ot tepulsive.
150 mictogtams pet cttbic meter maximmn 24·hout avetage not to be exceeded more
2.2
SECTION 2 See6lldtU'y StSlldSfds
The secondary ambient ait qnality standmds fOt stllfur oxides, partieulate mattet, cmbon
monoxide, total nonmethane hydtocmbons, lead, nitrogen dioxide, hydtogen sulfide,
photoehemieal oxidants, hydtogen fluot ide, total fluOt ides, and odot s measmed by tefetence
methods specified by the Board, ot by eqnivalent methods ate.
2.1 SuIfin Oxides (sulfln dioxide).
2.1.1 1300 microgrtrms pet cttbie metet (0.50 ppm) maximtlm 3·hom average not to be
exceeded mote than once pet year.
Partioulate Matt@r PM IO:
2.2.1
2.2.2
than once pet yem as detetmined in aecotdance ~ith 40 CFR Part 50 Appendix K.
50 mictograms pet cubic metet annml atithmetic mea:n, shaH be used as a guide in
2.3
assessing implementation plans to achieve the 24-hom ptitntrry standatd as
detetmined in accotdtrnce with 40 CFR Part 50 Appendix K.
Catbon Monoxide
2.4
Same as ptimary standatds.
Photochemical Oxidants.
2.5
Same as pt itntrry standatd.
Hydtocatbons.
2.6
2.6.1
Same as pt imary standatd.
Nitrogen Dioxide.
254 mictogtams pet cubic metet (0.135 ppm) maxinmm 24-hoot avetage not to be
2.6.2
exceeded mote than once pet yem.
1,020 mictograms per cttbic metet (0.54 ppm) maxinmm l-hout avetage not to be
2.6.3
2.7
2.7.1
exceeded mote than once pet yeat.
100 mietograms pet ettbic metet (0.05 ppm) antltlal mithmetie mean.
Gascous Fluotides (exptessed as HF).
0.50 mictogtams pet ettbie meter (.60 ppb) maxinmm 1 month avetage not to be
2.7.2
exceeded mote than once pet yem.
0.80 mictogtams pet cttbic metet (0.97 ppb) - maxinmm l=~eek avettrge not to be
exceeded mote than onee pet yem.
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2.7.3 2.86 microgram~ per cubic mcter (3.5 ppb) - Illaximnm 24-honr average not to be
exceeded more than onee per year.
2.7.4 3.68 microgram~ per cubic meter (4.5 ppb) - maxinmm 12-hom a'\1erage not to be
exceeded more thatl onee per yeat.
2.8 Hydrogen Snlfide.
2.8.1 14 microgram~ per cnbic meter (0.01 ppm) maximnm I-hom average not to be
excccded morc than once pcr year.
2.9 Total Flnoride~.
Dry weight ba~i~ (~ finor ide ion) in and on fur age fur con~nmption by grazing rtlminant~.
2.9.1 Not to exceed 40 ppm (w/w) average concentration of monthly ~Mllple~ over
growing ~ea~on (not to exceed 6 con~eetttive mortth~).
2.9.2 Not to exceed 60 ppm (w/w) - 2-month a'Verage.
2.9.3 Not to exeeed 80 ppm (IIV/W) -I-month average.
2.10 Lead.
Same a~ primary ~ttm:dard.
2.11 Odor~.
Same a~ primary ~ttm:datd.
Adopted vl/4-19-72; effective 4-19-72; amended v2/9-1-76, v3/6-13-79, v4/2-16-83, v5/4-20-88.
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REGULATION 3.05 Methods of Measurement
REPEALED - Superceded by Regulation 3.01
Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
Jefferson County, Kentucky
Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Necessity And Function: KRS 77.180 provides that the Air Pollution Control Board maymake and
enforce all needful orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of
KRS Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the methods to use for measuring air contaminants.
Ail contaminants shall bc mcasmcd by thc rcfercnce or equivalent methods and at snch fIeqneney
as specified in EPA regnlations on Ambient Air Qnality Sm veiHanee (40 CFR Parts 50,53 and 58)
or, in the case of contaminants for 'Which no national standard exists, by methods and at snch
£1 eqnency as specified by the District.
Adopted v1/4-19-72; effective 4-19-72; amended v2/9-1-76, v3/6-13-79, v4/4-20-88.
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PART REGULATION 5
Standards for Toxic Air Contaminants and Hazardous Air Pollutants
3 REGULATION 5.01 General Provisions
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Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
Jefferson County, Kentucky
Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Necessity And Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes plovide5 that the Air Pollution Control Board to
adopt may make and enforce all needful orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to
accomplish the purposes ofKRS Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the general provisions for
toxic air contaminants, the requirement for environmental acceptability of toxic air contaminant
emissions, and the requirement that new or modified processes or process equipment comply with
all applicable emission standards upon commencing operationte5tingand monitor ing to eompry If'i ith
the 5ta:ndMd5 ful hazaldotl5 air pollutant5.
SECTION 14 Definitions
Terms used in this regulation that are not defined in this regulation helein shall have the meaning
given to them in Regulation 1.02 Definitions. As used in the Part 5 regulations, the following terms
shall have the meaning given to them in this section.
4.1 "Stationary 50ulee" mean5 any building, 5tltlettlle, faeiliry, 01 in5tallation that emit5 01 may
emit any air pollutant that ha:5 been de5ignated a5 hll2':al dOU5 by the Di5tliet.
1.1 "Benchmark ambient concentration" means the concentration ofa toxic air contaminant that
is used in determining environmental acceptability pursuant to Regulation 5.21
Environmental Acceptabilityfor Toxic Air Contaminants.
1.1.1 The benchmark ambient concentration for a carcinogen (BACc) is the concentration,
including an averaging time frame, ofa toxic air contaminant that is representative ofan
additional lifetime cancer risk of one in one million (1 <811 0-6). The benchmark ambient
concentration for a carcinogen is established pursuant to Regulation 5.20 Methodology
for Determining Benchmark Ambient Concentration for a Toxic Air Contaminant
Section 3.
1.1.2 The benchmark ambient concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects of a toxic air
contaminant (BACNd is the concentration, including an averaging time frame, ofa toxic
air contaminant that is likely to be without an appreciable risk of deleterious effects
during a lifetime. The benchmark ambient concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects
of a toxic air contaminant is established pursuant to Regulation 5.20 Section 4.
1.2 "Category 1 TAC" means a toxic air contaminant listed in Regulation 5.23 Categories of
Toxic Air Contaminants Section 1.
1.3 "Category 2 TAC" means a toxic air contaminant listed in Regulation 5.23 Section 2.
1.4 "Category 3 TAC" means a toxic air contaminant listed in Regulation 5.23 Section 3.
1.5 "Category 4 TAC" means a toxic air contaminant listed in Regulation 5.23 Section 4.
1.6 "De minimis emission" means any of the following:
1.6.1 If the estimation of the emission of a TAC that may be contained in a mixture of
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1.6.3
1.6.4
1.6.4.1
1.6.4.5
1.6.1.1
1.6.1.2
1.6.2
1.6.4.2
1.6.4.2.1
1.6.4.2.2
1.6.4.3
1.6.4.3.1
1.6.4.3.2
1.6.4.4
chemicals is based upon the information contained on the Material Safety Data Sheet
(MSDS) for that mixture, then the emission of the TAC is deemed to be de minimis if
the concentration of that TAC is less than either of the following:
For a TAC that is determined to be a carcinogen, 0.1 %, or
For any other TAC, 1.0%,
The emissions from a process or process equipment or activity that is included on the
Trivial Activity list that is part ofthe District's EPA-approved Title V Operating Permit
Program, avaiiab1e on the Internet at ''http://www.apcd.org/permit/t5/trivia1.pdf',
The emissions from a process or process equipment or activity that is included on the
Insignificant Activity list that is part of the District's EPA-approved Title V Operating
Permit Program, available on the Internet at ''http://www.apcd.org/permitlt5/
insignificant.pdf', or
The emission ofa TAC from a process or process equipment that is equal to or less than
the amounts calculated by using the following method:
Determine the benchmark ambient concentrations pursuant to Regulation 5.20
Methodology for Determining Benchmark Ambient Concentration of a Toxic Air
Contaminant Section 4 and, if the TAC is determined to be a carcinogen, Section 3,
Multiply the BA~c (in IJ.g/m3) by:
0.54 (the I-HoUJ Factor in Regulation 5.22 Procedures for Determining the
Maximum Ambient Concentration ofa ToxicAir Contaminant Section 2 Table 1)
to derive the pound-per-hour de minimis value for the BA~c> and
By the applicable (based upon the averaging time period ofthe BACNd Annual,
24-Hour, or 8-Hour Factor in Regulation 5.22 Section 2 Table 1 to derive the
applicable pound-per-averaging time period de minimis value for the BACNC'
If the TAC is a carcinogen, multiply the BACc (in IJ.g/m3) by:
0.54 (the I-Hour Factor in Regulation 5.22 Section 2 Table 1) to derive the
pound-per-hour de minimis value for the BACc, and
480 (the Annual Factor in Regulation 5.22 Section 2 Table 1) to derive the annual
pound-per-year de minimis value for the BACc,
If the TAC is not determined to be a carcinogen, then an emission of that TAC that
is less than both the pound-per-hour de minimis value determined in section 1.6.4.2.1
and the applicable pound-per-averaging time period de minimis value determined in
section 1.6.4.2.2 is deemed to be a de minimis emission,
If the TAC is determined to be a carcinogen, then compare the pound-per-hour
de minimis values derived in sections 1.6.4.2.1 and 1.6.4.3.1 to determine which
value is smaller. An emission of that TAC that is less than both the smaller pound-
per-hour de minimis value and the corresponding applicable averaging time period
de minimis value determined in section 1.6.4.2.2 or 1.6.4.3.2 is deemed to be a de
minimis emission, or
1.6.5 The emissions from a new or modified surface coating process, including a coating
change, or process equipment, for which the construction permit application qualifies
under any of the circumstances described in Regulation 5.21 section 1.5, and for which
the potential volatile organic compound emissions are less than 5.0 tons per year.
1.7 "Exempt stationary source" means any of the following:
1.7.1 A gasoline dispensing facility subject to the provisions of Regulation 6.40 Standards of
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1.7.2
1.7.3
1.7.4
1.8
1.9
1.9.1
1.9.2
Performance for Gasoline Transfer to Motor Vehicles (Stage II Vapor Recovery and
Control), that may also include a cold cleaner subject to the provisions of
Regulation 6.18 Standards of Performance for Solvent Metal Cleaning Equipment
Section 4 Cold Cleaners. A gasoline dispensing facility does not include the initial
transfer ofgasoline into the fuel tanks of new motor vehicles at an automobile or truck
assembly plant,
A stationary source subject to the provisions of Regulation 6.44 Standards of
Performance For Existing Commercial Motor Vehicle And Mobile Equipment
Refinishing Operations or Regulation 7.79 Standards of Performance For New
Commercial Motor Vehicle And Mobile Equipment Refinishing Operations,
A stationary source subject to the provisions of Regulation 5.02 Adoption ofNational
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants section 3.12 National
Perchloroethylene Air Emission Standards for Dry Cleaning Facilities, or
A stationary source whose only permitted process or process equipment is a cold cleaner
subject to the provisions of Regulation 6.18 Section 4.
"Group 1 stationary source" means a stationary source subject to Regulation 2.16 Title V
Operating Permits.
"Group 2 stationary source" means a stationary source that either:
Is not a Group 1 or Exempt stationary source, and has applied for an operating permit
pursuant to Regulation 2.17 Federally Enforceable District Origin Operating Permits
(FEDOOP stationary source), or
Is not a Group 1, FEDOOP, or Exempt stationary source, and the actual emissions from
the stationary source are 25 or more tons per year individually of sulfur dioxide,
particulate matter, volatile organic compounds, or oxides of nitrogen.
111 SECTION 2t Applicability
112 This regulation applies to the owner or operator of any process or process equipment that emits or
113 may emit a toxic air contaminant or hazardous air pollutant or stationary somce for which a toxic
114 air contaminant or hazardous air pollutant emission standard or other requirement is prescribed in
115 a Part 5 undel this regulation. A new or modified process or process equipment shallsoulces must
116 comply with all applicable emission standards upon commencing operation.
117 SECTION 3 General Duty
118 The owner or operator of a process or process equipment from which a toxic air contaminant is or
119 may be emitted shall provide the utmost care and consideration to prevent the potential harmful
120 effects of the emissions resulting from the process or process equipment. A person shall not allow
121 any process or process equipment to emit a toxic air contaminant in a quantity or duration as to be
122 harmful to the health and welfare of humans, animals, and plants.
123 SECTION 2 Emission Tests and Monitoring
124 Emission tests and monitoring shall be eondueted and I eported as set forth in this I egnlation and the
125 EPA Regulation on National Emission Standmds for Haz:ardous Air Pollutants (40 CFR 61) and its
126 appendices. Whele the test lesults using an alternative method do not adeqttately indicate \ltihethel
127 a somec is in eompliance \ltiith a standard, the Distliet may leqttile use of the lefelence method 01
128 its eqnivalent. Eqttivalent test methods rot Fedelal Regulations ineorpolated in Regulations 5.02
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129 and 5.04 IeqttiIe EPA appraval.
130 SECTION 3 EmissioR TestiRg FaeHities
131 The owneI 01 operator ofa new ~ottIce ~ttbject to Regulation 5 and, at the reque~tofthe District, the
132 0 wnet or C'JpeIator ofan exi5ting 50UIce 5ttbjeet to Regttlation 5 5hall pIO vide or eatt5e to be pro vided
133 emis5ion te5ting fac:ilitie5 a5 follow~.
134 3.1 Sampling port5 adeqnate foI te5t method5 applicable to 5ttch 50mee,
135 3.2 Safe ~ampling platfoIm~,
136 3.3 Safe aeee~5 to 5ampling platfoIm5, and
137 3.4 Utilitie5 fOI 5ampling and te5ting eqnipment.
138 Adopted v1/7-14-76; effective 9-1-76; amended v2/6-13-79, v3/4-20-88.
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REPEALED - Superceded by Regulation 5.01
REGULATION 5.03 Potential Hazardous Emissions
Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
Jefferson County, Kentucky
Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
Necessity And Function: KRS 77.180 provides that the Air Pollution Control Board maymake and
enforce all needful orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of
KRS Chapter 77. This regulation establishes certain responsibilities for affected facilities emitting
potentially hazardous emissions.
Pel~on~ le~pon~ible £01 a ~omee from t'\ihieh haz;aldon~ mattel may be emitted inclnding bnt not
limited to, amimon, , aI~enie, M;besto~, bet,Hinm, bimnnth, lead, metenry, ~iliea, tin, vill)ll ehlmide,
eomponnd~ohneh matelial~,and othel toxie matelial~ ~hall gi ve the ntmo~t eale and eon~idelation
to the potential halmful effeet~ of the emi~~ions le~nlting from sneh aetivities. Evalnation ofsneh
faeilitie~ a~ to adeqnae, and emission potential t'\i ill be made on an indi vidnal ba~i~b, the Dish iet.
Adopted vl/7-l4-76; effective 9-1-76; amended v2/6-13-79.
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1 REGULATION 5.11 Standards of Performance for Existing Processes and Process
2 Equipment Sour ees Emitting Toxic Air Pollutants
3 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
4 Jefferson County, Kentucky
5 Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
6 Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
7 Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes pI 0'\1 ide!l that the Air Pollution Control Board to
8 adopt rna, make and enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the
9 purposes of KRS Chapter 77. This regulation provides for the control of toxic air pollutant
10 emissions from existing processes and process equipment !lomce!l.
11 SECTION 1 Kentucky References
12 Except as provided in Section 6, Kentucky Regulation 401 KAR 63:021 (11-11-86) for control of
13 toxic air pollutant~emissions from existing processes and process equipment !lomee!l is hereby
14 adopted and incorporated by reference. It is not the intent ofthis regulation to allow the use oftaller
15 stacks to effect compliance by application of the correction factor in Appendix C. However, in
16 certain situations in which the requirement to control cannot be justified, the District may permit
17 such usage. Further, in no event shall application of this regulation result in emissions of any
18 pollutant that which would exceed the emissions allowed by any applicable standard under
19 Part Regtllation 5,6, or 7.
20 SECTION 2 Summary and Applicability
21 This regulation Kentnck,y R:egttlation 401 KAR 63.021 controls emissions of toxic air pollutants
22 from processes and process equipment that were in existence before November 11, 1986, existing
23 somce!l by specifying either an allowable emissions limit or by requiring the application of
24 reasonably available control technology.
25 SECTION 3 General Definition
26 In 401 KAR 63:021 (11-11-86), "Cabinet" shall be read as "District".
27 SECTION 4 Compliance Schedules
28 Existing SOUlces in Jeffclson COtlnt)' !lhall fulfill theil obligation!l for Compliance schedules and
29 control plans as-required by this regulation shall be submitted to 40 1 KAR 63.021 by filing them
30 with the District.
31 SECTION 5 Availability
32 Copies of401 KAR 63:021 (11-11-86) are available from:
33 Division rol Ail Qnalit)'
34 803 Sehenkel Lane
35 FIankfort, KY 40601-1403
36 or
37 Air Pollution Control District
38 850 Barret Avenue
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39 Louisville, KY 40204-1745
40 SECTION 6 Adjusted Significant Level Determination
41 When detennining the adjusted significant levels of individual pollutants from existing processes
42 and process equipment at a stationary source, the height of release (H) used to enter the table in
43 Appendix C shall be a weighted average derived by dividing the sum of the products of emission
44 rates and heights ofrelease ofthe individual points ofrelease bythe total emission rate ofa pollutant
45 from all points of release. If the weighted height ofrelease falls between two values in the table in
46 Appendix C, the lesser value shall be used.
47 SECTION 7 Savings Clause
48 Any emission standard established pursuant to this regulation shall remain in effect until replaced
49 by an emission standard established pursuant to Regulation 5.21 Environmental Acceptability for
50 Toxic Air Contaminants.
51 Adopted vl/12-17-86; effective 12-17-86; amended v2/5-20-98.
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1 REGULATION 5.12 Standards of Performance for New or Modified Processes or Process
2 Equipment SOliI ces Emitting Toxic Air Pollutants
3 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
4 Jefferson County, Kentucky
5 Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
6 Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
7 Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes provides that the Air Pollution Control Board to
8 adopt rna, make and enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the
9 purposes ofKRS Chapter 77. This regulation provides for the control of toxic air pollutant torie'!I'
10 emissions from new or modified processes or process equipmentsomees.
11 SECTION 1 Kentucky References
12 Except as provided in Section 5, Kentucky Regulation 401 KAR 63:022 (11-11-86) for control of
13 toxic air pollutant tories-emissions from new or modified processes or process equipment somees
14 is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference. It is not the intent of this regulation to allow the
15 use of taller stacks to effect compliance by application of the correction factor in Appendix C.
16 However, in certain situations in which the requirement to control cannot be justified, the District
17 may permit such usage. Further, in no event shall application ofthis regulation result in emissions
18 of any pollutant which would exceed the emissions allowed by any applicable standard under
19 Part Regulation 5,6, or 7.
20 SECTION 2 Summary and Applicability
21 This regulation Kentueky Regulation 401 KAR 63.022 controls emissions of toxic air pollutants
22 from new or modified processes or process equipment, sourees that were constructed or modified
23 during the time period from November 11, 1986, until [insert the effective date ofVersion 3 ofthis
24 regulation], by specifying either an allowable emissions limit or by requiring the application ofbest
25 available control technology.
26 SECTION 3 General Definition
27 In 401 KAR 63:022 (11-11-86), "Cabinet" shall be read as "District".
28 SECTION 4 Availability
29 Copies of 401 KAR 63:022 (11-11-86) are available from:
30 Division far Air Quality
31 S03 Schenkel Lane
32 Frankfort, KY 40601-1403
33 or
34 Air Pollution Control District
35 850 Barret Avenue
36 Louisville, KY 40204-1745
37 SECTION 5 Adjusted Significant Level Determination
38 When determining the adjusted signifieant levels of indiv idttal pollutants at a somce, the height of
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39 release (II) nsed to errtel the table in Appendix C shall be a t'\ieighted average delived by dividing
40 the stlm of the plodttets of emission rates and heights of release of the individttal points of release
41 by the total emission late ora polltltant tiom all points oflelease. If the t'\ieighted height oflelease
42 falls bet't'\ieen t't'\io valnes in the table in Appendix C, the lessel valtle shall be tlsed.
43 When determining the adjusted significant levels ofindividual pollutants from an new or modified
44 process or process equipmentaddition or modifieation at a SOtllee, the height of release (H) used to
45 enter the table in Appendix C shall be a weighted average derived by dividing the sum of the
46 products of emission rates and heights of release of the individual points of release of the new or
47 modified process or process equipment by the total emission rate of a pollutant from all points of
48 release of the new or modified process or process equipmentin the addition 01 modification. Ifthe
49 weighted height ofrelease falls between two values in the table in Appendix C, the lesser value shall
50 be used.
51 SECTION 6 Savings Clause
52 Any emission standard established pursuant to this regulation shall remain in effect until replaced
53 with an emission standard established pursuant to Regulation 5.21 Environmental Acceptabilityfor
54 Toxic Air Contaminants.
55 Adopted v1/12-17-86; effective 12-17-86; amended v2/5-20-98.
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1 REGULATION 5.20 Methodology for Determining Benchmark Ambient Concentration of a
2 Toxic Air Contaminant
3 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
4 Jefferson County, Kentucky
5 Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
6 Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
7 Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes the Air Pollution Control Board to adopt and
8 enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of KRS
9 Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the methodology for determining the benchmark ambient
10 concentration for a toxic air contaminant.
11 SECTION 1 Use of Benchmark Ambient Concentration
12 A benchmark ambient concentration for a toxic aircontaminant developedpursuant to this regulation
13 shall be used in Regulation 5.21 Environmental Acceptability for Toxic Air Contaminants to
14 determine environmental acceptability.
15 SECTION 2 Determination that a Toxic Air Contaminant is a Carcinogen
16 2.1 A toxic air contaminant (TAC) shall be determined to be a carcinogen ifany ofthe following
17 provisions is met:
18 2.1.1 A carcinogenic unit risk estimate, or alternatively, a concentration representative of a
19 specified level of additional lifetime cancer risk, for the TAC is included in any ofthe
20 information sources identified in sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.3 or derived by using one of the
21 methodologies listed in section 3.3.5,
22 2.1.2 The TAC is listed as either "known to be a human carcinogen" or "reasonablyanticipated
23 to be a human carcinogen" in the most recent Report on Carcinogens published by the
24 National Toxicology Programpursuant to Section 301(b)(4) ofthe Public Health Service
25 Act as Amended by Section 262, PL 95-622, available on the Internet at
26 ''http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/roc'',
27 2.1.3 The TAC is classified as to potential carcinogenic risk to humans as "Group 1: The
28 agent (mixture) is carcinogenic to humans," "Group 2A: The agent (mixture) is probably
29 carcinogenic to humans," or "Group 2B: The agent (mixture) is possibly carcinogenic
30 to humans" by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (lARC). The IARC list
31 is available on the Internet at ..http://www-cie.iarc.fr/monoevaVcrthal1.html... or
32 2.1.4 The District determines that the TAC should be considered to be a carcinogen because
33 there is sufficient, credible information that any of the following criteria is met:
34 2.1.4.1 Known to be a human carcinogen: There is sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity
35 from studies inhumans which indicates a causal relationship between exposure to the
36 agent, substance, or mixture and human cancer,
37 2.1.4.2 Reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen:
38 2.1.4.2.1 There is limited evidence of carcinogenicity from studies in humans, which
39 indicates that causal interpretation is credible, but that alternative explanations,
40 such as chance, bias, or confounding factors, could not adequately be excluded,
41 2.1.4.2.2 There is sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity from studies in experimental
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2.1.4.2.3
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
animals which indicates there is an increased incidence of malignant or a
combination of malignant and benign tumors: (l) in multiple species or at
multiple tissue sites, or (2) by multiple routes of exposure, or (3) to an unusual
degree with regard to incidence, site, or type of tumor, or age at onset, or
There is less than sufficient evidence ofcarcinogenicity in humans or laboratory
animals, however; the agent, substance, or mixture belongs to a well defined,
structurally-related class of substances whose members are listed in the most
recent Report on Carcinogens published by the National Toxicology Program as
either a known to be human carcinogen or reasonably anticipated to be human
carcinogen, or there is convincing relevant information that the agent acts through
mechanisms indicating it would likely cause cancer in humans.
In making a determination pursuant to section 2.1.3, the following provisions shall apply:
Conclusions regarding carcinogenicity in humans or experimental animals are based on
scientific judgment, with consideration given to all relevant information. Relevant
information includes, but is not limited to, dose response, route of exposure, chemical
structure, metabolism, pharmacokinetics, sensitive sub populations, genetic effects, and
other data relating to mechanism of action or factors that may be unique to a given
substance. This applies to both the "known to be a human carcinogen" and the
"reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen" categories, and
For an agent to be determined ''known to be a human carcinogen," evidence from studies
ofhumans is required. This may include traditional cancer epidemiology studies, data
from clinical studies, or data derived from the study of tissues from humans exposed to
the substance in question and useful for evaluating whether a relevant cancer mechanism
is operating in humans.
66
67
68
69
SECTION 3 Cancer Risk Benchmark Determination Methodology
3.1 The benchmark ambient concentration for a toxic air contaminant (TAC) determined to be
a carcinogen (BACc) shall be calculated as follows:
B'AC -_ 1 ® 10-
6 [E' 1]!J'1 quation
C URE
URE
Where:
BACc
70
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76
77
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3.2
Benchmark Ambient Concentration for a carcinogen, a concentration
representative ofan additional lifetime cancer risk of1 in 1,000,000 (1181 10-6),
in units of micrograms per cubic meter (lJ.g/m3),
Unit Risk Estimate - Additional lifetime cancer risk occurring in a population
in which all individuals are exposed continuously for life (70 years) to a
concentration of 1 IJ.g/m3 of the chemical in the air they breathe, in units of
(lJ.g/m3yl. The URE shall be determined according to the methodology in
section 3.3, and
1181 10-6 = An upper bound additional lifetime cancer risk of 1 in 1,000,000.
Alternatively, if in any of the sources of information identified in section 3.3, the
concentration of a carcinogen, expressed in IJ.g/m3, that is representative of an additional
lifetime cancer risk of 118110-6 is identified instead of the URE, then the BACc is that
identified concentration. The URE can be calculated by using Equation 1.
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84 3.3 The following provisions shall apply to the derivation of a unit risk estimate (URE), or
85 alternatively a BACc directly, for a TAC determined to be a carcinogen:
86 3.3.1 Ifa URE for a TAC has been developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
87 (EPA) and included in the EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), available
88 on the Internet at ''http://www.epa.gov/iris/'', then that URE shall be used to determine
89 theBACc'
90 3.3.2 If a URE for a TAC has not been derived pursuant to section 3.3.1 but a URE for that
91 TAC has been developed by the California Office of Environmental Health Hazard
92 Assessment, available on the Internet at ..http://www.arb.ca.gov/toxics/healthvaV
93 contable.pdf', then that URE, found in the column "Inhalation Unit Risk (j.Lg/m3yl, shall
94 be used to determine the BACc'
95 3.3.3 If a URE for a TAC has not been derived pursuant to section 3.3.1 or 3.3.2 but an Initial
96 Risk Screening Level (IRSL) for that TAC has been developed by the Michigan Air
97 Quality Division, available on the Internet at ..http://www.deq.state.mi.us/
98 documents/deq-aqd-toxics-itslcas.pdf' sorted by Chemical Abstract Services (CAS)
99 number or ..http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-aqd-toxics-itslalph.pdf' sorted
100 in alphabetical order, then that IRSL shall be used as the BACc'
101 3.3.4 If a TAC has been determined to be a carcinogen, but a URE, or a BACc directly, has
102 not been derived pursuant to section 3.3.1,3.3.2, or 3.3.3, then the URE may be derived
103 using one of the following:
104 3.3.4.1 The methodology in Air Toxics Risk Assessment Reference Library, Volume 1,
105 Technical Resource Manual, Chapter 12 Inhalation Toxicity Assessment, U.S.
106 Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-453-K-04-001A, April 2004, which is
107 hereby adopted and incorporated by reference,
108 3.3.4.2 The methodology in Guidelinesfor Carcinogen RiskAssessment, u.s. Environmental
109 Protection Agency, NCEA-F-0644, July 1999, Review Draft, which is hereby
110 adopted and incorporated by reference,
111 3.3.4.3 The methodology in GuidelinesforCarcinogenRiskAssessment, U.S. Environmental
112 Protection Agency, EPA/630/R-00/004, September 24, 1986,51 FR 33992-34003,
113 which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference,
114 3.3.4.4 The methodology in R 336.1231 Cancer risk assessment screening methodology
115 (2)(b) and (3) of the Michigan Administrative Code, which is hereby adopted and
116 incorporated by reference, or
117 3.3.4.5 Any alternative cancer riskassessment methodology that can be demonstrated to the
118 satisfaction of the District to be more appropriate based on biological grounds and
119 that is supported by the scientific data.
120 3.3.5 If a URE for a TAC has not been derived pursuant to section 3.3.1,3.3.2,3.3.3 or 3.3.4,
121 then the BACc shall be the default value 0.0004 j.Lg/m3.
122 3.4 An annual average time period shall be used for a BACc'
123 SECTION 4 Chronic Noncancer Risk Benchmark Determination Methodology
124 The benchmark ambient concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects of a toxic air contaminant
125 (BACNd, a concentration that is likely to be without an appreciable risk ofdeleterious effects during
126 a lifetime, shall be determined as follows:
127 4.1 Ifa Reference Concentration (RfC) for a TAC has been developed by the EPA and included
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in the EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), available on the Internet at
''http://www.epa.gov/iris/'', then that RfC shall be used as the BA~c=
BACNC = RjC [Equation 2]
Where:
BA~c Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects ofa
TAC, in units of j..Lg/m3, and
RfC Reference Concentration, in units ofj..Lg/m3•
A 24-hour average time period shall be used for aBA~c determined pursuant to section 4.1.
136
137
138
139
140
141
4.2 If a BA~c for a TAC has not been determined pursuant to section 4.1 but a Reference
Exposure Level (REL) for that TAC has been developed by the California Office of
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, available on the Internet at
..http://www.arb.ca.gov/toxics/healthval/contable.pdf•• then thatREL, found in the column
"Chronic Inhalation (j..Lg/m3), shall be used as the BA~c:
BACNC = REL [Equation 3]
142
143
144
145
Where:
BA~c
REL
Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects ofa
TAC, in units of j..Lg/m3, and
Reference Exposure Level, in units of j..Lg/m3•
146
147
148
149
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151
152
4.3
A 24-houraverage time period shall be used for aBA~c determined pursuant to section 4.2.
If a BA~c for a TAC has not been determined pursuant to section 4.1 or 4.2 but an Oral
Reference Dose (RID) for that TAC has been developed by the EPA and included in the
EPA's IRIS, available on the Internet at ''http://www.epa.gov/iris/'', and data are not
available to indicate that oral-route to inhalation-route extrapolation is inappropriate, then
that RID shall be used to calculate the BA~c as follows:
BACNC = Oral RjD ® 70 k~ [Equation 4]
20 .!!!:......
day
A 24-hour average time period shall beused for aBA~c determined pursuant to section 4.3.
If a BA~c for a TAC has not been determined pursuant to section 4.1 to 4.3 but an Initial
Threshold Screening Level (ITSL) for that TAC has been developed by the Michigan Air
Quality Division, available on the Internet at ..http://www.deq.state.mi.us/
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160 4.4
161
162
Where:
BACNC
RID
70 kg
20 m3/day =
Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects ofa
TAC, in units of j..Lg/m3,
Reference Exposure Level, in units of j..Lg/kg-day,
The average body weight of a human, and
The average daily inhalation rate for a human.
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documents/deq-aqd-toxics-itslcas.pdf' sorted by Chemical Abstract Services (CAS) number
or ..http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-aqd-toxics-its1alph.pdf' sorted in alphabetical
order, then that ITSL shall be used as the BAc;.c:
163
164
165
166
BACNC = ITSL [Equation 5]
The average time period as listed for a specific ITSL shall be used for a BACNC determined
pursuant to section 4.4.
If a BAc;.c for a TAC has not been determined pursuant to section 4.1 to 4.4 but an
occupational exposure level (OEL) exists for that TAC, then the OEL may be used to
calculate the BAc;.c as follows:
Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects ofa
TAC, in units ofl-lg/m3, and
Initial Threshold Screening Level, in units of I-lg/m3•
[Equation 6]OEL
100
Where:
BACNC
ITSL
167
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169
170
171
172
173 4.5
174
175
176
100
OEL
Where:
BACNC
177
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Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects ofa
TAC, in units of I-lg/m3,
Occupational Exposure Level, that, for the TAC, is the lowest value of
either the National Institute ofOccupational Safetyand Health (NIOSH)-
recommended exposure level listed in current edition of the NIOSH
pocket guide to chemical hazards or the time-weighted average or ceiling
Threshold Limit Value (TLV) listed in the current edition of the
American Conference of Governmental and fudustrial Hygienists
Threshold Limit Value (TLV) booklet, in units of I-lg/m3, and
A composite safety factor to account for differences in susceptibility
between the healthy, adult worker population compared to the general
population that is more diverse and may contain individuals or
subpopulations more sensitive to the effects of the toxic air pollutant
(safety factor of 10). Additionally, the composite safety factor accounts
for the difference in exposure duration (in hours per week and years
working versus a lifetime) for the worker population compared to the
general population:
1 40 hours/week 30 years 1
- @ @ r::: --.
10 168 hours/week 70 years 100
An 8-hour average time period shall be used for a BAc;.c determined pursuant to section 4.5
based upon a time-weighted OEL and a I-hour average time period shall be used for a
BACNC determined pursuant to section 4.5 based upon a ceiling OEL.
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199
200
201
202
203
4.6 If a BA~c for a TAC has not been determined pursuant to section 4.1 to 4.5 but a 7-day,
inhalation, no observed adverse effect level (NOAEL) or lowest observable adverse effect
level (LOAEL) is available for that TAC, then the NOAEL or LOAEL may be used to
calculate the BA~c as follows:
BAC NOAEL Hr Exposed / Day [Equation 7]
NC = 35 ® 100 ® 24 Hr / Day
204 LOAEL Hr Exposed / DayBACNC = ® ---"'------"--35 ® 100 ® UF 24 Hr / Day
[Equation 8]
An annual average time period shall be used for aBA~c determined pursuant to section 4.6.
If approved by the District, the BA~cmay be determined on a case-by-case basis using a
NOAEL or LOAEL from repeated dose studies other than 7-day studies.
Ifa BACNC for a TAC has not been determined pursuant to section 4.1 to 4.6 but a 7-day, oral
NOAEL or oral LOAEL is available for that TAC, then the oralNOAEL or oral LOAEL may
be used to calculate the BA~c as follows:
Oral NOAEL WA bBACNC = ® - ® - [Equation 9]35 ® 100 IA a
205
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207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225 4.7
226
227
228
Where:
BACNC
NOAEL
LOAEL
35
100
UF
Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects ofa
TAC, in units of Ilg/m3,
No observed adverse effect level (inhalation study), in units ofllg/m3,
Lowest observed adverse effect level (inhalation study), inunits ofllg/m3,
A safety factor to account for using a NOAEL or LOAEL from a 7-day
exposure period to estimate a NOAEL or LOAEL for a lifetime study,
A standard composite safety factor comprised ofa safety factor of 10 to
account for differences between animals and humans and a safety factor
of 10 to account for the differences between individuals in the human
population, and
Uncertainty Factor, a value from 1 to 10, applicable when using a
LOAEL (lowest effect) instead of a NOAEL (no effect), determined by
the District on a case-by-case basis, considering the type and severity of
effect. For example, a value of 1 would be used when the lowest effect
was a skin rash; a value of 10 would be used when the lowest effect was
death.
229
230 Where:
Oral LOAEL WA bBACNC = ® - ®-35 ® 100 ® UF fA a
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An annual average time period shall be used for a BA~c determined pursuant to section 4.7.
If approved by the District, the BACNC may be determined on a case-by-case basis using an
oral NOAEL or oral LOAEL from repeated dose studies other than 7-day studies.
Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects ofa
TAC, in units of IJ.g/m3,
No observed adverse effect level (oral study), in units oflJ.g/kg-day,
Lowest observed adverse effect level (oral study), in units oflJ.g/kg-day,
A safety factor to account for using a NOAEL or LOAEL from a 7-day
exposure period to estimate a NOAEL or LOAEL for a lifetime study,
A standard composite safety factor comprised ofa safety factor of 10 to
account for differences between animals and humans and a safety factor
of 10 to account for the differences between individuals in the human
population,
Uncertainty Factor, a value from 1 to 10, applicable when using a
LOAEL (lowest effect) instead of a NOAEL (no effect), determined by
the District on a case-by-case basis, considering the type and severity of
effect. For example, a value of 1 would be used when the lowest effect
was a skin rash; a value of 10 would be used when the lowest effect was
death,
Body weight of experimental animal in kilograms (kg),
Daily inhalation rate ofexperimental animal in m3/day,
Absorption efficiency (percent absorbed) by the oral route of exposure,
and
Absorption efficiency (percent absorbed) by the inhalation route of
exposure.
NOAEL
LOAEL
35
100
UF
a
If a BA~c for a TAC has not been determined pursuant to section 4.1 to 4.7 but an
inhalation LCso from a study that is 4 or more hours in duration is available for that TAC,
then the LCso may be used to calculate the BA~c as follows:
LC
BACNC = 500 Q950100 [Equation 11].
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253
254
255
256 4.8
257
258
259
260 Where:
261 BACNC
262
263 LCso
264
265
266 500
267
268 100
269
Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects of a
TAC, in units of IJ.g/m3,
Concentration ofmaterial used in an inhalation study that causes death of
50% of the group of test animals when administered as a single dose in
a specific time period, in units of IJ.g/m3,
A factor to account for using an LCso to estimate a no observed adverse
effect level (NOAEL) for a lifetime study, and
A standard composite safety factor comprised ofa safety factor of 10 to
account for differences between animals and humans and a safety factor
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of 10 to account for the differences between individuals in the human
population.
An annual average time period shall be used for a BAc;,c determined pursuant to section 4.8.
[Equation 12].
273
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4.9 If a BAc;,c for a TAC has not been determined pursuant to section 4.1 to 4.8 but an LC50
from a I-hour inhalation study is available for that TAC, then the I-hour LC50 may be used
to calculate the BAc;,c as follows:
(I-Hr) LCsoBAC = ---------'------'
NC 500 ® 100 ® 40
An annual average time period shall be used for a BAc;,c determined pursuant to section 4.9.
If a BAc;,c for a TAC has not been determined pursuant to section 4.1 to 4.9 but an animal
oral LD50 is available for that TAC, then the LD50 may be used to calculate the BAc;,c as
follows:
LDso (mg/kg) WABACNC =---~------ ® -500 ® 100 ® 40 ® 0.167 fA
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Where:
BACNC
500
100
40
Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects ofa
TAC, in units of Ilg/m3,
Concentration ofmaterial used in an inhalation study that causes death of
50% of the group of test animals when administered as a single dose in
a specific time period, in units of Ilg/m3,
A factor to account for using an LC50 to estimate a no observed adverse
effect level (NOAEL) for a lifetime study,
A standard composite safety factor comprised ofa safety factor of 10 to
account for differences between animals and humans and a safety factor
of 10 to account for the differences between individuals in the human
population, and
A safety factor to account for the uncertainty of using a one-hour
inhalation LC50 compared to an exposure duration offour hours or more.
[Equation 13].
296 Where:
297 BACNC
298
299 LD50
300
301
302 500
303
304 100
305
Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects ofa
TAC, in units of Ilg/m3,
Amount of material administered in a single dose by a route other than
inhalation, e.g., oral, that causes death of 50% of the group of test
animals, in units of Ilg!kg,
A factor to account for using an LC50 to estimate a no observed adverse
effect level (NOAEL) for a lifetime study,
A standard composite safety factor comprised of a safety factor of 10 to
account for differences between animals and humans and a safety factor
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306
307
308
309
310
311
312
40
of 10 to account for the differences between individuals in the human
population,
A safety factor to account for the uncertainty ofestimating an LCso from
anLDso'
A factor to convert the daily dose to a 4-hourtime frame (4 -;- 24 = 0.167),
Body weight of experimental animal in kilograms (kg), and
Daily inhalation rate ofexperimental animal in m3/day.
313
314
315
316
317
An annual average time period shall be used for a BA~c determined pursuant to
section 4.10.
4.11 If a BA~c for a TAC has not been determined pursuant to section 4.1 to 4.10, then the
BACNC shall be the default value:
BACNC = 0.04 ~g/m 3 [Equation 14].
318
319
320
Where:
BACNC Benchmark Ambient Concentration for the noncarcinogenic effects of a
TAC, in units of Ilg/m3.
321
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323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
4.12
4.12.1
4.12.2
4.12.3
4.12.4
4.12.5
4.12.6
An annual average time period shall be used for a BA~c determined pursuant to
section 4.11.
Notwithstanding the methodologies in sections 4.3, 4.7, and 4.10, a BACNC shall not be
derived from one ofthese methodologies, which consider route-to-route extrapolation, unless
the District has affirmativelydetermined that the use oforal toxicity data is appropriate. The
use of oral toxicity data is not appropriate in the following cases:
When groups of chemicals have different toxicity by the two different routes (e.g.,
metals, irritants, and sensitizers),
When a first-pass effect by the respiratory tract is expected,
When a first-pass effect by the liver is expected,
When a respiratorytract effect is established, but dosimetrycomparison cannot be clearly
established between the two routes,
When the respiratory tract is not adequately studied in the oral studies, and
When short-term inhalation studies, dermal irritation, in vitro studies, or characteristics
of the chemical indicate potential for portal-of-entry effects at the respiratory tract, but
studies themselves are not adequate for the development of a benchmark ambient
concentration.
338 SECTION 5 Consideration of Acute Noncancer Effects
339 If the District determines that compliance with the BA~c over the applicable averaging time
340 specified in Section 4 does not provide adequate protection from the acute effects of a TAC, then
341 the District may establish a different acute benchmark ambient concentration (BA~CA) and shorter
342 averaging time that would provide adequate protection.
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343 SECTION 6 Available Documents
344 The District will maintain on its web page, ''http://www.apcd.org'', links to the documents identified
345 as available on the Internet and maintain at its office a copy of all documents identified in this
346 regulation. In addition, the District will maintain a current list of the benchmark ambient
347 concentrations that have been developed pursuant to this regulation and maintain this current list on
348 its web page.
349 Adopted vl/ _ ; effective _
5.20 - 10
Version #1, Draft #2 - Proposed January 10,2005
[I/adopted, this would be a new regulation]
[Approved by the Committee ofthe Whole on January 13, 2005, for Public Review]
1 REGULATION 5.21 Environmental Acceptability for Toxic Air Contaminants
2 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
3 Jefferson County, Kentucky
4 Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
5 Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
6 Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes the Air Pollution Control Board to adopt and
7 enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of KRS
8 Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the criteria for determining the environmental acceptability
9 of emissions of toxic air contaminants.
10 SECTION 1 Definitions
11 Terms used in this regulation that are not defined in this regulation shall have the meaning given to
12 them in Regulation 1.02 Definitions or Regulation 5.01 General Provisions.
13 1.1 "Best available technology for toxics" or "T-BAT" means an emission standard that reflects
14 the maximum degree of toxic air contaminant (TAC) emission reduction that the District
15 determines can be reasonably achieved by the process or process equipment, taking into
16 account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and health and welfare benefits. In
17 determining T-BAT, the District shall consider work practices, raw material substitutions,
18 production limitations including limitations on the hours ofoperation, alternative processes
19 and process design characteristics, air pollution control equipment, and pollution prevention
20 measures.
21 1.2 "Environmentally acceptable" or "environmental acceptability" (EA) means the ambient
22 concentration, including an averaging time frame, of a TAC, or the sum of the ambient
23 concentrations, including an averaging time frame, of multiple TACs, that is less than or
24 equal to the ambient goals and standards established in this regulation. These EA goals and
25 standards are collectively referred to as "EA levels."
26 1.3 "Existing process or process equipment" means, for the provisions ofthis regulation, one of
27 the following:
28 1.3.1 A process or process equipment, for which the construction permit did not qualify under
29 any ofthe circumstances described in section 1.5, that involves the potential emission of
30 a Category 1 or 2 TAC from a Group 1 or 2 stationary source, excluding the process and
31 process equipment for the initial transfer of gasoline into the fuel tank of a new motor
32 vehicle at an automobile or truck assembly plant, or
33 1.3.2 A process or process equipment located at a permitted stationary source that involves the
34 potential emission ofa TAC for which the District determines that the emissions do not
35 comply with the general duty clause of Regulation 5.01 Section 3.
36 1.4 "Hazard quotient" or "HQ" means the ratio between the concentration of a TAC and the
37 benchmark ambient concentration for noncarcinogenic effects for that TAC (BA~d. A
38 hazard quotient is a unitless numerical value.
39 1.5 "New or modified process orprocess equipment" means, for the provisions ofthis regulation,
40 a process or process equipment for which the District has received a construction permit
41 application that meets one ofthe following circumstances:
42 1.5.1 The application involves the potential emission ofa Category 1 or 2 TAC from a Group 1
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43 or 2 stationary source and the construction permit is issued by the District on or after
44 [insert the effective date of this regulation],
45 1.5.2 The application involves the potential emission ofa Category 3 or 4 TAC from a Group
46 1 or 2 stationary source, but does not involve the potential emission of a Category 1 or
47 2 TAC, and an administratively complete construction permit application was received
48 by the District on or after [insert the effective date of this regulation], unless the
49 construction permit application had been received by the District before June 30, 2004,
50 or
51 1.5.3 The application involves the potential emission of a TAC from a permitted stationary
52 source and the District determines that the emission would not comply with the general
53 duty clause ofRegulation 5.01 Section 3.
54 1.6 "Permitted stationary source" means a stationa.ry source that is subject to the permit
55 requirements ofRegulation 2.03 section 1.1 or 1.2.
56 1.7 "Source sector" means the general grouping of sources of air contaminants used by the
57 District for developing anthropogenic emissions inventories. These source sectors are as
58 follows:
59 1.7.1 Point source - industrial or commercial stationary source that is subject to the permit
60 requirements in Regulation 2.03 section 1.1 or 1.2 (permitted stationary source).
61 1.7.2 Area source - non-permitted commercial stationarysource or otheranthropogenic source
62 of emissions that is not included in section 1.7.1, 1.7.3, or 1.7.4.
63 1.7.3 Mobile source - motorized vehicle that is registered for use on the public roads and
64 highways.
65 1.7 4 Nonroad mobile source - motorized vehicle that is not registered for use on the public
66 roads and highways or any other equipment with a fossil fuel-fIred engine that is not a
67 point source.
68 SECTION 2 Ambient Goals and Standards for Environmental Acceptability for Toxic Air
69 Contaminants
70 2.1 The allowed emissions ofTACs, excluding de minimis emissions and the Category 3 and 4
71 TAC emissions for which the allowed emissions were approved pursuant to section 3.1.2.2,
72 from new or modifIed processes or process equipment, as defIned in section 1.5, shall not
73 exceed the ambient levels of environmental acceptability (EA levels) for TACs in
74 section 2.2, except as provided in section 2.3.
75 2.2 The following table establishes the EA goals for TACs for new or modifIed processes or
76 process equipment:
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J Applicable Goal EAL 2,3CSource Applicable Process or Applicable or Risk6 EALNc4,5Sector Process Eauioment 1 TACs Standard (®10-6) HQ
2.2.1 Point Individual stationary Individual Goal 1.0 HQ =0.20
source source, individual new TAC
or modified PIPE
2.2.2 Point Individual stationary Individual Goal HQ=0.38
source source, all new or TAC
modified PIPE
2.2.3 Point Individual stationary Total for all Goal 3.8
source source, all new or applicable
modified PIPE TACs
Notes for section 2.2 (also applicable to section 2.5):
1 Process or process equipment is abbreviated PIPE.
2 Re, or the risk, in units ofrisk in one million, from an individual TAC that is determined
to be a carcinogen, as applicable to section 2.2.1 (or section 2.5.1), means the cancerrisk
from an individual TAC from an individual process or process equipment, derived from
the following equation:
80
81
82
83
84
85
86 Maximum concentration; j
BACc.I
[Equation 1]
[Equation 2]
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
Where: an individual carcinogenic TAC, from
J an individual new or modified process or process equipment,
BACCi = the benchmark ambient concentration for that carcinogenic
TAC, as determined pursuant to Regulation 5.20 Section 3,
and
Maximum concentration = the highest concentration of a TAC in the
ambient air, taking into account the applicable averaging time
frame for the TAC, as determined pursuant to Regulation 5.22
Procedures for Determining the Maximum Ambient
Concentration ofa Toxic Air Contaminant.
Re, or the risk, in units of risk in one million, from all TACs that are determined to be
carcinogens, as applicable to section 2.2.3 (or section 2.5.3), means the sum ofthe cancer
risks at a single point from all individual TACs from all applicable individual processes
or process equipment, derived from the following equation:
R
c
= t t Maximum concentration; j
;;1 j;1 BACc.I
102
103
Where:
j
an individual carcinogenic TAC, from
an individual process or process equipment,
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105
106
107
108
109
110
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113
114
115
116
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119
120
4
n the total number ofcarcinogenic TACs to be included in the
demonstration ofenvironmental acceptability,
m the total number of processes or process equipment from
which carcinogenic TAC "i" may be emitted,
BACCi = the benchmark ambient concentration for that carcinogenic
TAC, as determined pursuant to Regulation 5.20 Section 3,
and
Maximum concentration = the concentration of a toxic air
contaminant in the ambient air at the point ofmaximum risk
of all applicable "i" emissions from all applicable "j"
processes or process equipment, taking into account the
applicable averaging time frame for the TAC, as determined
pursuant to Regulation 5.22.
RNc, or the risk from the noncarcinogenic effects ofan individual TAC, as applicable to
section 2.2.1 (or2.5.1 ), means the hazard quotient ofthe TAC from an individual process
or process equipment, derived from the following equation:
=
Maximum concentration;}
RNC = HQ; [Equation 3]BACNC .,
[Equation 4]=~ Maximum concentration; J'EALNC = HQ; LJ}=1 BACNC I
Where: an individual TAC, from
an individual process or process equipment,
the benchmark ambient concentration for the
noncarcinogenic effects of the TAC, as determined
pursuant to Regulation 5.20 Section 4, and
Maximum concentration = the highest concentration of a toxic air
contaminant in the ambient air, taking into account the
applicable averaging time frame for the TAC, as
determined pursuant to Regulation 5.22.
RNc, or the risk from the noncarcinogenic effects of an individual TAC from all
applicable individual processes or process equipment, as applicable to section 2.2.2 (or
2.5.2), means the hazard quotient of the TAC at a single point from all applicable
processes or process equipment, derived from the following equation:
121
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123
124
125
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127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
. 141
142
Where: an individual TAC, from
J an individual process or process equipment,
m the total number ofprocesses or process equipment from
which TAC "i" may be emitted,
BACNC the benchmark ambient concentration for the
noncarcinogenic effects of the TAC, as determined
pursuant to Regulation 5.20 Section 4, and
Maximum concentration = the concentration of a toxic air
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143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.1.1
2.3.1.2
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.4
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.5
contaminant in the ambient air at the point of maximum
concentration ofthe "i" emissions from all applicable "j"
processes or process equipment, taking into account the
applicable averaging time frame for the TAC, as
determined pursuant to Regulation 5.22.
6 The EALe Risk is in units of risk in one million.
Modification of the EA goals.
Afterproviding an opportunity for public review and comment, the District may approve
a written request from the owner or operator of a new or modified process or process
equipment to exceed:
One or both of the EA goals in section 2.2.1, provided that the applicable EA goals
in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 are met, and
One or both ofthe EA goals in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, provided that the applicable
EA standards in sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 are met.
As part of the request pursuant to section 2.3.1, the owner or operator shall submit a
demonstration that each element of T-BAT that is listed in section 1.1 has been
considered and that practices and measures potentially applicable to the process or
process equipment, including technology transfer, from readily available information
from any jurisdiction have been reviewed.
In making the determination whether to approve the request, the District shall consider,
among other factors, whether, and the extent to which, the allowed emissions from the
process or process equipment reflect the application ofthe best available technology for
toxics (T-BAT). The District shall also consider relevant, including both current and up
to 25 years in the future, demographic and land use factors.
The allowed emissions ofTACs, as specifiedin sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3, excluding de minimis
emissions, from processes and process equipment at a point source, as specified in sections
2.4.1 to 2.4.3, shall not, taking into account the compliance schedule for the various
categories ofTACs in section 4.5, exceed the EA levels for TACs in section 2.5 as follows,
except as provided in sections 2.6 and 2.7:
The EA goals in section 2.5.1 are applicable to Category 1 and 2 TACs from existing
processes and process equipment,
The EA standards in sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 are applicable to Category 1 and 2 TACs
from all existing processes and process equipment and Category 1, 2, 3, and 4 TACs
from all new or modified processes or process equipment, excluding the Category 3 and
4 TAC emissions for which the allowed emissions were approved pursuant to section
3.1.2.2, and
The EA goals and standards in section 2.5 are applicable to a process or process
equipment for which the District determines that the emissions ofaTAC do not comply
with the general duty clause of Regulation 5.01 Section 3.
The following table establishes the EA levels forTACs for processes and process equipment,
as specified in sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.3, at a point source:
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J Applicable Goal EALc 2,3Source Applicable Process or Applicable or Risk6 EALNc4, SSector Process Equipment 1 TACs Standard ((8)10-6) HQ
2.5.1 Point Individual stationary Individual Goal 1.0 HQ = 0.20
source source, individual TAC
existing PIPE
2.5.2 Point Individual stationary Individual Standard HQ = 0.75
source source, all PIPE, TAC
including new or
modified PIPE
2.5.3 Point Individual stationary Total for all Standard 7.5
source source, all PIPE, applicable
including new or TACs
modified PIPE
Notes for section 2.5: See the notes for section 2.2.
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204
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207
208
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2.6
2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3
2.7
2.8
Modification of the EA goals.
After providing an opportunity for public review and comment, the District may approve
a written request from the owner or operator ofa process or process equipment subject
to the EA goals in section 2.5.1 to exceed one or both ofthose EA goals, provided that
the corresponding EA standards in sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 are met.
As part of the request pursuant to section 2.6.1, the owner or operator shall submit a
demonstration that each element ofT-BAT listed in section 1.1 has been considered and
that practices and measures potentially applicable to the process or process equipment,
including technology transfer, from readily available information from any jurisdiction
have been reviewed.
In making the determination whether to approve the request, the District shall consider,
among other factors, whether, and the extent to which, the allowed emissions from the
process or process equipment reflect the application of T-BAT. The District shall also
consider relevant, including both current and up to 25 years in the future, demographic
and land use factors.
The owner or operator ofa new or modified process or process equipment, except for a new
or modified process or process equipment that was approved by the District to exceed one
or both ofthe EA goals in section 2.2.2 or 2.2.3 pursuant to the provisions of section 2.3, is
not required to demonstrate compliance with the EA standards in sections 2.5.2 or 2.5.3 until
required to do so pursuant to the provisions of section 4.1, taking into account the schedule
for the various categories of TACs.
The EA goals for TACs, applicable to the emissions from existing processes and process
equipment, as defined in section 1.3, and new ormodified processes and process equipment,
as defined in section 1.5 (including the Category 3 and 4 TAC emissions for which the
allowed emissions were approved pursuant to section 3.1.2.2), excluding de minimis
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emissions, are as follows:
J Applicable Goal EAL 1CSource Applicable Source Applicable or Risk3 EALNc2Sector of Emission TACs Standard (®10-6) HQ
2.8.1 Point source Applicable processes Individual Goal HQ = 1.00
and process TAC
equipment
2.8.2 Point source Applicable processes Total for all Goal 10.0
and process applicable
equipment TACs
Notes for section 2.8:
1 Re, or the risk, in units of risk in one million, from all TACs that are determined to be
carcinogens, as applicable to section 2.8.2, means the sum of the cancer risks at a single
point from all individual TACs from all applicable stationary sources, derived from the
following equation:
R
e
= t t Maximum concentration; j
;=1 j=l BACe.I
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Where: an individual carcinogenic TAC, from
J an individual source of emission,
n the total number ofcarcinogenic TACs to be included in the
demonstration ofenvironmental acceptability,
m the total number of sources of emission from which
carcinogenic TAC "i" may be emitted,
BACCi = the benchmark ambient concentration for that carcinogenic
TAC, as determined pursuant to Regulation 5.20 Section 3,
and
Maximum concentration = the concentration ofa toxic air
contaminant in the ambient air at the point ofmaximum risk
ofall applicable "i" emissions from all applicable '1" sources
ofemission, taking into account the applicable averaging time
frame for the TAC, as determined pursuant to Regulation
5.22.
RNc, or the risk from the noncarcinogenic effects of an individual TAC, as applicable to
section 2.8.3, means the hazard quotient of the TAC from all applicable stationary
sources, derived from the following equation:
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240
=~ Maximum concentration; j
RNC = HQ; Lj=l BACNC I
[Equation 6]
241 Where: 1 an individual TAC, from
242 J an individual source of emission,
243 m the total number ofsources or emission from which TAC
244 "i" may be emitted,
245 BA~e the benchmark ambient concentration for the
246 noncarcinogenic effects of the TAC, as determined
247 pursuant to Regulation 5.20 Section 4, and
248 Maximum concentration = the concentration of a toxic air
249 contaminant in the ambient air at the point of maximum
250 concentration ofthe "i" emissions from all applicable "j"
251 sources of emission, taking into account the applicable
252 averaging time frame for the TAC, as determined
253 pursuant to Regulation 5.22.
254 The EALe Risk is in units of risk in one million.
255 SECTION 3 New or Modified Process or Process Equipment that May Emit a Toxic Air
256 Contaminant
257 3.1 A construction permit required by the provisions of the Part 2 regulations for a new or
258 modified process or process equipment that may emit a TAC shall, except as exempted
259 pursuant to section 3.2, incorporate the following provisions:
260 3.1.1 The permit conditions shall contain an allowed emission standard for a Category 1 or 2
261 TAC from a Group 1 or 2 stationary source that has been demonstrated to comply with
262 the environmental acceptability goals of section 2.2, except as provided in section 2.3,
263 3.1.2 The permit conditions shall contain an allowed emission standard for a Category 3 or 4
264 TAC from a Group 1 or 2 stationary source that meets one of the following:
265 3.1.2.1 The allowed emission standard has been demonstrated to comply with the
266 environmental acceptability goals ofsection 2.2 except as provided in section 2.3, or
267 3.1.2.2 The allowed emission standard has been demonstrated to comply with Section 3 of
268 Regulation 5.01. If the owner or operator chooses this option for compliance, then,
269 prior to issuing the construction permit, the District shall provide an opportunity for
270 public review and comment, and
271 3.1.3 If determined appropriate by the District, then the construction permit shall require the
272 owner or operator of the new or modified process or process equipment to install,
273 calibrate, operate, and maintain a continuous or intermittent emissions or parametric
274 monitoring system. Applicable records shall be maintained for a period of at least 5
275 years, made available to the District upon request, and submitted to the District as
276 specified in the construction permit.
277 3.2 Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 shall not apply to a TAC emission that is a de minimis emission as
278 defined in Regulation 5.01 section 1.6.
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279 SECTION 4 Demonstration of Environmental Acceptability and Compliance Plans for
280 Permitted Stationary Sources
281 4.1 The owner or operator ofa Group 1 or Group 2 stationary source shall determine, according
282 to the procedures in this regulation, whether the allowed emissions from all processes and
283 process equipment at the stationary source comply with the EA levels in sections 2.5.1
284 to 2.5.3. When making this determination, the owner or operator may include the effect on
285 the allowed emissions ofa process or process equipment pursuant to a promulgated Clean
286 Air Act §112(d) maximum achievable control technology (§112(d) MACT) standard,
287 provided that the change in allowed emissions and the compliance deadline are identified.
288 The owner or operator shall, for each process or process equipment, submit to the District
289 the results and the supporting documentation ofthe determination according to the following
290 schedule:
291 4.1.1 For a Group 1 stationary source, the following:
292 4.1.1.1 For Category 1 TACs, by December 31, 2005, and
293 4.1.1.2 For Category 2 TACs, by December 31,2007, and
294 4.1.2 For a Group 2 stationary source, the following:
295 4.1.2.1 For Categories 1 and 2 TACs, by September 30,2008.
296 4.1.3 For cause, the District may extend the compliance date of section 4.1.1.1 by up to 6
297 months. To be eligible for this extension, the owneror operator ofthe process or process
298 equipment shall submit all ofthe information that is available by the compliance date and
299 a written request to the District explaining whythe extension is necessary and the actions
300 that were taken to minimize the needed extension.
301 4.2 If the District determines that the concentration of a TAC in the ambient air is, or may be,
302 greater than the EA goal in section 2.8.1 or 2.8.2 and a potentially responsible entity for the
303 emissions of the TAC is identified, then the Board may require the owner or operator ofan
304 identified stationary source to submit the information identified in Section 4 of
305 Regulation 1.06 Stationary Source SeljMonitoring, Emissions Inventory Development, and
306 Reporting and meet the requirements of sections 4.1, 4.4, and 4.5 ofRegulation 5.21 on an
307 accelerated schedule. In this case, the District shall notify the owner or operator in writing
308 and shall specify the dates for complying with these requirements.
309 4.3 If the allowed emissions, or, if the applicable permit does not contain an allowed emission
310 standard, then the potential emissions, of a TAC from a process or process equipment are
311 determined, pursuant to section4.1, to exceed one or more ofthe EA levels in sections 2.5.1
312 to 2.5.3 but the actual emissions do not exceed these EA levels, then the owner or operator
313 may request, in writing, that the District revise the appropriate permit conditions to reduce
314 the allowable emissions, or establish an allowable emission standard that is consistent with
315 new source review requirements, specifying the new level of allowed emissions. Upon
316 receipt by the District of the request, the new emission standard may be used for
317 demonstrating environmental acceptability and shall be an enforceable requirement of the
318 applicable permit for the affected process and process equipment.
319 4.4 If the allowed emissions of a TAC from a process or process equipment are determined,
320 pursuant to the provisions of section 4.1, to exceed one or both of the EA goals in section
321 2.5.1 (and the District has not given approval to exceed those EA goals pursuant to section
322 2.6) or the EA standards in section 2.5.2 or 2.5.3, then the owner or operator shall submit to
323 the District a compliance plan and schedule for compliance with the applicable EA level
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according to the following schedule:
For a Group 1 stationary source, as follows:
For Category 1 TACs, by June 30, 2006, and
For Category 2 TACs, by December 31, 2008, and
For a Group 2 stationary source, as follows:
For Categories 1 and 2 TACs, by September 30,2009.
For cause, the District may extend the compliance date of section 4.4.1.1 by up to 6
months. To be eligible for this extension, the owner or operator ofthe process or process
equipment shall submit all ofthe information that is available by the compliancedate and
a written request to the District explaining why the extension is necessary and the actions
that were taken to minimize the needed extension.
A compliance plan required pursuant to section 4.4 shall provide for compliance as soon as
practicable but no later than the following dates:
For a Group 1 stationary source, the following:
For Category 1 TACs, December 31,2007, and
For Category 2 TACs, December 31, 2009, and
For a Group 2 stationary source, the following:
For Categories 1 and 2 TACs, September 30,2010.
For cause, the District may extend the compliance date of section 4.5.1.1 by up to 6
months and the compliance date in sections 4.5.1.2 and 4.5.2.1 by up to 12 months. To
be eligible for this extension, the owner or operator ofthe process or process equipment
shall complete as much of the compliance plan as can be done by the applicable
compliance date and submit a written request to the District explaining whythe extension
is necessary and the actions that were taken to minimize the needed extension.
The District may extend the applicable compliance date of section 4.5.1 or 4.5.2 that
would otherwise be applicable to a process or process equipment that is subject to a
§112(d) MACT standard, provided that the §112(d) MACT standard is promulgated at
the time that the compliance plan is due pursuant to section 4.4. If the compliance date
is extended, then the owner or operator shall timely and fully comply with the
requirements of the §112(d) MACT standard. An extension of the compliance date for
the process or process equipment subject to this §112(d) MACT standard does not affect
the applicable compliance date of section 4.5.1 or 4.5.2 for any other process or process
equipment at the stationary source.
A compliance plan and schedule pursuant to the provisions of section 4.4 shall, at a
minimum, contain the following milestone steps and dates:
Perform an engineering analysis ofpotential solutions,
Prepare a bid package for vendors for equipment,
Submit to the District a construction permit application for new equipment and any
required modifications,
Select a vendor and issue a purchase order for equipment,
Commence construction,
Complete construction,
Prepare and submit a proposed compliance testing protocol to the District for approval,
Perform the required compliance testing,
Prepare and submit a final compliance testing report to the District for approval, and
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4.6.10
4.7
4.8
4.8.1
4.8.2
4.8.3
4.8.4
4.8.5
4.8.6
4.8.7
4.9
4.10
Submit quarterly progress reports.
After providing an opportunity for public review and comment, the District may approve a
compliance plan and schedule from a stationary source and the approved compliance plan
and schedule shall be an enforceable requirement of the applicable District permit for the
process and process equipment included in the compliance plan.
If the District detennines, based upon the information submitted to the District pursuant to
section 4.1 or other information, that an EA goal in section 2.8.1 or 2.8.2 would be exceeded,
then the following process shall be followed:
The District shall prepare a proposed Risk Reduction Plan (Plan). The Plan shall set
forth the information relied upon in making the determination, the assumptions and
calculations in support ofthe Plan, and the analysis and rationale from section 4.8.2. The
Plan shall specify the additional reductions from each stationary source contributing to
the exceedance of the EA goal that are necessary to achieve compliance with the
applicable EA goal,
In determining the additional reductions, the District shall consider the extent to which
each contributing process and process equipment has applied T-BAT, the other factors
to be considered in sections 2.3 and 2.6, and other factors necessary and appropriate upon
which to base a fair, equitable, and effective apportionment of the responsibility for
additional reductions,
The Board shall provide an opportunity for public review and comment on the proposed
Plan,
Following the opportunity for public review and comment, the Board shall take action
on the proposed Plan. Board action may include, but is not limited to, approval,
modification and approval, or denial of the proposed Plan,
Within 180 days of Board approval of a Plan, the owner or operator of each affected
stationary source shall submit a compliance plan and schedule that shall, at a minimum,
contain the milestone steps and dates identified in section 4.6. Compliance with the
required reductions identified in the approved Plan shall be achieved as soon as
practicable but no later than 18 months after Board approval ofthe compliance plan and
schedule,
After providing an opportunity for public review and comment, the Board may approve
the compliance plan and schedule from the stationary source, and
Anymore stringent emission standard, and the schedule for complying with this emission
standard, shall be an enforceable requirement of the applicable District permit for the
affected process and process equipment.
In the alternative to the provisions of sections 4.1.2, 4.4.2, and 4.5.2 applicable to Group 2
stationary sources, the Board may, by regulation, establish specific requirements for a class
ofstationary sources. Ifthe Board adopts a new regulation or amends an existing regulation
in lieu ofrequiring compliance with these provisions by individual stationary sources in that
class, then the District shall notify the owner or operator of each stationary source in that
class that compliance with these provisions is not required.
Ifthe District detennines that the presence of2 or more TACs, at concentrations that comply
with the EA levels in sections 2.2, 2.5, and 2.8, would result in a synergistic or additive
toxicological effect that may adversely affect human health, or that there is human exposure
from routes of exposure other than direct inhalation, then the District shall prepare a
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414 proposed Risk Reduction Plan and the procedures specified in section 4.8 shall be followed.
415 Any more stringent emission standard, and a schedule for complying with this emission
416 standard, shall be an enforceable requirement of the applicable District permit for the
417 affected process and process equipment.
418 4.11 Upon written notification bythe District that abenchmark ambient concentration established
419 pursuant to Regulation 5.20 for a TAC that is, or may be, emitted by the stationary source
420 has become more stringent, the owner or operator of the stationary source shall, within 6
421 months of this notification, make a revised determination, according to the procedures in
422 Regulation 5.21, whether the allowed emissions from the stationary source comply with the
423 EA levels in section 2.5 basedupon the revised benchmark ambient concentration and submit
424 the results to the District. If one or more ofthese EA levels is exceeded, then the owner or
425 operator shall, within 18 months of the initial notification, submit a compliance plan and
426 schedule meeting the provisions of section 4.6, providing for compliance as soon as
427 practicable but no later than 36 months after the initial notification. Upon approval by the
428 District of the compliance plan and schedule, the approved compliance plan and schedule
429 shall be an enforceable requirement of the applicable District permit for the process and
430 process equipment included in the compliance plan.
431 4.12 Ifa benchmark ambient concentration established pursuant to Regulation 5.20 for a TAC
432 becomes less stringent, the owner or operator may request that an emission standard based
433 upon the more stringent benchmark ambient concentration be revised to reflect compliance
434 with the EA levels based upon the revised benchmark ambient concentration. The District
435 may approve the request and revise the emission standard, provided that the revision
436 complies with all other applicable requirements and the effectiveness of an existing
437 emissions control measure is not reduced or eliminated.
438 4.13 If the District detennines that the concentration of a TAC in the ambient air resulting from
439 any TAC emission of a stationary source is, or may be, greater than an EA level in section
440 2.5 or 2.8, then the District may require emission reductions of that TAC. In this case, the
441 written notification shall include the date for submittal ofa compliance plan and schedule
442 to the District and the date for compliance with the EA levels. Any more stringent emission
443 standard and the compliance schedule shall be an enforceable requirement ofthe applicable
444 District permit for the affected process and process equipment.
445 4.14 If the owner or operator submits a revised demonstration ofcompliance with the EA levels
446 in sections 2.2 or 2.5, based upon the use of an EPA-approved dispersion model update or
447 replacement model, that justifies a change to an applicable emission standard for the process
448 or process equipment, then the District may revise the pennit standard accordingly,
449 consistent with applicable new source review requirements.
450 Adopted vl/ ; effective _
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1
2
REGULATION 5.22 Proceduresfor Determining the Maximum Ambient Concentration of
a Toxic Air Contaminant
3 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
4 Jefferson County, Kentucky
5 Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
6 Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
7 Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes the Air Pollution Control Board to adopt and
8 enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of KRS
9 Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the procedures for determining the maximum concentration
10 of a toxic air contaminant in the ambient air.
11 SECTION 1 Determining the MaximumAmbient Concentration ofa Toxic Air Contaminant
12 1.1 The maximum ambient concentration of a toxic air contaminant determined by one of the
13 procedures in Sections 2 to 5 shall be used to determine compliance with the ambient levels
14 for environmental acceptability (EA levels) established in Regulation 5.21 Environmental
15 Acceptabilityfor Toxic Air Contaminants.
16 1.2 For intermittent emissions, the average emission rate maybe used to determine the maximum
17 ambient concentration if the average rate is not less than 10% ofthe maximum hourly rate.
18 Intermittent emissions are emissions that are not allowed to be emitted continuously for the
19 entire length of the time specified in Regulation 5.20 Methodology for Determining
20 BenchmarkAmbient Concentration ofa Toxic Air Contaminant as the applicable averaging
21 time for a benchmark ambient concentration.
22 1.3 Each procedure in Sections 2 to 5 represents an acceptable method for determining the
23 maximum ambient concentration of a toxic air contaminant, although there are stated
24 limitations for the use of the Tier 2 procedure. In general, the intent is that the Tier 1
25 procedure is the most simple to use, requires the least amount of process- and process
26 equipment-specific information, and provides the most conservative maximum ambient
27 concentration; proceeding on a continuum, the Tier 4 procedure is the most complex to use,
28 requires the greatest amount of process- and process equipment-specific information, and
29 provides the least conservative maximum ambient concentration. The following is a brief
30 description of the four procedures:
31 1.3.1 Tier 1- Table1: Simple Factor for Determining Maximum Ambient Concentration: The
32 allowed emission rate for the appropriate averaging time for the specific toxic air
33 contaminant is divided by a factor from the table to give the maximum ambient
34 concentration.
35 1.3.2 Tier 2 - Table 2: Annual Factor: The allowed hourly emission rate is divided by the
36 appropriate annual factor from the table to give the maximum ambient concentration.
37 The annual factor from the table depends on the building height, stack height-to-building
38 height ratio, and the distance to the closest secured property line, and the annual factor
39 from the table may be adjusted depending on the averaging time of the benchmark
40 ambient concentration for the specific toxic air contaminant.
41 1.3.3 Tier 3 - SCREEN3 and TSCREEN Models: The output ofthese screening models is the
42 maximum hourly ambient concentration. The maximum hourly ambient concentration
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43 may be multiplied by an adjustment factor depending on the averaging time of the
44 benchmark ambient concentration for the specific toxic air contaminant. The models
45 contain different algorithms based upon the type of release, for example, stack or
46 fugitive. Basic dispersion modeling parameters are required, such as building height and
47 dimensions, stack height, stack diameter, exhaust gas flow rate, exhaust gas temperature,
48 and emission rate for a stack emission.
49 1.3.4 Tier 4 - EPA-Approved Dispersion Model: The output ofthese highly complex models
50 is the maximum ambient concentration for the identified averaging time, which is set
51 within the model depending on the averaging time of the benchmark ambient
52 concentration for the specific toxic air contaminant. The models contain different
53 algorithms based upon the type of release, for example, stack or fugitive. Detailed
54 dispersion modeling parameters are required.
55 1.4 If there is not an established applicable emission limit for a toxic air contaminant (TAC),
56 then the potential to emit for that TAC shall be used. However, pursuant to Regulation 5.21
57 Section 4.3, the owner or operator ofthe stationary source may request a new emission limit
58 for that TAC that, upon receipt by the District, may be used to determine the maximum
59 ambient concentration pursuant to Regulation 5.22.
60 1.5 If the District determines that the model chosen, model options, or model inputs are not
61 appropriate to model the emissions from a process or process equipment, then the District
62 may disapprove the results of the modeling demonstration.
63 SECTION 2 Tier 1 - Table 1: Simple Factor for Determining Maximum Ambient
64 Concentration
65 2.1 The maximum concentration ofa toxic air contaminant from aprocess or process equipment
66 in the ambient air may be determined by using the appropriate factor from Table 1 and the
67 applicable Equation 1 to 4. The appropriate factor is determined by the averaging time for
68 a specific toxic air contaminant, which is established in Regulation 5.20. The calculated
69 maximum concentration is then used in determining compliance with the EA levels in
70 Regulation 5.21 by using the applicable equation in Regulation 5.21 section 2.2,2.5, or 2.8.
71 IfTable 1 contains two factors for a benchmark ambient concentration averaging time, then
72 the factor that results in the greater maximum concentration shall be used.
73 2.2 Table 1 Simple Factorfor Determining Maximum Concentration reads as follows:
M T~~1
75 Simple Factor for Determining Maximum Ambient Concentration
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
BACt
Averaging Annual 24-Hour 8-Hour I-Hour
Time Factor (FA)2 Factor (F24)3 Factor (Fst Factor (Ft)5
Annual 480 0.54
24 hours 0.12 0.05
8 hours 0.02 0.02
1 hour 0.001
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Notes for Table 1:
1 BAC is the benchmark ambient concentration of a toxic air contaminant as
determined pursuant to Regulation 5.20.
2 The Annual Factor FA is in units of(lb/year)/(lJ.g/m3). Use Equation 1.
The 24-Hour Factor F24 is in units of(lb/24 hours)/(lJ.g/m3). Use Equation 2.
4 The 8-Hour Factor Fg is in units of(lb/8 hours)/(lJ.g/m3). Use Equation 3.
The I-Hour Factor F1 is in units of(lb/l hour)/(lJ.g/m3). Use Equation 4.
90
91
92
Maximum Concentration;}
Maximum Concentration;}
Maximum Concentration;}
= Allowed annual emission;}
FA
= Allowed 24-hour emission;}
F24
Allowed 8-hour emission;}
Fs
Equation 1
Equation 2
Equation 3
93 Allowed I-hour emission;}
Maximum Concentration; j =
F1
Equation 4
94
95
96
97
98
Where: i = an individual toxic air contaminant, from
j = an individual process or process equipment,
Allowed emission is in units of pounds per the applicable time period,
and
Maximum Concentration is in units of IJ.g/m3•
99 SECTION 3 Tier 2 - Table 2: Annual Factor for Determining Maximum Ambient
100 Concentration
101 3.1 The maximum concentration ofa toxic air contaminant from a process or process equipment
102 in the ambient air may be determined by using the appropriate annual factor from Table 2
103 (adjusted if appropriate) and Equation 5. The calculated maximum concentration is then
104 used in determining compliance with the EA levels in Regulation 5.21 by using the
105 applicable equation in Regulation 5.21 section 2.2,2.5, or 2.8.
106 3.2 The use ofTable 2 requires information about the dispersion characteristics ofthe source of
107 emissions, namely, the distance to the nearest secured property line, the height ofthe stack,
108 and, as described in section 3.7.2, the height of the influential building.
109 3.3 Table 2 shall not be used if any of the following provisions applies:
110 3.3.1 The stack height is less than 10 feet or the emission is a fugitive emission,
111 3.3.2 The influential building height is more than 100 feet,
112 3.3.3 There are terrain elevations that are more than 25%ofthe discharging stack height within
113 a distance of 500 feet from the stack, or
114 3.3.4 The analysis is for an elevated receptor, for example, a hospital air intake.
115 3.4 The annual factor value derived from Table 2 is the ratio of the annual averaged hourly
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117
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3.5
3.5.1
3.5.2
3.5.3
3.6
3.7
3.7.1
3.7.2
3.7.3
3.7.4
3.7.5
3.7.5.1
3.7.5.2
3.7.5.3
3.7.5.4
3.7.5.5
3.7.5.6
emission rate divided by the maximum annual ambient impact, in units of (lbs/hr)/(llg/m3).
The annual factor shall be adjusted if the averaging time of the benchmark ambient
concentration (BAC) for the specific toxic air contaminant as determined pursuant to
Regulation 5.20 is different than annual. This adjustment is done as follows:
24-hr factor (lbs/hr)/(llg/m3) = annual factor ® 0.091.
8-hr factor (lbs/hr)/(llg/m3) = annual factor ® 0.046.
1-hr factor (lbs/hr)/(llg/m3) = annual factor ® 0.02.
Determine the maximum concentration. This is done by using the allowed hourly emission
limit (lb/hr), taking into account the intermittent emissionprovision ofsection 1.2, for a toxic
air contaminant from a process or process equipment; the annual factor as derived from
Table 2 and, if appropriate, making the adjustment pursuant to section 3.5; and performing
the calculation in Equation 5. The resulting maximum concentration is in units ofllg/m3:
Allowed I-hour emission;).
Maximum Concentration . . = Equation 5
I) annual (adjusted) factor
Where: = an individual toxic air contaminant, from
j = an individual process or process equipment, and
annual (adjusted) factor is the annual factor derived from Table 2, including
any adjustment required by section 3.5.
Instructions for deriving the annual factor from Table 2 are as follows:
Determine the height of the discharging stack from ground level in feet (Hs)'
Determine the height of the influential building in feet (Hb). This is done by first
identifying all buildings, including buildings on-site and off-site, located within a
distance of 5 times their height from the discharging stack. Then, determine which
building is the highest. This is the influential building, with height (Hb) in feet. If the
stack is not attached to a building, then a building height of40% ofthe stack height shall
be assumed.
Determine the ratio ofthe stack height to the influential building height by dividing the
stack height, in feet, by the influential building height, in feet, Hs /Hb•
Determine the minimum distance, in feet, from the discharging stack to the secured
property line. Ifthere is no secured property line, then a distance of25 feet shall be used.
Determine the appropriate annual factor from Table 2. This is done by selecting the
columnwith the appropriate influential building height andHs /Hb ratio, and selecting the
row with the appropriate minimum distance to the secured property line.
If the influential building height is between values in the column headings, then use
the lower value or interpolate between values in the column headings.
IfHs is less than Hb, then set the influential building height equal to the stack height
and use the 1.25 Hs IHb column.
IfHs IHb is between 1 and 1.25, then select the 1.25 column.
IfHs /Hb is between 1.25 and 1.75, then use the 1.25 column or interpolate between
the 1.25 and 1.75 columns.
IfHs /Hb is between 1.75 and 2.5, then use the 1.75 column or interpolate between
the 1.75 and 2.5 columns.
IfHs IHb is greater than or equal to 2.5, then use the 2.5 column.
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158 3.7.5.7 If the minimmn distance to the secured property line is between 2 distances in the
159 row headings, then use the lower value, for example, if the distance is 250 feet, then
160 use the 200 foot distance row in Table 2.
161 3.8 Table 2 Annual Factor reads as follows:
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
Table 2 Annual Factor
BldgHt 10 20 30 40
~/Hb 1.25 1.75 2.50 1.25 1.75 2.50 1.25 1.75 2.50 1.25 1.75 2.50
StckHt 12.5 17.5 25 25 35 50 37.5 52.5 75 50 70 100
D 25 0.0085 0.022 0.159 0.032 0.084 0.679 0.075 0.220 1.603 0.152 0.421 2.941
I 50 0.0087 0.022 0.159 0.032 0.084 0.679 0.075 0.220 1.603 0.152 0.421 2.941
S 75 0.0096 0.022 0.159 0.032 0.084 0.679 0.075 0.220 1.603 0.152 0.421 2.941
T 100 0.011 0.023 0.159 0.033 0.084 0.679 0.075 0.220 1.603 0.152 0.421 2.941
A 200 0.020 0.040 0.159 0.042 0.084 0.679 0.082 0.220 1.603 0.157 0.421 2.941
N 300 0.030 0.053 0.178 0.059 0.116 0.679 0.099 0.221 1.603 0.174 0.421 2.941
C 400 0.040 0.065 0.171 0.077 0.140 0.679 0.126 0.268 1.603 0.200 0.421 2.941
E 500 0.051 0.077 0.189 0.094 0.164 0.679 0.153 0.318 1.603 0.243 0.505 2.941
600 0.063 0.091 0.222 0.112 0.188 0.746 0.181 0.368 1.603 0.287 0.588 2.941
F 700 0.075 0.104 0.241 0.130 0.211 0.812 0.208 0.413 1.603 0.328 0.664 2.941
T 800 0.089 0.119 0.257 0.148 0.235 0.768 0.235 0.459 1.608 0.370 0.740 2.941
900 0.103 0.134 0.264 0.167 0.258 0.770 0.261 0.502 1.672 0.411 0.812 2.941
1000 0.119 0.151 0.272 0.187 0.282 0.800 0.289 0.545 1.786 0.452 0.883 2.95S
1500 0.209 0.245 0.318 0.290 0.406 1.080 0.428 0.756 1.953 0.654 1.214 3.521
2000 0.311 0.350 0.383 0.408 0.539 1.256 0.573 0.965 2.304 0.861 1.534 3.731
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Table 2 Annual Factor (Con't)
BldgHt 50 60 70 80
H./Hb 1.25 1.75 2.50 1.25 1.75 2.50 1.25 1.75 2.50 1.25 1.75 2.50
StckHt 62.5 87.5 125 75 105 150 87.5 123 175 100 140 200
D 25 0.263 0.736 4.630 0.412 1.114 6.098 0.606 1.656 8.621 0.839 2.242 8.33
I 50 0.263 0.736 4.630 0.412 1.114 6.098 0.606 1.656 8.621 0.839 2.242 8.33
S 75 0.263 0.736 4.630 0.412 1.114 6.098 0.606 1.656 8.621 0.839 2.242 8.33
T 100 0.263 0.736 4.630 0.412 1.114 6.098 0.606 1.656 8.621 0.839 2.242 8.33
A 200 0.266 0.736 4.630 0.413 1.114 6.098 0.606 1.656 8.621 0.839 2.242 8.33~
N 300 0.282 0.736 4.630 0.426 1.114 6.098 0.614 1.656 8.621 0.845 2.242 8.33
C 400 0.312 0.736 4.630 0.455 1.114 6.098 0.641 1.656 8.621 0.868 2.242 8.33
E 500 0.351 0.743 4.630 0.498 1.114 6.098 0.683 1.656 8.621 0.909 2.242 8.33
600 0.409 0.838 4.630 0.545 1.114 6.098 0.741 1.656 8.621 0.967 2.242 8.33
F 700 0.468 0.951 4.717 0.625 1.269 6.250 0.808 1.672 8.621 1.040 2.242 8.33
T 800 0.528 1.064 4.803 0.705 1.429 6.410 0.901 1.825 8.621 1.111 2.242 8.33
900 0.585 1.168 4.854 0.781 1.572 6.579 1.000 2.016 8.621 1.235 2.488 9.091
1000 0.644 1.276 4.950 0.861 1.724 6.849 1.101 2.203 9.091 1.359 2.732 10.00C
1500 0.924 1.761 5.376 1.232 2.404 7.042 1.577 3.106 9.615 1.953 3.846 11.90
2000 1.205 2.222 5.882 1.603 3.049 7.353 2.041 3.968 9.615 2.525 4.808 12.821
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Table 2 Annual Factor (Con't)
BldgHt 90 100
HslHb 1.25 1.75 2.50 1.25 1.75 2.50
StckHt 113 158 225 125 175 250
D 25 1.126 3.049 13.514 1.458 3.876 14.286
I 50 1.126 3.049 13.514 1.458 3.876 14.286
S 75 1.126 3.049 13.514 1.458 3.876 14.286
T 100 1.126 3.049 13.514 1.458 3.876 14.286
A 200 1.126 3.049 13.514 1.458 3.876 14.286
N 300 1.129 3.049 13.514 1.458 3.876 14.286
C 400 1.147 3.049 13.514 1.475 3.876 14.286
E 500 1.185 3.049 13.514 1.506 3.876 14.286
600 1.244 3.049 13.514 1.563 3.876 14.286
F 700 1.316 3.049 13.514 1.634 3.876 14.286
T 800 1.404 3.049 13.514 1.730 3.876 14.286
900 1.502 3.086 13.514 1.832 3.876 14.286
1000 1.634 3.289 13.514 1.931 3.876 14.286
1500 2.358 4.505 15.152 2.778 5.208 16.129
2000 3.049 5.618 16.129 3.597 6.494 18.519
219 Notes for Table 2:
220 Bldg Ht is the building height, in feet,
221 Hs /Hb is the ratio of the stack height to the building height,
222 Stack Ht is the stack (or release) height, in feet, and
223 The annual factor is in units of (lbs/hr)/(llg/m3).
224 SECTION 4 Tier 3 - SCREEN3 and TSCREEN Models
225 4.1 The maximum concentration ofa toxic air contaminant from a process or process equipment
226 in the ambient air may be determined by using the EPA SCREEN3 or TSCREEN models,
227 using the appropriate algorithm for the type of emission release, for example, stack or
228 fugitive. The maximum concentration derived from the use ofone ofthese models, with the
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229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.1
4.2.1
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
adjustment identified in section 4.2 as appropriate, is then used in determining compliance
with the EA levels in Regulation 5.21 by using the applicable equation in Regulation 5.21
section 2.2, 2.5, or 2.8.
The resulting maximum concentration from the SCREEN3 or TSCREEN model is in units
of ~g/m3 for a I-hour averaging time. If the averaging time for a benchmark ambient
concentration (BAC) for the specific toxic air contaminant as determined pursuant to
Regulation 5.20 is other than 1 hour, then the resulting maximum concentration shall be
adjusted as follows:
For a BAC with an 8-hour averaging time, multiply by 0.44,
For a BAC with a 24-hour averaging time, multiply by 0.22, and
For a BAC with an annual averaging time, multiply by 0.02.
The SCREEN3 model shall be run in the "regulatory default mode" as described in the
SCREEN3 User's Guide (EPA-454/B-95-004). This document is available on the Internet
at "www.epa.gov/scramOOl/usergiscreen/screen3d.pdf'.
Ifthe TSCREEN model is used, the model inputs and options used shall be included with the
modeling results submitted to the District pursuant to Regulation 5.21.
The SCREEN3 model may be downloaded for free from the Internet at "www.epa.gov/
scramOOl/tt22.htm#SCREEN3".
The TSCREEN model may be downloaded for free from the Internet at ''www.epa.gov/
scramOO1/tt22.htm#TSCREEN".
249 SECTION 5 Tier 4 - EPA-Approved Dispersion Model
250 5.1 The maximum concentration ofa toxic air contaminant from a process or process equipment
251 in the ambient air may be determined by using the EPA Industrial Source Complex Model
252 (ISC3) model or another appropriate model included in Appendix A Summaries ofPreferred
253 Air Quality Models of 40 CFR Part 51 Appendix W Guideline on Air Quality Models.
254 Additionally, a model included in Appendix B Summaries ofAlternativeAirQuality Models
255 of40 CFR Part 51 Appendix W may be used, provided that the use ofthe Appendix B model
256 meets one of the three conditions for approval specified in Appendix B section B.O
257 Introduction and Availability and prior approval is given by the District. The maximum
258 concentration derived from the use of one of these models is then used in determining
259 compliance with the EA levels in Regulation 5.21 by using the applicable equation in
260 Regulation 5.21 section 2.2,2.5, or 2.8.
261 5.2 In running one ofthe models allowed pursuant to section 5.1, the model shall be set to report
262 the maximum concentration for the averaging time period consistent with the averaging time
263 established for the toxic air contaminant pursuant to Regulation 5.20.
264 5.3 The ISC3 model shall be run in the "regulatory default mode" as described in the User's
265 Guidefor the Industrial Source Complex (ISC3) Dispersion Models, Volume 1(EPA-454/B-
266 95-003a). This document is available on the Internet at ''www.epa.gov/scramOOl/userg/
267 regmod/isc3vl.pdf'.
268 5.4 The ISC3 model may be downloaded for free from the Internet at "www.epa.gov/scramOOl/
269 tt22.htm#ISC".
270 Adopted vl/ ; effective _
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1 REGULATION 5.23 Categories of Toxic Air Contaminants
2 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
3 Jefferson County, Kentucky
4 Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
5 Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
6 Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes the Air Pollution Control Board to adopt and
7 enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of KRS
8 Chapter 77. This regulation identifies the categories of toxic air contaminants to be addressed in
9 these regulations.
10 SECTION 1 Category 1 Toxic Air Contaminants
11 1.1 The Category 1 Toxic Air Contaminants list includes the compounds monitored in the 2000
12 to 2001 West Louisville Air Toxics Study at a concentration representative of a cancer risk
13 greater than 1.0(8110-6 or a non-cancer Hazard Quotient (HQ) greater than 1.0.
14 1.2 The Category 1 Toxic Air Contaminants list reads as follows:
15 Category 1 Toxic Air Contaminants
16 CAS No. Compound
17 1. 107-13-1 Acrylonitrile
18 2. 7440-38-2 Arsenic
19 & various and arsenic compounds
20 3. 71-43-2 Benzene
21 4. 75-25-2 Bromoform
22 5. 106-99-0 1,3-Butadiene
23 6. 7440-43-9 Cadmium
24 & various and cadmium compounds
25 7. 56-23-5 Carbon tetrachloride
26 8. 67-66-3 Chloroform
27 9. 126-99-8 Chloroprene [2-Chloro-1,3-butadiene]
28 10. 7440-47-3 Chromium
29 & various and chromium compounds
30 11. 106-46-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4-Dichlorobenzene
31 12. 140-88-5 Ethyl acrylate
32 13. 50-00-0 Formaldehyde
33 14. 75-09-2 Methylene chloride [Dichloromethane]
34 15. 7440-02-0 Nickel
35 & various and nickel compounds
36 16. 127-18-4 Perchloroethylene [Tetrachloroethylene]
37 17. 79-01-6 Trichloroethylene
38 18. 75-01-4 Vinyl chloride
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39 Category 1 Toxic Air Contaminants notes:
40 For all listings above that contain the word "compounds," the following applies: Unless
41 otherwise specified, these listings are definedas including anyunique chemical substance
42 that contains the named chemical (i.e., arsenic, cadmium, chromium, and nickel) as part
43 of that chemical's infrastructure.
44 SECTION 2 Category 2 Toxic Air Contaminants
45 2.1 The Category 2 Toxic Air Contaminants list includes the compounds with 2002 Toxics
46 Release Inventory(TRI) reported air emission,§ for Jefferson County, Kentucky, with an EPA
47 Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) Full Model Relative Risk Score equal to
48 or greater than 500 that are not included in Category 1 Toxic Air Contaminants.
49 2.2 The Category 2 Toxic Air Contaminants list reads as follows:
50 Category 2 Toxic Air Contaminants
51 CAS No. Compound
52 1. 7429-90-5 Aluminum (fume or dust)
53 2. 7664-41-7 Ammonia
54 3. 7637-07-2 Boron trifluoride
55 4. 141-32-2 Butyl acrylate
56 5. 7782-50-5 Chlorine
57 6. 7440-48-4 Cobalt
58 & various and cobalt compounds
59 7. 7440-50-8 Copper
60 & various and copper compounds
61 8 V · D" t 1. anous .. . . . . . . . . . . .. llsocyana es
62 9. Various Glycol ethers2
63 10. 7647-01-0 Hydrochloric acid [Hydrogen chloride]
64 11. 7664-39-3 Hydrofluoric acid [Hydrogen fluoride]
65 12. Various Lead compounds
66 13. 7439-96-5 Manganese
67 & various and manganese compounds
68 14. 91-20-3 Naphthalene
69 15. 7697-37-2 Nitric acid
70 16. 7664-93-9 Sulfuric acid
71 17. 108-88-3 Toluene
72 18. 95-63-6 1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene
73 19. 1330-20-7 Xylene (mixed isomers)
74 ** 95-47-6 o-Xylene
75 ** 108-38-3 m-Xylene
76 ** 106-42-3 p-Xylene
77 Category 2 Toxic Air Contaminants notes:
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78 ** The specific isomer is included in the "mixed isomers" listing.
79 For all listings above that contain the word "compounds," the following applies: Unless
80 otherwise specified, these listings are defined as including anyunique chemical substance
81 that contains the named chemical (i.e., cobalt, copper, lead, and manganese) as part of
82 that chemical's infrastructure.
83 I Diisocyanates include the specific chemicals listed in the 2003 Reporting Year List
84 ofTRI Chemicals, available on the futemet at
85 ''http://www.epa.gov/tri/chemicallRY2003ChemicalList.pdf'.
86 2 Includes mono- and di-ethers of ethylene glycol, diethylene glycol, and triethylene
87 glycol
88 R-(OCH2CH2)n-OR'
89 where:
90 n = 1,2, or 3;
91 R = alkyl C7 or less, or
92 R = phenyl or alkyl substituted phenyl; and
93 R' = H or alkyl C7 or less, or
94 OR' consisting ofcarboxylic acid ester, sulfate, phosphate, nitrate, or sulfonate,
95 but excludes ethylene glycol monobutyle ether (EGBE, CAS No. 111-76-2).
96
97 SECTION 3 Category 3 Toxic Air Contaminants
98 3.1 The Category 3 Toxic Air Contaminants list includes the compounds identified by the EPA
99 pursuant to Section 112(k) of the Clean Air Act as presenting significant risks to public
100 health in urban areas that are not included in Category 1 Toxic Air Contaminants or
101 Category 2 Toxic Air Contaminants.
102 3.2 The Category 3 Toxic Air Contaminants list reads as follows:
103 Category 3 Toxic Air Contaminants
104 CAS No. Compound
105 1. 75-07-0 Acetaldehyde
106 2. 107-02-8 Acrolein
107 3. 7440-41-7 Beryllium
108 & various and beryllium compounds
109 4. None Coke oven emissions
110 5. 542-75-6 1,3-Dichloropropene
111 6. None Diesel particulate matter
112 7. 106-93-4 Ethylene dibromide [1,2-Dibromoethane]
113 8. 107-06-2 Ethylene dichloride [1,2-Dichloroethane]
114 9. 75-21-8 Ethylene oxide
115 10. 118-74-1 Hexachlorobenzene
116 11. 302-01-2 Hydrazine
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117 Category 3 Toxic Air Contaminants (Con't)
118 CAS No. Compound
119 12. 7439-97-6 11ercury
120 & various and mercury compounds
121 13. 1336-36-3 Polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]
122 14. 50-32-8 Polycyclic organic matterl [P011] (Benzo[a]pyrene)
123 & various (also represented as 7-PAH)
124 15. 78-87-5 Propylene dichloride [1,2-Dich1oropropane]
125 16. 91-22-5 Quinoline
126 17. 79-34-5 1,1,2, 2-Tetrachloroethane
127 Category 3 Toxic Air Contaminants notes:
128 For all listings above that contain the word "compounds," the following applies: Unless
129 otherwise specified, these listings are defined as including anyunique chemical substance
130 that contains the named chemical (i.e., beryllium and mercury) as part ofthat chemical's
131 infrastructure.
132 Includes organic compounds with more than one benzene ring, and which have a
133 boiling point greater than or equal to 100cC. The seven polycyclic aromatic
134 hydrocarbon (7-PAH) compounds are Benz[a]anthracene, Benzo[b]fluoranthene,
135 Benzo[k]fluoranthene, Benzo[a]pyrene, Chrysene, Dibenz[a,h]anthracene, and
136 Indeno[1,2,3-cd]pyrene.
137 SECTION 4 Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants
138 4.1 The Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants list includes the Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs)
139 listed by the EPA pursuant to Section l12(b) of the Clean Air Act that are not included in
140 Category 1 Toxic Air Contaminants, Category 2 Toxic Air Contaminants, or Category 3
141 Toxic Air Contaminants.
142 4.2 The Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants list reads as follows:
143 Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
CAS No. Compound
1. 60-35-5 Acetamide
2. 75-05-8 Acetonitrile
3. 98-86-2 Acetophenone
4. 53-96-3 2-Acetylaminofluorene
5. 79-06-1 Acrylamide
6. 79-10-7 Acrylic acid
7. 107-05-1 Allyl chloride
8. 92-67-1 4-Aminobiphenyl
9. 62-53-3 Aniline
10. 90-04-0 o-Anisidine
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155
156
157 11.
158
159 12.
160 13.
161 14.
162 15.
163 16.
164 17.
165 18.
166 19.
167 20.
168 21.
169 22.
170 23.
171 24.
172 25.
173 26.
174 27.
175 28.
176 23.
177 3D.
178 31.
179 32.
180 33.
181 34.
182 35.
183 36.
184 37.
185 38.
186 39.
187 40.
188 41.
189 42.
190 **
191 **
192 **
193 43.
194 44.
195 45.
196 46.
197 47.
198 48.
Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants (Con't)
CAS No. Compound
7440-36-0 Antimony
& various and antimony compounds
1332-21-4 Asbestos
151-56-4 Aziridine [Ethyleneimine]
114-26-1 Baygon [Propoxur]
92-87-5 Benzidine
106-51-4 p-Benzoquinone [Quinone]
98-07-7 Benzotrichloride
100-44-7 Benzyl chloride
92-52-4 Biphenyl .
117-81-7 Bis (2-ethylhexyl) phthalate [DEHP]
111-44-4 Bis (2-chloroethyl) ether [Dichloroethylether]
542-88-1 Bis (chloromethyl) ether
74-83-9 Bromomethane [Methyl bromide]
n-93-3 2-Butanone [Methyl ethyl ketone] [MEK]
156-62-7 Calcium cyanamide
133-06-2 Captan
63-25-2 Carbaryl
75-15-0 Carbon disulfide
463-58-1 Carbonyl sulfide
120-80-9 Catechol
133-90-4 Chloramben
57-74-9 Chlordane
8001-35-2 Chlorinated camphene [Toxaphene]
79-11-8 Chloroacetic acid
532-27-4 2-Chloroacetophenone
108-90-7 Chlorobenzene
510-15-6 Chlorobenzilate
106-89-8 l-Chloro-2,3-epoxypropane [Epichlorohydrin]
75-00-3 Chloroethane [Ethyl chloride]
74-87-3 Chloromethane [Methyl chloride]
107-30-2 Chloromethyl methyl ether [CMME]
1319-77-3 CresollCresylic acid (mixed isomers)
95-48-7 o-Cresol
108-39-4 m-Cresol
106-44-5 p-Cresol
98-82-8 Cumene [Isopropylbenzene]
72-55-9 DDE [1,1-Dichloro-2,2-bis (p-chlorophenyl) ethylene]
334-88-3 Diazomethane
132-64-9 Dibenzofuran
96-12-8 1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane
84-74-2 Dibutylphthalate
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199
200
201 49.
202 *
203 50.
204 51.
205 *
206 52.
207
208 53.
209 54.
210 55.
211 56.
212 57.
213 58.
214 59.
215 60.
216 61.
217 62.
218 63.
219 64.
220 65.
221 66.
222
223 67.
224 68.
225 *
226 69.
227 *
228 70.
229 71.
230 72.
231 *
232 73.
233 *
234 74.
235 *
236 75.
237 76.
238 77.
239
240 78.
241 79.
242 80.
Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants (Con't)
CAS No. Compound
91-94-1 3,3'-Dichlorobenzidine
72-55-9 1,1-Dichloro-2,2-bis(p-chlorophenyl) ethylene [DDE]
75-34-3 1,1-Dichloroethane [Ethylidene dichloride]
75-35-4 1,1-Dichloroethylene [Vinylidene chloride]
111-44-4 Dichloroethyl ether [Bis (2-chloroethyl) ether]
94-75-7 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic acid [2,4-D]
& various including salts and esters
62-73-7 Dichlorvos
111-42-2 Diethanolamine
123-91-1 1,4-Diethyleneoxide [l,4-Dioxane]
64-67-5 Diethy1 sulfate
119-90-4 3,3'-Dimethoxybenzidine
60-11-7 4-Dimethylaminoazobenzene
121-69-7 N,N-Dimethylaniline
119-93-7 3,3'-Dimethylbenzidine
79-44-7 Dimethylcarbamoyl chloride
68-12-2 N,N-Dimethylformamide [DMF]
57-14-7 1,1-Dimethylhydrazine
131-11-3 Dimethyl phthalate
77-78-1 Dimethyl sulfate
534-52-1 4,6-Dinitro-o-cresol
& various including salts
51-28-5 2,4-Dinitrophenol
121-14-2 2,4-Dinitrotoluene
123-91-1 l,4-Dioxane [l,4-Diethyleneoxide]
122-66-7 1,2-Diphenylhydrazine
106-89-8 Epichlorohydrin [1-Chloro-2,3-epoxypropane]
106-88-7 1,2-Epoxybutane
100-41-4 Ethylbenzene
51-79-6 ., Ethyl carbamate [Urethane]
75-00-3 Ethyl chloride [Chloroethane]
107-21-1 Ethylene glycol
151-56-4 Ethyleneimine [Aziridine]
96-45-7 Ethylene thiourea
75-34-3 Ethylidene dichloride [l,l-Dichloroethane]
76-44-8 Heptachlor
87-68-3 Hexachlorobutadiene
58-89-9 1,2,3,4,5,6-Hexachlorocyclohexane
& various All stereo isomers, including Lindane
77-47-4 Hexachlorocyclopentadiene
67-72-1 Hexachloroethane
822-06-0 Hexamethylene-1 ,6-diisocyanate
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Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants (Con't)
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
CAS No.
81. 680-31-9
82. 110-54-3
83. 108-10-1
84. 123-31-9
85. 74-88-4
86. 78-59-1
* 98-82-8
* 58-89-9
& various
87. 108-31-6
88. 67-56-1
89. 72-43-5
90. 75-55-8
* 74-83-9
* 74-87-3
91. 71-55-6
* 78-93-3
92. 60-34-4
* 74-88-4
* 108-10-1
93. 624-83-9
94. 80-62-6
95. 1634-04-4
96. 101-14-4
97. 101-77-9
98. 98-95-3
99. 92-93-3
100. 100-02-7
101. 79-46-9
102. 684-93-5
103. 62-75-9
104. 59-89-2
105. 56-38-2
106. 82-68-8
107. 87-86-5
108. 108-95-2
109. 106-50-3
110. 75-44-5
111. 7803-51-2
112. 7723-14-0
& various
113. 85-44-9
Compound
· Hexamethylphosphoramide
............. Hexane
· Hexone [Methyl isobutyl ketone]
· Hydroquinone
· Iodomethane [Methyl iodide]
............. Isophorone
· Isopropylbenzene [Cumene]
· Lindane and all stereo isomers
see 1,2,3,4,5,6-Hexachlorocyclohexane
· Maleic anhydride
............. Methanol
· Methoxychlor
· 2-Methylaziridine [1,2-Propylenimine]
· Methyl bromide [Bromomethane]
· Methyl chloride [Chloromethane]
· Methyl chloroform [1, I,I-Trichloroethane]
· Methyl ethyl ketone [MEK] [2-Butanone]
· Methylhydrazine
· Methyl iodide [Iodomethane]
· Methyl isobutyl ketone [Hexone]
· Methyl isocyanate
· Methyl methacrylate [MMA]
· Methyl tert-butyl ether [MTBE]
· 4,4' -Methylene bis (2-chloroaniline)
· 4,4'-Methylenedianiline
· Nitrobenzene
· 4-Nitrobiphenyl
· 4-Nitrophenol
· 2-Nitropropane
· N-Nitroso-N-methylurea
· N-Nitrosodimethylamine
· N-Nitrosomorpholine
· Parathion
· Pentachloronitrobenzene [Quintobenzene]
· Pentachlorophenol
............. Phenol
· p-Phenylenediamine
· Phosgene
· Phosphine
· Phosphorus
and phosphorus compounds
· Phthalic anhydride
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Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants (Con't)
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
CAS No.
114. 1120-71-4
115. 57-57-8
116. 123-38-6
* 114-26-1
117. 75-56-9
* 75-55-8
* 106-51-4
* 82-68-8
118. 100-42-5
119. 96-09-3
120. 1746-01-6
121. 7550-45-0
122. 95-80-7
123. 584-84-9
124. 95-53-4
* 8001-35-2
125. 120-82-1
* 71-55-6
126. 79-00-5
127. 95-95-4
128. 88-06-2
129. 121-44-8
130. 1582-09-8
131. 540-84-1
* 51-79-6
132. 108-05-4
133. 593-60-2
* 75-35-4
134. 57-12-5
& various
135. N/A
136. 10043-92-2
& various
137. 7782-49-2
& various
Compound
· . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3-Propane sultone
· " beta-Propiolactone
· Propionaldehyde
· Propoxur [Baygon]
· Propylene oxide
· 1,2-Propylenimine [2-Methylaziridine]
· Quinone [p-Benzoquinone]
· Quintobenzene [Pentachloronitrobenzene]
· Styrene
· Styrene oxide
· 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin
· Titanium tetrachloride
· Toluene-2,4-diamine
· 2,4-Toluene diisocyanate [TDI]
· 0-Toluidine
· Toxaphene [Chlorinated camphene]
· 1,2,4-Trichlorobenzene
· I, I , I-Trichloroethane [Methyl chloroform]
· . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,1,2-Trichloroethane
· 2,4,5-Trichlorophenol
· 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol
· Triethylamine
· Trifluralin
· 2,2,4-Trimethylpentane
· Urethane [Ethyl carbamate)]
· Vinyl acetate
· Vinyl bromide
· Vinylidene chloride [l,l-Dichloroethylene]
............. Cyanide
and cyanide compounds l
· Fine mineral fibers2
............. Radon
and other radionuclides3
· Selenium
and selenium compounds
324
325
326
327
Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants notes:
* This compound is also listed under a different name and the other listing has a listing
number.
** The specific isomer is included in the "mixed isomers" listing.
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Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants (Con't)
Category 4 Toxic Air Contaminants notes (con't):
For all listings above that contain the word "compounds," the following applies: Unless
otherwise specified, these listings are defined as including any unique chemical substance
that contains the named chemical (i.e., antimony, cyanide, phosphorus, and selenium) as
part of that chemical's infrastructure.
334
335
336
337
338
339
2
X'CN where X = H' or any other group where a formal dissociation may occur. For
example, KCN or Ca(CN)2
Includes mineral fiber emissions from facilities manufacturing or processing glass,
rock, or slag fibers (or other mineral derived fibers) ofaverage diameter 1 micrometer
or less.
A type of atom which spontaneously undergoes radioactive decay.
340 SECTION 5 Exemptions from the Definition of Toxic Air Contaminant
341 As used in these regulations, the following substances shall not be considered to be a toxic air
342 contaminant:
343 5.1 Any substance for which there is a national ambient air quality standard, but only to the
344 extent that a particular substance is treated in a generic fashion, for example, as particulate
345 matter or a volatile organic compound,
346 5.2 Carbon dioxide,
347 5.3 Ethane,
348 5.4 Grain dust,
349 5.5 Helium,
350 5.6 Hydrogen,
351 5.7 Liquified petroleum gas,
352 5.8 Methane,
353 5.9 Nitrogen,
354 5.10 Oxygen,
355 5.11 Propane, and
356 5.12 Water vapor.
357 Adopted vl/ _ ; effective _
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1 REGULAnON 5.30 Report and Plan of Action for Identified Source Sectors
2 Air Pollution Control District of Jefferson County
3 Jefferson County, Kentucky
4 Relates To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
5 Pursuant To: KRS Chapter 77 Air Pollution Control
6 Necessity and Function: KRS 77.180 authorizes the Air Pollution Control Board to adopt and
7 enforce all orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes ofKRS
8 Chapter 77. This regulation establishes the requirement for the District to develop a proposed
9 report and plan of action to assess and address the toxic air contaminant emissions from minor
10 stationary sources, area sources, non-road mobile sources, and mobile sources.
11 SECTION 1 Definitions
12 Terms used in this regulation that are not defined in this regulation shall have the meaning given
13 to them in Regulation 1.02 Definitions or Regulation 5.01 General Provisions.
14 1.1 "Source sector" means the general grouping of sources ofair contaminants used by the
15 District for developing anthropogenic emissions inventories. These source sectors are as
16 follows:
17 1.1.1 Point source - industrial or commercial stationary source that is subject to the permit
18 requirements in Regulation 2.03 section 1.1 or 1.2 (permitted stationary source).
19 1.1.1.1 Major or moderate point source - a Group 1 or Group 2 stationary source as
20 defined in Regulation 5.01 sections 1.8 and 1.9.
21 1.1.1.2 Minor stationary source - a point source that is not a major or moderate point
22 source.
23 1.1.2 Area source - non-permitted commercial stationary source or other anthropogenic
24 source of emissions that is not included in section 1.1.1, 1.1.3, or 1.1.4.
25 1.1.3 Mobile source - motorized vehicle that is registered for use on the public roads and
26 highways.
27 1.1.4 Nonroad mobile source - motorized vehicle that is not registered for use on the public
28 roads and highways or any other equipment with a fossil fuel-fired engine that is not
29 included as a point source.
30 SECTION 2 Report and Plan of Action
31 2.1 By no later than June 30, 2006, the District shall submit to the Board a proposed Report
32 and Plan of Action to assess and address the risk to human health and welfare from
33 ambient air concentrations of toxic air contaminants (TACs) from minor stationary
34 sources, area sources, non-road mobile sources, and mobile sources.
35 2.2 The Report shall, at a minimum:
36 2.2.1 Include a general identification of the sources and, to the extent that it can reasonably
37 be determined, estimates, by TAC, of the emissions from each source sector and the
38 relative ambient air risk from each sector,
39 2.2.2 Evaluate the status of and need for improvement of TAC emission inventories for
40 these source sectors,
41 2.2.3 Identify and evaluate existing and likely programs at the federal level and in Kentucky
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42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.2.6
2.2.7
2.2.8
2.2.9
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.1
that are intended to reduce emission from these sources,
Identify and evaluate existing and likely programs in other jurisdictions that are
intended to reduce emission from these sources,
Identify appropriate risk goals and standards for these source sectors,
Assess any needs for monitoring of the sources,
Identify any special considerations relating to addressing risk from these sectors,
Identify all resources necessary to implement the Plan of Action, and
Identify a process for active and meaningful stakeholder involvement in the
development of, and review and comment on, the proposed Report and Plan.
The proposed Plan of Action shall suggest specific programs, activities, areas to be
addressed by regulation, if any, and a timetable to achieve the identified risk goals and
standards by no later than December 31, 2012. Programs may include, but are not limited
to, the following:
For area sources, in addition to any appropriate emission reductions, strategies such as
land use mechanisms to minimize impacts, especially on sensitive sub-populations
such as the young, the elderly and those with health conditions,
For non-road mobile sources, cleaner fuels and cleaner equipment, including
accelerating their availability and use, and
For mobile sources, promoting and accelerating the use of alternative fuel vehicles,
cleaner fuels, cleaner vehicles, effective transportation policies such as improved and
increased public transit, improved and increased bike and pedestrian facilities,
promoting urban in-fill policies, and diesel retrofits.
64 Adopted vl/ ; effective _
5.30-2
RISK ASSESSMENT & COMMUNICATION
Mark J. Klan, Ph.D.
ETRS,LLC
Shelbyville, Kentucky
Copyright 2005. All Rights Reserved.
SECTION I

Risk Assessment & Communication
Mark J. Klan, Ph.D.
ETRS,LLC
Environmental Toxicology & Risk Assessment Services
Shelbyville, Kentucky
502-485-9798
mjklan@bluegrass.net
Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: What it is, What it is not, Applications.
Major Areas ofDiscussion:
• Elements of a Risk Assessment:
Introduction, Site Characterization, Toxicity Assessment, Exposure Assessment,
Risk Characterization
• Risk Characterization:
Science, Regulation, Reality
• Risk Communication:
Regulators, the "Public"
• Risk Management and Applications of Risk Assessment
Regulations, Remediation, Litigation, Public Relations
For more information, please contact Dr. Mark J. Klan.
Dr. Klan has provided scientific expertise for a wide variety ofclients andprojects with
emphasis in the areas oftoxicology, human health and ecological risk assessment, risk
communication, risk management, litigation support and environmental regulations. Projects
have rangedfrom the toxicological evaluation ofnew products andprocesses to brownfields
redevelopments. Dr. Klan served on the Governor's Brownfields Task Force to assist in
establishing new regulations for environmental remediation projects (VERP) and is currently
serving on Kentucky's Air Toxics Workgroup organized by the EPPC
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